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CHAPTER 21 
 
PRODUCING ‘DECENT GIRLS’: GOVERNMENTALITY AND 
THE MORAL GEOGRAPHIES OF SEXUAL CONDUCT IN 
IRELAND (1922–1937) 
 
UNA CROWLEY and ROB KITCHIN 
 
First published in Gender, Place and Culture (2008), 15(4), 355-372. 
 
Introduction  
In this article we undertake a Foucaultian analysis of the changing sexual 
landscape of Ireland in the period between independence (1922) and the 
ratication of the Constitution (1937). This period was a time of 
formative nation building as the newly independent Ireland, free of 
British intervention, sought to dene Irishness and the national moral 
character. Several commissions examined the moral conduct of the 
nation and reported on how Irish social behaviour should be disciplined 
and a number of new pieces of legislation were enacted, designed to give 
the state and its various bodies the power to intervene into the sexual 
lives of its citizens (see Table 1). Following Foucault, we would argue 
that during this period there was a ‘political, economic, and technical 
incitement to talk about sex’ – an explosion of discussion about sex 
(including both social and criminal acts) accompanied by tactics to 
regulate sexual conduct.  
 
Whilst sexual conduct was the focus of regulation prior to independence, 
during this period we would contend there was an intensication and 
deepening of the disciplining regime as the state built for itself new 
institutionalised power, at the same time bolstering the power of the 
Catholic Church and heads of family to regulate subjects. The Catholic 
Church had increasingly sought to shape sexual morality from the mid-
eighteenth century through the pulpit and schooling, ‘using discourses of 
sin, shame, guilt and familism as a means of disciplining, enacted through 
the confessional, penance, censorship and marriage’ (Kitchin and Lysaght 
2004, 196). In the face of political disillusion after the civil war and 
perceived social and moral decay, it joined forces with the newly formed 
Cosgrave1
 
government to produce ‘a mutually reinforcing political and 
episcopal vision’ underpinned by a commitment to Catholic moral values 
(Howell 2003, 339; Fanning 1983), despite the 1922 Constitution dening 
the state as ofcially secular.2 
 
 
1 William T. Cosgrave became the rst leader of Cumann na nGaedheal, the rst party to 
hold power in the Irish Free State after the granting of independence. The party was 
ofcially constituted in March 1923 and remained in power until 1932. 
2 The only reference to religion in the 1922 Constitution was one that guaranteed religious 
freedom and equality to all the citizens of the Free State. 
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Table 1. Key reports and government acts concerning the regulation of 
sexuality 
 
1923 Local Government 
(Temporary 
Provisions) Act 1922 
Provided a framework for dealing with 
unmarried mothers, proposing various 
methods for reforming ‘first offenders’ and 
punishing ‘recidivists’ and those who could 
not or would not be reformed. 
1923 Censorship of Films 
Act 
Established a film censor (moral editor) with 
power to cut or refuse a licence to films which 
in his opinion were subversive of public 
morality, indecent, obscene or 
blasphemous. 
1925 Civil Service 
Amendment Act 
Gave the government the power to bar 
women 
from certain civil service exams. 
1925 1925 Poor Law 
Reform Commission 
and the Workhouses 
Proposed methods for reforming ‘fallen 
women’ and punishing those who could not 
or would not be reformed. 
1926 Inter-Departmental 
Committee of 
Inquiry regarding 
Venereal Disease 
Set up to ‘make inquiries as to the steps, if 
any, 
which are desirable to secure that the extent 
of Venereal disease may be diminished’. 
 
1926 Report of the 
Committee on Evil 
Literature 
Apart from reporting on ‘indecent literature’, 
also reported on levels of illegitimacy and 
contraception. 
1924, 1927 Intoxicating Liquor 
Act  
1924 Act limited opening hours and an 
amendment in 1927 reduced the number of 
licensed premises – both were driven, in 
part, by concerns over the effects of alcohol 
on sexual conduct. 
1924, 1927 Juries Bills Denied women the right to sit on juries. 
 
1927 1927 Report of the 
Commission on the 
Sick and Destitute 
Poor 
 
Focused on the issue of illegitimacy and 
unmarried mothers. The Report delineated 
two classes of mother – ‘those who may be 
amenable to reform’ and the ‘less hopeful 
cases’. It advocated different treatment for 
each category. Commission proposed 
a period of detention or ranging from ‘moral 
upbringing’ to segregation to forced 
detention.  
1929 Censorship of 
Publications Act 
Section 16, 17 banned the advertising of 
contraception or abortion. Prohibited the 
sale and distribution of ‘indecent or obscene’ 
books. 
1930 Illegitimate Children 
(Affiliation 
Orders) Act 
Ordered fathers to pay maintenance 
1930-34 Report of the 
Department of Local 
Government and 
Public Health 
 
Emphasised the importance of specialised 
homes for ‘fallen women’. 
 
1931 Legitimacy Act  Provided for legitimation by subsequent 
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 marriage of parents. 
1931 Committee on the 
Criminal Law 
Amendment Acts 
(1880–1885) 
and Juvenile 
Prostitution 
 
This report dealt with age of consent, 
contraception and prostitution. It found an 
‘alarming amount of sexual crime’, 
illegitimacy, prostitution sexual immorality. 
Recommendations included raising the age 
of consent from 16 to 18, a ban on 
contraceptives ‘except in exceptional 
circumstances’, increased penalties for 
brothel owners and the establishment of a 
female police force. This report was never 
published. 
1934 Maternity Homes Act  Registration of private maternity 
homes – brought in after grave concerns 
about the high rate of infant mortality 
(particularly amongst illegitimate babies) 
and ‘baby farming’. 
1935 The Conditions of 
Employment Act  
Extended the marriage bar of the Civil Service 
Amendment Act to the entire civil service 
(except for workers in the lower grades such 
as cleaners) and gave the government power 
to limit the number of women employed in 
any given industry. 
1935 Dance Halls Act  Clamped down on illicit behaviour – covering 
licensing, suitability of premises, parking of 
motorcars, age of admission, police 
supervision and hours of proposed dancing. 
1935 Criminal Law 
Amendment Act  
The Act raised the age of consent from 
16 to 17 years and raised from 13 to 15 the 
age at which carnal knowledge would be 
classed a felony. Section 16, ‘suppression of 
prostitution’, increased the penalties for 
prostitution. Section 17 banned the sale 
and importation of contraception. 
Section 18 related to public indecency – 
inhibiting sexual behaviour in public. 
1937 Bunreacht na hE´ 
ireann (Irish 
Constitution) 
 
Articles defined the family as the basic social 
unit of society and the position of woman as 
‘mother’, made contraception and divorce 
illegal and reconfirmed the illegality of 
abortion and homosexuality (as enshrined in 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 and 
Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885). 
Nationalist and religious leaders could for the rst time shape the moral 
landscape in their own vision through their new abilities to formulate, 
control and deliver legal reform and welfare, health and education. This 
was reinforced by a strong social homogeneity (in the 1926 census, 92.6% 
classied themselves as Catholic, 61% lived outside towns and villages). 
As a consequence, Inglis (1987, 165) argues that during this time ‘secular 
civility became synonymous with Catholic morality’.  
 
Hug (2001, 25) thus argues that from ‘the beginning ... the Catholic 
hierarchy, a number of lay groups, and the government together imposed 
a Catholic construction of sexuality and worked to regulate it. Anything 
3
that threatened the family was seen to threaten the stability of society, 
and of the nation as a whole’. Consequently, at this time ‘there was 
installed ... an apparatus for producing an ever greater quantity of 
discourse about sex, capable of functioning and taking effect in its very 
economy’ (Foucault 1978, 23). And while the 1937 Constitution was 
certainly not the end point of the state’s attempts to actively shape the 
sexual conduct of its citizens, it brought this period to a close by pulling 
together many of the discourses and practices developed over the 
previous 15 years, making contraception and divorce illegal, reconrming 
the illegality of abortion and homosexuality (as enshrined in the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861 and Criminal Law Amendment Act 1885 
that were continued after independence), making the family the 
cornerstone of Irish society, and outlining a very circumscribed view of 
women’s role in society.  
 
Several other studies have started the process of analysing the recently 
released reports that have been suppressed since the period and 
legislation enacted at the time. For example, Kennedy (2000, 2001), 
McAvoy (1999), Finnane (2001) and Smith (2004) have explored the 1931 
Report of the Committee on the Criminal Law Amendment Acts (1880–1885)3
 
and 
Howell (2003) has examined the 1927 Report of the Committee on Venereal 
Disease. Gray and Ryan (1998), Gray (1999), Ryan (1999, 2002), Valiulis 
(1995a) and Daly (1995) have explored the connections between control 
of women’s sexuality, gender, identity and nation building, and Luddy 
(2001) and Earner-Bryne (2004) have examined issues concerning 
illegitimacy, unmarried mothers and emigration. These studies, however, 
tend to focus on one particular report, piece of legislation or form of 
sexual practice (such as prostitution or illegitimate births), rather than 
construct a genealogy of how these various reports and Acts worked 
together to produce a particular moral terrain. Moreover, with the 
exception of Howell (2003), these studies frame their analysis within a 
feminist framework that casts the regulation of sexuality as a highly 
gendered project aimed predominately at regulating the lives of women. 
This is undoubtedly the case (indeed, almost without exception, 
discourses and legislation were targeted at women), but crucially we 
would argue that it was a gendered project that was thoroughly spatial in 
its conceptualisation, with the practices of regulation designed to produce 
particular moral geographies within the home, work and public spaces, 
and which led to a network of new interlinked institutional spaces 
designed to reform and discipline ‘sexual deviants’ and act as a deterrent 
to the ‘weak-willed’ (for example, Magdalene Asylums, County Homes, 
Mother and Baby Homes, reformatories and industrial schools, some of 
3 This Report is often referred to as the Carrigan Report after James Carrigan its 
chairman. 
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which persisted to near the end of the twentieth century4).  
 
In contrast to these other studies, in this article we draw on Foucault’s 
ideas to detail how the various reports and legislation worked together to 
spatially regulate sexual conduct in different spheres to create a new 
moral terrain post-independence. Our examination is based on primary 
archival research conducted between 2003 and 20055
 
that analysed all of 
the reports and legislation in Table 1, conducted a reading of all editions 
of the Irish Times from 1921 to 1945 and the Irish Independent 1924–
19376
 
for stories concerning sexuality and its regulation, examined ofcial 
and unofcial correspondence between government departments, 
ofcials, religious and lay organisations and members of the general 
public (stored at the National Archives, Dublin), and analysed 
contemporaneous literature and the Dáil (parliamentary) minutes for the 
period.  
 
New moral geographies of sexuality in post-independence Ireland  
In Volume 1 of the History of Sexuality, Foucault (1978) produced an 
account of how power in its various guises is brought to bear on 
sexuality, setting out how relatively open attitudes towards sexuality in 
seventeenth-century Europe were recongured so that by the end of the 
nineteenth century sexuality was largely repressed. Sexuality became 
carefully regulated through moral and legal disciplining, conned to the 
realm of the legitimate and procreative couple. This regulation was 
enforced through interlocking mechanisms of state and institutional 
policing, accompanied by societal, familial and self-regulation.  
 
While Foucault (1978) concentrates his analysis on the construction of 
discursive regimes concerning sexuality at different periods of history and 
how such regimes produced new modes of governance and shaped sexual 
identities, he did so in large part by charting the various spaces through 
which sexual disciplining was articulated (e.g., hospitals, schools, courts, 
churches, homes). As such, he recognised the inherent spatiality of sexual 
governance and subject formation; that there were a diverse collection of 
4 These institutions helped maintain and sustain each other. For example, many of the 
children born in County Homes (the old workhouses and subject to Poor Law regulation) 
and Magdalene Asylums were generally fostered out, adopted abroad or eventually sent to 
an Industrial School. Girls brought up in Industrial Schools frequently ended up working in 
the laundries attached to the Magdalene Asylums. Those admitted to the religious run, state-
funded, Mother and Baby Homes were for the most part ‘rst offenders’ from families who 
could afford to pay a fee and in a position to keep the ‘secret’ intact. Their children, 
however, often suffered the same fate as those born in the County Homes and Magdalene 
Asylums. The last Magdalene Asylum closed in 1996 (Culliton 1996). 
5 The project is funded by the Irish Research Council for Humanities and Social Sciences 
(IRCHSS) through their postdoctoral fellowship scheme (Project title: A Genealogy of 
Sexual Standards and Practices in Ireland: 1880–2003). 
6 During this period, the Irish Independent was viewed as a nationalist and Catholic national 
newspaper which gave its allegiance to Cumann na nGaedheal. The Irish Times was viewed 
as a liberal, Protestant national newspaper. 
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sites of power/knowledge wherein certain people (e.g., medical 
professionals, teachers, priests, parents) sought to use spatialised 
practices to encourage and enforce regulatory regimes designed to shape 
sexual behaviour. As Foucault notes, these sites and practices do not 
simply work as locations of discipline but, in conjunction with the 
predominate discursive regime, instil modes of self-discipline wherein 
subjects monitor and adapt their sexual behaviour with regard to their 
own moral values and those of others. These sites and their spatialities 
then are key loci in the production of particular sexual subject positions; 
they are ‘places of formation’ (Markus 1993).  
 
The various commission reports and legislation identied in Table 1 
worked, as Foucault suggested, to create a series of places of formation in 
the newly independent Ireland – places that both reected and sought to 
produce a new moral landscape as desired by the state and church. In the 
remainder of this section we highlight how Ireland’s new legislative order 
worked to have a profound effect on the discursive and material practices 
of sexual regulation in post-independence Ireland, radically reshaping the 
production of various social spheres.  
 
Home places  
The primacy of the family as the cornerstone of Irish society, and thus 
the home as the key social and political sexual site, was well established 
by the early twentieth century. This position was further strengthened 
post-independence through proscription (legislation) and prescription 
(church pastorals, Dáil Debates, elite discourse) so that the sexual 
conduct of individuals within the home was increasingly inundated by 
new rules and regulations that positioned it as a woman’s place and the 
site of procreational sexual conduct, with no state or religiously 
sanctioned alternative. Women were pushed toward home life through a 
disciplinary grid that ensured that they became married before or once 
sexually active, maintained their procreative role throughout their 
twenties and thirties (through the denial of contraceptives) and their 
mothering and family duties throughout their lives, denied them the 
ability to divorce, limited their access to public and work space, and 
punished moral infractions.  
 
Illegitimate births were demonised by the state and Catholic Church as 
gross moral infractions. Women who became pregnant prior to marriage 
sought wedlock to give the relationship and child a legitimate family 
status in order to avoid stigmatisation by family, community, and to 
avoid places of discipline and reformation such as Mother and Baby 
Homes, emigration abroad or giving the child up for adoption. The 
Committee on the Criminal Law (Amendment) Acts 1880–1885 (Carrigan 
Report) noted with grave concern the perceived increase in sexual 
immorality, stating that the percentage of illegitimacy per total births for 
6
1929 was the highest recorded and ‘that since 1925 illegitimacy is 
increasing throughout the country at an unprecedented rate’ (Carrigan 
1931, 8). It was noted that 3.1 per cent of total births registered in 1929 
were illegitimate – including births in county homes (Poor Law 
institutions) and public hospitals – and that the problem of illegitimacy 
and unmarried mothers ‘has strained the accommodation of the County 
Homes beyond their capacity’ (Carrigan 1931, 9). It also commented that 
‘the number of illegitimate births unregistered considerably exceeds the 
number of such births registered ... that the total number is much in 
excess of ofcial gures we have no doubt’ (Carrigan 1931, 9).  
 
Fifty-four doctors working in public and private practice stated 
‘emphatically that in their experience ofcial statistics of illegitimacy did 
not adequately represent that actual condition of the country regarding it’ 
(Carrigan 1931, 6). The same opinion was expressed by British rescue 
organisations who sought to assist unmarried Irish mothers who had 
travelled to Britain ‘in shame’, for example, the Liverpool and Catholic 
Aid Society, Police Court Missionary in Manchester, Leeds Diocesan 
Rescue, and the Crusade of Rescue in London. The Liverpool Society for 
the Prevention of International Trafc in Women and Children reported 
a total of 1947 Irish cases for the period 1926–1930. In Ireland, 
charitable organisations such as the Catholic Protection and Rescue 
Society provided accommodation to unmarried mothers. For the three 
years, 1923–1925, it dealt with 1351 applications, between 1926 and 1928 
2707 applications, in 1929 with 950 applications and in 1930 with 1026 
applications. St Patrick’s Guild dealt with 834 cases for the years 1923–
1925, 1126 between 1926 and 1928, 495 cases in 1929, and 452 cases in 
1930. Other illegitimate births were not registered due to concealment, 
emigration and forced marriage.  
 
Once married, the state sought to maintain a woman’s place in the 
marital home by removing the means of divorce. Before 1922 a divorce 
could be obtained by means of a Private Members’ Bill in parliament and 
although there was no specic mention of divorce in the 1922 
Constitution, the Attorney General favoured allowing divorce for those 
who wanted it. Three Private Members’ Bills were presented in Ireland in 
1924. However, in 1925 standing orders were suspended making it 
impossible for such Bills to be introduced in the future. Archbishop 
Gilmartin of Tuam warned that family ties were weakened in countries 
where facilities for divorce were available, arguing that in these places 
‘the family hardly existed’ (Irish Catholic Directory 1927, 583, cited in 
Keogh 1995, 29). J.J. Byrne (TD7) contributed to the debate by stating: 
‘This country, I believe, stands for the sanctity of marriage ... To the vast 
7 TD stands for Teachta Dála, meaning Member of Parliament. 
7
majority of people the limitation, the control of births, or the iniction of 
race suicide upon this nation is one which is bitterly resisted’ (Dáil 
Debates, vol. 26, 18 October 1928, col. 686).  
 
Despite some opposition (mainly from Anglo-Irish activists like William 
Butler Yeats), this remained the situation until divorce was made 
unconstitutional in 1937 (Keogh 1995; Kennedy 2001). The 1937 
Constitution cemented the family as the key social unit in society, 
marriage as the key social act, and explicitly stated that a woman’s place 
in society was as home-maker. Article 41.1.1 stated that, ‘The State 
recognises the Family as the natural primary and fundamental unit group 
of Society, and as a moral institution possessing inalienable and 
imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to all positive law’. In 
Section 3.1 of the article: ‘the State pledges itself to guard with special 
care the institution of marriage, on which the Family is founded, and to 
protect it against attack’. Section 3.2 declared: ‘no law shall be enacted 
providing for providing for the grant of a dissolution of marriage’. In 
other words, divorce became illegal, only being repealed in 1995 through 
a constitutional referendum (and then only being passed by a narrow 
margin of 1%; Ferriter 2004, 718).  
 
The illegality of divorce was not the only legal impediment to women 
leaving the family home if they so desired. Under the Women’s Property 
Act, 1882–1893, women could keep property they owned prior to 
marriage (which would account for only a minority of women in Ireland) 
but had no legal right to the marital home or to any of the proceeds 
should it be sold. This Act was not repealed until 1957 under the Married 
Women’s Status Act. A married woman could not claim a domicile 
independent of her husband until 19868
 
or be ofcially registered as 
unemployed9
 
until the enactment of the Social Welfare Act 1986 and it 
was not until 1964, under the Guardianship of Infants Act, that mothers 
were given the same legal status as fathers in the care of their children.  
 
Prior to and once conned in the marital home, the state and other 
organisations such as the Church sought to limit citizen’s access to 
literature on birth control and access to contraceptives. The Report of the 
Committee on Evil Literature (1926) revealed that many Irish citizens were 
aware of the availability of commercial contraception and/or advice on 
how to procure contraception and ‘aborticants’. Commercial 
8 A woman could only claim independent domicile after 1986. Before 1986, a married 
woman had the domicile of her husband and could not acquire a domicile independently of 
him so long as the marriage subsisted. The effect of the Domicile Act was to give married 
women the same capacity as anyone else of having an independent domicile. 
9 Prior to the enactment of the Social Welfare (No. 2) Act 1985, married women were not 
allowed to claim unemployment assistance unless their husbands were incapable of self-
support. 
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contraceptives (referred to as birth control propaganda and race suicide 
by the Report), including condoms, cervical caps, creams, and 
spermicides, were available to people in the Free State through mail order 
from Britain. Advice was also freely available on home-made methods of 
contraception for those unable to afford the commercial variety. Over 23 
les (National Archives, Jus 7/2) of ‘evidence’ for the report, much of it 
from concerned citizens, contain documents, journals, and newspaper 
cuttings advertising contraception or offering advice on sexual matters. 
The Report concluded that easy access to birth control, or knowledge 
concerning birth control, would lead to sexual relations between 
unmarried citizens and offend the moral majority.  
 
The evidence gathered by the Committee provided the foundation for the 
1929 Censorship of Publications Act which banned all literature 
advocating or giving information on contraception and abortion. In order 
to shore up a series of loopholes in the 1889 Indecent Advertisements 
Act, which permitted the advertisement of medicines and appliances for 
procuring abortions, promoting miscarriage or preventing conception in 
newspapers, this Act banned the printing, publishing, distribution or sale 
of ‘any book or periodical publication ... which advocates the unnatural 
prevention of conception or the procurement of abortion or miscarriage 
or any method, treatment, or appliance to be used for the purpose of 
such prevention or such treatment’, unless the reader had a permit in 
writing granted to him/her by the Minister for Justice (sections 16, 1 a, b, 
c). Advertisements which dealt with ‘any disease affecting the generative 
organs of either sex, or to any complaint or inrmity arising from or 
relating to sexual intercourse, or to the prevention or removal of 
irregularities in menstruation’ were liable to the board’s control. 
Infractions carried the possible penalty of up to £100 in nes or 
imprisonment of up to three months (sections 17, 10, 2). In 1935, section 
17 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act imposed a complete ban on 
the importation and sale of articial contraceptives.  
 
Literature providing information on the dangers of contraception was, 
however, allowed to circulate freely. In his book on Lawful Birth Control, 
John A. O’Brien (1934, 81) quotes the following eminent gynaecologists, 
Dr Guchteneere:  
 
...this noxious character (the frustration of an essential 
function of the organism) is inherent in every contraceptive 
method without exception, although certain of the methods are 
particularly dangerous – for example, coitus interruptus, the 
most widespread and most harmful of all.  
 
9
O’Brien goes on to quote from the Opening Address to the Congress of 
German Gynaecologists in 1929:  
 
... almost all preventative methods present a danger – and 
frequently no negligible one – to the health of the woman 
especially. Nature cannot be hoodwinked. Continual and 
fruitless stimulation of the genital organs leads to more or less 
serious chronic pelvis disorders and very frequently sterility. 
(O’Brien 1934, 82–3)  
 
In addition to the Censorship of Publications Act (1929), the December 
1930 Papal Encyclical Casti Connubi cemented social policy on birth 
control and condemned the use of contraceptives, sterilisation, or 
abortion in any circumstances – even where the life of the woman was 
threatened through pregnancy (including tuberculosis, heart and kidney 
disease). Such policy worked to condemn women to the marital home. 
 
Workplaces  
 
In a Christian State women should be excluded even by 
law from occupations unbecoming or dangerous to female 
modesty. The employment of wives or mothers in 
factories or outside their own household should be strictly 
limited by legislation. (Cahill 1924, cited in Valiulis 1995b, 
171)  
 
Women’s connement within the home was aided by a series of 
legislative reforms that severely curtailed their ability to undertake paid 
employment or civic duties. The Civil Service Amendment Act (1925) 
gave government the power to bar women from certain civil service 
exams (based purely on sex) and in 1933 female teachers were required to 
resign upon marriage. The Conditions of Employment Act (1935) 
extended the marriage bar to the entire civil service (except for workers 
in the lower grades such as cleaners) and gave the government power to 
limit the number of women employed in any given industry (apart from 
this clause it was a progressive piece of legislation guaranteeing holidays 
with pay, regulating work hours, overtime, and so on; the marriage bar 
was nally repealed in 1973). Companies who hired men rather than 
women were given additional tariff protection.  
 
Legal and ofcial discourse was reinforced with repeated references in 
the media and from the pulpit to women’s ‘former dignity’ (Ferriter 
2004). It was claimed women had forgotten their true identity, the true 
meaning of their lives, and had strayed from the home to the detriment 
of themselves, the family, and the nation. Women who worked outside 
the home discredited the institution of marriage. Women had but one 
vocation:  
 
10
... the one for which nature had admirably suited her ... that 
of wife and mother. The woman’s duties in this regard 
especially that of bringing up children, are of such far-
reaching importance for the nation and the race, that the 
need of safeguarding them must outweigh almost every 
other consideration. (Irish Monthly, vol. 53, 1925, 28–9 
cited in Valiulis 1995a, 127) 
 
One priest in Kerry opined that ‘it was a sure sign of the break-up of the 
planet when women took to leaving their homes and talking in public’ 
(cited in Kiberd 1995, 397). Even the supposedly liberal and Protestant 
Irish Times (22 February 1937) expressed criticism of married women 
working: ‘Some day, please Heaven! The nation will be so organised that 
work will be available for every man, so that he may marry and assume 
the burdens of a home and for every woman until she embarks upon her 
proper profession – which is marriage’. Further, in 1924 and 1927 the 
Cosgrave government enacted the Juries Bills which virtually ensured that 
there would be no women jurors (for half a century after independence 
only three women served on a jury; Kiberd 1995). Church leaders argued 
that women carrying out jury duties ‘is manifestly inconsistent with their 
home duties; and that any women be eligible to act as jurors in certain 
types of criminal cases is contrary to the Christian ideal of female 
modesty. Hence it is desirable that women be exempted from duty’ (Cahill 
1925, cited in Valiulis 1995b, 171).  
 
This process of excluding women from workplaces ran in stark contrast 
to the Sex Disqualication (Removal) Act (1919) which ruled that neither 
sex nor marriage should disqualify a person from ‘exercising any public 
function or for any civil ofce or post’ (cited in Fitzpatrick 1998, 235). 
Moreover, somewhat paradoxically, in the rst decades of the twentieth 
century only three countries in Europe – England, Wales, and Norway – 
had a higher percentage of girls in secondary school education, and only 
two countries – Finland and the Netherlands – had a higher percentage 
of women in primary teacher training colleges. Finland was the only 
country that had a higher percentage of women in university; a state of 
affairs that was maintained right through to the 1930s (Daly 1995, 107). 
And yet, within a few short years, the fate of women within society was 
sealed with the enactment of the new Irish Constitution in 1937 which 
ensured that ‘mothers shall not be obliged by economic necessity to 
engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home’ (article 
41.2.2). Inevitably, many women were squeezed out of the workplace and 
into the marital home, denied a means of independent income, becoming 
reliant on the husband to provide for her and her family.  
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Public space  
 
The cult of sex is everywhere. Sex is blazoned on our 
fashion places, palpitates in our novels, revels in our 
ballrooms ... (Irish Monthly, March 1926, cited in Valiulis 
1995b: 172)  
 
In the early 1920s new ideas on sexual liberation, drawn largely from 
overseas, began to articulate themselves through cinema, art, literature, 
fashion and pastimes in Ireland. In response, the Catholic Church argued 
there was a national crisis with regard to sexual immorality, condemning 
what it saw as a growing obsession with pleasure, a slackening of parental 
control, and a decline in sexual morality. New legislation quickly 
followed. The Censorship of Films Act (1923) established the creation of a 
lm censor (moral editor) with power to cut or refuse a licence to lms 
which in his opinion were ‘subversive of public morality’ (sections 7(2)). 
His duties were to ban any lm that he felt:  
 
Unt for general exhibition in public by reason of its 
being indecent, obscene or blasphemous; or because the 
exhibition thereof in public would tend to inculcate 
principles contrary to public morality or would be 
otherwise subversive of public morals.  
 
This was shortly followed by the Intoxicating Liquor Act (1924) that limited 
opening hours, and an amendment in 1927 that attempted to reduce the 
number of licensed premises, both driven by concerns over the effects of 
alcohol on sexual conduct. However, it was the craze for jazz and 
dancing that upset the clergy the most. According to Lee (1989, 158), ‘A 
morbid preoccupation with occasions of sin in dance halls would 
dominate pastoral pronouncements throughout the twenties and thirties’. 
Of course it was not only the dance halls themselves that concerned the 
Bishops but what went on during breaks from the hall and on the way 
home. Far from DeValera’s much quoted St Patrick Day (1943) 
broadcast10
 
about ‘happy maidens’ and dancing at the crossroads, Bryan 
MacMahon recalls a campaign led by priests in the 1930s against 
crossroads dancing. ‘Wooden roadside platforms were set on re by 
curates ... priests drove their motorcars backward and forward over the 
timber platforms ... and those who played music at dances were branded 
as outcasts’ (cited in Whyte 1971, 28). The church was in favour, 
however, of modest céilí dances11
 
as ‘Irish dances do not make 
degenerates’ (Cardinal Logue 1925 cited in Breathnach 1983, 44). These 
concerns of the clergy were echoed in the Report of the Committee on the 
Criminal Law Amendment Acts (1880–1885) that concluded: ‘The 
‘commercialised’ Dance Halls, Picture Houses of sorts, and the 
10 Available on http://www.rte.ie/laweb/11/11_t09b.html/ 
11 The Irish céilí is a form of group dancing to traditional Irish music 
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opportunities afforded by the misuse of motor cars for luring girls, are 
the chief causes alleged for the present looseness of morals’ (Carrigan 
1931, 12).  
 
While men were to be foiled in their attempts to lure women, it was 
women who were most often the targets of reproach and discipline from 
the church. For example, the Catholic Truth Society, employing 
nationalistic tones, stated:  
 
The women of Ireland, heretofore, renowned for their 
virtue and honour, go about furnished with the paint-pot, 
the lip-stick ... and many of them have acquired the habit 
of intemperance, perhaps one of the sequels to their lately 
adopted vogue of smoking. A so-called dress performance 
or dance today showed some of our Irish girls in such 
scanty drapery as could only be exceeded in the slave 
market of pagan countries. (Irish Independent, 13 October 
1926)  
 
Bishop O’Doherty of Galway, who forbade his ock from attending 
dances on Saturday nights, advised fathers: ‘If your girls do not obey you, 
if they are not in at the hours appointed, lay the lash upon their backs. 
That was the good old system, and that should be the system to-day’ 
(Irish Catholic Directory 1925, 568; see also Irish Independent, 9 April 
1924). The outcome of these protests was the Dance Halls Act (1935) that 
was passed without debate in the Dáil. Owners of dance halls and 
organisers of public dances were obliged to obtain licences (which 
restricted times and dates) before dances could be held.  
 
In tandem there were attempts to limit women’s participation in athletic 
pursuits (married women were ‘discouraged’ by priests) and a teacher 
training college for women in Limerick (Mary Immaculate College) 
started the ‘Mary Immaculate Modest Dress and Deportment Crusade in 
1927’, in response to Catholic Bishops’ appeal for women to dress 
modestly. Women were instructed not to wear dresses less than four 
inches below the knee. Instruction also covered behaviour and 
disapproved of smoking, alcohol, immodest dancing, and so on (Ferriter 
2004, 329).  
 
While the moral panic concerning sexual liaisons arising from encounters 
in public space was largely driven by concerns over improper relations 
and illegitimate births, the spectre of venereal disease also played a part. 
In 1925, the Committee on Venereal Disease was established to 
investigate the prevalence of venereal disease in the Free State and to 
suggest solutions to the problem. Reporting in 1927 the Committee 
stated that the disease was widespread and that there was ‘no 
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considerable area entirely free from the disease’ (p. 5). The Commission 
felt that it was so prevalent (in both rural and urban areas, and affecting 
men, women and children) that it constituted ‘a menace to the 
maintenance and advancement of the physical and intellectual standards 
of the race’; it was ‘a serious menace to the health of the nation’ (p. 13). 
Controversially the Committee concluded that both syphilis and 
gonorrhoea ‘appears to be conveyed by apparently decent girls 
throughout the country’ (p. 18) with even women of the rural West of 
Ireland, a source of purity in the national narrative, not free from moral 
and physical contagion (Howell 2003). In a statement that went against 
the grain of established discourses on the ‘social disease’, the Report 
concluded it was ‘disseminated largely by a class of girl who could not be 
regarded as a prostitute’ (p. 3).  
 
Indeed, the Report noted that the problem of the open brothel no longer 
existed in Dublin (p. 10). Up until the 1920s, brothels in Dublin’s red 
light district, Monto,12
 
had operated openly and ‘without much let or 
hindrance on the part of the police authorities’ (Suppression of 
Prostitution 1947, sections 4, 5). However, in 1924 the newly formed 
Catholic fundamentalist Legion of Mary joined forces with Jesuit Richard 
Devane (Pro-Cathedral in Malborough St) and Dublin Metropolitan 
Police and began patrolling the area, picketing brothels and placing 
prostitutes in rescue homes. Within six months the majority of brothels 
were closed down.  
 
The problem was, then, not one of prostitution but of girls not acting as 
decently as they sought to portray themselves, with the Committee 
concluding that if it ‘was possible to get rid of the prostitute the 
eradication of Venereal Disease would not be effected’ (p. 5). The 
solution was to limit women’s public role and access to public space and 
therefore the opportunities to act as indecent women.  
 
Places of discipline and reformation  
Accompanying the movement to regulate women’s participation in paid 
employment, public service and public life, and to effectively constrain 
their lives to the marital home, was the creation of a set of sites designed 
to discipline and reform ‘fallen’ women, act as a deterrent to others, and 
to address a number of related issues, such as the strain on 
accommodation and nances of the County Homes (in the 1920s these 
former workhouses dealt with the majority of unmarried mothers); the 
perceived failure of County Homes to instil a sense of respectability and 
12 Michael McCarthy, author of Priests and People in Ireland (1908: 282–3) designated 
Monto ‘the greatest blot upon the social life of Dublin and Ireland’ where ‘the trade in 
immorality is carried out as openly as any branch of legitimate business’ and ‘the principal 
houses are as attractively painted and tted up on the outside as private hotels which are 
legitimately licensed for the sale of drink in the principle streets of the city’. 
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responsibility amongst its citizens; ‘souperism’ or girls eeing to 
Protestant refuges; unsafe and unregulated maternity homes where infant 
mortality was extremely high; pregnant single girls emigrating to England 
in large numbers; and the threat to the ‘much cherished ideal of the 
traditional family by bypassing convention and creating unorthodox 
units’ (Earner-Byrne 2004, 172). County Homes, Mother and Baby 
Homes, Industrial and Reformatory Schools, and Magdalene Asylums 
formed a network of independent institutions that incarcerated women 
who transgressed society’s sexual norms as dened by Church and state, 
and the offspring of such a transgression, by physically removing them 
from their communities and placing them in supposed sites of reform. As 
a result, unmarried mothers and their children were sent to these sites to 
be remade as women society deemed appropriate. The legitimacy for 
their containment and surveillance was dependent, to a large degree, on a 
rationale of defending the wider social body from dangerous or 
potentially dangerous moral forces.  
 
As Smith (2004, 227) notes, the move towards the creation of such sites 
‘coincided, almost precisely, with the foundation of the Irish Free State’. 
Indeed, within the rst ve years of independence a nationally organised 
and politically directed programme to protect the social body was already 
in place. The Local Government Temporary Provisions Act (1923) and the 
Report of the Commission on the Relief of the Sick and Destitute Poor, 
including the Insane Poor (1927) advocated a series of recommendations 
that effectively conferred criminal status on single women with children 
born out of wedlock (Powell 1992; Smith 2004). The 1927 Report of the 
Commission stated:  
 
in dealing with the problem of accommodation for 
unmarried mothers it must be recognised that there are 
two classes to be provided for, namely:  
(1)   those who may be amenable to reform and  
(2) those who for one reason or another are regarded as 
less hopeful cases. (1927, para. 228)  
 
The latter class were deemed to be lacking any possibility for self-
improvement and thus liable to a range of sovereign and disciplinary 
interventions. Included in this class were deserted wives, ‘who 
subsequent to desertion had children not the offspring of their husbands’ 
(Powell 1992). Similar divisions were presented in the Dáil:  
 
You might divide the mothers into two classes. You have 
the middle-class mothers with whom the social workers 
and nuns in cities come into contact. In the other case, 
you have the mothers who go to county homes and who 
comprise the vast majority of mothers of illegitimate 
children in the Free State. Amongst the latter type you 
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have a small percentage of mothers who themselves are 
illegitimate, who come of illegitimate stock, and who 
observe no moral code whatever. (M. J. Kennedy, Dáil 
Debates, vol. 33, 13 February 1930)  
 
The Report of the Commission proposed two modes of treatment, which 
was intended to differentiate and segregate the two classes of offenders. 
First offenders were to be sent to Mother and Baby Homes and repeat 
offenders to County Homes and Magdalene Asylums.  
 
First offenders, it was felt, required moral ‘upbuilding’, ‘rmness’ and 
‘discipline’ but also, depending on the character of the offender, ‘charity’ 
and ‘sympathy’. These women were to be dealt with in the same 
institution as children. In parallel, such institutions were created to full 
these needs modelled on a prototype institution run by the Sacred Heart 
Nuns in Bessborough, County Cork, set up ‘primarily for young mothers 
who have fallen for the rst time and who are likely to be inuenced 
towards useful and respectable life’ (Annual Report of the Department of 
Local Government and Public Health 1928, 113). Unmarried, pregnant 
women sent to these homes generally came from families who could 
afford to pay a fee to the home (Rafferty and O’Sullivan 1999, 74). The 
Order set up another Mother and Baby home in Sean Ross Abbey, 
Roscrea in 1930, and the Sisters of the Sacred Heart of Jesus and Mary 
set up another in Castlepollard in 1935.13
 
The state itself ran similar 
institutions, operated by the Poor Law Authorities (but staffed by nuns), 
at Pelletstown, County Dublin, Tuam, County Galway, and Kilrush, 
County Clare (Powell 1992; Garrett 2000).  
 
Unmarried mothers were generally (and illegally) held in these homes for 
up to two years as it was felt ‘a number of the girls [were] very weak-
willed and [had] to be maintained in the Home for a long period to 
safeguard them against a second lapse’ (Department of Local 
Government and Public Health 1930–31, 130). During their stay women 
were trained in domestic duties like cooking, sewing, knitting and 
religious instruction (Department of Local Government and Public 
Health 1928–29, 114, cited in Powell 1992, 191). Children of rst 
offenders were very often quickly separated from their mothers – 
checked for any problems (mental or physical) and usually informally 
adopted if found to be healthy and ‘normal’ (Rafferty and O’Sullivan 
1999). Although, in theory, women and their children were free to leave 
at any time, many stayed because they were unaware of their civil and 
legal rights or because in many cases poor law authorities refused to 
13 In 1930, 60 of the 120 children born in Sean Ross Abbey died (Department of Local 
Government and Public Health, 1938). 
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allow them to take their children with them. Not only was this illegal, it 
was also understood in ofcial circles. In her Annual Report for 1931–
1932, the Inspector of Boarded-Out Children, Alice Lister wrote: ‘A 
grave wrong is done to their children by retaining them in the Co. 
Homes, but retention of the children is the only means of securing the 
mothers from the danger which freedom spells for them’ (cited in Irish 
Times, 1 May 1999).  
 
For repeat offenders or ‘less hopeful cases ... residue composed probably 
of those who are the least open to good inuences’, the Report proposed 
a period of detention (Department of Local Government and Public 
Health Annual Report 1927, 69), not only to protect the social order but 
because their children ‘could be infected with the deviant genes and 
perpetuate the threat’ (Rafferty and O’Sullivan 1999, 74). These 
sentiments were backed up by politicians. For example, in the Dáil, Dr 
Ward spoke of ‘the difculty of the unmarried mother’ and of ‘setting up 
separate institutions for that particular class ... with compulsory powers 
to keep the mother there for a year or so’ (Dáil Debates, vol. 23, 23 May 
1928). The Commission’s proposals regarding single women with more 
that one child were quickly put into effect, with mother and children 
separated and conned to different institutions. Mothers were generally 
incarcerated in County Homes and for the most part children remained 
under poor law regulation and were either sent to industrial schools or 
were fostered.14
 
County Homes were supplemented by an arrangement 
between local authorities and the Sisters-in-Charge of Magdalene 
Asylums in 1932 for the containment of unmarried mothers (Annual 
Report of the Department of Local Government and Public Health 
1931–32, 129 cited in Powell 1992, 181).  
 
Magdalene Asylums (named after the prostitute Mary Magdalene) 
provided ‘special provision’ for repeat offenders. These institutions were 
originally created by social purity movements in the nineteenth century to 
rehabilitate and provide refuge to prostitutes and destitute women. They 
were quickly appropriated by the Catholic Church and by the 1920s were 
almost exclusively used to reform unmarried mothers, female sexual 
deviants, and those who transgressed sexual social norms. The Good 
Shepherd Sisters ran asylums in Limerick, Wexford, Waterford, Cork and 
Belfast. The Sisters of Mercy ran asylums in Limerick and Galway, and 
the Sisters of Our Lady of Charity ran asylums in Limerick and two in 
Dublin. Once temporary places of refuge and asylum providing respite 
14 In orphanages catering for illegitimate children, the infant mortality rate in the mid-1920s 
ranged between 29% and 34% at a time when infant mortality rate in the rest of society was 
5% or 6% (Annual Reports of the Registrar General of Births, Marriages and Deaths, 1923–
1928). 
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from abuse, disease, and so on, they became increasingly distanced from 
the original ideals of the social purity movement and instead turned into 
long-term, punitive institutions, driven by a quest for retribution and 
repentance. ‘Inmates’ and ‘penitents’ were obliged to surrender their 
infants and work primarily in laundries attached to the asylums. Unlike 
other businesses, these prot making laundries were not subject to the 
Factory Act (1895) that protected workers’ rights.  
 
Penitents were referred to as ‘children’ and subject to enforced silences 
for long periods of the day. Under constant surveillance, close 
friendships were discouraged (Rafferty 1999; Finnegan 2004) and 
individual identity was suppressed and rebuilt (ostensibly carried out to 
protect anonymity). Women were often given new names and prohibited 
from talking of their past. Beds in the dormitories were open to the gaze 
(even trips to the toilet were carefully monitored and surveyed). Finnegan 
(2004, 29–30) quotes from ‘Rules for the Direction of the Classes’ (1898, 
138); rules that were observed in the Good Shepherd Asylums until at 
least the 1960s:  
 
We should not, at recreation nor elsewhere, allow two 
children to be alone ... there should be no corners in 
which some could hide from the eyes of the Mistress. It is 
in such places the demon lies in wait for the children, to 
tempt them to do wrong ... Then redouble your vigilance 
... Watch them in the chapel; watch them at work; watch 
them particularly during the hours of recreation. Let your 
surveillance extend to everything.  
 
Shunned by their families, these women and girls largely ceased to exist 
in the outside world. ‘Escapees’ were often returned by their families or 
members of the Garda. Denied civil and constitutional rights, many 
stayed for life. No one knows how many women and girls were sent to 
the laundries. The religious orders continue to refuse to make these 
records available, but estimates range into tens of thousands (Finnegan 
2004; Ferriter 2004).  
 
Producing ‘decent girls’  
 
The real power – the real success of this whole new 
apparatus of sexuality – was that men, women, girls and 
boys inculcated sexuality in themselves. The key to the 
deployment of this sexuality was a continuous, rigorous 
examination of the self using the rules, regulations, 
principles and practices of the Catholic Church. (Inglis 
1997, 13)  
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Protection of Ireland’s distinctiveness (and ctive ethnicity) and recently 
won independence was the primary concern for many post-independence 
political activists, and Ireland’s appointed (and self-appointed) moral 
crusaders were determined to control dissident elements and cultural 
values in order to build a ‘pure and unsullied society’ (Kenny 2000, 117). 
As we have illustrated, the new Irish state very quickly became a site of 
applied bio-politics, and governmental practices began to focus explicitly 
on (visible) sexual morality as a key target of social intervention and 
organisation. Following reports on the morality of the population there 
was a proliferation of policy documents and legislation concerned with 
the administration of life (issues relating to, for example, contraception, 
abortion, divorce, venereal disease, health, hygiene) as policy makers and 
other state actors set about the task of reforming, regulating, dominating 
and controlling the politics and practices of the Irish population. As 
such, various ofcial and unofcial government agents (through 
proscription and prescription) sought to shape the conduct, aspirations, 
needs, desires and capacities of individuals within difference spheres.  
 
The disciplinary regime that was constructed was highly gendered, 
focusing almost exclusively on the regulation and self-regulation of 
women. They worked to form a dense spatialised grid of discipline, reform 
and self-regulation, seeking to produce ‘decent’ women inhabiting 
virtuous spaces by limiting access to work and public spaces, conning 
women to an unsullied (marital) home, with the ever-present threat of 
new sites of reformation, and convincing citizens that such material and 
discursive practices were in their own and the nation’s best interests (and 
thus to self-discipline their own sexual behaviour). With regard to the 
latter, governmental strategies not only aimed to constrain, coerce, 
discipline and normalise but also to produce a certain kind of regulated, 
civilised subject (Foucault 1978) – decent men, but more particularly, 
women. The dividing practices employed not only helped to dene who 
was in and out of the social body, but thus what constituted a desirable 
social body. The result was that by the early 1930s a systematic 
framework for the regulation and surveillance of sexual practices and 
segregating problem elements of the population was in place.  
 
As we have noted, however, what occurred in this period (1922–1937) 
was not a replacement of earlier discourses on sexual purity and morality. 
For example, discourses on the immorality of prostitution, contraception, 
sexual perniciousness, obscene literature, and so on, had been laid down 
in the previous decades by social purity movements, the legal and medical 
professions, and religious institutions. As such, there was nothing new 
about attempts to regulate and reform morality through place 
(institutions for the punishment, reform and regulation of ‘sexual 
deviants’ were already well established and there had been sporadic 
attempts to regulate red light districts throughout the nineteenth 
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century). There was, however, a transformation in the scale and 
continuity of the exercise of power, a shift in emphasis and objective, an 
increasing obsession amongst political and religious elites with the 
visibility of sex, and the development of a much more systematic and 
connected disciplinary regime. Concurrent with this, there was a diffusion 
of what might be termed ‘containment culture’ (Smith 2004) – where 
Irish citizens are implicitly held to be without maturity and the attributes 
of responsibility and autonomy, and where unwanted discourses and 
threats to the national narrative were suppressed and statistics concealed 
under the pretext that revelations of high levels of immorality and sexual 
crime would ‘offend the sensibilities of the Irish people’ and ‘rejoice its 
enemies’ (for example, ofcial reports were not openly published). In 
both cases, women were the central foci.  
 
The pressure to produce ‘decent girls’ – honest, chaste, virtuous, homely 
– meant that women became particular targets and a calculated 
administration of feelings of shame and guilt about the body and 
sexuality, designed to link the ethical capacities of women to the ends of 
government, were set in train (Inglis 1997; Rose 1993). In tandem with 
nationalist and Catholic discourse, legislative measures were implemented 
that sought not only to constrain women, but to work positively (and 
oppressively) to create a particular subjectivity so that women would be 
seen to ‘conform to the prescribed national paradigm’ (Smith 2004, 210–
11; Valiulis 1995b; McAvoy 1999).  
 
It is perhaps no surprise then to note that it was women, having been 
persuaded to the logic of the governmentality advocated, who were the 
strongest supporters and effective objects and vehicles of new regimes 
regulating sexual conduct; the most ardent creators of new moral 
geographies. For example, in 1925 it was for the most part women who 
were involved in the closing of the Dublin’s red light district, Monto 
(although directed by Frank Duff, founder of the Legion of Mary). 
Women also formed voluntary groups to monitor cinemas, theatres and 
women’s dress code (Kenny 2000). In 1929, a report from the Galway 
Board of Health ‘indicated that some women refused to use the facilities 
of Galway Maternity Hospital because they would be forced to associate 
with unmarried mothers’ (cited in Carrigan 1931, 9–10). ‘Concerned 
citizens’ and lay organisations like the Irish Vigilance Association and 
Legion of Mary alerted the censors to ‘immoral’ literature and sought 
increased penalties. It was, for the most part, families, relatives and the 
local clergy who sent ‘promiscuous’ or potentially promiscuous girls and 
deviant women to Magdalene Asylums, and public representatives (e.g. 
elected councillors) openly recommended incarceration, categorisation 
and segregation of ‘fallen women’ (see for example Shaw 1926 and Ward 
1928). And it was nuns who scrutinised, supervised and enforced the 
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strict disciplinary regimes within these institutions.  
 
In turn, the suspension of the law when it came to the treatment of 
unmarried mothers and their children served to heighten the 
discretionary powers of those (for example, nuns, local authorities, 
families) ‘who are asked to rely on their own judgement to decide 
fundamental matters of justice, life and freedom’ (Butler 2004: 55). By 
constructing any form of sexuality outside that of marriage as a moral 
problem and an issue of social responsibility it legitimated what was 
essentially a police action – the spatial connement of the ‘deviant’. 
Connement in these circumstances was not seen to infringe on the 
women’s rights as citizens and as such was viewed as a legitimate form of 
government.  
 
These pressures clearly had a profound effect on the moral landscape of 
Ireland shaping sexual conduct and the lives of women in numerous 
ways. This said, it is clear from the record that Irish adults were far from 
‘innocents’, unaware of their sexuality, sexual conduct, or the 
punishments meted out to transgressors in their name. After all, the 
disciplining regime was seen to be addressing a set of real concerns. 
During the rst decades of the foundation of the new state, many women 
and men were exploring their sexuality and having sex prior to marriage. 
The use of contraception and birth control was relatively common in 
both rural and urban areas as was the availability of information. It is also 
clear that many men and women were having sexual relations outside 
marriage. Venereal disease was widespread, levels of illegitimacy were 
rising steadily, and there is strong evidence of pregnant women 
emigrating to Britain in large numbers to have their babies in a less 
puritanical and more anonymous environment (Earner-Byrne 2004). As 
such, it is a mistake to assume that all subjects bowed to the disciplining 
regime. Instead, there were ways of resistance (having relationships, 
affairs, attending dances, and so on), and challenges to the changes taking 
place. For example, Ryan (2002, 61) quotes a piece from the Irish 
Independent (15 December 1936: 7) where a social worker describes the 
situation of unmarried mothers: ‘These girls are the scapegoats of a 
tradition of Puritanism that will not admit that things are as they are’.  
 
At the same time, the obsession with immoral foreign literature, 
contraception, working women, divorce, and dance halls deected 
attention away from the reality of high levels of sexual crime and abuse 
and ‘the social scars which disgured Ireland’ (Lee 1989) and which 
recent public inquiries are only now starting to address such as sexual 
abuse by clergy and others in positions of power. The reluctance of 
successive governments to prepare a regular report on sexual crime 
speaks volumes. In 1937, the Department of Justice prepared a minute 
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for the Executive Council arguing for the need of a regular report: ‘The 
present practice is so very unusual in a modern state and would be so 
difcult to explain or justify, if and when public attention is drawn to it, 
that it is proper to have a government decision on the matter’ (June 1937, 
cited in Finnane 2001, 531). The minute was later withdrawn from the 
cabinet agenda. There was no public evaluation of the scale of sexual 
crime and no discussion on the impact on individuals (as in pre-Free 
State Irish Citizen articles) (Smith 2004). This denial was evident even 
amongst the judiciary. Sentencing a soldier for an assault on a young girl 
a district court judge stated he ‘was glad to say that cases of indecent 
assault were uncommon in this country, and this was attributable to the 
manhood of the country. It had rightly been said that Irishmen had 
greater respect for women than the men in any other country in Europe’ 
(Irish Times, 6 August 1928). Ironically, in 1927 and 1928 the rates of 
sexual assault on women were the highest recorded since 1909 according 
to the evidence presented by the Garda Commissioner, Eoin O’Duffy, to 
the Carrigan Committee in 1931 (cited in Finnane 2001, 535). Moreover, 
the ‘culture of containment’ worked to free Irish society from polluting 
elements while simultaneously rendering the ‘contaminated’ less visible 
(in a psychological, social and material sense). Incarcerating sexualised 
women and children in religious institutions rendered the compromising 
reality of their existence invisible while paradoxically conrming society’s 
high standards. It sustained the new ‘imagined community’ concealing 
any visible signs of sexual crime, incidence of rape, incest, paedophilia 
and ignorance, and in ‘return the nation secured its identity as a Catholic 
and morally pure society’ (Smith 2004, 233).  
 
The disciplining regime and the ideologies of respectability and superior 
sexual morality thus worked to produce a refuge in which to evade 
analysis and allow people to ‘practise innocence’. It would appear that a 
signicant proportion of the population assumed this role, creating an 
intimate symbiosis between government and civil society, through the 
adoption of new modes of self-regulation. As a consequence ideas on 
sexual conduct, and the role and place of women in society more 
generally, and how these should be maintained through new legislation, 
censorship, retribution and incarceration, were taken for granted, and 
came to be seen as desirable and commonsense, even though they had 
negative consequences for many in society, thus producing new moral 
geographies. Most Irish people seemingly accepted a role (if at the 
unconscious level) as accomplices in the new vision of Irishness and 
Ireland and its governmentality. As Lee (1989, 652) states: ‘The ultimate 
perfection of the design had been achieved when it could be conceived 
not only by its architects but also by its victims, for all their inner sense 
of deprivation, as a divine dispensation’. The consequence of the new 
doxa was that within one generation women’s political, economic and 
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reproductive rights had been so severely curtailed that they were 
‘explicitly barred from claiming for themselves a public identity’ (Valiulis 
1995a, 120). The discursive formation was so deep-seated that it was not 
until the 1970s through to the 1990s that legislation and the constitution 
were subject to sustained critique and campaign, and a reconguring of 
the immediate post-independence, moral landscape was undertaken.15 
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CHAPTER 22 
 
TOWARDS A GEOGRAPHY OF NAMA 
 
SINÉAD KELLY 
 
First published on Ireland After Nama, 
http://irelandafternama.wordpress.com/, December 7, 2009. 
 
Introduction 
A striking feature of the official documentation of the National Assets 
Management Agency (NAMA) and subsequent commentary is its lack of 
attention to geographic or spatial considerations. Indeed, this tendency of 
‘aspatial’ analysis has also been a key feature of banking and financial 
operations, where property assets, which exist in physical space and have 
a specific geographic location, are presented in numerical form (often 
aggregated) on loan books, on balance sheets and indeed as part of 
complex asset bundles, such as CDOs (collatoralised debt obligations). 
Such an understanding and presentation of data serves very much to 
conceal the geography of those assets.  
 
During the boom, financial institutions massively expanded their total 
lending and, as we know, what characterises the Irish banking system 
(and crisis), is that much of the lending went into property, which has a 
very particular geography. And, given the general tendency of property 
developers and investors to engage in developments in increasingly 
riskier locations the longer the boom goes on, and the considerable 
property price inflation that occured in every region in Ireland, it was the 
overlooking of geographical considerations that facilitated further 
inflation of the asset bubble. 
 
That push to boost lending and increase the profitability of banks seemed 
to pay little attention to broader indicators in the Irish economy but also 
failed to pay due cognisance to locational considerations. In an industry 
in which the three rubric for success have long been recognied as 
“location, location and location”, such overlooking of spatial 
considerations is nothing short of amazing. 
 
The very viability of NAMA as a financial project is highly dependent on 
the geography of those property assets which underpin the loans which 
NAMA is purchasing. While certain well-located assets may indeed 
provide for a secure yield in the medium term, others, such as large sites 
lacking any urban zoning status located at the edge of small Irish towns 
and villages for which enormous prices were paid per hectare, are 
unlikely even in the very long term to prove to possess much value above 
that of farmland. 
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Approaching the ‘details’ of NAMA and applying sectoral and 
geographical scenarios 
From the draft NAMA business plan released in October 2009, one can 
ascertain the broad composition of the loans. Of the total amount of 
€77bn of loans being transferred to NAMA from banks’ asset sheets: 
 €27.8bn (36%) relates to ‘land’  
 €21.8bn (28%) relates to ‘development loans’ 
 €27.7bn (36%) relates to ‘associated loans’ 
Beyond that broad breakdown, there is little information on when the 
loans were granted, on the type of property to which the loans relate 
(residential, office, retail, industrial, etc.) and on the geography of the 
assets.  
 
To date, the total extent of our knowledge of the ‘geography’ of those 
loans is provided only by a very broad break-down between international 
locations (see Figure 1). But in a sector in which a matter of 40 or 50 
metres distance between sites might mean the difference between success 
and failure in the case of urban redevelopment projects, particularly in 
office development markets, such crude delimitation is almost entirely 
unhelpful. Unfortunately, we know too little about the location of 
NAMA-related property for an accurate assessment to be made as to 
their likely real value.  
 
Figure 1. The Geographical Breakdown of NAMA’s Portfolio 
 
 
 
Source: Draft NAMA Business Plan (2009) 
 
Some €33.13bn of those loans relate to properties located in the Republic 
of Ireland. However, an appraisal of the real value of the underlying 
assets requires, in the case of loans against land, a review of the 
geographical location, zoning characteristics and planning status. For development 
loans, an evaluation needs to be undertaken of the sectoral status 
(residential, industrial, office, retail and other commercial) of schemes 
within a local context in which the current level of provision of such 
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property is taken into account, together with considerations of existing 
vacancy rates, the projected scale and stage of development (completions, 
currently on-site or due to be undertaken), and the prevailing and 
projected scales of demand for such space. 
 
As laid out in the draft NAMA business plan (NAMA, 2009), NAMA will 
pay €54bn for loans with a book value of €77bn, representing a 30 
percent “haircut” on the original loans’ value. While NAMA will pay 15 
percent above the estimated current market value for the assets, it does 
so on the basis that the total reduction in average property prices in the 
boom-slump cycle is 47 percent (the peak having occured in early 2007 
and the trough estimated to have occured in September 2009) and that 
the 15 percent premium can be recouped over the lifetime of NAMA 
through a rising property market.  
 
While we do not have specific information on the geographical location 
of the assets that are to be transferred to NAMA, we can examine some 
recent trends in the property market and compare them to the 
assumptions underpinning NAMA. 
 
The Agricultural Land-Price Spiral 
What became clear during the boom years was that a very sharp increase 
in land prices was occuring, not just in and near urban areas but also in 
rural areas – agricultural land. According to Savills-HOK’s Irish 
Agricultural Land Research report in May 2007, Irish land values jumped 
from just under €10,000 per hectare (€3,850 per acre) in 1998 to over 
€58,400 per hectare (€23,600 per acre) in 2006, by far the highest price 
per hectare in Europe (see Figures 2 and 3). This jump in part reflected 
the tendency for farmers to sell small plots of land for development 
purposes (one-off housing) and an increasing trend of wealthy individuals 
buying small farms for lifestyle purposes, particularly within commuting 
distance of Dublin. In many cases, the proceeds from land sales was re-
invested in farmland, where farmers with land at the edge of towns sold 
them off during the boom times and bought farms elsewhere pushing up 
land prices even further and becoming even more out-of-kilter with the 
day-to-day economics of farming. With the onset of the property crash, 
agricultural land prices have and will continue to fall back sharply, with 
those greenfield sites at the edge of towns bought with redevelopment in 
mind, open to devaluations in the region of 90-95 percent. 
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Figure 2. Irish Land Values 1973-2006 (€ per hectare) 
 
 
 
Source: Savills HOK (2007) CSO, Eurostat, Farmers Journal 
 
Figure 3. European Land Values by Country 2005/6 (€ per hectare) 
 
 
 
Source: Savills HOK (2007) CSO, Eurostat, Farmers Journal 
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Record Site Prices 
If we examine some of the record prices paid for redevelopment sites in 
urban areas at the height of the boom, and compare them to revaluations 
on other similar sites during the slump, it should give us some indication 
as to the real extent of price falls.  
 
In late 2005, a number of significant site sales in the prestigious area of 
Ballsbridge in Dublin 4 attracted considerable attention. During this 
period, the developer Sean Dunne bought two sites, the former Jury’s 
Hotel and the former Berkeley Court Hotel. The sites comprised seven 
acres and were purchased for ca. €379M, averaging a then unprecedented 
€54.1M per acre (MacDonald and Sheridan, 2008; Brawn, 2009). Another 
developer, Ray Grehan of Glenkerrin Homes bought a nearby 2.05 acre 
site, the former UCD Veterinary College, for ca. €171.5M, an incredible 
€83.7M per acre. In 2006, a small site of just over a third of an acre went 
for almost €40M (€95M per acre). These were purchases that were made 
close to the height of the boom for potential redevelopment sites which 
had no planning permission. Even if the subsequently proposed mixed-
use developments had been given planning permission and had they been 
completed at the height of the property boom, the margins for 
profitability were already stretched. So what scale of price devaluations 
could we expect in the property crash for these sites? 
 
Take the example of a nearby 0.5 acre site on Herbert Road, Ballsbridge; 
this former Cablelink office-building was offered for sale in autumn 
2007, just after the peak of the property boom, for €30M. Two years 
later, the asking price stood at €9.5M representing a 68 percent decrease, 
and that was the asking price – by no means an accurate indicator of how 
low market prices could fall.  
 
As has been well-documented on the Ireland After Nama blog (see 
Kitchin, 2009; Moore, 2009), the case of the Irish Glass Bottle site in 
Ringsend in Dublin 4 is instructive. This 24.9 acre site, purchased in early 
2007 for ca. €413M (€16.6M per acre) by a consortium involving 
companies of Bernard McNamara and Derek Quinlan and the Dublin 
Docklands Development Authority (DDDA), was revalued in October 
2009 at €60M. This represents a whopping 85 percent price devaluation, 
which is significantly above the “haircut” of 30 percent or the 47 percent 
average property price fall upon which NAMA’s calculations are based. 
In the case of the Irish Glass Bottle site, we are talking about a large 
centrally-located brownfield site with special planning status for mixed 
use (residential and enterprise) functions under the DDDA’s Master Plan, 
with reasonably good prospects of redevelopment in the medium-to-
longer term. Yet, in spite of the existence of an overarching planning 
framework, this site has retained only 15 percent of its market-peak 
value. This begs the question that if such well-located sites are 
experiencing such colossal price falls, then what are the prospects for 
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greenfield sites at the edge of cities or at the edge of towns throughout 
Ireland. 
 
Investigating Development Loans – The changing geography of 
Dublin’s office stock 
Many of the Development Loans and Associated Loans set out in the NAMA 
business plan (NAMA, 2009) relate to loans for commercial property in 
Ireland. It is to an examination of recent trends and indicators for the 
different commercial property sectors that this discussion now turns. 
Taking the Dublin office market as an example, research from the Centre 
for Urban and Regional Studies (CURS), TCD and Savills-HOK 
(MacLaran & O’Connell, 2007) has traced the changing volume and 
geography of office space in Dublin since 1995. Over the past 15 years, 
the volume of modern office stock expanded enormously. However, the 
geography of office development has also changed significantly, where 
proportionately, there has been a fall in the dominance of the prime 
office locations of Dublin 2 and 4, while suburban office locations have 
grown substantially (see Table 1). While in 1995, suburban office 
developments accounted for 14.6 percent of the total stock, by 2008, that 
figure had leapt to over 35 percent. 
 
Table 1. The Changing Geography of the Modern Office Stock in 
Dublin, 1995-2008 
 
 1995 2008 
Dublin 2 54.5 % 32.0 % 
Dublin 4 14.1 % 12.4 % 
Dublin 1, 7, 8 16.8 % 14.9 % 
IFSC / North Docks n.a. 5.6 % 
Blackrock / Dun Laoghaire 4.4 % 3.3 % 
North Suburbs 0.7 % 6.4 % 
West Suburbs 1.9 % 10.1 % 
Other South Suburbs 7.6 % 15.4 % 
 
Source: CURS/SavillsHOK Office Database 
 
Rates of vacancy in the modern office stock vary considerably 
geographically and are particularly high in certain suburbs, having been 
especially high in west Dublin (see Figure 4). The research indicates that 
since 2007, there have been high levels of activity in office construction 
in suburban areas, office space that has yet to reach the market. It is 
likely that some loans associated with office space in suburban areas will 
be transferred to NAMA, areas that even during the boom were 
experiencing relatively high vacancy levels.  
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Figure 4. Vacancy Rates in Dublin’s office stock, December 2000 to 
December 2008 
 
 
 
Source: CURS/SavillsHOK Office Database 
 
Moreover, with the then Minister for Justice Dermot Ahern proposing in 
later 2009 to ban the use of upward-only rent reviews for all new leases 
in commercial property, this would likely have a downward effect on the 
capital values that new office buildings would achieve. While, this 
proposed ban could be seen as a positive step for some business sectors 
(new tenants especially), it may have serious implications for NAMA (and 
simultaneously for Irish society) as NAMA’s business model is tied to a 
rising property market. More specifically, many of NAMA’s underpinning 
calculations drew heavily on trends and expectations in commercial 
property sectors, which at that time were based on a system of upward-
only rent reviews. 
 
Residential Loans 
It is likely that a good deal of the Development and Associated Loans 
relate to residential developments at various stages of construction. And, 
while it is clear that substantial reductions have occured in house prices 
generally, it is difficult to gauge the likely level of devaluation on 
residential loans that will transfer to NAMA. Where loans transferred to 
NAMA are found to involve housing developments that are at a stage of 
completion, we can draw on new house prices as an indicator.   
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Figure 5. New house prices – National, Dublin and Regional, 2000-
2009Q2 
 
 
 
Source: DoEHLG, Housing Statistics Bulletins, various years 
 
Based on the DoEHLG’s Housing Statistics Bulletins, Figure 5 indicates 
that new house prices nationally fell by 26 percent from the peak of the 
boom (2007Q2) to July 2009. For Cork and Galway, the figure was 23 
percent, for Limerick, 11 percent, with Waterford and other areas 
experiencing 26 percent and 25 percent price drops respectively. Notably, 
the fall was sharpest in Dublin where new house prices fell by 40 percent 
and there is little to indicate that the downward trend halted in 
September 2009, the date that the draft NAMA business plan (NAMA, 
2009) has taken to represent the price-floor of the market. 
Unsurprisingly, sales activity was much reduced.  
 
Notably, the type of ‘assets’ that will be transferred to NAMA will likely 
include some of those unfinished housing estates and apartment 
complexes that have become a very visible feature of the Irish landscape 
– in city suburbs, in inner-city neighbourhoods and at the edge of towns 
and villages countrywide. In these cases, the ratio of market value to loan 
value will have fallen dramatically, with the management and disposal of 
these ‘assets’ likely to prove difficult and expensive.   
 
The property crash beyond NAMA 
While this discussion has sought to develop further a geography of 
NAMA’s portfolio, raising some serious questions about the calculations 
and underpinning assumptions of NAMA in the process, it must also be 
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remembered that there are other major elements of the property crash 
that will not be addressed by NAMA. The NAMA portfolio involves 
loans relating to ca.1,600 borrowers, with just 100 borrowers accounting 
for 50 percent of the portfolio. Land, Development and Associated 
Loans of less than €5M are excluded from NAMA (except those with 
EBS and Irish Nationwide). The number of these loans is unknown but 
their geography is likely to be predominantly rural in nature or rather, at 
the fringe of towns and villages throughout Ireland. Then, of course, 
there is that far more immediate concern for tens-of-thousands of 
households of mortgage repayment difficulties, negative equity and the 
threat of housing foreclosures in the not-too-distant future. In NAMA 
and the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV), these households will find little 
comfort.  
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Introduction  
On June 29, 2005, Philip McGrath, Brendan Philbin, Vincent McGrath, 
Micheál O Seighin and Willie Corduff were jailed by the High Court in 
Dublin for contempt of court. The ve – all from the Erris peninsula in 
Mayo, in the west of Ireland – had refused, despite a court order, to stop 
obstructing the construction of a gas pipeline through some of their 
lands. The Rossport Five, as they became known, remained in jail until 
September 30, 2005, for 94 days (see Fig. 1). Despite their release, the 
campaign against the construction of the gas pipeline – known as Shell 
chun Sáile or Shell to Sea – continues. Despite these protests, the 
construction of the gas pipeline also continues.  
 
This paper focuses on the lead up to and the aftermath of the 
imprisonment and release of the Rossport Five, and raises broader 
questions about why and how political geographers should engage with 
this story, unfolding in a remote part of Ireland. The question of why 
may be quite obvious. Rossport matters, because it is a dispute about 
ownership and use of natural resources; because it illustrates the threats 
posed to local communities by a powerful coalition of state and capital; 
and because, as a consequence, it raises questions of scalar politics and 
power. In this way, Rossport is part of a longer tradition in geography 
that focuses on place-based conicts and struggles (for some recent 
examples, see Davies, 2005, 2006; Perreault, 2003; Watts, 2004a; Zaup, 
2008). The question of how political geographers should engage with this 
story is, perhaps, more difcult to answer. In this paper, I suggest that 
the story of Rossport offers the possibility for a redeployment of 
postcolonial thought within political geography. While political 
geographers engage with the postcolonial, their analyses most often focus 
on the postcolonial as a bounded temporal and spatial state (see, for 
example, Christopher, 2009; Power, 2001; Ramutsindela, 2001; Sidaway, 
2003; Tan, 2007), or apply postcolonial analyses to the new imperialism 
of the US (see, for example, Slater, 2004; Sparke, 2005).1 The potential 
for an expanded understanding of postcolonial theory in political 
geography and geopolitics has been articulated by Robinson (2003), but 
1 Though rarely explicitly framed as political geography, there is a growing body of 
work on the relationship between postcolonial theory and development (see, for 
example, Power, Mohan, & Mercer, 2006; Raghuram & Madge, 2006; Raghuram, 
Madge, & Noxolo, 2009). 
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her powerful argument has yet to make a signicant impact on the 
discipline. In this paper, I suggest that a broader engagement with 
postcolonial thought offers new insights into the epistemologies of 
political geography, and new directions for the practise of political 
geography. The work of Walter Mignolo, a professor of literature and a 
key writer on Latin America, provides one such set of possibilities. In 
particular, Mignolo’s attention to the geo-politics of knowledge – the 
spaces where knowledge is created, and the means by which knowledge is 
legitimated – offers a provocative challenge to political geography. 
Mignolo’s strategies for unveiling the geo-politics of knowledge are 
varied, but two are of particular relevance here. The rst is 
‘decoloniality’, which makes the place of knowledge production explicit. 
The second is ‘border thinking’, which explicitly works to link together 
those spaces and places that have been marginalised through the twin 
processes of colonialism and modernity. By applying these strategies to 
Rossport, we can move beyond the restricted uses of postcolonial theory 
in political geography, and identify new ‘horizons of expectation’ for the 
discipline.  
 
The place of Rossport  
Rossport is located in the Erris peninsula, a harsh and beautiful place (see 
Fig. 2). It is exposed to the Atlantic Ocean, and endures strong winds, 
heavy rainfall, and long dark winter nights. It has suffered from 
depopulation, high levels of emigration, and marginalisation throughout 
the decades, from famine times to the current day.   
 
Robert Lloyd Praeger, writing in 1937, described Erris as ‘the wildest, 
loneliness stretch of country to be found in all Ireland’ (1997: 195–196). 
Despite its position as a Gaeltacht region in the current day. 
mythologised west of Ireland, Erris has not been part of the Irish 
national imaginary in the way of Connemara or the Aran Islands.   
 
Rather, it has appeared from time to time in public discourses as a 
signier of poverty, a pattern that was well established in the colonial era: 
witness, for example, the words of journalist Thomas Campbell Foster 
who, in despair at what he had experienced in Erris, wrote that:  
It is a singular fact that the further you travel westward in 
Ireland, the more bountiful does nature appear to have 
been in heaping upon the country natural resources, and 
the less has been done by the hand of man to use and 
improve them (Foster, 1846: 218).  
Like many other parts of Ireland, Erris and its population suffered in the 
colonial period. This continued after independence. In Irish 
parliamentary debates since 1921, for example, the portrayal of Erris is 
generally as a place of struggle: where food is scarce, where subsistence 
activities such as shing, turf-cutting and the sale of seaweed are under 
threat, and where state services are poorly supplied. The current picture 
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of the Mayo Gaeltacht, from the 2006 Census, is not very different: it 
shows a region with an older age prole, higher levels of unemployment 
and lower levels of education than the national average (CSO, 2006). 
 
Fig. 1. The Rossport Five on their release from prison, from left Philip 
McGrath, Brendan Philbin, Vincent McGrath, Micheál O Seighin and 
Willie Corduff (Goldman Environmental Prize, 2007c).  
 
 
 
Yet Erris is also beautiful, with breathtaking scenery and a strong sense 
of community, underpinned by a deep attachment to place (Vincent 
McGrath, in Garavan et al., 2006: 157). Census statistics and ofcial 
debates do not capture its beauty and hold over many of the people who 
live there. From time to time, this sense of community and place 
becomes apparent, even to outsiders. A telling parliamentary exchange 
occurred in 1978, when the Minister of Agriculture, in response to a 
question about the division and allocation of 1600 acres of commonage 
in Rossport, Mayo, said:  
 
A preliminary investigation as to the feasibility of dividing 
this commonage was carried out a few years ago. The 
matter was not, however, proceeded with as it transpired 
that the majority of the co-owners were not in fact 
interested in division (Dáil Eireann, 1978). 
And many of those directly involved in the current division in Erris, over 
the building of a gas pipeline, frame their involvement in terms of ‘the 
love of the land and the love of the place’ (Garavan et al., 2006: 27). 
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Fig. 2. Rossport, the Erris peninsula and the proposed new route of the 
pipeline.  
 
Anatomy of a dispute  
Beginning in the late 1990s, Erris began to appear more regularly in 
parliamentary debates and national media reports. This was linked to the 
discovery, in 1996, of gas in the offshore Corrib eld by Enterprise Oil. 
The Corrib eld is located in the Slyne Basin, one of the four 
sedimentary basins to the west of Ireland that are a focus of exploration 
activity (Shannon, Corcoran, & Haughton, 2001). In 1996, the Irish 
Department of Communications, Energy and Natural Resources had over 
20 offshore exploration licences in place, to companies that included 
Marathon, Chevron, Mobil and Bula, as well as Enterprise Oil (DCENR, 
2008).2
 
In early 2001, the Corrib gas nd was publicly declared as 
commercially viable by Enterprise Energy Ireland (EEI), the company set 
up to develop the nd. However, EEI had already been working behind 
the scenes for a number of months (CPI, 2005). They had identied a site 
for an onshore gas processing plant; and they had identied a route for 
the pipeline from landfall to the plant by late 2000 (CPI, 2005). By 
August 2001, EEI had been granted planning permission for the 
2 At the end of 2007, the Department also had over 20 offshore exploration licenses in 
place, to companies that included Statoil, Providence Resources, Island Oil and Gas, 
Enterprise Oil and Marathon (DCENR, 2008). 
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processing plant, and by November 2001, they received a petroleum lease 
for the gas eld (Garavan et al., 2006: 7). Planning permission for the 
pipelines associated with the project was granted in February and April 
2002 (Shell, 2008). In April 2002, Shell purchased Enterprise Oil, and 
took over its controlling stake in the project. There are now three core 
partners: Shell (45%), Statoil (36.5%) and Marathon (18.5%) – of these, 
only Statoil has been involved from the very beginning (Shell, 2008). 
Planning permission for the processing plant was appealed on a number 
of occasions, before nally being granted in October 2004. Following a 
number of reports and recommendations, a new onshore pipeline route 
has been proposed, and SEPIL has just applied for planning permission 
for the new route (see Fig. 2). Locals opposed to the development frame 
their opposition in terms of safety and health. They claim that the 
pressure of unprocessed gas in the pipeline will be too high, that the 
pipeline will be too close to people’s homes, and that the environmental 
effects of gas transportation and processing will be devastating to the 
place, people and wildlife. They want the gas to be processed offshore.  
 
On the surface, these dates and events seem relatively straightforward. 
Yet, they mask the structures and networks of exploitation and solidarity 
and the threads of memory that underpin the many Rossport stories. The 
rst is the alliance between state and capital. In the case of oil and gas 
exploration and production, ‘Ireland has had the best scal terms in the 
world for exploration and production’ (Indecon, 2007: 76). In Ireland, 
the tax rate on prots from oil and gas is currently 25%, with no require-
ment for royalties or production bonuses, and with full write off of 
capital expenditure. In addition, corporations can sell oil and gas to the 
state at full market value (Allen, 2007; CPI, 2005; Indecon, 2007).3
 
Beyond these general scal conditions, the current government has 
brought its weight to bear to ensure that this specic development 
continues: it facilitated the compulsory acquisition of land for the 
pipeline by introducing new legislation; it enabled meetings between the 
developers, the Taoiseach,4
 
and the planning authority (CPI, 2005:14; 
Garavan et al., 2006: 8); and it regularly took the side of the developers, 
branding the protestors as trouble-makers. Less directly, a government 
minister – Michael McDowell, the Minister for Justice – spearheaded a 
smear campaign against the Centre for Public Inquiry and its chief exec-
utive, Frank Connolly, who had published a highly critical report in 
November 2005, entitled The Great Corrib Gas Controversy.5
 
The Centre 
for Public Inquiry was set up in 2005 and received signicant funding 
from Atlantic Philanthropies. Its aim was to investigate corruption in 
3 The current Minister for Communications, Energy and Natural Resources, Eamon Ryan 
of the Green Party, has changed these terms for licenses issued from January 1, 2007. 
Changes include a prot resource rent tax of up to an additional 15%. 
4 The Irish Prime Minister, at the time Bertie Ahern of Fianna Fáil.
5 McDowell alleged that Connolly had travelled to Colombia using a false Irish passport, in 
the company of his brother Niall. Niall Connolly is one of the ‘Colombia Three’, found 
guilty of training FARC members in bomb-making by a Colombian appeal court 
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Irish public life, but its funding was withdrawn after Michael McDowell 
alleged in the Irish parliament that Frank Connolly was an active member 
of the IRA. Connolly suggested that the allegations were ‘patently a 
considered and timed response to the publication of the Report on the 
Corrib Gas controversy from those seeking to protect vested interests’ 
(Connolly, 2005). More recently, the Garda Síochána – the police force of 
the Irish state – have been highly active in protecting the construction 
site and in preventing protests, and the Irish Naval Service has provided 
protection for a ship laying the pipeline in Broadhaven Bay. The alliance 
between state and capital has not always been seamless. A senior 
planning ofcial refused permission for the processing plant in 2003 
(McCaughan, 2008: 29–31, 36–40); some Irish TDs (MPs) have been 
highly critical of the treatment of the Rossport Five and the local 
community6; and the Ministers involved in the provision of generous 
incentives to the oil and gas exploration industries have been forced to 
resign and are under investigation for corruption in relation to other 
events. However, it is clear that the Irish state has signicantly facilitated 
the development of the Corrib Gas eld, and it continues to do so 
despite some local opposition.  
 
The second is the types of networks of solidarity, support and resistance 
that have coalesced around the issue of the pipeline. The main opposition 
group, Shell to Sea, runs a very active website and campaign, and they 
have support groups in Germany and Norway, as well as throughout 
Ireland. The campaigners regularly draw comparisons between their 
situation and that of the Ogoni in Nigeria: so much so that a nickname 
for the protestors in Mayo is the Bogoni. A documentary on the Corrib 
Gas pipeline, called Those Who Dance, makes this connection explicit, 
intercutting footage from Ireland and Nigeria. Ogoni campaigners, such 
as Owens Saro-Wiwa, have been regular visitors to Ireland and to Mayo. 
In this way, Shell to Sea has become part of an international coalition of 
groups opposed to the activities of resource exploitation companies, 
particularly Shell. However, Shell to Sea has also targeted Statoil, and 
activists have travelled to Norway, met with politicians and trade union 
activists, and attempted to inuence public opinion in that country. The 
story of the Corrib Gas pipeline has also attracted interest and attention 
from international environmental groups, such as Global Community 
Monitor and the Goldman Environmental Prize, which was awarded to 
Willie Corduff in 2007. ‘I didn’t realise’, Corduff said in his acceptance 
speech, ‘that somewhere in the world people were watching what I was 
doing and actually appreciated it’ (Goldman Environmental Prize, 2007a). 
The extent of the international links of the Shell to Sea campaign is in 
contrast to earlier assessments of environmental campaigns in Ireland as 
generally ‘limited both in time and space [and] not networked into 
professionalised or national campaigning frameworks’ (Davies, 2006: 
6 Two of the most publicly critical TDs, Mayo-based Jerry Cowley (Independent) and 
Dublin-based Joe Higgins (Socialist Party), lost their parliamentary seats in the 2007 General 
Election 
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721). Within Ireland, a coalition of environmental and left-wing 
campaigners has been central to the campaign against the pipeline. 
Indymedia Ireland, a radical media collective, continues to provide 
comprehensive coverage of the struggle. The Rossport Solidarity Camp, 
established in Rossport in 2005, provided practical support to the local 
community, and became involved in direct action campaigns. In addition, 
Rossport is often discursively connected to other environmental 
campaigns in Ireland, such as the attempt to prevent the building of the 
M3 motorway through Tara, the ancient capital of Ireland and a 
UNESCO World Heritage site. Micheál O Seighin commented that the 
aim of the Shell to Sea campaign ‘was not to get it into the national 
media. It was to get it into the unofcial network that is there, where real 
people live, but not the sheltered establishment’ (in Garavan et al., 2006: 
78). However, the extent of the support has created its own difculties, 
with Shell to Sea pejoratively linked, in various media and other reports, 
to Sinn Féin and to violent protesting tactics. In April 2008, another 
protest group, including some of the Rossport Five, was established. This 
group, Pobal Chill Chomáin in, has proposed an alternative onshore site 
for the renery, a compromise from the Shell to Sea position that gas 
processing should take place offshore. Similarly, local residents who 
support the pipeline are often marginalised, and their voices are often 
obscured, particularly in the creation of transnational alliances.  
 
The third is ‘the sound of the past’ (Robinson, 2006: 1). The events in 
Erris, particularly since the jailing of the Rossport Five, have raised the 
spectre of Michael Davitt and the Land League. In 1879 Davitt, a Mayo 
native, was one of the founders of the Land League, a peasant rights 
organisation, and his legacy is still strong in Mayo. The act of jailing also 
made audible the sound of other, more recent injustices. The ve men 
who were jailed became, on imprisonment, the Rossport Five, evoking 
memories of the Birmingham Six or the Guilford Four. Yet, the ‘sound 
of the past’ is not only linked to conict and injustice, but it is also part 
of the emotional attachment to place. As Willie Corduff said, ‘it’s memo-
ries that are making us do what we’re doing’ (in Garavan et al., 2006: 15). 
Those memories are materialised in a range of local initiatives concerned 
with preserving and keeping alive the stories of Erris,7
 
and in the stories 
that people tell about the pipeline that draw on the past. As Caitlín Uí 
Sheighin recounts, ‘there is a local prophesy in a story that says a wave 
will rise at Glengad and sweep up the estuary. Now we believe that refers 
to gas’ (in Garavan et al., 2006: 96). This is taken up by Micheál O 
Seighin, who says:  
 
people will still tell you locally that the last battle from 
some prophesy or other will be the battle of Ballinaboy. To 
me this is an echo of the awareness of people back to the 
7 See, for example, the interactive CD produced by Comhar Dún Chaocháin Teoranta in 
2000, with images, songs, stories and placenames of the local area. 
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Bronze Age time. An awareness that having a grip on a 
place is tenuous and can be destroyed. You can have an evil 
god like Balor who can destroy the thing and a Lugh 
Airgeadlámh isn’t always at hand (in Garavan et al., 2006: 
96).8
  
 
The past does not only become audible through the memories of the 
community. The other actors in this dispute – the state and the oil and 
gas exploration and development companies, in particular – also have 
memories of past conicts, past resolutions, and past successes (see, for 
example, Bradshaw, 2007; Davies, 2008; Wheeler, Rechtman, Fabig, & 
Boele, 2001). These memories also shape the events in Erris, though they 
are, perhaps, less audible than the sounds of the past for the protestors.  
Border thinking and decoloniality: putting Mignolo to work in 
Rossport  
Why Rossport should matter to political geography and political 
geographers is quite clear. The question of how Rossport should matter 
is more troublesome, but of more strategic importance. In approaching 
this question, the work of Walter Mignolo raises some interesting 
possibilities and directions. Mignolo is a professor of literature and a key 
writer on Latin America, yet his insights into the geo-politics of 
knowledge raise highly relevant questions: for Rossport and for political 
geography and geographers. By introducing the concepts of border 
thinking and decoloniality, therefore, I’d like to put Mignolo to work in 
Rossport.  
 
For Mignolo, and for a growing number of Latin American theorists, the 
idea of modernity should never be delinked from coloniality. The modern 
world system is also and always the colonial world system, Mignolo 
argues, and coloniality is the ‘darker’ side of modernity. There is, he says, 
‘no modernity without coloniality’ (Mignolo, 2007: 466). For Mignolo, 
this raises signicant questions about epistemologies, in particular the 
ways in which the tenets of modernity – variously described in terms of 
progress, development, emancipation and, especially, rationality – assume 
the rhetoric of universality. Mignolo challenges such universality through 
the introduction of his conceptualisation of body-politics and geo-
politics. By body-politics, he refers to the embodied construction of 
specic forms of allegedly universal knowledge; while by geo-politics he 
refers to the importance of locating the construction of knowledge. All 
histories, and indeed all geographies, are local, Mignolo argues. What 
differentiates these local histories and geographies is that some – like 
modernity or coloniality – have global designs. And global designs, as 
Mignolo points out, ‘are always controlled by certain types of local 
histories’ (Mignolo, 2000: 66), despite the attempts to mask the specic 
8 In Irish mythology, Balor (of the Evil Eye) was a king of the Fomorians, a race of giants. 
He had just one eye, and could kill people by looking at them. Lugh Airgeadlámh, a hero of 
the Tuatha de Danann, was Balor’s grandson, and was responsible for killing him 
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geopolitical location of their formulation (Mignolo, 2007: 463). Anibal 
Quijano describes this as the ‘provincial pretence to universality’ (in 
Mignolo, 2007: 493). This disruption of the global/local binary does not 
serve to reinstate the local as a privileged locus of knowledge. Rather, its 
aim is to recognise the particular power relations and spatial imaginaries 
of specic local histories and geographies.  
 
Decoloniality makes the place of knowledge production explicit. In 
arguing for the decolonisation of knowledge, Mignolo envisions a 
constant double movement, of ‘unveiling the geo-political location of 
theology, secular philosophy and scientic reason and simultaneously 
afrming the modes and principles of knowledge that have been denied 
by the rhetoric of Christianisation, civilisation, progress, development, 
market democracy’ (Mignolo, 2007: 463). The stories that the Rossport 
Five tell of their struggle and their imprisonment capture this double 
movement. They tell of a local community forced to educate itself about 
gas pipelines and pipeline pressure, water pollution and the practises of 
multinational corporations. They describe a clash of views – about the 
importance of place and community, about denitions of progress and 
development. And they also demonstrate the rhetoric of modernity: how 
their opposition was narrated as the stance of people opposed to 
progress and development. Underpinning these stories is the sense of a 
dominant world view that is itself highly localised. ‘They all went to the 
same school of training’, Philip McGrath observed of the Shell personnel 
who visited his house, trying to get him to sign over his land for the 
building of the pipeline (in Garavan et al., 2006: 103).  
 
The Rossport Five and their families and supporters reiterate that this is 
not a struggle about money and individual gain, a perspective that is 
difcult for multinational companies, and indeed many in contemporary 
Ireland, to understand. These very different approaches to the value of 
resources came into regular conict. For Mary Corduff, the Shell world 
view is that:  
money is the answer. Prot is all. People or environment 
doesn’t come into the equation. Money for them is all and 
they’d nearly think how could it not be money (in Garavan 
et al., 2006: 36).  
In a statement to the court, Micheál O Seighin said ‘the farms form the 
basis of the identity of the people. Monetary compensation cannot 
compensate for undermining the social identity of the people’ (in 
McCaughan, 2008: 77). And when Willie Corduff accepted the Goldman 
prize in 2007, he stated that Shell ‘have never understood what our place 
and our community means to us’ (Goldman Environmental Prize, 2007a). 
The short description of Rossport residents as not wishing to divide 
commonage may well be anaethema to the property owing obsession of 
contemporary Ireland (Dáil Eireann, 1978). However, the exchange in 
the Irish parliament gave an insight into a way of life based on co-
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operation and mutual aid, rather than individualisation and private prot.  
 
Yet, to argue that Rossport needs to be seen as a struggle to protect a 
traditional way of life falls into precisely the trap that Mignolo outlines. 
‘Tradition’, he argues, ‘is not a way of life that predated ‘modernity’ but 
an invention of the rhetoric of modernity’ (Mignolo, 2007: 472). The 
practise of difference, of fundamental importance to the rhetoric of 
modernity, was spatialised, rst placing modernity in opposition to 
located ‘barbarians’, and next placing modernity in opposition to located 
‘tradition’. The ‘barbarians’ of Rossport, the people ‘holding up the gas, 
holding up progress’ (Philip McGrath, in Garavan et al., 2006: 106), even 
when redened as the keepers of tradition, are always articulated in terms 
of the rhetoric of modernity. In this way, modernity – in the form of 
modern rationality – is ‘engulng and at the same time defencive and 
exclusionary’ (Mignolo, 2007: 451). Thus, the High Court judge – 
according to Philip McGrath – told the Rossport Five that ‘he could take 
everything off them’ (in Garavan et al., 2006: 114). The maps that SEPIL 
produced for planning applications, environmental impact statements and 
information campaigns made few attempts to show homes. The 
environmental impact statement section dealing with community and 
socio-economics states that ‘it is a fact that the Study Area is very 
peripheral even within County Mayo and this presents signicant 
development problems’ (SEPIL, 2008: 6-17), while pointing out that 
opposition to this kind of initiative often occurs despite the goal of 
modernisation through the spread of an industrial wealth base through 
the country (SEPIL, 2008: 6-1). Writing of oil companies in the Niger 
Delta, Michael Watts commented that they ‘had little understanding of 
community politics and simply interacted with local elites (or families 
within elite groups), lacked transparency in their determination of oil spill 
severity and compensation rates … and used cash payments as a way of 
attempting to purchase consent’ (Watts, 2004b: 22). Modernity at work, 
in Nigeria and in Ireland, is exclusionary, defensive, and engulng, and it 
can only exist and be maintained because of the domination of others 
(Escobar, 2007: 184).  
 
Where decoloniality refers to making explicit the body- and the geo-
politics of knowledge, border thinking offers a way to move beyond mere 
identication. Mignolo comments that one of the key problems with the 
rhetoric of modernity is its effect on those ‘who are not lucky enough to 
be in the space where time and history move forward’ (Mignolo, 2007: 
467). Border thinking links together those marginalised spaces. In doing 
so, it is both epistemological and ethical (Mignolo, 2000: 68–69). It is 
epistemological because it highlights the limits to modernity and the 
obscured body- and geopolitics of global designs. It also allows the 
connections between different experiences of exploitation to be explored 
(Mignolo, 2007: 498). As Mignolo comments:  
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what each diverse local history has in common with others 
is the fact that they all have to deal with the unavoidable 
presence of the modern/colonial world and its power 
differentials (Mignolo, 2007: 497).  
 
It is ethical because it is not concerned with imposing – by implicit or 
explicit force – one vision of society over others that differ. Rather, 
border thinking connects these common experiences and uses them to 
create a new, pluri-versal basis for knowing (Mignolo, 2007: 497).  
 
How might the story of Rossport illustrate decoloniality and border 
thinking? The rst relates to the ways in which the protestors used 
knowledge as a weapon, seeking out the rhetoric of modernity in the gas 
development project.9
 
Micheál O Seighin was sceptical of the original 
plans, yet uncertain of his own position. ‘I did see as a geographer that 
what they were doing was wrong, utterly stupid’, he said, ‘but maybe they 
knew more than I did’ (in Garavan et al., 2006: 66). Following from this, 
members and supporters of Shell to Sea made it their business to learn – 
about pipelines and about gas processing, but also about the ways in 
which they could create ruptures in the alliance between state and capital. 
Through their exposure of the ways in which state and EU policies and 
legislation had been breached, most recently in an appeal to the 
European Parliament’s Committee on Petitions, Shell to Sea continues to 
call both state and capital to account. Yet this is not without signicant 
costs. ‘That bloody company has forced me to learn more about pipeline 
safety than I ever wanted to know’, Micheál O Seighin said (in Allen, 
2007: xv), while his wife Caitlín said that for six years ‘he worked from 
morning until night on all sorts of documents and research work [while] 
I’d get very angry about things’ (in Garavan et al., 2006: 77). For others 
of the Rossport Five, their time in jail placed huge burdens on their 
families: the demands of farm work in the summer months, the stress of 
dealing with media and public appearances, and the strain of weekly trips 
to prison that meant leaving home at ve in the morning, and not getting 
back until late. The second relates to the ways in which protestors against 
the pipeline understand place. Vincent McGrath expressed it in this way:  
 
My ancestors have lived here in Rossport for many 
generations, at least six generations, in the same spot along 
the shore on the northern side of Sruth Fada Conn ... The 
homeplace down by the shore is called Rinn na Rón,10
 
where the seals used to congregate and sometimes come 
ashore. That’s where I was born and reared. So we’ve been 
here a long time and as you’d expect we have a strong sense 
9 This provides an interesting counterpoint to the ways in which capital employs knowledge 
geographically (see Bridge & Wood, 2005 for a discussion of geographies of knowledge in 
the oil industry). 
10 Rinn na Rón translates as ‘the place of the seals’. 
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of attachment to the land and a deep sense of belonging to 
the place (in Garavan et al., 2006: 157).  
 
Place, in this way, is tied to memory, to belonging, and to emotion. The 
logic of capital and prot does not necessarily dominate here, despite the 
sense of the area as economically marginal. This understanding of place is 
present in the work of other writers on Ireland: in that of Nuala Ní 
Dhomhnaill, for example, and her articulation of dinnsheanchas – the 
knowledge of place that is also a lived dimension of life (Ní Dhomhnaill, 
2005: 25–42); or in that of Tim Robinson, who poetically excavates the 
landscape of his home in Connemara (see, for example, Robinson, 2001, 
2006). These are not romanticised portrayals of place, but they are 
emotional, and that recognition of the emotion of place is of particular 
importance. The third relates to the ways in which the protestors actively 
drew parallels and created alliances with others, often using connections 
to place as a point of common reference. From members of the Rossport 
Solidarity Camp to Ogoni activists, Shell to Sea sought connections that 
would help them make sense of the situation and give them insights into 
successful struggle. So, they welcomed the ‘eco warriors’ at the camp, 
despite being told ‘they’ll rob every one of your houses’ (Willie Corduff, 
in McCaughan, 2008: 78). They developed relationships with activists in 
Nigeria, helped in many instances by Irish missionary nuns and priests 
who had worked in that country. Kevin O’Hara, an Irish priest who set 
up the Centre for Social and Corporate Responsibility in Port Harcourt, 
Nigeria, said of his visit to Erris that ‘I was very saddened to see all the 
mistakes, a repeat of what I saw in Nigeria and it was happening in 
County Mayo, Ireland’ (in McCaughan, 2008: 107). Describing 
themselves as ‘an international non-violent campaign’, Shell to Sea cite 
Gandhi, Martin Luther King and Michael Davitt as inspirations for their 
actions, and link their actions to national and international protest 
groups, while remaining locally based (Shell to Sea, 2008), displaying a 
form of open localism (Castree, 2004) or the ‘convergence spaces’ of 
global justice movements that are place-based though not place-bound 
(Cumbers, Routledge, & Nativel, 2008: 192). In these various ways, the 
protestors work to unveil the rhetoric of modernity. In the process, they 
create the conditions for the kind of border thinking suggested by 
Mignolo – a way of recognising the distinct ‘spaces of experience’ of 
places around the world, marked by their distinct experiences of 
modernity and coloniality, and linked by their desire to build a different 
world.  
 
Putting Rossport to work in political geography  
In their recent editorial, the editors of Political Geography wrote of the 
need to kick political geography further towards a ‘global perspective’ 
(O’Loughlin, Raento, & Sidaway, 2008: 2). My concern is with their idea 
of a global perspective. While I appreciate its underlying sentiment, 
following Mignolo and Khatibi I wish to suggest that a global perspective 
may not be the most appropriate aspiration. Instead, I propose that 
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political geography aims for ‘an other perspective’ (Mignolo, 2000), and I 
argue that the story of Rossport offers one such perspective.  
 
I want to start with the epistemologies of Rossport within the context of 
political geography. How might we place Rossport? Is it a resource 
conict? Is it an environmental movement? Is it an uplifting account of 
transnational advocacy? In many ways, Rossport could be used to 
illustrate all of these approaches. As a resource conict, it provides an 
interesting illustration of critical resource geographies that centres such 
an analysis in the European Union, albeit at the western periphery of the 
EU (Hayter, Barnes, & Bradshaw, 2003). It has been analysed as an 
environmental movement by a variety of sociologists, interested in 
understanding Rossport as yet another iteration of protests fuelled 
primarily by environmental concerns (Leonard, 2007, 2008). Within the 
discipline of geography, it was used for building networks of 
transnational advocacy when a number of IBG speciality groups signed a 
letter of protest against Shell’s involvement in the development. In this 
way, Rossport became yet another site of protest against Shell 
sponsorship of the RGS. In all of these instances, Rossport has the 
potential to be an intriguing case study, particularly if such a case study 
highlights the layers and levels of connections and complexities – what 
Gearóid Ó Tuathail has described as ‘thick geographical knowledge’ (Ó 
Tuathail, 2003: 654). However, the case study as currently constituted in 
human geography serves a different purpose. While in a small number of 
instances, particular cases ‘have become the focus of so much research 
they’ve become iconic’ (Castree, 2005: 541), those cases are most often 
‘global’ cities, home to global geographers. Most often, cases are used to 
illustrate theory at work, by providing the ‘case study from another place’ 
(Simonsen, 2004: 526). In this way, there is an obvious conict between 
the complex ways in which human geographers theorise place, and the 
ways in which they put those places to work. If Rossport is to be a case 
study, then it needs to be understood not as an exemplar of a particular 
theoretical position, but rather as a complicated and entangled place with 
its own ‘spaces of experience’ and ‘horizons of expectations’. Rather than 
forcing the Shell to Sea campaign into universalist theoretical frameworks 
that fail to take account of either their body-or geo-politics, this approach 
highlights the local geographies of theory-production. In this way, 
Rossport becomes a study of the scalar geographies of politics and 
political action – this inversion, for political geography, represents a form 
of border thinking.  
 
In Rossport, everyday life has been drawn into practical politics (Smith, 
2005: 37). Yet, the catalyst for activist politics is a potent combination of 
fear and anger, underpinned by a desire for justice. The stories of the 
Rossport Five are suffused with fear: fear of a loss of livelihood, and fear 
of a destruction of a community and a way of life, particularly through 
some kind of potential environmental catastrophe. They also narrate the 
ways in which fear becomes transformed into anger, and how anger itself 
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is transformed into action. This anger is palpable. Caitlín Uí Sheighin 
comments on the ‘contemptuous manner’ that the judge used (in 
Garavan et al., 2006: 84), while Philip McGrath spoke of how locals, 
following the compulsory acquisition orders, ‘probably had more temper 
against them then. A bit of anger was getting up then’ (in Garavan et al., 
2006: 105). Brendan Philbin, meanwhile, said of Shell that: ‘they have 
instilled an anger in families that won’t be forgotten for long a many day’ 
(Goldman Environmental Prize, 2007b) – that sense of anger was 
intensied following the imprisonment of the Rossport Five. 
Geographers are again beginning to irt with emotion – with fear and 
angst, with awe and love, with worry and loss (Davidson, Bondi, & 
Smith, 2005: 2–3). Many of these emotions, particularly love and fear, are 
present in the narrations of place that form the basis of the Rossport 
struggle, and make sense within a longer geographic tradition that 
attempts to understand the relationship between people and the places 
they inhabit. Yet, in the nascent recognition of the place of emotions 
within geography, anger still struggles for recognition. Anger ‘is still, 
more often than not, evaluated negatively in western thought’ (West-
Newman, 2004: 191). This is clear within geography, and within political 
geography, where anger is suspiciously missing from the narratives and 
the analyses that make it into print.11
 
Despite calls for angry writing 
(Keith, 1992) and for a ‘critical geography animated by both anger and 
hope’ (Blomley, 2007: 62), a broader engagement with the geographies 
and politics of anger is still absent. Yet, anger is central to the protests at 
Rossport; and requires ethical and epistemological attention. In another 
context, West-Newman comments that anger ‘enunciates and justies 
demands for justice and restitution; it confronts threats to survival and 
well-being’ (West-Newman, 2004: 204). 
 
‘An other’ thinking, within political geography, recognises the validity and 
importance of anger, and sees anger as a collective experience and 
expression, rather than as an individual failure. It also sees anger as 
crucial to social transformation, rather than only about individual self-
awareness. Taking the anger of Rossport seriously requires political 
geographers to engage, more directly, with emotional geographies, 
particularly those related to conicts and disagreements over place and 
over resources.  
11 There is a body of work on hate within political geography (see Flint, 2004), but not 
on anger. 
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Fig. 3. Land through which the pipeline, as originally proposed, would 
have passed (Goldman Environmental Prize, 2007d).  
 
 
 
Anger has been identied as important to ‘dialogues of indigenous rights’ 
(West-Newman, 2004: 190), and this also suggests another direction that 
Rossport offers for political geography. In another work, Lawrence Berg 
and I have argued that geography needs to engage with anti-colonial as 
well as postcolonial thought (Gilmartin & Berg, 2007), while others have 
argued for the need for a dialogue about ‘indigenous geographies’ 
(Johnson, Cant, Howitt, & Peters, 2007; Shaw, Herman, & Dobbs, 2006). 
Anti-colonial and indigenous geographies come together in Rossport, 
where Micheál O Seighin weaves together Balor and Lugh Airgeadlámh 
with an analysis of the pipeline protest that says ‘our establishment may 
be postcolonial but we are not’ (in Garavan et al., 2006: 62).12
 
Yet, the 
concept of indigeneity may well be stretched by Rossport. For example, 
Shaw et al. describe indigenous peoples as:  
 
groups with ancestral and often spiritual ties to particular 
land, and whose ancestors held that land prior to 
colonisation by outside powers, and whose nations remain 
submerged within the states created by those powers (Shaw 
et al., 2006: 268).  
 
While it is clear that many people in Erris have a strong tie to the land 
and the place, it is more difcult to prove an ancestral link, and almost 
12 For Ó Seighin, the marker of a postcolonial state is that power rests with elites – with 
the civil service and the politicians – rather than with the people (Garavan et al., 2006: 
62). 
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impossible to assert the people of Erris as a submerged nation within the 
Irish state. In other words, many people in Erris and many of the 
protestors against the pipeline understand themselves as Irish, rather than 
as Irish-, and their understanding of what it means to be Irish was central 
to their protest. As Vincent McGrath said, ‘going to jail was an act of 
faith in the Irish people and I was proven right because once the people 
had the facts about what was going on they supported us’ (in Garavan et 
al., 2006: 177).  If indigeneity is further understood as racialised, then this 
creates additional difculties in Erris, where the population is racially 
homogenous: in the Mayo Gaeltacht, for example, 98.8% of respondents 
identied as White in the 2006 Census (CSO, 2006). 
 
More broadly, Erris is located within the European Union, governed by 
EU legislation, in one of the world’s wealthiest countries. Yet, the search 
for collective rights and sovereignty, the insistence on the importance 
and meaning of place, and the shared experience of past colonialisms 
highlight the ways in which the struggles of Rossport may well resonate 
with the struggles of many indigenous groups. The events in and around 
Erris demonstrate a common experience – the ways in which people who 
‘have other ideas of how economy and society should be organised … 
become subject to all kinds of direct and indirect violence’ (Mignolo, 
2007: 450).13
 
For the Rossport Five, the land they fought for could not 
have a monetary value – its value was measured in memories and 
attachments, and fear and anger was the motivation for its preservation. 
‘[I]t wasn’t about money. we weren’t used to money. We managed 
without money’, Willie Corduff insisted (in Garavan et al., 2006: 44). ‘I 
might as well die here with Shell as to go. Because I would die anyway if I 
had to leave with the memories I have of here’ (in Garavan et al., 2006: 
18). Border thinking – an other thinking – seeks these links between 
places that are fundamentally, albeit differently, marked and scarred by 
their experiences of coloniality through modernity. Rossport, as a 
location for anti-colonial activity, as a site of common ground with 
Indigenous geographers, as an entangled case study, and as a place of 
emotions, creates the possibility for new ‘horizons of expectation’ within 
political geography (see Fig. 3).  
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CHAPTER 24 
 
SPACE AND PLACE IN THE NATIONAL SPATIAL 
STRATEGY FOR THE REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 
 
JAMES A. WALSH 
 
First published in Davoudi, S. and Strange, I. (eds) (2009) Conceptions of 
Space and Place in Strategic Spatial Planning. London: Routledge, pp. 95-125. 
 
Introduction 
The publication of The National Spatial Strategy 2002 – 2020 (NSS) in 
December 2002 with the subtitle People, Places and Potential was a 
significant milestone in the history of planning in Ireland. Just over 
fifteen years previously the Minister for the Environment had abolished 
the National Institute for Physical Planning and Construction Research 
(An Foras Forbartha) and also the nine Regional Development 
Organisations that had since the early 1970s been responsible for the 
preparation of regional development strategies. Even more remarkable is 
the fact that just four years after the publication of the NSS it became a 
cornerstone for the National Development Plan 2007-2013 with the subtitle 
Transforming Ireland A Better Quality of Life for All (Government of Ireland 
2007). In his Foreword to the National Development Plan the Minister 
for Finance provides an unequivocal endorsement of the NSS: “our 
spatial strategy …is crucial to managing the challenges of the future and 
the potential for growth and development… spatial objectives are 
integrated within the goals of economic, social and environmental 
sustainability and our national and international responsibilities under 
these headings” (GoI 2007: 13).  
 
The NSS was formulated against a background of unprecedented 
economic transformation in the Republic of Ireland. Over a relatively 
short period the country had moved from a position of very low levels of 
economic development compared to the core regions of western Europe, 
to becoming the state with the second highest level of per capita Gross 
Domestic Products (GDP). The experience of economic convergence 
was, however, accompanied by increasing tendencies towards regional 
divergence within Ireland (Walsh 2000). The reality of unbalanced 
regional development in the context of increasing national prosperity was 
a major catalyst for producing the National Spatial Strategy. The goal of 
balanced regional development was itself problematic in definition and 
brought to the fore some deeply ingrained conceptions of the 
distinctiveness and expectations of the residents of certain places in 
Ireland.  
 
The National Spatial Strategy was also prepared against the background 
of the changed political landscape following the 1998 Good Friday 
Agreement in Northern Ireland (see Chapter Five in this volume) which 
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opened up the prospect of closer economic links over the longer term 
between the North and South of Ireland. Chapter Five in this volume 
provides an account of the initiative that was already underway to 
develop a regional development strategy for Northern Ireland. It was 
timely for the government in the Republic to consider the spatial 
dimension of economic development and how the emerging 
opportunities associated with a more stable political climate throughout 
the island might be utilized to the mutual benefit of both the North and 
the South. 
 
A further influence on establishing a receptive political climate for a 
National Spatial Strategy was the on-going European debate that 
culminated with the publication of the European Spatial Development 
Perspective (ESDP) in 1999. Officials from the Department of the 
Environment in Ireland participated in the ESDP process unlike their 
counterparts in Northern Ireland and Wales, through which they had 
become aware of the new spatial planning concepts and the vocabulary 
adopted for the ESDP.   
 
Taken together, the primary concern with balanced regional 
development, the emerging all-island dimension, and the awareness of 
the territorial planning discourse at the European level, provided a 
powerful synergy of pressures to prepare a Spatial Strategy for a new 
Ireland coming to grips with managing the fruits of success ‘while 
ensuring a high quality of life for all our people’ (DELG 2002:3). 
 
This chapter analyses the process of preparing the National Spatial 
Strategy using the conceptual frameworks relating to space and place 
presented in Chapter One. The next section commences with a more 
detailed discussion of the context for the strategy which is then followed 
by analyses of the strategy making process and the content of the NSS 
before some general conclusions are identified in the final section. As 
there are linkages between context, process and content the sub-themes 
identified in Chapter One are interwoven across the sections. For 
example, the context includes a discussion of both the empirical socio-
economic realities and also of initiatives by a number of government 
departments and others that helped to create a supportive institutional 
environment for launching the NSS preparation process. Within the 
process there was a constant interplay between knowledge creation 
through research and the various modes of consultation.  
 
The approach adopted here is to examine the concepts of space and place 
as they are used in the National Spatial Strategy, the extent to which there 
is a shared understanding of the concepts, and to consider the 
methodologies used by planners and others in the preparation of the 
Strategy.  The conceptualisation of space has changed very much over 
recent decades. It includes the more traditional absolutist perspective that 
treats geographic space as a container of fixed or mobile objects and 
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dynamic behavioural flows which are susceptible to analysis within the 
frameworks of positivism (Harvey 1969). More recently greater emphasis 
has been placed on structuralism and a relational perspective that space is 
continuously produced and reproduced through socio-spatial relations 
that include cultural, social, political and economic relations (Smith 1984; 
Sheppard 1995). The conceptualisation of place has been extensively 
developed in a relational sense by Massey (1995, 1997) and by others 
such as Soja (1989) from a post-modern perspective that emphasizes the 
importance of the personal sense of place, that places are relational and 
contingent, and are understood differently by different people. These 
varying conceptions of space and place are relevant to understanding 
how strategic spatial planning is approached and how that influences the 
content of the strategy. They are also important for understanding the 
range of methodologies and tools that are used by planners and others in 
the preparation of strategic spatial plans. Of particular interest is the 
extent to which alternative methodologies have been relied upon, 
including the rational comprehensive planning approach in which many 
planners were trained under the influence of Faludi (1973) and the more 
recent transactive planning practices involving participation, 
communication, abstract visualisation, negotiation, collaboration and 
institutional capacity building that are advocated by Innes (1996), 
Albrechts (2001), Allmendinger (2002) and  Healey (1997, 1998 and 
2006).   
 
The outcome from this review of the NSS process is an interpretation 
which identifies the coexistence of processes that are typically discussed 
within the traditions of positivist, structuralist or post-modern 
approaches to planning. The Irish experience is that processes and 
practices from each of the different planning traditions were necessary to 
ensure that a National Spatial Strategy could be produced which was 
sensitive to the needs of many different stakeholders such as the citizens, 
the business community, professional planners, senior officials across 
many departments of the civil service, and the elected political leaders. 
Reconciling the divergent conceptions of space and place, and the 
associated planning methodologies, held by influential stakeholders from 
different disciplinary backgrounds was a significant challenge for all 
involved in the NSS process.  
 
The context for the national spatial strategy 
The spatial context for economic and social development in Ireland is 
still strongly influenced by a settlement pattern and transport networks 
that were initially put in place to assist in the territorial organization and 
administration of a former colony. That legacy, which was historically 
guided by a relational spatial perspective coupled with a highly centralised 
public administrative system and an electoral model that encourages a 
strong sense of localism, continues to influence spatial development 
patterns even though the contemporary conditions are very different. 
Superimposed on the historical legacy are the locational imperatives of 
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foreign direct investment which is a key aspect of  Ireland’s engagement 
with globalization and has become the main driver of economic 
development over recent decades; a labour market catering for a highly 
educated and mobile workforce including many immigrants; and a more 
discriminating consumerist, but less cohesive, society that is increasingly 
attaching a higher premium to quality of life and broader environmental 
issues (Bartley and Kitchin 2007).  
 
Previous Responses to Uneven Regional Development 
The history of government engagement with the issue of uneven regional 
development in Ireland originates with the Undeveloped Areas Act of 
1952 and can be broadly subdivided into three phases over the past fifty 
years (Boylan 2005). The first, which lasted until the late 1960s, was 
mainly characterised by an association between development, 
industrialisation and urbanisation. For Ireland, given the very weak 
indigenous manufacturing base and also the imbalances in the urban 
system, this meant a strong reorientation of industrial policy towards the 
attraction of inward investment and a strong preference among 
influential policy advisors for an urban-oriented strategy which was most 
explicitly expressed in proposals for a regional development strategy 
based on growth centres (Buchanan and Partners 1968). However, this 
first phase also highlighted a tension, which has persisted, between the 
objectives for national economic growth, and other objectives in relation 
to the regional and rural dimensions of development.  
 
The rational theoretical underpinnings of the growth centre model did 
not find sufficient political support and it was abandoned by the 
government in 1969. The perceived risks to the ‘efficiency’ of national 
development policies from a proactive approach to championing regional 
‘equity’, along with the political challenges of promoting an urban-led 
approach to an electorate comprising a very large rural component, 
resulted in a move towards a regional strategy that became heavily reliant 
on the dispersal of inward investment in manufacturing, coupled with a 
restriction on supports for Dublin (Walsh 1989). The Buchanan strategy 
was a classic managerial or control type intervention that was well 
grounded on a positivist analytical process but very weak on consultation, 
consensus building and customisation to meet the particularities of the 
Irish spatial context. The failure to have the Buchanan strategy adopted 
as government policy left a long shadow over any future attempts to 
promote a new spatial development strategy. Indeed, one of the 
challenges faced by those preparing the NSS was to find ways of 
differentiating it from its failed predecessor, a challenge that was 
compounded by a lingering reluctance among some economic analysts to 
recognise that planning paradigms and the conceptualisations of space 
and place had changed significantly over the intervening years (see for 
example O’Leary 2001). 
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The second phase covered the period from the early 1970s to the late 
1980s. Government policy statements in 1969 and 1972 effectively 
identified the regional industrial strategy of the Industrial Development 
Authority (IDA) as the main instrument for achieving the goals of 
regional development. The 1970s was also a period of considerable 
expansion and improvements in farm incomes during the period of 
transition to full Common Agricultural Policy’s guaranteed prices. The 
redistribution of employment in manufacturing along with the new 
prosperity in the more commercially oriented farming regions resulted in 
a major demographic turn around, where net in-migration, coupled with a 
high birth rate, resulted in a population increase of 465,200 (15.6 per 
cent) between 1971 and 1981. Most importantly the demographic change 
was experienced throughout most of the State (Horner et al 1987). 
 
However, throughout this period there were also significant weaknesses 
in the government strategy for regional development. The effects of 
industrial restructuring in Dublin and other old industrial centres were 
largely ignored; elsewhere there was an overemphasis on inward 
investment without sufficient support for indigenous firms, and there 
was a policy vacuum in relation to the emerging services sector (Walsh 
1989). More importantly, the spatial focus shifted to improving the 
position of the Republic of Ireland as a single region (without explicit 
reference to intra-regional imbalances) within the framework of the EU 
regions. Furthermore the political divisions and the ongoing conflicts in 
Northern Ireland were not conducive to any consideration of an island of 
Ireland perspective on spatial development. 
 
A critical review of industrial policy in 1982 led to a revision of the role 
of manufacturing industry in regional development. This was followed by 
a government White Paper on Industrial Policy in 1984 that proposed a 
move to a policy of supporting targeted manufacturing sectors where 
they could make the greatest progress, which was generally regarded as 
the larger urban centres. The shift in the focus of industrial policy was 
further supported by the National Economic and Social Council in 1985 
when it recommended that in future the designation of areas for 
industrial support should be based on criteria related to the potential 
rather than the needs of regions. This was the beginning of a return to a 
more urban focussed regional development strategy and a move away 
from the traditional needs or ‘regional equity’ approach.   
 
In addition to the reorientation of industrial policy, the general stagnation 
of the Irish economy in the 1980s resulted in a significant reduction in 
the volume of inward investment and a greatly diminished capacity by the 
Industrial Development Authority (IDA) to influence the location of new 
investments, especially towards the weaker regions. Widespread losses in 
manufacturing employment, a faltering agricultural sector, a weak 
producer services sector, and increasing unemployment, all combined to 
bring about a return to high levels of net emigration from both rural and 
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urban areas (Walsh 1991). These trends resulted in a mobilisation of local 
interests with powerful champions in the weaker rural areas (McDonagh 
2001) that lead to intensive lobbying of government for a renewed 
approach to securing balanced regional development. 
 
The foundations for a new era of economic development were laid in the 
mid-to-late 1980s (NESC 1986) resulting in very rapid economic growth 
in the 1990s during which the third phase in strategic spatial planning 
emerged. The transformation of the economy and society of Ireland since 
the early 1990s has been influenced by many factors including strategic 
repositioning by government and economic development agencies of 
Ireland as a space or investment territory in the broader context of the 
international economy (Breathnach 1998) which has resulted in the Irish 
economy becoming one of the most open in the world. Crucially, the 
transformation has been mediated through an unbalanced urban system 
that is dominated by the Dublin city region (McCafferty, 2007).  
 
The complexity and dynamic nature of the recent geography of socio-
economic development has been described by Horner (1993, 2000) who 
noted the emergence of city regions, while McHugh (2001) and Walsh 
(2007) have identified the intricate webs of relations that link rural and 
urban areas and which also contribute to the construction of an 
increasingly complex rural spatial structure. These analyses, combining 
elements of both the positivist and postmodern traditions, can be 
contrasted with others more firmly rooted in the traditional bounded 
spatial approach (e.g. administrative regions) of some regional 
economists (Morgenroth 2007). Collectively these studies confirmed the 
existence of significant inter-regional differences in economic 
performance, especially in relation to per capita productivity levels and 
also in the endowments of key resources that are likely to influence 
future development patterns. These resources include physical 
infrastructure, human capital and institutionalized knowledge creation 
and transfer mechanisms.  
 
By the late 1990s it had become evident that while the macro economic 
indicators for Ireland were rapidly converging towards those for the most 
developed regions of the EU, there was also a strong tendency towards 
divergence on key socio-economic indicators for the Irish regions. 
Unbalanced regional development was reflected in widening differentials 
in productivity, new physical infrastructure investment, new employment 
opportunities, migration of the youngest and brightest from rural areas 
and small urban centres, and ultimately depopulation of extensive rural 
areas.  
 
At the same time escalating house prices in Dublin and other cities were 
forcing ever increasing numbers into new housing located at very 
considerable distances from the main workplaces. This phenomenon of 
long distance commuting (Williams and Shiels 2002; Walsh et al 2007) 
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from rural areas in the outer hinterlands of the cities while other rural 
areas continued to stagnate has resulted in heated discourses between 
those concerned about the implications of seemingly uncontrolled urban 
sprawl on the one hand, and the depopulation of more remote rural areas 
on the other hand. This issue combined with the concerns about the need 
to position Ireland advantageously in the EU and global economy, and 
the unbalanced distribution of economic activity within the State, was an 
additional factor in establishing the case for a National Spatial Strategy.  
 
The heightened awareness of inter and intra regional differences in the 
Republic of Ireland were brought into even sharper focus with the 
emergence of conditions to support a new era of political stability in 
Northern Ireland. Some economic leaders were quick to identify the 
possibility of a potential economic corridor linking Belfast and Dublin.  
For others it raised the prospect of an even greater spatial divide between 
the eastern and western parts of the island of Ireland, but it also provided 
opportunities to take a fresh perspective on spatial planning for the 
northwest and Border areas (Walsh and Murray 2006). For the 
government of the Republic it provided a unique opportunity to engage 
in a process of tentatively putting in place measures to support a more 
coherent approach to territorial development within the context of the 
territory of the entire island of Ireland, while fully recognizing the 
political status of Northern Ireland as a region of Great Britain. This 
contextual dimension has particular relevance for understanding the 
conceptualisation of the Border areas in the NSS and more broadly for 
interpreting the key long term proposal in the NSS for the gradual 
development of an Atlantic Corridor linking the main cities in the west 
and south. 
 
Related Policy Initiatives and Other Studies 
The trends just outlined emerged from a period during which the 
economic growth rates were much higher than anybody had anticipated 
and for which there was no overall spatial framework, nor were there 
appropriate administrative structures to ensure co-ordination and 
integration of policies and strategies. Serious concerns about the 
emerging spatial patterns of development were articulated in discourses 
around a number of related policy areas which helped to identify the 
need for a policy initiative in the area of high level strategic spatial 
planning. In addition, the case for a national spatial strategy was 
promoted by a wide range of powerful advisory bodies as well as by some 
organisations with a specific interest in regional development and spatial 
planning (Walsh 1999b).  
 
The government’s strategy for Sustainable Development (GoI 1997) 
affirmed the centrality of the environment in the process of development 
and it emphasised the role of the physical planning system in sectoral 
integration on a territorial basis. The general thrust of the Planning and 
Development Act, 2000, which for the first time introduced the concept 
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of planning and sustainable development, is towards a comprehensive and 
integrated approach to spatial planning extending from the local authority 
level through the regional to the national level so that the overall 
objective of balanced and sustainable development can be achieved in a 
manner compatible with the supranational perspective represented by the 
ESDP.  
 
The first White Paper on Rural Development, Ensuring the Future – A 
Strategy for Rural Development in Ireland included a recommendation that the 
objectives for rural development should be addressed within a framework 
for spatial development that takes account of the relationships between 
rural and urban areas and also of the diverse functional roles of towns 
and villages for those residing in the countryside (GoI 1999a).  
 
In the area of enterprise development the national policy advisory and 
co-ordination board for industrial development and science technology 
published, in 1996, A Strategy for Enterprise in Ireland in the 21st Century in 
which a forceful case was made for an urban-led regional policy (Forfas 
1996). It was followed in January 2000 with Enterprise 2010, which 
recommended a spatial strategy that would ensure: inter alia, co-ordinated 
provision of access, communication and utilities infrastructure, serviced 
land at an appropriate scale for towns of different size and a good 
regional spread of educational and training facilities (Forfas 2000).  
 
The fist major opportunity to get the specific concept of a national 
spatial strategy inserted into the overall thrust of development policies 
came with the preparation of the third National Development Plan for 
the period 2000-2006. The previous plans for 1989-1993 and 1994-1999 
were particularly weak on regional development and spatial planning 
(Walsh 1993).  
 
In advance of preparing the National Development Plan for the period 
2000-2006 the Department of Finance commissioned a report by the 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) on the priorities for 
investment. Significantly, it recommended that a national spatial strategy 
focused on a hierarchical hub and spoke settlement model should be 
adopted as the framework for a massive investment programme over the 
medium to long term (FitzGerald et al, 1999).  
 
Contemporaneously with the preparation of the ESRI Report and 
ongoing work on the National Development Plan by the Department of 
Finance, the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) was also 
preparing an outline strategy for development for the first decade of the 
twenty first century (NESC 1999). It set out a new vision which included 
the objective of sustainable and balanced development between regions 
and between urban and rural areas. In placing considerable emphasis on a 
comprehensive programme of infrastructural investment to encompass 
economic, social and environmental dimensions the NESC Report 
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strongly recommended a National Spatial Development Strategy. This 
was a crucial report as the NESC is chaired by the highest ranking civil 
servant and includes among its membership the most senior national 
representatives of each of the social partners as well as senior officials 
from key government departments. It is a key arena for consensus 
building at the highest level and its recommendations are normally taken 
seriously by the government. 
 
Finally, the National Development Plan 2000-2006 (NDP) published in 
November 1999 identified balanced regional development as a core 
objective. This was the first time that a National Development Plan gave 
such prominence to regional policy for which the following objective was 
identified:  
 
to achieve more balanced regional development in order to 
reduce the disparities between and within the two regions 
and to develop the potential of both to contribute to the 
greatest possible extent to the continuing prosperity of the 
country. (GoIb1999:43 (3.19).  
 
In support of this objective the NDP identified Dublin, Cork, Limerick–
Shannon, Waterford and Galway as ‘Gateways’ or locations where public 
and private investment would be prioritised in order to drive the 
development of their wider regions. Furthermore, the NDP committed 
the Department of the Environment and Local Government to prepare 
an overall spatial development strategy for the whole country, including 
the identification of a limited number of additional regional gateways to 
complement those already identified in the NDP.  
 
The contextual overview has demonstrated the importance of evidence-
based empirical analysis, with a strong emphasis on visual representation 
as a tool to promote a shared understanding of the need for a spatial 
policy initiative. It has also illustrated that a consensus around the need 
for an NSS only emerged after a lengthy process involving many 
seemingly unrelated initiatives. Much of the early public discourse was 
facilitated through conferences and publications of the Irish Branch of 
the Regional Studies Association (McCafferty and Walsh 1997; Walsh 
1998) rather than directly through the professional planning institutes 
which became active at later stages. Finally, an important feature of the 
process that led to the decision to prepare an NSS was the participation 
of a small number of individuals who were unaffiliated to any of the 
major stakeholders, in almost all of the preparatory steps mentioned 
above which provided a basis for maintaining consistency in relation to 
the overall objectives that an NSS should address.  
 
The preparation process of the national spatial strategy 
The formal process of preparing the NSS was launched in Spring 2000 
following the establishment of a Spatial Planning Unit (SPU) within the 
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Department of the Environment and Local Government. The SPU was a 
small cohesive group of only four professional planners who were 
assisted by a senior level administrative civil servant. In recognition of 
the cross cutting nature of spatial planning a Steering Group of high level 
representatives from all relevant government departments was 
established to assist the SPU. This was an important forum which helped 
to negotiate a consensus across departments with potentially conflicting 
goals.  
 
In addition an Expert Advisory Committee, chaired by the former Chief 
Executive of the agency responsibile for attracting inward investment to 
Ireland, was established. It included academic and other professional 
experts from different parts of Ireland, along with representatives from 
Northern Ireland and Scotland. Furthermore, the broader European 
reference frame was represented by a senior member of the ESPON 
programme management team. This Group assisted the SPU by critically 
assessing and refining at an early stage new concepts and approaches to 
planning, and also by ensuring that the NSS retained a clear focus on 
each of the three keywords: National, Spatial, and Strategy.  
 
Collectively, the personnel of the SPU and the Expert Advisory Group 
brought a considerable amount of planning expertise and skills to the 
process which provided the opportunity to develop the NSS in a way that 
went distinctively further in a conceptual and methodological sense than 
the NDP or any of the other strategies or reports mentioned in the 
previous section. The planning methodologies that became important in 
the preparation process included visual representations of the current and 
prospective situations based on best available evidence, extensive 
consultations guided by research, and negotiations aimed at achieving a 
politically acceptable and administratively workable set of proposals. 
 
The preparation of the strategy was guided by three parallel and 
complementary methodological processes. The first was an extensive 
programme of both proactive and reactive consultation; the second was a 
major research programme, and the third involved formal arrangements 
to secure buy-in across a number of government departments.  
 
Consultation Phase 1 
From the outset, the Minister responsible for producing the National 
Spatial Strategy was determined to develop the strongest possible level of 
consensus about the need for a national spatial strategy and what it might 
contain. To this end, specialist communications experts were procured to 
assist the SPU team in developing sophisticated techniques for both 
listening to the views of various groups and interests and communicating 
perspectives, conclusions from research and the finished product itself.  
 
Very quickly the SPU produced a scoping report that set out the 
objectives and methodology for preparing the strategy (DELG 2000a). 
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The Scope and Delivery report sets out clearly the national and international 
context. In particular, it acknowledges the relevance of the aims and 
options contained in the ESDP. It then identifies the following objectives 
for the NSS:   
 Continuing national economic and employment growth;  
 Continuing improvement in Ireland’s international 
competitiveness; 
 Fostering balanced regional development; 
 Improving the quality of life for all sections of society; and 
 Maintaining and enhancing the quality and diversity of the natural 
environment and cultural heritage. 
 
In order to achieve these objectives through spatial planning the report 
identified ten key challenges that the NSS would need to address. Apart 
from the challenge of fully exploring the concept of ‘balanced regional 
development’, other challenges related to reconciling the potentially 
competing objectives of economic competitiveness with balanced 
development; developing the concept of Gateways that was initially 
proposed in the NDP; assessing infrastructural requirements; addressing 
areas of social  exclusion, and ensuring that the NSS would build upon 
the relationship between the two political entities on the island of Ireland 
and between Ireland and its EU partners. 
 
This was followed by an outline of the methodology that would be 
adopted for the preparation process which would include opportunities 
for participation by a broad range of stakeholders at different stages. The 
outline timeframe was very ambitious with a target of completing the 
process by the end of 2001. The scoping report was widely disseminated 
and generally given an enthusiastic welcome for its level of detail and its 
commitment to facilitating participation while at the same time aiming 
for a relatively short timeframe. To the extent that there was any dissent 
it mostly related to concerns about delays that an extensive consultation 
process might incur. 
 
Targeting of key audiences was a key aspect of the consultation and 
communications strategy. The first large event was attended by 
approximately 300 invited ‘leaders’ from the public, private and voluntary 
sectors, and was addressed by ‘champions’ of the NSS proposal. These 
included the Minister with overall responsibility for developing the NSS 
who was an enthusiastic advocate. This “Leaders Forum” was followed 
by workshops organised with the assistance of the eight Regional 
Authorities. Other high priority target groups included senior officials in 
national and regional development agencies, each of the social partners, 
national advisory fora such as the National Economic and Social Council 
and the National Partnership for Sustainable Development (Comhar).  
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The consultation process was guided by presentations of findings arising 
from the ongoing research programme, and also at crucial stages by 
papers published by the SPU. The first, disseminated in February 2000, 
sought to elicit views on an indicative list of issues that were grouped 
under six broad headings (DELG 2000b):  
 Urban Ireland and balanced regional development 
 Rural Ireland and balanced regional development 
 People and balanced regional development 
 Communications infrastructure and balanced regional 
development 
 Management of the environment and balanced regional 
development 
 Delivery mechanisms and balanced regional development. 
 
While the manner of listing issues around urban and rural Ireland might 
have conveyed a sense of a conceptualisation based on separate, self-
contained and unconnected spaces, in practice the emphasis was strongly 
on the relationships between areas, including an explicit reference to the 
international and national roles of Dublin, and an explicit recognition of 
the diversity of rural area types based on a specially commissioned rural 
typology study.  
 
The Department of the Environment received 73 submissions in 
response to the Issues paper from a wide range of sources that included 
local and regional authorities, other public bodies, and community-based 
groups and individuals. Among the key responses were widely held views 
that the NSS should be unambiguously recognised as the overarching 
framework for local and regional strategies, and that the interaction with 
other policy areas should be curtailed to the spatial dimension. Other 
concerns that emerged from the submissions were around areas such as 
quality of life, transport and accessibility especially in rural areas, 
employment prospects particularly outside the main cities, declining 
population in rural areas, protection of landscapes of national 
importance, and policies in relation to urban sprawl, ribbon development 
and single rural dwellings. 
 
From these responses it was evident that expectations were high with 
regard to the NSS and also that a strong social dimension needed to be 
included which had to be reconciled with the economic competitiveness 
concerns of the Department of Finance, representatives of the business 
community such as the Chambers of Commerce, and others. The 
overriding conceptual issue that emerged however was to do with 
balanced regional development, about which there was much confusion 
and uncertainty.  
 
Recognising the central importance of establishing an agreed perspective 
on how balanced regional development might be defined, the Issues paper 
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was followed in June 2000 by a Technical Working Paper on the concept 
of Balanced Regional Development (BRD). This paper was crucial to the 
direction that the NSS would eventually take. It was published early in 
the process, following deliberations by the Expert Advisory Group. Two 
competing interpretations of BRD were considered where the distinction 
was between ‘balance as equality’ and ‘balance as full utilisation of 
potential’. Drawing on the report of the Study Programme on European 
Spatial Planning (Nordregio 2000) the SPU recommended the ‘potential’ 
interpretation and provided the following definition of balanced regional 
development: 
 
A structured spatial development approach, which seeks to 
ensure that no area or space is under or overdeveloped to 
the extent that this detracts from that area’s potential to 
contribute to realising the optimal performance of the 
country as a whole in economic, social, environmental and 
physical terms (DELG 2000c:3).  
 
The concept of ‘potential’ is a central component of the approach to 
BRD outlined above. This was defined as ‘the combination of socio-
economic and locational factors and the interaction between them that 
create the conditions and possibilities for economic development’, 
(DELG 2000c:4). The BRD paper brought the discussion a stage further 
by focusing on the concepts of space and place which, following the 
SPESP report, were defined as follows:  
 
‘a ‘space’ is a territorial arrangement where any given place 
can be described by comparison with other locations 
within that territory’, and ‘a ‘place’ is any geographical 
location that can be described in comparison to other 
locations in terms of unique characteristics’ (DELG 
2000c:4). 
 
The central task of the NSS was then presented as being about ‘spatial 
positioning’ of any given ‘place’ in relation to a ‘space’. This rather 
abstract formulation provides some insights into the conceptual 
challenges faced by the members of the SPU. While rejecting the 
traditional ‘needs’ or ‘regional equity’ arguments as the rationale for the 
NSS, the spatial translation of the alternative ‘potential’ approach was 
difficult to achieve with clarity. However, the difficulties in defining the 
concept of  potential within a regional context which has roots in the 
‘balanced competitiveness’ concept used in the ESDP, may well have 
been helpful at that juncture in the preparation process. A clear rejection 
of the spatial equity approach could be justified from a rational analytical 
perspective, and this was necessary in order to maintain the confidence 
of economic stakeholders in the process who feared that the NSS could 
lead to a weakening of the national economic performance by detracting 
investment from Dublin. This concern was acknowledged from the 
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outset by the Minister for the Environment when he addressed the first 
Leaders’ Forum, at which he confirmed that the NSS would ensure that 
the international competitiveness of Dublin would be maintained. 
 
The presentation of the ‘potential’ model was, however, for the most part 
rooted  in conceptions of space and place that are close to the positivist 
tradition in that ‘space’ is used to describe territorial containers in which 
‘places’ have locally defined and constructed characteristics. This 
approach does not adequately reflect the extent to which places in 
Ireland are economically and socially embedded in international networks 
of production and consumption.  
  
The Balanced Regional Development paper elicited many responses with 
the majority supportive of the proposed interpretation. Not surprisingly 
some of the more cautious responses were from representatives of areas 
that might have expected to gain more from the spatial equity approach, 
while on the other hand the most enthusiastic support came from the 
economic and business interests and representatives of Dublin. There 
was little response from the academic community of planners and related 
disciplines so that the opportunity for critical analysis that might lead to 
further refinement of the core concepts did not arise.  
 
The NSS Research Programme 
An extensive research programme was embarked upon in tandem with 
the first phase of the consultation process. The abandonment of regional 
planning for almost twenty years had left a major void in the knowledge 
base concerning the patterns, and underlying dynamics, of spatial 
development in Ireland. The SPU identified a list of almost 30 research 
projects that needed to be undertaken over a very short time frame. In 
practice this mammoth task was shared between the members of the SPU 
and several consultancies including university based research units. This 
approach brought additional planning expertise into the process and 
resulted in an extensive body of new knowledge which was publicised in 
summary format on the NSS website.  
 
A selection of the main outcomes from the research programme are 
summarised in Walsh (2004). The research projects provided a significant 
resource of new information on spatial patterns that were of direct 
relevance to the formulation of the NSS proposals. While much of the 
new information was more descriptive than analytical in nature, which is 
not surprising given the very limited time frame for this work, it was used 
extensively in the workshops in order to maintain the focus on high level 
national issues and to avoid the risks associated with regional or local 
level introspection. More generally, the research component highlighted 
that there were significant gaps in the knowledge base on contemporary 
patterns of spatial development, especially at a fine geographical scale, 
and there were even greater gaps in the understanding of the underlying 
dynamics shaping new spatial patterns. For example, very little is known 
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of the extent of the regional, national and international networks that 
places are situated within; the new types of rural-urban relations; or the 
functional roles of small and medium size urban centres. It also became 
evident that there are serious deficits in the range and quality of easily 
accessible spatial data, and that the capacity for spatial data analysis and 
modelling was very weak. The scale of the challenges to be addressed 
within the time frame of the NSS was estimated by reference to specially 
prepared population projections. 
 
Consultation Phase 2 
The second phase in the consultation process commenced in September 
2001 when the SPU published the final Consultation Paper Indications for 
the Way Ahead (DELG 2001). The 33 page document restates the 
purpose, vision and principles of the NSS. It then elaborates on the 
proposed approach to balanced regional development which it suggests 
should be ‘a targeted approach based on the focussed strengthening of a 
small number of urban centres’ (DELG 2001: 4). It also asserts that this 
small number of strong centres will:  
 energise the contribution that different areas can make to 
balanced regional development, 
 facilitate the development of North/South interactions, 
 counterbalance the pull of the Greater Dublin Area and the 
Dublin-Belfast corridor, 
 support complementary roles for urban and rural areas, and 
 lift the level of development of entire areas. 
 
In order to achieve these objectives five concepts were introduced: 
functional areas; potential; critical mass; gateways; and linkages. Taken 
together this set of concepts provided the basis for elaborating a more 
comprehensive approach to balanced regional development. The 
introduction of the concept of functional areas as an explicit alternative 
to thinking of territorial organisation in mainly administrative boundary 
terms was a major innovation to discussions about regional development 
and planning in Ireland. By focusing on the relationships between places 
the SPU selected twelve functional areas that covered the entire State. 
The boundaries of such areas were depicted as overlapping and 
imprecise, and were designed to convey a sense that in the latter phase of 
the NSS preparation the precision associated with formal empirical 
analysis needed to be modified to take account of additional informal 
knowledge derived in a somewhat ad hoc fashion from the collective 
wisdom of experienced planners and other spatial development 
researchers. According to the DELG (2001:15) the functional areas 
‘typically tend to share common characteristics and issues, and they are 
spaces where people live their working, schooling, shopping and leisure 
lives and with which many can identify. This sense of identification spans 
the urban/rural divide and in places extends across county boundaries’. 
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Each of the areas contains an urban centre or a number of centres, which 
are central to the economic functioning of that area. 
 
The functional areas approach to balanced regional development relies 
heavily on the concepts of potential and critical mass. Potential is now 
defined as the capacity which an area possesses for development arising 
from its endowment of natural resources, population, labour, economic 
and social capital and its location relative to markets. Different areas have 
varying types and levels of potential. Critical mass is defined as the size, 
concentration and characteristics of populations that enable a range of 
services and facilities to be supported and which, in turn, can attract and 
support higher levels of economic activity. It is, therefore, an important 
concept in optimising local and regional potential. Critical mass can be 
achieved in different ways. It normally requires a concerted effort to 
develop a single town or city to play a larger role and deliver benefits to 
its wider hinterland. Alternatively, in some areas it might involve 
providing a package of supports to link a number of neighbouring towns 
in a polycentric network in order to collectively achieve a critical level of 
supporting infrastructures, facilities and services. Concentration of 
resources to achieve stronger centres and, thereby, the development of 
related areas is a crucial dynamic in bringing about more balanced 
regional development.  
 
The National Development Plan designated the five largest urban centres 
as Gateways. These centres are at strategic locations and they also 
possess good social and economic infrastructure and support services 
including higher education institutions. The Indications paper signalled 
that there was scope for three or four additional Gateways though it 
refrained from identifying them. It further asserted that there would be a 
role for smaller centres, both individually and as components of regional 
urban networks. Rural areas for the most part were envisioned as 
constituting the hinterlands of urban centres upon which they depend for 
services and economic opportunities.  
 
This territorial perspective, which allows for adaptations in response to 
the profiles of different regions, seeks to distance the NSS discourse 
from the language of Growth Centres that was associated with the earlier 
Buchanan report. In doing so it relies upon a broader concept of 
sustainable development than one primarily oriented towards economic 
growth. Thus it promotes a territorial approach based on spaces 
(represented by the functional areas) rather than one based on a small 
number of places as was the case with growth centre strategies. The 
adoption of ‘spaces’ as the territorial units for the draft NSS was a useful 
heuristic device in shifting the focus of most stakeholders from a short 
term and absolutist spatial perspective to a more dynamic and longer 
term approach where spatial positioning within Ireland and in the wider 
international arena became important. Finally, the Indications paper noted 
the importance of linkages between places or spaces which are regarded 
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as vitally important for building critical mass, enabling complementary 
strengths to develop in different places, and facilitating policies and 
strategies to promote development of a single island economy.  
 
The Indications paper was very widely distributed using a variety of media, 
and followed up by ten Consultative Forums including seven at regional 
level and three at national level that were facilitated through the National 
Economic and Social Council, the National Partnership for Sustainable 
Development, and a Professional Bodies forum that included planners, 
architects and engineers. The paper was also considered formally by most 
of the local authorities. This consultation phase took place at a sensitive 
time as a general election was due to be held before summer 2002. For 
this and other tactical reasons the content of the Indications paper 
remained parsimonious on specifics, such as identifying additional 
gateways or potential hub centres. The focus was kept at the conceptual 
level.  
 
There were in total 259 written responses to the paper from a wide 
variety of organisational and personal interests. The overwhelming 
reaction was supportive of the approach and proposals contained in the 
paper. Half of the responses subscribed without reservation to the overall 
approach towards balanced regional development and another 39 per 
cent were also supportive subject to some clarifications.  
 
There were, however, some key areas that generated considerable 
discussion. The main focus of the new discourse was on the concept of 
functional areas (FAs), which was followed by comments on the 
Gateways and other settlement proposals, and also by suggestions in 
relation to implementation. The functional area concept and the 
accompanying map elicited some positive support, as a starting position, 
from the Irish Planning Institute and the Institute of Engineers in 
Ireland, but overall there were strong reservations with almost 30 per 
cent of the submissions stating that the concept of functional areas as 
outlined in the paper did not provide a useful explanation for the manner 
in which the country functions spatially. The main concerns were that the 
boundaries of the functional areas were not coterminous with those of 
the counties and regions. Particularly strong reservations were expressed 
by the local authorities in the Midlands and Southeast as the draft FA 
map suggested a distinctive FA located between these two regions. 
 
The emphasis in the Indications paper on the role of Gateways in 
developing the FAs was also a cause for concern among those 
representing rural interests. In particular there was a view shared by many 
that the Strategy was likely to be urban led, with potentially detrimental 
impacts on rural areas. Allied to this was a concern that planning issues in 
respect of rural housing were not adequately addressed, which in itself is 
a discourse of contestation. A related issue mentioned by the Irish 
Planning Institute and other professionals was a need to identify and 
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protect outstanding landscapes as components of the national culture and 
heritage, while also recognising that they may constitute significant 
economic assets especially in some of the more disadvantaged rural areas. 
A different concern expressed by the National Partnership for 
Sustainable Development was that the Indications paper did not explicitly 
attempt to integrate sustainable development with spatial planning. 
 
In summary the second consultation phase was characterised as a process 
led by the experts in the SPU and their advisors, that involved extensive 
well targeted consultation, and which sought views on a number of key 
concepts that could eventually underpin the final version of the NSS. At 
a conceptual level the paper introduced a relational perspective on space 
with spatial development considered as a dynamic process mediated 
through a hierarchical network of places. The precision of positivist 
analysis was replaced by somewhat fuzzy visualisation, and in keeping 
with the structuralist paradigm the roles of agencies such as local 
authorities, sectoral development bodies, key infrastructural providers, 
and professional organisations as stakeholders in spatial development 
were recognised. The feedback from the consultation process 
necessitated a revision of some key concepts (e.g. functional areas) and a 
need to incorporate what may be described as post-modern concerns that 
acknowledge diversity and the multiple responsibilities of spatial planning 
such as sustainable development, quality of life, protection of outstanding 
landscapes, and maintenance of viable rural communities. This phase also 
emphasised the necessity for clarity and consistency among those 
responsible for developing the strategy on what ought to be the core 
issues addressed in the NSS, and what other contexts might be more 
appropriate for issues that do not strictly come within the scope of the 
NSS. 
 
The consultation process continued throughout the first half of 2002, 
though in a less visible manner as the place specific sensitivities implicit 
in the National Spatial Strategy had to be carefully managed in the 
volatile context of a national election campaign. While all political parties 
were in agreement on the broad objective of balanced regional 
development and on the need for better planning in urban and rural areas 
it was prudent in the context of an electoral campaign to avoid any 
politically contrived debate on the roles that particular places might be 
assigned.   
 
Modes of Implementation   
The Indications paper provided several proposals in relation to how the 
NSS might be implemented. These included the establishment of a 
Managing Authority at central level that would be supported by an inter-
departmental network representing all of the relevant government 
departments, and also mechanisms for ensuring co-ordinated actions by 
various State agencies and infrastructure providers. In this way it was 
envisaged that the implementation, or perhaps more appropriately the 
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application, of the NSS would build on the partnership model of 
negotiated co-operation and collaboration that had been fostered 
throughout the preparation process. It was also proposed that in future 
all sectoral strategies would need to be consistent with the NSS 
objectives and overall framework, and furthermore that the application of 
the NSS would be supported in a consistent way by new Regional 
Planning Guidelines and county/city development plans while the City 
and County Development Boards would be required to provide 
frameworks for integrated development in accordance with the NSS. 
These proposals were generally welcomed and could be interpreted as 
evidence of support for a balanced approach that envisaged a 
combination of some elements of the positivist tradition of command 
and control via land use regulation, and also elements of the post-modern 
paradigm with its emphasis on participation, consensus building and 
shared governance in both the horizontal and vertical dimensions. In 
keeping with the overarching goal of greater coordination of spatial 
planning strategies between the two jurisdictions on the island of Ireland 
the Indications paper also suggested that the North/South Ministerial 
Council might assume a role in this area.  
 
The content of the national spatial strategy 
The final version of the National Spatial Strategy which builds upon the 
feedback to the Indications paper was published in December 2002. It is a 
substantial document written in a style that seeks to engage the various 
stakeholders in the expectation that there will be sufficient institutional 
and political support to ensure that the central messages distinguishing 
the NSS from other strategies are adopted throughout the public policy 
arena. Following a brief outline of the rationale and context for the NSS, 
Section Two provides an overview of the changing spatial structure of 
Ireland commencing with the external drivers and also summarising 
recent population and household projections. Section Three contains the 
core elements of the national strategy and sets out ‘how Ireland can be 
spatially structured and developed over the next twenty years in a way 
that is internationally competitive, socially cohesive and environmentally 
sustainable’ (DELG 2002:38). This is followed in Section Four by a 
preliminary outline of how each region will participate in the NSS. 
Section Five sets out indicative policies on the spatial dimensions of 
policies related to enterprise development, housing, access to services, 
and environmental management. In relation to the latter dimension 
which was identified as a weakness in some responses to the Indications 
paper, there is an affirmation that ‘the NSS will be implemented within 
the framework of strong and ambitious policies for the protection of the 
environment and policies to integrate environmental considerations into 
sectoral policies’ (DELG 2002:114). Various aspects of implementation 
are taken up in Section Six. In this part the content of the NSS is 
reviewed in line with the framework set out in the Chapter One in this 
volume.   
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Interpretation of Spatiality, Conceptions of Place and Spatial Organisation Principles 
The opening parts of Section One clearly establish that a relational 
perspective on the Republic of Ireland ‘space’ is being adopted. Figure 
2.1 (DELG 2002:21) illustrates graphically the links between Ireland and 
the UK, the EU core region and wider global context, while the inset on 
the same Figure captures some of the connections between the North 
and South of Ireland. Figure 2.2 (DELG 2002:23) has four maps showing 
the cities and towns throughout the island of Ireland. Taken together the 
first two Figures in the NSS establish that the NSS proposals seek to 
address issues concerning the functional and physical connectedness of 
different places to spaces and places beyond the territory within which 
the NSS will be implemented. 
 
The first attempt to promote a functional spatial perspective according to 
the functional areas model in the Indications paper resulted in concerns 
that have been summarised above. It became clear that the draft 
Functional Areas map could not be relied upon as a tool in the NSS. In 
its place the NSS adopts an alternative functionalist interpretation of the 
strategic roles that are regarded as appropriate for each part of the 
country. Taking account of the vital national and international roles of 
the Dublin city region, the potentials of other cities and towns, and the 
different types of rural areas (DELG 2002: 54) the NSS outlines five 
strategic spatial roles. While these are illustrated as zones with fuzzy 
boundaries (DELG 2002: 57) with each place assigned to only one 
strategic role, in practice it was envisaged that each of the roles could be 
applicable to the different parts of each region. In broad terms the 
strategic roles are guided by the following principles to support a 
dynamic conception of spatial relations: 
 Consolidating the Dublin city region, 
 Strengthening the urban structure in a zone extending from Cork 
and Waterford via Limerick and Galway to Sligo and Letterkenny 
/ Derry as an alternative development axis to a potential East 
coast corridor linking the Dublin and Belfast city regions, 
 Reinforcing the intervening parts of the Midlands by seeking to 
create the critical mass necessary to sustain an inland Gateway, 
 Revitalising western areas through urban led economic 
diversification and further exploitation of local potential based on 
land and marine resources, 
 Co-operating in an all-island context with a particular focus on 
places either side of the Border.  
 
In order to give effect to these roles the NSS proposes a settlement 
strategy based on Gateways and Hub towns, which is complemented by 
proposals for other towns and the rural areas. A defining set of 
attributes, organised according to eleven headings, is provided for the 
Gateways and Hubs (DELG 2002: 40). These places are conceptualised 
in a multi-dimensional and multi-functional way that goes well beyond 
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the ‘agglomeration economies’ arguments of regional economists who 
prefer to think in terms of growth centres (O’Leary 2007). The NSS 
identifies four additional Gateways to supplement the five already named 
in the National Development Plan. Each of the new Gateways (Dundalk, 
Sligo, Athlone-Tullamore-Mullingar, and Letterkenny-Derry) is located in 
the weaker Objective 1 region (Figure 1).    
 
Figure 1. 
 
 
The conceptualisation underlying the Gateways and Hubs draws heavily 
upon ideas contained in the ESDP. For example, the Midland Gateway is 
presented as a polycentric model linking three towns, while in the 
northwest the proposal to develop Letterkenny as a Gateway is 
contingent upon developing closer functional linkages with the much 
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larger city of Derry in Northern Ireland. Over the long term the NSS 
envisages the emergence of an Atlantic Gateway corridor linking Galway, 
Limerick, Cork and Waterford in order to achieve the critical mass to be 
a significant internationally competitive economic zone that will also 
provide an alternative to the east coast development. In order to promote 
balanced development within the regions nine Hub centres are identified, 
including two that are duo-centric reflecting local complementarities in 
functional roles. 
 
The NSS further seeks to restructure the prevailing patterns of spatial 
relations through alterations to the transport network (Figure 2).  The 
main proposals include upgrading the strategic radial routes linking each 
of the Gateways to Dublin, and also by providing improved cross-radial 
linking corridors to facilitate greater interactions between and within the 
regions, especially in the western and southern parts of the country. In 
addition the NSS envisages improving the transport links to the 
northwest through a co-operative development of the route throughout 
Northern Ireland. It is also envisaged that enhanced international 
linkages via air and sea will be required, and in this regard the 
opportunities for enhancing accessibility through Northern Ireland are 
noted (DELG 2002: 61).  
 
Throughout 2003 and the first half of 2004 the Regional Authorities, 
with the assistance of planners from the Department, prepared Regional 
Planning Guidelines which together with the NSS will provide the 
framework for future county and city development plans. Securing and 
maintaining a consensus on strategic spatial priorities at the local level is 
a major challenge. However, through a refocusing of spatial planning 
around more strategic issues it is anticipated that it will be possible to 
bring about a mindset shift away from traditional preoccupations with 
land zonings and parochialism, and that less reliance will need to be 
placed on regulation by central government, even though that option has 
had to be invoked on a few occasions over recent years.  
 
While the NSS relies upon new concepts of spatiality it has been subject 
to some criticisms. For many professional planners, some regional 
economists (Morgenroth 2003), and especially representatives of the 
business community there are concerns that too many Gateways and 
Hubs have been proposed and that this will lead to a weakening of 
strategic focus on priority locations that could contribute most to 
achieving balanced regional development. There has also been criticism 
that the assumptions underlying the polycentric elements of the strategy 
may not be well grounded (McCafferty 2002). The absence of designated 
hub towns from some areas with extensive populations has been noted 
by Walsh et al (2006) while recent analyses based on the 2002 Census of 
Population (published after the NSS) provide evidence for a more 
vigorous approach to implementation and revision of the population 
targets for the Gateways (Walsh 2007). For those concerned more with 
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the rural dimension there is a concern that the NSS is overly reliant on 
urban based potential and that it does not adequately deal with the 
prospects for rural areas. 
 
Figure 2.  
 
 
Many of these limitations have been addressed in initiatives involving 
core members of the SPU which have resulted in a number of reports 
since the publication of the NSS. The initiatives include government 
strategies for transport, and science, technology and innovation (DETE 
2006); a foresight study for Rural Ireland 2025 (Rural Foresight Group 
2005); a framework for co-operation in relation to investment in 
infrastructure in Northern Ireland and the Republic (InterTradeIreland 
2006); and detailed proposals in relation to developing the Gateways and 
Hubs (DEHLG and Forfas 2006; DEHLG 2006b and 2007). 
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The role of the NSS as the National strategy is to provide a high level 
overarching framework that is subsequently further elaborated at regional 
and local levels.  
 
In summary, the NSS is innovative in terms of its conceptualisation of 
space and spatial relations. Many of the concepts required further 
elaboration which has been achieved through a continuation of the 
consensus building approach that characterised the preparation process, 
and through the building of active networks involving key actors 
throughout the system of public administration, including cooperative 
engagements with counterparts in Northern Ireland. Despite the 
reservations expressed by some the NSS has a high level of political and 
institutional support as evidenced by the prominence it has received in 
the National Development Plan.  The experience to date demonstrates 
that in order to develop and secure on-going support for a challenging 
and innovative spatial strategy the conceptualisation and methodologies 
require a blending of traditional positivist expert-led analysis with an 
understanding of institutional structures and processes, and a 
methodology firmly grounded in post-modern approaches to negotiation, 
agenda setting and consensus building.   
 
Concept of the Future and Time 
The preparation of the NSS was informed by detailed assessments of 
recent trends in many spheres of activity that impact upon spatial 
development. The most important outcome for the NSS was a realisation 
that a new socio-economic context had emerged since the early 1990s 
and furthermore that the change is likely to remain on-going, and will 
continue to be significantly influenced by emerging impacts from 
Europeanisation and globalisation process. The impacts of these 
international processes, which are poorly understood, will be even greater 
in Ireland than in neighbouring states due to the exceptionally high level 
of openness of the economy. Thus the NSS attempts to provide a twenty 
year framework for an uncertain future. While every effort was made to 
ascertain the most likely macroeconomic trends, and a set of population 
projections were prepared based on alternative assumptions concerning 
demographic indicators and macroeconomic trajectories, the Strategy 
opts for a future that is ultimately guided by a quasi linear interpolation 
of the conditions at the turn of the century. The reasonably well 
understood contemporary context is uncritically projected into a future 
sheltered from any radical or uncomfortable shocks. This is all that was 
feasible within the limited time frame. With more time and resources the 
preparation process could have benefited from a foresight type 
assessment that would have developed a number of alternative scenarios 
which could then be evaluated. Instead, the key futuristic challenge is 
presented starkly by reference to future patterns of population 
distribution with or without the NSS. 
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Despite the uncertainty concerning the future the NSS adopts a confident 
positivist approach that envisages a twenty year planning framework 
designed to achieve a better balance of social, economic, physical 
development and population growth between regions. Furthermore, 
through closer matching of where people live and where they work, 
different parts of Ireland will for the future be able to sustain a better 
quality of life for people, a strong competitive economic position, and an 
environment of the highest quality (DELG 2002 10). These statements fit 
very comfortably within the positivist tradition of plan making and a 
belief that the future can indeed be shaped through planning. In order to 
achieve its objectives the implementation section identifies structures and 
mechanisms that will be put in place to ensure that the desired outcomes 
can be achieved. Further work on mobilising key actors and on 
integrating the NSS approach into other plans and programmes was 
envisaged for the period 2003-2006 after which implementation leading 
to tangible benefits will proceed. This phase will be facilitated by the 
investment programmes contained in the National Development Plan 
and its successors which tend to operate on five to seven year basis. 
 
Visualisation and Representation 
In contrast to the positivist approach that underpinned much of the 
analysis and also the conceptualisation of the future, the use of imagery 
in the Strategy statement and also in some of the earlier presentations 
during the consultation phase, displays a distinctly post-modern 
approach. Each of the key maps is deliberately fuzzy at the edges and 
tends to be more suggestive than prescriptive. Among the key messages 
emerging from the maps are the importance of spatial differentiation, 
connectivity, complementarities and inclusiveness. The photographic 
imagery, while limited in its coverage, captures a sense of a country 
breaking away from congestion and dull urban construction in the city to 
brighter, well-connected, free-flowing and energised regions inhabited by 
smiling happy children in sustainable communities and environments. 
The underlying messages are that the NSS can contribute to an 
enhancement of quality of life and sustainability throughout the regions 
by promoting a settlement framework that seeks to be inclusive without 
impinging on the established institutional and administrative physical and 
other boundaries. 
 
A notable aspect of the visualisation techniques is the extent to which 
they are used, as alternatives to narrative in some cases, to convey 
messages about strategic spatial planning in an island of Ireland context 
(Hoch, 2007). The confidence of the political administration in the 
Republic in this regard contrasts with the more cautious approach 
adopted in the Northern Ireland strategy (see Chapter Five in this 
volume).  
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Understanding of Scale 
The National Spatial Strategy as the title implies is primarily a planning 
framework for the State. However, various geographical scales that 
impinge upon spatial planning at the nation State level are invoked. In 
the opening section that particular scale is correctly positioned within 
larger international contexts. A strong political economy perspective 
underpins the analysis of the relationship between the national and 
international scales with references to globalisation, the role of the EU, 
international obligations in relation to sustainable development, and the 
role of urban centres as places through which international forces are 
mediated and through which participation in international production, 
consumption and governance networks are secured. In relation to the 
island of Ireland scale, the narrative and visualisation falls more within 
the post-structuralism and post-modern traditions as it is necessary to 
take account of the underlying political contestation and variable 
discourses that have influenced development patterns in the past, and 
also the variety of more recent political initiatives that may provide 
opportunities for new forms of territorial cooperation in areas related to 
economic development and provision of public services as diverse as 
healthcare and electricity.  
 
The presentation of the internal dimensions of the strategy confirms a 
nested hierarchical approach to scale in spatial planning that extends 
from the local through the region to the national level, and vice versa, 
and which is strongly grounded in the positivist tradition of spatial 
analysis. The hierarchical vision is elaborated further in the use of spatial 
categories such as Gateways and Hubs with polycentric networks being 
invoked to create additional critical mass at a number of scales extending 
from the Atlantic Gateway to the ternary Midland Gateway and duo-
centric Hubs in the West and Southwest. However, the anticipated 
complementary horizontal integration to be achieved by means of the 
Regional Planning Guidelines through application of the potentiality 
principle in pursuit of balanced development owes much to the post-
positivist traditions of planning. 
 
In summary in this area, as in so many other aspects of the Strategy, there 
is evidence of a plurality of conceptual approaches that are appropriate to 
the diverse objectives underlying the complex business of strategic spatial 
planning.  
 
Conclusions 
The National Spatial Strategy for the Republic of Ireland was embarked 
upon after a lengthy period during which there had not been any 
framework for promoting balanced regional development. However, in 
the context of rapidly increasing prosperity, and the prospect of a 
restoration of peaceful conditions in Northern Ireland, a number of 
somewhat unrelated initiatives culminated in a government commitment 
to prepare a twenty year strategy that would facilitate the promotion of 
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balanced regional development. The first lesson that became apparent is 
that the context for preparing the NSS was completely different to that 
which prevailed when the last previous attempt was made in the mid 
1960s. The strong welfare redistribution role of the State had been 
replaced by a more liberal and entrepreneurial ideology; the nature of the 
national and international socio-economic realities and their underlying 
drivers of transformation were utterly different; and additionally the 
conceptualization of space and place had also undergone a number of 
paradigm shifts as outlined in the opening chapter. Allied to the diversity 
of perspectives on space and place were new ways of thinking about 
development, government and governance. However, the conceptual 
shifts were not universally shared across disciplines, or among 
professionals in the areas of planning policy design and implementation, 
or among officials throughout different government departments.  
 
The review of the Irish experience demonstrates that a plurality of 
planning paradigms was used at different stages in the process and for 
different tasks. The traditional positivist based expert knowledge and 
methodologies of professional planners and others were essential at 
crucial stages but they needed to be complemented by insights and 
methods from the structuralism and post-modern traditions. In particular 
there was a strong emphasis on consultation and developing a consensus 
based on partnership. It is also apparent that the NSS process and 
content were strongly influenced by the ESDP process.  
 
Reverting to the discourse in Chapter One the NSS experience 
demonstrates the extent to which the conceptualization of space and 
place has shifted away from a Euclidean neutral container and objectively 
map-able perspective. There is now a greater recognition of the extent to 
which places are socially and politically constructed as nodes in global 
production and consumption networks. For example, the role of certain 
locations in the Dublin city region as points for connecting the Ireland 
space to the global economy became a key issue, while the assessment of 
rural areas illustrated that formerly weak and remote rural locations were 
increasingly assuming new roles as consumption spaces that are 
incorporated into wider national and international systems of demand 
centred on tourism, leisure activities and simply differences in lifestyle 
and values. 
 
Linked to the paradigm shifts are new ways of thinking about the 
organization and representation of space. While proximity, accessibility 
and distance decay effects remain important there is an increasing 
awareness of the role of the extent to which functional spaces are fluid 
and based on networks that are less place bound, and are also not 
congruent with administrative areas. These changes in the ways in which 
spatial relations are considered are particularly challenging to both 
analysts and practitioners trained in the positivist tradition and 
methodologies and can make the task of securing a consensus on 
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fundamental issues quite difficult. This was evident in the debates that 
occurred around the role and number of Gateways and how they 
compare with or differ from the older concept of Growth Centres.  
 
The role of planners and other public servants within the process of 
spatial strategy formulation was vital. In relation to the NSS they had to 
combine the traditional roles of attempting to predict future development 
trends (for example population projections, housing demand, car 
ownership) while also seeking to achieve a negotiated consensus that 
required considerable consultation around draft proposals guided by 
expert analyses. The extent, depth and pro-active nature of the 
consultation process were a crucial factor in securing the support of very 
divergent stakeholders in a policy area requiring some fundamental 
reassessment and abandonment of traditional thinking. At one level, the 
small size of the Spatial Planning Unit made it easier to maintain 
consistency in the discourses with others and it was also able to keep a 
tight rein on the overall purpose and scope of the Strategy when at times 
issues were highlighted that could have posed a risk to the whole exercise 
(for example, a debate on rural housing based on flimsy evidence 
occupied the main focus of attention for a considerable period). At other 
levels, the work of the SPU was greatly aided by the evolution of a 
network of key high ranking officials in other Government departments 
and agencies that overtly took the form of the high level 
interdepartmental steering group but that over time, has developed into a 
virtual cross departmental team.  The formal and robust exchanges 
between Departments that might normally be anticipated as they forge 
new relationships in working with each other in developing the NSS were 
replaced by collaborative and cordial day to day working relationships as 
the new era of spatial planning and its relational aspects emerged.   
 
More critically while the planners and officials involved in developing the 
NSS wisely avoided sophisticated technical (positivist) modelling to 
produce alternative scenarios the process could have benefited from a 
(post-modernist) foresight type exercise that would have provided an 
opportunity to think more widely outside the comfort zones of the 
contemporary world that we know. More generally, while spatial planners 
have comfortably taken on board processes of engagement and 
consensus building that fit with the post-modern perspective there are 
significant challenges in communicating relational and post-modern 
concepts and having them incorporated into spatial strategy reports. 
 
The experience in relation to implementation is that it is no longer 
sufficient to rely on a command and control approach through land use 
regulation. Much more can be achieved through an approach that seeks 
to promote a deeper understanding of the processes shaping territorial 
development. Of course, this requires sustained information sharing, a 
culture of cooperation and collaboration and a higher level of strategic 
capacity throughout different levels and strands of governance. While the 
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SPU were successful in building a supportive institutional context at all 
levels there is a need for on-going reinforcement in a consistent way of 
the main elements of the strategy. The subsequent studies initiated by the 
SPU on developing the Gateways, and the report commissioned by 
InterTradeIreland (2006) on how best to coordinate infrastructural 
investments in the North and South have been particularly helpful in 
keeping the core concepts to the forefront and in maintaining an 
engagement by key stakeholders (see also NESC 2005; National 
Competitiveness Council 2006). These initiatives are especially necessary 
when actions by others may unintentionally damage confidence in the 
process as, for example, the government’s decentralisation programme, 
or at a different level some of the media commentary following the 
publication of the preliminary results of the 2006 census of population.  
 
Strategic spatial planning should be led by professional planners but the 
process needs to be better supported. The NSS experience brought to the 
fore the necessity for a systematic rolling research programme, means to 
overcome the very considerable gaps in spatial data, and the need to 
enhance the level of expertise among professional planners at all levels in 
the administrative system. For the future, there is a need for a greater 
level of discourse amongst planners, regional economists, other policy 
makers and decision takers on changing perspectives of space and place 
and to make more tangible the concepts associated with the relational 
and post-modern perspectives in strategic spatial planning.  
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CHAPTER 25 
 
BEYOND THE “SIGH OF THE OPPRESSED CREATURE”:  
A CRITICAL GEOGRAPHICAL ENQUIRY INTO 
CHRISTIANITY’S CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE MAKING OF A 
PEACEABLE WEST 
 
MARK BOYLE 
 
First published in Annals of the Association of American Geographers (2010), 
100(3), 678-694. 
 
A certain wisdom holds that we are now living in a postsecular age when 
religion is reasserting itself in the public realm. One hallmark of this age 
is the signicance attributed to religion in international relations. The 
principal global regions, it is purported, sit perilously on the brink of a 
“clash of civilizations,” at the heart of which is conict caused, 
aggravated, or symbolized by tensions within and between the prophetic 
religions of Middle Eastern origin, Judaism, Christianity, and Islam; the 
wisdom religions of Chinese origin, Confucianism and Daoism; the 
mystical religions of Indian origin, Hinduism and Buddhism; and the 
older ethnic or indigenous religions, which still resonate particularly in 
Australia and Africa. Simultaneously dubbed a source of conict and war 
and a vehicle for peace and security, it is assumed that religion is enjoying 
a new sense of agency in geopolitics.  
 
The focus of this article is the role of Christianity as a peace breaker and 
peace maker in the contemporary geopolitical theater. Placing the 
spotlight on Christianity serves as a necessary antidote to tendencies 
within the West to ascribe sole culpability for any emerging “clash of 
civilizations” to Islam and in particular Islamic fundamentalism. There 
can be no doubt that Islamic extremism has emerged as a potent threat to 
global peace and stability in the past decade, but to focus only on militant 
Islam is to occlude necessary examination of the roles and responsibilities 
of other religions, not least Christianity, Judaism, and Hinduism. It is 
crucial to hold to account the leadership of all the principal religions and 
to scrutinize their respective contributions to the making of war and 
peace.  
 
Christianity’s embroilment in international relations takes many direct 
and indirect forms and includes prayer, lobbying, advocacy, and action 
around the provision of emergency relief in war zones and divided 
societies; ethical consumption and fair trade; corporate social 
responsibility within transnational companies; humanitarian aid in areas 
suffering natural or human disasters; nuclear disarmament; pollution and 
climate change; forced migration including the movement of refugees and 
sex trafcking; human rights abuses; HIV and reemerging infectious 
disease; biotechnology and stem cell research; new technologies of 
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fertility control and engineering; creationism and the school curriculum; 
faith-based schooling; the legal status of same-sex marriages; fertility 
control; adoption practices; dress codes in public spaces; freedom of 
speech and worship; and media responsibility.  
 
Any elevation of Christianity within the public sphere requires a parallel 
moment of introspection, confession, and contrition. There can be no 
doubt that throughout its past, Christianity has made important 
contributions to cross-cultural and ecumenical dialogue, the deescalation 
of intractable and violent conict, and directly to peace building itself. 
Although there is a tendency to view much of this work as essentially 
humanitarian and precognitive, motivated by immediate, practical, 
applied, and pragmatic concerns, it is Christocentric, Eurocentric, and 
Westerncentric to regard it as innately virtuous. It is necessary to 
excavate the theological, philosophical, and political bases of Christian 
initiatives for peace. Christianity has enjoyed a unique proximity to 
political power and has been implicated in a variety of inglorious histories 
of colonialism and imperialism. Against the backdrop of a new phase of 
Western colonialism, imperialism, and neocolonialism, it has a special 
obligation to reect on the ways in which it might be serving both as a 
progressive and regressive institution in world affairs today.  
 
On the other hand, although recognizing the potential of religion to serve 
as the “opium of the people,” mystifying, obfuscating, and veiling the 
roots of inequality, oppression, exploitation, and colonialism, Marxism 
has a much richer tradition of engagement with religion and recognizes 
its dual potential. Recently, Marxist philosopher Slavoj Zizek and 
Christian theologian John Milbank (Zizek and Milbank 2009) have both 
mooted the possibility of bringing Hegel and Christ into a new dialogue 
but for different reasons and on different terms. Written in exile in the 
United States and published in three volumes between 1954 and 1959, in 
fact Bloch’s (1986) The Principle of Hope makes an earlier and equally 
compelling case for reframing religion as at once a tool for the powerful 
and a resource for revolution. For Bloch, religion was indeed the “sigh of 
the oppressed creature,” as Marx (1843) so famously proposed in his 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, but it was also a rich source of 
utopian hope and revolutionary consciousness. Marxism needed to be 
alert to regressive uses of religion to legitimate exploitation, human 
misery, and conict but could also be more open to building solidarity 
with religious currents that promote social justice; a fairer deal for the 
marginal, excluded, and poor; and planetary peace.  
 
If the sigh of the oppressed creature is to give way to  the principle of 
hope, it is imperative that Christianity’s progressive social and political 
currents assert themselves over regressive, conservative, and obfuscatory 
constituencies. The critical question then is the extent to which 
Christianity is formulating and evangelizing progressive social and 
political agendas, building and fortifying purposeful social movements in 
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support of the world’s poor and exploited, widening and enriching public 
debate and democratic politics, and nurturing a stronger sense of global 
responsibility and care. Or, to put the counterfactual, to what degree is 
Christianity formulating and evangelizing conservative and regressive 
social and political agendas, building and fortifying entrenched and elitist 
interests, narrowing and diminishing public debate and democratic 
politics, and in-aming a sense of otherness and superiority?   
 
The case of the Roman Catholic Church is used to open a discussion on 
Christianity’s varied, complex, contradictory, and competing ecumenical 
agendas. The approach taken places the Roman Catholic Church under 
postcolonial scrutiny. The Catholic Church is variably confronting its 
entanglements in colonial histories and reecting on the possibilities of, 
strategies for, and merits of postcolonializing. A critical geographical 
enquiry into Catholicism’s contributions to war and peace might 
productively interrogate the importance of the spaces and places from 
which Catholicism is postcolonializing its embroilments with other 
societies, cultures, and religions. The purpose of such enquiry would be 
to shed light on the locations from which Catholicism is acting to 
reassert a resurgent Christian West and the locations from which it is 
variously “provincializing” the West, so as to produce more or less 
effective strategies for peace building.  
 
Firmly rooted as it is within contemporary social, cultural, and political 
geography, Kong’s manifesto for “new geographies of religion” provides 
an opportunity to think both critically and geographically about 
Christianity’s multiple approaches to building global peace and security 
(Kong 2001a, 2001b, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2006, 2007; see also special 
editions of Social and Cultural Geography [Holloway and Vallins 2002], 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers [Proctor 2006], and 
Geopolitics [Agnew 2006]). This article extends Kong’s call for new 
geographies of religion and offers the concepts of “milieux of 
translation,” referring to the social, economic, political, and cultural 
prisms through which theology becomes refracted into praxes, and 
“formations of the secular,” referring to the conditions in secular 
democracies that permit religions prescribed access to the public realm, 
as key to the development of geographies of Christianity’s 
postcolonialization.   
 
In their search for an appropriate vista through which to apprehend the 
varied and complex processes of domination, control, resistance, and 
violence that have resulted from past and present colonial and imperial 
projects, geographers, too, have drawn on and contributed to the 
emerging eld of postcolonial studies (Sidaway 2000; Blunt and McEwan 
2002; Nash 2004; McEwan 2008). Motivated by a sense of contrition 
about the historical complicity of the discipline of geography in the 
colonization by European powers of territories in Latin America, Asia, 
and Africa, sustained attention is now being given to the locations from 
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which postcolonial theory and postcolonial geography itself is being 
imagined, framed, and enacted (Minca 2003; Pollard et al. 2009). This 
article concludes that future dialogue between Christianity and geography 
might productively focus on the risks and rewards that ow from the 
pursuit of postcolonial envisioning of global peace and security. 
 
Christianity and Colonization: Evangelical Christianity in the 
United States—Paradigmatic or Exceptional? 
Christianity comprises a crowded landscape with a confusion of beliefs. 
Originating as a Jewish sect in the rst century, Christianity’s growth to 
prominence has been fractured by at least two great schisms, the 
separation of Roman Catholicism from Eastern Orthodoxy in the 
eleventh century, and the further splitting of Protestantism from Roman 
Catholicism during the sixteenth century Reformation. Protestantism, 
too, exists as a complex composite of confessions, including the 
Anglican, Lutheran, Presbyterian, Calvinist, Baptist, Pentecostalist, 
Methodist, and Evangelical churches. With an estimated baptized 
population of 1.1 billion (Christianity has an estimated 2.2 billion 
adherents), Roman Catholicism stands as the single largest and most 
globally expansive denomination.   
 
Given its complex historical formation it would seem inappropriate to 
make generalizations about Christianity’s proximity to political power. 
Nevertheless, for some critics, beginning with the fourth-century 
Constantinian conversion of the Roman Empire, embodied in the 
Crusades of the eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries, and most 
clearly demonstrated in European colonization of Africa, Asia, and Latin 
America from the sixteenth century, Christianity’s principal churches 
have been embroiled, albeit in varied and complex ways, in past colonial 
and imperial projects.   
 
It is certainly true that at least three sets of relationships between 
Christianity and empire can be identied (Weber 1930; Tawney 1938; 
Said 1978; Livingstone 1992; Driver 2001):  
 Christianity as a precondition for the emergence of Europe: Christianity 
provided the prepolitical cultural and moral foundations, 
conditions, and arguments and energy, efcacy, and organization 
for the emergence of European states, the rise of modern 
European capitalism, and the annexation by European states of 
overseas territories and resources.  
 Christianity as a source of geopolitical imaginaries that fuel colonial projects: 
Through the production of geopolitical imaginaries that 
emphasize hierarchies of reason, virtue, and truth, Christian 
discourses about the “Orient” formed a critical component of 
“Orientalism” more generally, dened as a Western projection 
onto and will to govern over the Orient. 
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 Strategic alliances between Christianity and colonial projects: Early 
Christian missions provided knowledge, often in maps, which 
aided military conquests and colonial planning while Christian 
missionaries exploited the new opportunities opened up by 
colonization to evangelize.   
In the combustible geopolitical climate of the moment, pivoting around a 
new phase of Western imperialism and a purported clashing of world 
civilizations, it is perhaps unsurprising that critics have claimed that 
Christianity is buttressing the geopolitical strategies of Western advanced 
capitalist nations and that these interventions stand as the latest 
incarnation in Christianity’s historical intermeshing with empire. 
Although such claims have been directed at many Christian churches, 
they have been focused principally on the role of evangelical Christianity 
on American foreign policy. Amid rhetoric pronouncing a return to the 
Crusades and ruminations of Christianity as an “imperial religion and 
religion of the imperialist,” it is important to be alert to the limits of 
historical comparison. Nevertheless, it is worthwhile considering critical 
voices, as they help to establish what is at stake in any consideration of 
Christianity’s complicity in Western geopolitics.  
 
Developments within global capitalism from the mid-1970s have pitted 
the West, and in particular the United States, into a new relationship with 
the rest of the world. Encapsulated by the debate between Niall Ferguson 
and Robert Kagan at the American Enterprise Institute in 2003, and 
reected in disputes surrounding the Project for a New American 
Century, there is disagreement within the American right as to whether 
the United States should be described as an empire (Durham 2006). 
According to Agnew (2005), at the very least emerging international 
relations announce a new phase in U.S. economic and political 
hegemony. Harvey (2003), Gregory (2004), and Smith (2005) went 
further to assert that these relations are predicated on new modes of 
colonial and imperial annexation. The trafcking, reembedding, and 
policing of Western neoliberal ideology in non-Western societies has 
played a key role in appropriating economies around the world and 
underwriting a new period of transnational “accumulation by 
dispossession” (Harvey 2005).  
 
Meanwhile, as early as 1980, Daniel Patrick Moynihan prophesized the 
rebirth of ethnicity as a force in world affairs. A spectator of the 
fragmentation of the Soviet Union into a mosaic of virulent ethnic 
nationalisms, Moynihan (1993) later likened future world disorder to 
“Pandaemonium,” the capital of hell in Milton’s seventeenth-century 
poem Paradise Lost. This focus on ethnicity was to mutate into a concern 
with civilizations, a derivative but distinctive concept. It was Huntington 
(1996) who was to globalize the specter of Pandaemonium and bring the 
geopolitics of civilizations into everyday public discourse, asserting that 
world peace and security, and in particular the Christian West, is 
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increasingly being threatened by the clashing of civilizations. Inspired by 
Flaubert’s unnished Bouvard et Pécuchet,  written in 1880 at the height of 
the European colonial adventure, Said (1978, 113) noted the signicance 
of the maxim that “Europe needed Asia to regenerate itself.” Reading 
Huntington, it would almost seem that the West now “needs” a clash of 
civilizations, and in particular an other in militant Islam, to regenerate 
itself today (Said 2006).  
 
Schama (2008) provided a timely reminder that Christianity has always 
been central to American political life but noted that evangelical 
Christianity has been presented with a new historical opening. The 
neoconservative lobby in the United States has played a pivotal role in 
shaping U.S. foreign policy and promoting fears over an impending clash 
of civilizations, and it is through this lobby that evangelical Christianity 
has exerted inuence. Although often traced to a clique of “Straussians” 
who worked their way into high ofce or who were able to inuence 
senior gures within the administration of President George W. Bush, 
neoconservatism in fact encompasses a wider constituency including 
“Evangelical Christians, Jewish Straussians, avowedly secular cold 
warriors who have made a fetish of the West, conservative feminists, and 
other family moralists” (Brown 2006, 698). Its pioneers include Irving 
Kristol, Norman Podhoretz, Nathan Glazer, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, 
and, more recently, Robert Kagan, William Kristol, Richard Perle, and 
Paul Wolfowitz.  
 
Neoconservatism expresses abhorrence toward the alleged moral 
decadence wrought by liberalism, counterculture, and postmodernism 
since the 1960s. For neoconservatives, a strong theologically informed 
state will be required if the United States is to arrest declining standards, 
dwindling respect for tradition and authority, moral liberalism, the folly 
of political correctness, misplaced multiculturalism, and the paralyses of 
relativism. The West, however, is threatened by outside “deviant” and 
“rogue” states, too, not least from the “axes of evil” emanating from the 
Muslim world. The United States has a divine mandate to “civilize” 
“laggards,” “tyrants,” and “dictators” by imposing liberal democracy, 
order, freedom, and the market, by force if necessary. Nationalism and 
patriotism are fanned by a rekindled interest in natural law and moral 
order and Christianity is foregrounded as unashamedly at the heart of 
public life and public policymaking.  
 
The operation of power and authority within the U.S. polity ensures that 
this is a postsecular society only for religious constituencies that support 
the interests of U.S. nationalism and patriotism, U.S. capitalist 
globalization, and an offensive U.S. foreign policy. Culturally and morally 
conservative, evangelical Christianity ts this prole and has therefore 
enjoyed unequal and privileged access to political power. Moreover, it is 
difcult to assert that Christian neoconservatives have worked to fortify 
and enrich the functioning of democracy in the United States. 
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Evangelical Christianity has not only beneted from a secular politics 
open to its message, but through its absolute claims to truth and 
authority has helped to constitute a foreclosure of genuine agonic debate 
and impaired the proper functioning of democratic politics. Brown 
(2006) referred to neoliberalism and neoconservatism’s combined 
dedemocratic tendencies as constituting an “American nightmare.”  
 
Undoubtedly the role played by evangelical Christianity in public life in 
the United States in general and U.S. geopolitical strategy more 
specically provides a crucial insight into the ways in which some 
Western polities remain radically and unequally open only to regressive 
Christian geopolitical agendas that are consonant with powerful colonial, 
imperial, and neocolonial interests. Even within its own terms of 
reference, however, such a mode of argumentation requires clarication, 
qualication, renement, and perhaps even correction. It is inappropriate 
to infer that purported relationships that exist in the United States betray 
Christianity’s more generic and innate complicity in the West’s struggle to 
maintain global hegemony. It is imperative to return again to 
Christianity’s complex historical emergence and splintering. Two critical 
aws merit particular mention.  
 
First, many constituencies within evangelical Christianity rightly object to 
the simplicity of recent accounts and their lack of representativeness of 
the wider faith community. Within geography, Dittmer (2007a, 2007b, 
2008), Gerhardt (2008a, 2008b), and Sturm (2006, 2008) have all offered 
more nuanced insights into the popular geopolitical imaginaries and more 
varied political leanings of evangelical Christians in the United States, 
with specic reference to the different eschatologies proffered by 
premillennial dispensationalism and postmillenialism. Meanwhile, 
Yorgason and Chen (2008) have added the geopolitical imaginaries of 
Mormonism to the story. The more complex relationships between 
evangelicalism, Protestantism, the religious right, neoliberalism, 
neoconservatism, the presidency of George W. Bush, and U.S. foreign 
policy have also provided a focus for more careful debate in religious 
studies (Chernus 2008), international relations (Bacevich and Prodromou 
2004), American studies (Newman 2007), and political science (Brown 
2006).  
 
Second, serious theoretical and political weaknesses derive from 
enshrining the case of the United States as paradigmatic and drawing 
overly strong inferences. Understanding of the contributions of 
Christianity to war and peace is being skewed as a result of an excessively 
narrow focus on a single case. It is necessary to explore with a broader 
gaze the variety of ecumenical vistas that are being secreted and 
mobilized as Christianity’s rich diversity of denominations and churches 
interlace with other secular societies in other parts of the world. The 
remainder of this article strives to heighten awareness of the more varied 
stories that might be told if Christianity’s complex historical emergence 
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and rich diversity of institutional formations are given wider recognition. 
Given its numerical dominance and global expansiveness, the Roman 
Catholic Church offers a valuable alternative case through which to 
probe Christianity’s more messy social and political agendas.  
 
In Search of the Principle of Hope : A Critical Geographical 
Enquiry into the Ecumenical Agendas Promoted by the Roman 
Catholic Church  
This article contends that the varieties of peacebuilding strategies Roman 
Catholicism promotes reect the myriad ways in which Catholic 
theologians are seeking to “provincialize” the West so as to alter the 
terms of reference of ecumenical dialogue. Following Chakrabarty (2000), 
the concept of provincialization is used here to refer to critical practices 
that usurp and decenter the sovereign supremacy enjoyed by Europe and 
the West in the framing of world history and global politics. It is possible 
to discern strategies that seek to historicize and relativize (1) the 
European Enlightenment, (2) Christocentric ecumenicism, and (3) 
globalized neoliberal capitalism, respectively. The peace initiatives offered 
by three of the most inuential Roman Catholic theologians of the 
moment, Joseph Ratzinger (Pope and leader of the Roman Catholic 
Church), Hans Küng (leading Northern Hemispheric critic of the Roman 
Curia and reformer within the Catholic Church), and Leonardo Boff (a 
leading gure within Latin American liberation theology), capture exactly 
the different implications that ow from each of these forms of 
provincialization.  
 
Joseph Ratzinger was born in Germany in 1927, Hans Küng in 
Switzerland in 1928, and Leonardo Boff in Brazil in 1938. All three were 
ordained priests in the Roman Catholic Church and progressed to 
doctorate studies: Ratzinger graduating from the University of Munich in 
1953 with a thesis on Saint Augustine’s doctrine of the concept of 
justication in the Protestant theology of Karl Barth; and Boff from the 
University of Munich in 1970 with a thesis on the church and the 
liberation of the oppressed as a sign of the divine in the secular world. 
Throughout the 1960s all three were to secure renown as leading 
progressive and liberal thinkers within the Catholic Church, and each was 
to contribute to and to be deeply inuenced by the Second Vatican 
Council (1962–1965).  
 
Their pathways were soon to part. Ratzinger took up a series of academic 
chairs at the Universities of Bonn, Munster, Tubingen, and Regensburg, 
before serving as Archbishop of Munich from 1977, Prefect to the 
Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith from 1981, and nally Pope 
Benedict XVI from 2005 onward. Küng, meanwhile, served as Chair in 
Theology and Director of the Institute for Ecumenical Research at the 
University of Tubingen until he retired in 1996, after which he 
established and served as President of the Global Ethic Foundation in 
Tubingen. Boff returned to his native Brazil where he took up a series of 
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chairs in theology, philosophy, and ethics and most recently served as 
Professor Emeritus of Ethics, Philosophy of Religion, and Ecology at the 
Rio de Janeiro State University.  
 
At the heart of any critical geographical enquiry into the extent, nature, 
and consequences of Roman Catholicism’s engagements with 
postcolonialism must be a concern with the locations in which different 
postcolonial strategies germinate and take shape and the capacity of these 
strategies to then access and mold the geopolitical agendas pursued by 
different nations. To this end, in this section I argue that the concepts of 
milieux of translation and formations of the secular are of value when 
subjecting Catholicism to postcolonial scrutiny. The idea of milieux of 
translation is deployed to help account for the ways in which Catholic 
theology produces different faith-based social and political praxes as it 
becomes refracted through different social, cultural, economic, and 
political worlds. The notion of formations of the secular is introduced to 
help account for the variable manifestations and impacts of Catholic 
peace strategies on public realms in different democratic polities.  
 
Milieux of Translation: Locating Catholic Provincializations of the 
West  
Catholic theology is capable of generating such different social and 
political prescriptions in part because theologians inhabit different 
geographical worlds, the prisms through which they refract universal 
tenets and concretize what needs to be done on this earth. Ratzinger 
comes to ecumenical dialogue following a long struggle with European 
secularism. Küng, meanwhile, has approached ecumenical activity from a 
conciliatory, European, post-Reformation Catholic tradition that found 
its zeitgeist in the liberal, ecumenical, and cosmopolitan atmosphere 
sown by the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965). Finally, Boff has 
crafted his ecumenical vista out of the ashes of Latin America’s own 
history of colonization and neocolonization by European powers and 
later North American economic interests.   
 
Joseph Ratzinger’s ecumenical vista stems most fundamentally from his 
long struggle with European secularism. Ratzinger regards Europe as a 
critical bulwark against U.S. global imperialism and a potential “third 
way” between the West and other civilizations. In principle, then, he is a 
supporter of European integration and the deepening and widening of 
the European Union. Europe, however, is a continent in crisis. For 
Ratzinger, the roots of Europe’s crises can be traced to the European age 
of reason itself and to the still reverberating cultural legacy of the 
European Enlightenment. The rise to prominence of radical or aggressive 
secularism has led to a godless Europe and as a consequence to the 
collapse of natural law and triumph of postmodernism and relativism 
(Boeve 2007).  
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For Ratzinger, Christianity’s encounter with Greek culture in the fourth 
and fth centuries was nothing short of divine providence. The 
Hellenistic Enlightenment allowed the fragments of Christian thought to 
be subjected to ruthless exegesis, critique, and reformulation. In turn, 
Christianity nourished Greek society by providing fundamental answers 
to questions of public signicance. The European Enlightenment 
ushered in a period of de-Hellenization and resulted in a severing of 
theology from philosophy. It succeeded only in producing forms of both 
reason and religion that were inherently and unnecessarily self-limiting.  
Although claiming to be universal, this enlightenment was Eurocentric 
and culturally specic and needed to be historicized. A new 
rapprochement between faith and reason was required. “Pathologies of 
reason” required a “hint” from the great religions if they were to avoid 
becoming destructive, whereas “pathologies of religion” could be puried 
through rational debate and the application of human reason (Ratzinger 
2006).  
 
Ratzinger’s principal contribution to ecumenical dialogue has come from 
his assertion that Christianity and more specically Roman Catholicism 
will be most t for purposes for interfaith, intercivilizational, and 
intercultural dialogue when it bears the stamp of its Greek heritage. 
Harnessing the fruits of the Greek enlightenment, Christianity could rst 
engage in rational and reasoned debate on the competing claims to truth 
that inhere in different religions with a view to effecting some sort of a 
consensus. Second, it could provide a moral foundation through which 
European states might broker a more progressive set of relations with 
other regions of the world. Christianity could not hope to produce the 
kingdom of Heaven on earth and contained no prescription for a perfect 
society, but it could furnish the prepolitical moral and ethical precepts for 
a just world.  
 
In 2000, in his capacity as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine 
of Faith, Ratzinger had attracted international hostility by publishing 
Dominus Iesus: On the Unicity and Salvic Universality of Jesus Christ and the 
Church (Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith 2000). This document 
afrmed the absolute claim of Catholicism to be the one true religion and 
reasserted the belief that salvation was only possible through discipleship 
of Jesus Christ. It was condemned as arrogant, supremacist, and a blow 
for ecumenical relations. Ratzinger’s response came in the form of Truth 
and Tolerance: Christian Belief and World Religions (Ratzinger 2003). The 
question of the relative merits of different religions could not be 
divorced from their competing claims to truth. A product of the 
Hellenistic Enlightenment, Christianity could defend the authority of its 
claims in a more rational and logical way than could other religions 
(Salvatore 2006).  
 
This argument was publicized in his infamous Regensburg Lecture 
(Ratzinger 2006) and in the furor that followed Ratzinger was accused of 
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implying that Islam’s claims to truth were weaker because it devalued 
human reason, was inherently irrational and drawn to violence, and 
demanded only blind faith. The purpose of this lecture was to assert that 
theology properly belonged in the university and that progress in 
ecumenical dialogue between Christianity and Islam required that both 
revalorize reason and rigorous intellectual scholarship. However, in a 
brief but provocative passage, Ratzinger meditated on a dialogue between 
the Byzantine Emperor Manuel II and an unnamed educated Persian 
reputed to have taken place near Ankara in 1391.  Conditioned by his 
Greek education, the Emperor rejects the Islamic concept that God’s 
logic transcends human logic and therefore that God is unknowable. 
Lamenting Islamic belief in the idea of a holy war—conversion by 
compulsion—the Emperor is quoted as saying, “Show me just what 
Mohammed brought that was new, and there you will nd things only 
evil and inhuman, such as his command to spread by the sword the faith 
he preached” (Ratzinger 2006, 3).  
 
In a public debate with Jurgen Habermas in 2004, Ratzinger argued that 
Christianity had a critical role in rediscovering the power of conscience 
and providing prepolitical moral foundations for the liberal democratic 
state (Habermas and Ratzinger 2006).  Christianity had a duty to arrest 
the degeneration of morality wrought by the ascendancy of secular 
society and to provide an ethical bedrock for contemporary societies, but 
its principal task was never to search for the kingdom of Heaven on 
earth. Original sin had condemned “sinful” and “boastful” humans to 
continual lapses of error and humans could never hope to invent a 
perfect societal form. Ratzinger has in fact developed a forensic and 
extensive critique of Marxism and socialism on the one hand, and 
Western democracy, capitalism, and imperialism on the other (Ratzinger 
2003). He has been at the forefront of deliberations on the moral and 
ethical problems presented by biotechnology, medicine, and science. 
Nevertheless he has consistently stopped short of a signicant 
commitment to any particular social, political, or economic ideology 
other than an improved status quo.  
 
In June 2009, he published his long-awaited social encyclical Caritas in 
Veritate (Charity in Truth), which will dene the remit for Roman 
Catholic social doctrine for the foreseeable future (Benedict XVI 2009).  
This encyclical sought to root Christian social doctrine in natural law 
rather than political ideology. It addresses directly the current economic 
recession and crises in the global nancial system and reects on forms 
of economic life conducive to supporting human development in its 
widest and holistic sense. Although it is too rich to attempt to summarize 
here, the encyclical reveals the limits to which Ratzinger is prepared to 
move beyond the specication of a better status quo. Although warning 
that the instrument of the market can produce negative consequences, 
the thrust of the encyclical holds that markets are neither intrinsically 
good nor bad but are shaped by the “cultural congurations which dene 
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them and give them direction” (Benedict XVI 2009, 36). It is “man’s [sic] 
darkened reason” (36) that allows markets to degenerate and falter.  The 
injection of Christian values back into every level of capitalist society 
holds the key to the correction of markets so that they are directed 
toward the common good.  
 
Hans Küng came to prominence as a leading advocate of reform of the 
Roman Curia during the Second Vatican Council. A product of post-
Reformation liberal Catholicism, and greatly inuenced by the liberal, 
ecumenical, and cosmopolitan zeitgeist sown by the “freedom 
generation” of the 1960s, Küng’s reputation has been built on his erce 
criticism of self-admiration within the Roman Catholic Church, in 
particular in relation to its “medieval facade.”  In The Church, Küng 
(1967) argued that the New Testament provides no doctrine of the 
Church’s essence that preceded its initial form. The essence of the 
Church, therefore, always expresses itself in historical form. Christianity 
was free to invent for itself a future based on (1) its origins and oriented 
to the present rather than its medieval past; (2) partnership and 
community and not patriarchal and hierarchical expressions of power; (3) 
ecumenicism and inclusivity and not fundamentalism and exclusivity, and 
(4) multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism and not Eurocentric 
imperialism.  
 
From this starting point, Küng has gone further than any other Christian 
leader in laying the foundations for ecumenical dialogue. To date, he has 
participated in three phases of such dialogue. His early focus was on 
Christian reunication and the development of “theological bases for a 
rapprochement between the Church of Rome and Canterbury” (Küng 
1964, xxxiii; 1967).  This was followed with a series of works examining 
the status of contemporary Christianity (Küng 1976), the  existence of 
God (Küng 1980), and Christianity and Darwinism (Küng 2007), all of 
which spoke directly to a secular audience. Since 1991, however, his 
primary focus has been on the building of bridges between Christianity 
and other world religions (Küng 1991, 1997, 2002; Küng and Schmidt 
1998). He has sought to provincialize Christian ecumenism with a view 
to entering genuinely democratic ecumenical dialogue.  
 
Küng’s ongoing efforts to foster “a de-escalation  of the clashing 
together of civilizations” is structured around four maxims:   
 There will be no peace among the nations without peace among 
the religions. 
 There will be no peace among the religions without dialogue 
between the religions.   
 There will be no dialogue between the religions without 
investigation of the foundations of the religions.  
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 There will be no survival of our globe in peace and justice without 
a new paradigm of international relations based on global ethical 
standards.  
For Küng, the pivotal idea of the global ethic must be  approached with 
modesty and humility and should not be taken to refer to “a new global 
ideology, a new single world culture, or even an attempt at a uniform 
unitary religion” (Küng 1997, 64). It is not intended to “replace the 
Torah, the Sermon on the Mount, the Qur’an, the Bhagavadgita, the 
Discourses of the Buddha, or the Analects of Confucius” (Küng 1997, 
64). Instead it is inspired by the idea that for all their differences, 
religions share a number of “fundamental precepts” and reveal 
a “fundamental consensus on binding values, irrevocable standards, and 
personal attitudes” (Küng 1991, 8).  
 
From this promising start, arguably Küng fails to capture the full 
potential of his approach. Küng’s project remains the work of a Western 
theologian and scholar, thinking, writing, and acting for a Western 
audience. A reading across the fundamental ethical precepts shared by all 
religions inevitably gives rise to a series of abstract schemas ultimately 
too removed from the world to be of practical utility. For example, the 
Declaration of the Parliament of the World’s Religions pioneered by 
Küng reached consensus on the importance of a “Golden Rule,” “Do 
unto others what you would have done unto yourself,” and four common 
truths: “a commitment to a culture of non-violence and respect for life; 
... a culture of solidarity and a just economic order; ... a culture 
of tolerance and a life of truthfulness; ... equal rights and partnership 
between men and women” (Küng 1998, 18). Representatives from every 
religion felt able to sign the Declaration only because it steered clear of 
any concrete proposals.  
 
Küng’s own efforts to ground the global ethic have been largely 
pragmatic and conservative. Like Ratzinger, he has failed to move beyond 
the specication of prepolitical moral foundations for a just society and 
economy, although in his search for such foundations he has cast his net 
far wider among a plurality of cultures and religions. Following a 
somewhat meandering engagement with the politics and economics 
of Kissinger, Roosevelt, Wilson, Bismarck, Morgenthau, Friedman, 
Keynes, and Polayni, Küng’s program for social change is based on 
improvements within the existing system (Küng 1997). A basic and 
fundamental reorientation toward ethical behavior, without 
an accompanying transformation of the basic structures of world order or 
global capitalism, will alone bring the West into an improved relation 
with non-Western societies. Peace between nations requires a new 
responsible politics, avoiding both “Realpolitik without morals” and a 
“moralizing Idealpolitik.” Accompanying a responsible politics would be 
a responsible economics, which tracks a “Third Way” between 
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“welfarism which is not affordable” and “neoliberalism which lacks 
social justice.”  
 
Leonardo Boff, alongside other important theologians such as Gustavo 
Gutierrez, José Miguez Bonino, Enrique Dussel, Segunda Galiliea, 
Ronaldo Munoz, and Juan Luis Segundo, has been at the forefront of 
the development of Southern Hemispheric liberation theology. Instituted 
following the second Latin American Bishops Conference in 1968, and 
germinating rst in Brazil and Peru in the early 1970s, liberation theology 
has grown to become something of an interdenominational global social 
movement, generating radical theological traditions in other parts of 
Latin America, India, Sri Lanka, the Philippines, Taiwan, and in parts of 
Africa and inuencing Black Christian social movements in the southern 
states of the United States. Although there is a sense today that the 
failure of the Nicaraguan and Salvadorian revolutions and more generally 
the failure of Marxism and the ascendancy of capitalism have rendered 
liberation theology obsolete, this tradition nevertheless continues to 
bristle with debate as to how to effect meaningful social change.  
 
Boff has published more than one hundred books laying out the 
foundations for liberation theology and articulating its central concerns 
(most pertinent for this article are Boff 1978, 1982, 1985, 1986, 
1997, 2005b, 2006, 2008). For Boff, the Christianity that came to Latin 
America was already inculturated by the European Greco-Roman 
tradition and took the form of a Western, hierarchical, clergy-dominated 
institution. This tradition was further mediated by the process of 
transplantation itself, with Christian missions, settlements, and 
evangelizing bound up with the Iberian colonial project, military 
conquest, violence and genocide, and economic exploitation. Stripped of 
the clothing of its origins and the wounds it inicted as part of 
its passage, however, the Christian message still held the key to 
redemption. The challenge for liberation theology was to decolonize 
Christianity and to effect a new synthesis between the Bible and the 
social and political realities of present-day Latin America.  
 
Liberation theology conceives of structures of polity and economy that 
serve to produce and reproduce global inequality, oppress the poor and 
the marginalized, and threaten the earth’s resources and natural 
environments, as nothing less than the presence of evil in the world.  
Capitalism in its “fundamentalist” neoliberal form, and democracy in its 
“compromised” Western form, are the work of the devil and inherently 
sinful. Jesus Christ was the world’s foremost revolutionary. If Christianity 
was to take the message of Christ seriously it had no option other than to 
challenge these structures and work for fundamental social and political 
transformation. The prognosis then was to rescue Christianity from the 
European colonial project and to recast the Christian message by 
bringing it into confrontation with the categories of politico-social 
liberation and praxes and in particular with Marxism and political 
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ecology. Importantly, though, all social theory was useful only in so far as 
it helped Christianity better understand and fulll its mission. In 
liberation theology, Marxism is always subordinate to and parasitical on 
Christianity and there is no innate or intrinsic devotion to Marx.  
 
According to Boff, global peace and security cannot be achieved within 
the contemporary world order, structured as it is to serve Western 
capitalism and the globalization of the neoliberal agenda. Western foreign 
policy toward Afghanistan, Palestine, and Iraq shares clear parallels with 
Iberian colonization of Latin America. Addressing unequal power 
asymmetries between colonizer and colonized is the only secure way to 
avoid a clash of civilizations. In an interview in Comunitá Italiana in 
November 2001 in the immediate aftermath of the 11 September attacks 
on the World Trade Center, Boff controversially asserted:  
 
For me, the terrorist attack of September 11 represents 
the shift towards a new humanitarian and world model. 
The targeted buildings send a message: a new world 
civilization couldn’t be built with the kind of dominating 
economy (symbolized by the World Trade Center), with 
the kind of death machine set up (the Pentagon), and with 
the kind of arrogant politics and producer of many 
exclusions (White House spared, because the plane fell 
before). For me the system and culture of capital began to 
collapse. They are too destructive. (Boff 2001, 15)  
 
Advocating a provincialization of Enlightenment Europe and a 
progressive redeployment of the global market for the common good, 
Ratzinger’s ecumenical agenda remains essentially conservative and 
defensive of Western economic and political structures and therefore 
stands as a limited act of contrition. Küng’s point of departure is a 
condent West, virtuous in its basic economic and political structures but 
willing to look out to the world with humility, to confess and face up to 
past and present arrogance and misdeeds, to open up to genuine cross-
cultural dialogue and ecumenical solidarity, and to be enriched by other 
cultures and value systems. Arguably his approach offers more than he 
eventually realizes. Boff demands that the West face up to the role of 
capitalist economic interests and Western theories of development in the 
production of global inequality, friction, tension, and war and advocates a 
radical and alternative politics and economy. Although it is crude to sort 
all three into a continuum, it would seem appropriate to conclude that 
Boff’s postcolonial agenda is the most radical, Ratzinger’s is the most 
conservative, and Küng’s sits uneasily between conservativism and 
liberalism.  
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Formations of the Secular: Securing Access to and Impact on 
Public Realms and Democratic Polities  
To have any material signicance, approaches to peace building need to 
concretize into praxes that access and impact public realms in different 
societies. Critical geographical enquiry needs to pay attention to the 
situated mobilization of peace strategies as well as the situated 
production of the colonial and postcolonial visions that undergird these 
strategies. It is here that geographies of secularism and geographies of the 
workings of democratic systems emerge as key. An important debate 
between Casanova (1994) and Asad (2003) helps frame reection on the 
impact of the Roman Catholic Church in secular politics.  
 
According to Casanova (1994), the much vaunted reentry of religion into 
the public realm does not represent a threat to secularism but instead 
reveals its maturation. Secularism resulted in a differentiation of elds of 
human endeavor with an effective separation of religion from politics, 
economy, science, and so on; the relegation of religion to the private and 
personal spheres; and the declining signicance of religious beliefs, 
practices, and institutions. This removal of religion from the public 
sphere was to the detriment of agonic debate and resulted in an inferior 
species of secularism. For Casanova, religions inject ethical values into 
secular societies, which they themselves rarely prioritize, such as 
solidarity, peace, and human dignity. The dawning of the postsecular age 
announces a new moment when religion, now disciplined and contained 
by the rules of democratic debate, reenters public life productively, 
as one voice among many, making a reasoned case, like all other interest 
groups, for particular public policy choices.  
 
Asad (2003), in contrast, refused to regard the reassertion of religion in 
the public sphere as, at least  in any simple way, an enrichment, 
advancement, and reinvigoration of the secular project, offering instead 
an anthropology of secularism that reveals its differential capacities to 
absorb different religions and denominations into the public realm. The 
categories secular and religion were invented at a pivotal moment in 
Europe’s history. Secularism itself then emerged as a 
historically distinctive and sociopolitical process that sought to roll back 
religious and traditional authority only to replace it with new sources of 
power, politics, ethics, and modes of governance. Asad advanced the 
concept of “formations of the secular” to historicize secularism (see also 
Withers’ 2007 “placing” of the European Enlightenment), to reveal the 
signicance of its European heritage, and to capture the manner in which 
its prevailing political, economic, social, and cultural institutions act to 
sanction only particular and preferred incursions of religion into public 
life.  
 
Echoing Asad’s concerns, Swyngedouw (2008) has recently sought to 
draw the attention of geographers to the works of Jacques Ranciere, 
Slavoj Zizek, and Chantal Mouffe, concerning the status of our 
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“postpolitical” moment. A postpolitical democratic formation arises 
when the manufacturing of consent comes to take precedence over 
genuine agonic debate, concepts of democratic participation become 
diluted to the point of ineptitude, entry to the public sphere is 
effectively foreclosed, and the public realm comes to serve as a source of 
propaganda for capital’s trajectories. Whereas the postsecular thesis 
posits a widening of the public sphere, concomitant with the elevated 
role played by religious leaders in public debate, the postpolitical thesis 
heightens awareness of the potentially illusionary character of such 
widening and draws attention to the heavily policed public sphere in 
which religions are currently struggling to articulate particular agendas.  
 
Ratzinger, Küng, and Boff have accessed and impacted the public realm 
in different ways. First and foremost these differences reect their 
differential access to authority within the Catholic Church itself. 
The Roman Curia (apparatus of governance) and Roman Magisterium 
(teaching ofce) provide a centralized, hierarchical, and absolute system 
of governance for the entire Church, vetting ecumenical agendas 
emerging from any sectional interest or particular national, regional, or 
local church to ensure alignment with ofcial Roman doctrine. There is 
no doubt that by holding the Petrine ofce, Ratzinger has been able to 
employ the resources of the Vatican to ensure a high prole for his 
vision of how to secure global peace and security. His approach to 
ecumenicism has become de facto the ofcial position of the Roman 
Catholic Church. Even before his ascension to the papacy, in his prior 
role as Prefect for the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, Ratzinger 
was to censor, silence, and impose sanctions on both Küng and Boff. 
Although ostracization within the Church has undoubtedly opened up 
new audiences for Küng and Boff by default, their marginalization has 
inhibited their inuence.  
 
At the root of Küng’s ecumenical agenda is a belief that freedom within 
the Church is a prerequisite for the pursuit of freedom from social 
oppression. Only by looking inward can Catholicism look outward with 
condence. It needs rst to transcend its self-congratulatory pretension 
toward superiority and absolutist primacy before it can become an 
effective partner in dialogue. On this basis he has challenged the Catholic 
Church to rethink its approach to interfaith marriage, the role of women 
in the church, contraception, clerical celibacy, church governance, papal 
infallibility, and Marian piety. Throughout, however, he has chosen to 
remain a Catholic:  
 
Despite my years of immense difculty with Rome I 
remained true to the conviction that the Petrine 
ofce, oriented on the constitution of the New Testament, 
and the great Catholic tradition of the rst millennium, 
with a moral and pastoral rather than formal and juristic 
authority, can still be an opportunity for Christianity as 
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a whole. In this respect I am certainly perhaps the most 
radical Catholic critic of medieval juristic primacy of the 
rule by the pope, but paradoxically at the same time 
possibly one of the most effective Catholic advocates for a 
pastoral primacy in the service of Christian ecumenism. 
(Küng 2008, 428)  
 
Following a protracted conict with Rome over the speed with which the 
Roman Curia and Roman Magisterium were “modernizing,” Küng’s 
interrogation of the doctrine of papal infallibility in 1970 nally 
provoked Vatican reprisal, leading eventually in 1980 to the withdrawal 
of his right to instruct in the Catholic faith. Küng was charged with no 
longer believing in the central doctrines of the Catholic faith and 
therefore was assumed to be unable and unt to communicate these 
doctrines effectively. This marginalization was profoundly debilitating for 
Küng and arguably he has yet to recover from it on a personal and 
political level. As a consequence, Küng’s contribution has been 
channeled outside of the Church in his role as a public intellectual and 
president of an inuential research institute.  
 
In 1996 Count K. K. von der Groeben provided an endowment to 
establish the Global Ethic Foundation   in Tubingen, Germany, and 
installed Küng as president. The foundation has since expanded ofces 
into Hungary, Colombia, Ireland, Switzerland, and France. In search of a 
global ethic, the Foundation has been active on three particular fronts. 
First, Küng has sought to deepen public understanding of world religions 
through the production of a seven-part television series, publication of 
major manuscripts on each of the main religions, and the organization of 
an exhibition of world religions that has toured the major cities of the 
world. Second, Küng has engaged world leaders in his project by hosting 
an annual invited lecture, given to date by Tony Blair, Mary Robinson, 
Ko Annan, Horst Kohler, Shirin Ebadi, Jacques Rogge, Helmut 
Schmidt, and Desmond Tutu. Finally, Küng has played a central role in 
drafting two signicant cross-faith declarations: the Declaration of the 
Parliament of the World’s Religions in Chicago in 1993 and the Universal 
Declaration of Human Responsibilities in 1997 (Küng 1998).  
 
Following his elevation to the papacy, Ratzinger met Küng at Castel 
Gandolfo in Lazio in September 2005. There was to be no reconciliation 
(Küng 2008). Ratzinger himself has praised the global ethic project as 
well spirited but has argued that it can only work at a level of abstraction 
that means little to those experiencing actual conict, war, and genocide 
(Habermas and Ratzinger 2006). Küng, meanwhile, is vehement that any 
conversation with Islam or Judaism predicated on Hellenistic reasoning 
holds out little promise for a genuine ecumenical dialogue:  
 
Only one enlightenment is really acceptable to him, 
the classical Greek enlightenment. He regards the clothing 
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in Greek dress of a message which comes from the 
semitic sphere as a divine dispensation of such a kind that 
no other dress is either necessary or legitimate. The 
secular enlightenment of the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries is unacceptable to him; Hellenism is the maxim 
of all that is authentically Christian. . . . Anyone who 
wants to carry on a conversation with Jews or Muslims on 
the bases of the traditional Hellenistic doctrine of Trinity 
and incarnation will begin a pseudo dialogue that will 
very soon come to an end. (Küng 2008, 133, 305)  
 
Four years into Ratzinger’s papacy, Küng remained pessimistic about his 
vision for the Catholic Church and the contributions it might make to 
world peace. In January 2009 in the German newspaper Sueddeutsche, 
and based on a line of reasoning whose credibility time alone will 
determine, Küng pondered over the prospects for the Catholic Church 
were Barack Obama to become Pope:  
 
In the Catholic Church the mood is oppressive, the pile-
up of reforms paralysing. Ratzinger has conrmed all the 
fears which arose when he was elected pope. The pope 
favours people who still reject the freedom of religion 
afrmed by Vatican II, dialogue with other churches, 
reconciliation with Judaism, a high esteem for Islam and 
the other world religions and the reform of the liturgy. 
Whereas President Obama, with the support of the whole 
world, is looking forwards and is open to people and to 
the future, this Pope is orientating himself above all 
backwards, inspired by the ideal of the medieval church, 
sceptical about the Reformation, ambiguous about 
modern rights of freedom. Whereas President Obama is 
concerned for new cooperation with partners and allies 
Pope Benedict XVI is trapped in thinking in terms of 
friend and foe. He snubs fellow Christians in the 
Protestant churches by refusing to recognize 
these communities as churches. The dialogue with 
Muslims has not got beyond a lip confession of 
“dialogue.” Relations with Judaism must be said to have 
been deeply damaged. (Küng 2009, 4)  
 
In his role as Prefect of the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith, 
Ratzinger (1984) published an Instruction on Liberation Theology warning 
Roman Catholics about the “errors” in liberation theology. Shaped by 
Catholic warring with Marxist ideology, in particular its privileging of 
materialism over spiritualism in the unfolding of history, the central 
importance of the Solidarity movement in Poland to the papacy of his 
predecessor John Paul II, and his own experiences of Soviet Communism 
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in East Germany, Ratzinger ascribed to liberation theology the status 
of heresy:  
 
The very radicality of Liberation Theology means that 
its seriousness is often underestimated. Since it cannot t 
into any of the accepted categories of heresy its 
fundamental concerns cannot be detected by the existing 
range of standard questions. The Sermon on the Mount is 
indeed God taking sides with the poor. But to interpret 
the “poor” in the sense of the Marxist dialectic of history 
and “taking sides” with them in the sense of class struggle 
is a wanton attempt to portray as identical things which 
are contrary. (Ratzinger 1984, 4)  
 
He was to use this Instruction to censor a number of Latin American 
bishops and theologians. Leonardo Boff was censored for nine months in 
1985 following publication of his Marxist-inspired Church, Charism, 
and Power and when the Roman Magisterium attempted to do so again in 
1992 to prevent his participation in the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, 
he opted to leave the priesthood. Ostracized by Rome, Boff’s 
political theology found an audience among grassroots activists  in 
marginal communities in Brazil and his work in defense of the poor has 
earned international recognition.  
 
Synchronizing global political and economic politics with local and 
community activism, for Boff, “Comunidades de Base” or “Base 
Christian Communities” have offered a fruitful way forward for Christian 
social praxes. There are more than one hundred thousand of these 
grassroots organizations in Brazil alone. The Comunidades de Base have 
served not only as sites for the production of new forms of liturgy, 
worship, prayer, and lay involvement in ministry but also as 
breeding grounds for community leaders, activists, and agitators; trade 
union members and organizers; and representatives of socialist political 
parties. From within these sites a contextual theology capable of 
challenging capitalist exploitation and the hegemony of 
transnational capital and restoring human dignity has been 
produced, circulated, and popularized.  
 
For Boff the Roman Catholic Church will not serve as a partner for 
peace in any meaningful sense for as long as Ratzinger remains Pope: 
 
If the attitude of confrontation with modernity and 
postmodernity prevails, I foresee disastrous consequences 
for the future of the Church. Traditionalist as he is, 
Benedict XVI must know that this strategy profoundly 
wears down the Church. In the past, he deprived the 
liberation movements of the oppressed the cooperation of 
Christians who could have offered Christian values to the 
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emerging social relations, leaving them instead alienated 
and immature. A Church that returns to models of the 
past becomes immobile, like a fossil. Ratzinger says that 
only the Catholic Church is the Church of Christ and that 
the others are not Churches, but only have ecclesial 
elements. It is also to say to other religions that they have 
valid elements, but that their followers run a grave risk of 
perdition because they are outside the Catholic Church, 
the only true religion. This is not to dialogue but to insult. 
Cordiality is used to facilitate conversion. That is deceitful 
and undignied. (Boff 2005a, 1)  
 
The prole, resources, and politics of the Petrine Ofce have ensured 
that Raztinger’s approach to peace building has reached a global audience 
and inltrated public debate in many societies with some effect. Although 
no longer the church of the establishment in many European states 
where it formerly dominated, the Catholic Church exerts both formal and 
informal inuence, especially in polities where there remains a signicant 
Catholic electoral block. Nevertheless, as evidenced in the extraordinary 
breadth of public commentary that surrounded his overseas visits to 
Germany in 2006; Brazil in 2007; France, the United States, and Australia 
in 2008; and Cameroon, Angola, and the Middle East in 2009, Ratzinger 
has been unable to access the secular stage without exciting 
controversy and resistance. This is in spite of the fact that the Church has 
used its tightly regulated and centralized command and control structure 
to silence dissenting voices and to promote socially conservative 
political agendas.  
 
Defense of the Church’s “citizenship” rights has been a major theme of 
Ratzinger’s papacy. The Roman Curia repeatedly laments that Ratzinger 
has been the victim of negative media coverage and has been unduly 
and unfairly caricatured and ridiculed. For Ratzinger media hostility is 
evidence of the persistence of aggressive secularism and the difculties 
some secular constituencies have with granting Christianity the right to 
participate in democratic debate. It is not surprising then that at the heart 
of Caritas in veritate is a plea for a fairer hearing for Christianity:  
 
The Christian religion and other religions can offer 
their contribution to development only if God has a place 
in the public realm, specically in regard to its cultural, 
social, economic, and particularly its political 
dimensions. The Church’s social doctrine came into being 
in order to claim “citizenship status” for the Christian 
religion. Denying the right to profess one’s religion in 
public and the right to bring the truths of faith to bear on 
public life has negative consequences for true 
development. The exclusion of religion from the public 
square – hinders an encounter between persons and their 
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collaboration for the progress of humanity. Public life is 
sapped of its motivation and politics takes on a 
domineering and aggressive character. (Benedict XVI 
2009, 30)  
 
Catholicism’s struggles to be taken seriously in the public square in spite 
of its ruthless “management” of dissenting liberal and socialist wings 
raises important questions about the wider contributions of Christianity 
to democratic formations beyond the United States. Two interpretations 
present themselves. First, it might be that secularism has become so 
entrenched even in those Western democracies that aspire to a 
postpolitical foreclosure of agonic debate in favor of deepening 
and extending neoliberal ideologies that political systems do not see value 
in courting Catholicism even when it might be politically useful to their 
cause. The marginalization and silencing of the Catholic Church by 
aggressive secularism raises the possibility that beyond the United States, 
conservative Christianity might be of limited interest to capitalist elites 
with vested interests in globalizing neoliberalism and 
consolidating Western power. In our postpolitical moment, rationalities 
that originate in the secular eld might be capable of manufacturing 
consent alone, without the need for religion to serve as an additional 
source of support.  
 
An alternative reading posits that secularism is working effectively to 
facilitate an appropriate and healthy incorporation of Catholicism back 
into the public sphere. Asad (2003) is correct to foreground the varying 
access to the public realm different religions and branches of religion 
actually secure in different places and at different times. In contexts 
when Roman Catholicism struggles to justify and promote even its more 
conservative social and political agendas, however, Casanova’s (1994) 
assertion that religion has the potential to make valuable contributions to 
the enhancement of agonic debate in the public democratic sphere 
becomes more convincing. At its best, secularism permits Roman 
Catholicism only an equal opportunity to state its case. Critical 
geographical enquiry into Christianity’s contributions to war and peace 
needs to map both the unequal and privileged access to secular politics 
some Christian churches enjoy in some societies and the progressive and 
regressive outcomes that derive from the struggles other Christian 
churches encounter when trying to secure access to the public realm in 
other secular democracies.  
 
Conclusion  
As growing intolerance between religions has come to be viewed as a 
signicant threat to world peace and security, Christianity has been called 
on to exercise its inuence responsibly and to promote greater 
tolerance, understanding, and mutual respect. The embroilment of certain 
branches of evangelical Christianity in the rise of a new phase of U.S. 
imperialism has been interpreted as conrmation that Christianity is 
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structurally imbricated in the Western project and its struggle to maintain 
global hegemony and as such is incapable of brokering peace between 
Western and non-Western societies. This article has challenged the 
paradigmatic status ascribed to this case study and has called for 
a heightened awareness of Christianity’s complex historical emergence 
and conictual brew of churches and faith communities.  
 
With specic reference to Christianity’s single largest denomination, the 
Roman Catholic Church, this article advances the more careful claim that 
although Christianity can indeed perform as a mystifying apparatus, 
serving the interests of colonial and imperial projects, it can also work as 
a galvanizing force for progressive social, cultural, economic, and 
political agendas. On this basis it has placed Roman Catholicism under 
postcolonial scrutiny and set out an agenda for a critical geographical 
enquiry into Catholicism’s role in war and peace. The concepts of milieux 
of translation and formations of the secular have been used to denote the 
signicance of both the situated production of Christianity’s colonial and 
postcolonial visions and the situated capacities of these visions to be 
brought to the public square and to impact meaningfully on democratic 
polities.  
 
Concerned with the future of critical human geography and the search 
for a foundational ethics for a meaningful politics, some geographers 
have offered Christianity itself as a credible source of nourishment 
and encouragement. Pacione (1999, 118), for example, asserted that 
Christianity is capable of providing a “moral framework for a more 
relevant human geography,” and Cloke (2002, 587) offered Christianity as 
a resource for “living ethically and acting politically in human 
geography.” This article demonstrates that there is indeed considerable 
merit in reconsidering (institutional) geography’s relationship with 
Christianity and afrms the potential value of Christian geographies. But 
it would seem unfortunate if the discipline of geography, itself in the 
throes of reection on its colonial origins, were to allow its moral and 
ethical compass to be uncritically dened by a Christianity that is 
arguably only now awakening to its historical emergence in and 
through empire.  
 
Future dialogue between Christianity and geography might usefully begin 
with an exchange of ideas on how best to progress Chakrabarty’s (2000) 
wider project of historicizing, relativizing, and provincializing Europe 
and the West. Critical human geography, and in particular postcolonial 
geography, must simultaneously instruct as well as be instructed by 
Christianity. Christianity can furnish geography with a range of possible 
strategies for provincializing the West and insights into the challenges of 
pursuing these strategies materially in the realpolitik of contemporary 
international relations. Geography, meanwhile, offers Christianity a 
heightened self-understanding of the role of location, space, and place, in 
the framing, enactment, and success of different postcolonial visions. 
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Only when it is put in its proper place will it be possible to deliberate on 
the times and spaces in which it may be productive to harness 
Christianity in the service of critical geographical enquiry.  
 
Finally, although Christianity has provided the focus for this article, it is 
clear that other religions, in particular Islam, Judaism, and Hinduism, 
require similar critical scrutiny. It is here, however, that more complex 
theoretical challenges might present themselves. Given the relationship 
both have with the West, it could be argued that the dialogue 
(institutional) geography is capable of having with Christianity is 
not open to easy replication. Of course, it is ethnocentric to assume that 
the majority of Anglo-American geographers are Western or Christian, 
even in the loosest senses of these signiers, but it remains pertinent to 
ask with what authority and on what bases Anglo-American critical 
human geography might feel entitled to bring Islam, Judaism, 
Confucianism, Daoism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and so on to account. If 
critical geographical enquiry is to advance interfaith, intercultural, and 
intercivilizational dialogue, it will need to think seriously about the 
colonizing tendencies of postcolonial geography itself. It is imperative 
that Anglo-American geographers are afforded the right to 
speak critically about other religions but the terms of reference of such 
critical enquiry and the analytical frameworks that might be best suited to 
the task require prior reection.  
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‘NOTHING LESS THAN ITS ERADICATION’? IRELAND’S 
HUNGER TASK FORCE AND THE PRODUCTION OF 
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Introduction  
Issues to do with hunger and its continued prevalence are high on the 
development agenda at the moment. There have therefore been some 
recent noteworthy interventions that aim to do something about it. For 
example, in Africa, the continent in which hunger is most prevalent, the 
Comprehensive African Agricultural Development Programme (CAADP) 
calls for African governments to invest 10 percent of their national 
budgets on supporting agriculture. Such investments tend to pay off – for 
example, in Sierra Leone, increased government spending has 
dramatically boosted rice production (Africa Renewal, 2011: 10) – but 
they are not the only changes that might be pursued to reduce hunger. 
One notable set of arguments is contained in the World Bank’s 2008 
World Development Report, Agriculture for Development, which 
suggests that Africa should pursue ‘the new agriculture’, which can be 
‘led by private entrepreneurs in extensive value chains linking producers 
to consumers’ (World Bank, 2007: 8) and particularly via the production 
of non-traditional agricultural exports (think: baby sweet corn or fresh 
cut flowers [Barrett et al., 1999]). Meanwhile, from the other end of 
political spectrum, an alternative path to reducing hunger has been laid 
out in the Nyeleni Declaration, an ambitious and imaginative set of 
arguments for food sovereignty and radical reform of the global food 
economy (see Patel, 2009) promoted by La Via Campesina, a 
transnational movement of peasants and small-scale farmers (see 
Desmarais, 2007).  
Still another contribution to the debate about hunger and how best to 
tackle it is a 2008 report by the Hunger Task Force (hereafter, HTF), a 
group of experienced development and health experts mandated by the 
Irish government in 2006 to, ‘identify the additional, appropriate and 
effective contributions that Ireland [could] make to international efforts 
to reduce hunger and thus achieve the first Millennium Development 
Goal of halving poverty and hunger by 2015’ (HTF, 2008: 14). The HTF 
report, which was launched at the United Nations in 2008, sets out:  
[…] a very focused programme of actions to address three 
priorities, which the Task Force believes can have the 
greatest impact in reducing, and ultimately eliminating, 
hunger: Increasing the productivity of smallholder, mainly 
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women, farmers in Africa; implementing programmes 
focused on maternal and infant undernutrition; and 
ensuring real political commitment, at national and 
international levels, to give hunger the absolute priority it 
deserves’ (p.1).  
It is not my intention to critique the report’s call for action. I leave it for 
someone else to consider fully whether development interventions 
regarding the first two priorities will save or improve many lives, or if the 
third recommendation is really the best use of Ireland’s resources. Rather, 
what interests me in this paper is what the report says and fails to say 
about the causes of hunger. Further, I want to consider what the report 
might tell us about the place in which it emerged and on which I argue it 
reflects: Ireland. In particular, I argue there is a need to position the 
report relative to some pertinent political and economic changes in the 
country and Ireland’s peculiar geo-history. In this regard there are two 
absolutely crucial points to note.  
The first is that the HTF was formed at the height of the so-called ‘Celtic 
Tiger’ boom; that is, at a time when the Irish political class was optimistic 
about how it could use the country’s wealth. Among the members of the 
HTF, for instance, there was a sense that Ireland could try to become 
‘the Norway of hunger’. Thus, like Norway, which is a small, resource-
abundant country proudly occupying its position as the world’s foremost 
advocate for conflict resolution, Ireland could aim to become a third-
party mediator, an initiator, indeed a leader in the fight against hunger. 
Why hunger? This is the second point: Ireland knows about hunger.  
 
Between 1845 and 1852 in particular, an Gorta Mór (in Irish, ‘the Great 
Hunger’) killed one million people and caused at least another million to 
emigrate (see Nally, 2008). As Chair of the HTF, Joe Walsh, noted in the 
Preface to the 2008 report: ‘The members of the Task Force believe that 
Ireland, because of its history and commitment to development, can play 
a pivotal role in the global fight against hunger’ (HTF, 2008: 1). Other 
members of Ireland’s political class also highlighted the country’s 
legitimacy and indeed obligation to tackle hunger. For example, one 
month after the HTF presented its report to the UN General Assembly 
in 2008, Ireland’s President, Mary McAleese, said in Norway:  
 
Last month at the United Nations General Assembly the 
Irish Government launched its Hunger Task Force 
Report. Indelibly marked as we are by the memory of our 
own Great Famine, Ireland is determined to take a strong 
leadership role on the issue (McAleese, 2008).  
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Likewise, in a speech to the U.N. General Assembly in 2009, Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Mr. Peter Power, T.D. said:  
I speak today as the representative of a country which has 
experienced famine and hunger and a country whose 
population was decimated after the Great Famine of 1847. 
Hunger is the result of many failings. Its eradication, and 
nothing less than its eradication, must be our goal (Power, 
2009; my emphasis).  
As these quotations indicate, therefore, leading members of Ireland’s 
political class argued that Irish interventions regarding hunger were not 
only needed but also that Ireland had the legitimacy to speak up. It is 
hard to argue against this general sentiment. But as I will argue in the 
next section, although the HTF report invokes and seeks to build upon 
memories and commemorations of the Irish Famine, it does not show 
any signs that the group sought to learn anything about the causes of that 
particular hunger, nor how those general causes might still be at work 
today.  
A critical analysis of the Hunger Task Force report  
To begin, then, consider the following, which is the report’s clearest 
statement about the causes of hunger:  
 
This inability [to obtain the basic food intake] can arise 
from a number of causes including poverty, low food 
production, mothers’ and fathers’ lack of education, poor 
dietary diversity and hence low nutritional quality, poor 
water, sanitation and health facilities, and climatic shocks. 
This indicates the multi-dimensional nature of the hunger 
problem and of the solutions needed to reach the MDG. 
The vulnerability of hungry households is exacerbated by 
gender inequality, and the impact of HIV/ AIDS and 
other major diseases. The extent and causes of hunger 
vary by region. War and HIV/AIDS have been hugely 
important factors causing undernutrition, particularly in 
sub-Saharan Africa. In Asia, the low status and consequent 
poor education of women has affected child malnutrition 
and mortality (p.17).  
There should be no doubt that hunger is multidimensional. It is. Hunger 
will always be the result of complex combinations of forces. Nor will 
there be much disagreement with highlighting connections between hunger 
and poverty, low food production, poor dietary diversity, or poor water, 
sanitation and health facilities. Or that ‘war and HIV/AIDS’ have been 
important factors in sub-Saharan Africa. However, recognizing 
connections or factors is absolutely not the same as identifying them as 
causes. Poverty, for example, is an effect of other processes and failures 
(although which precise mix of processes and failures is not at issue in this 
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paper). Thus, what the HTF report does in this short statement is ascribe 
causality to effects. It draws on and advances a confused, incorrect logic.  
In addition to displaying a poor grasp of hunger’s causes, the report also 
ignores numerous central features of the capitalist food economy that 
contribute to and, we might even say, produce hunger. In particular, the 
report should have gone beyond identifying relevant related conditions 
affecting the incidence of hunger and instead considered a similar set of 
dynamics that played a part in creating Ireland’s famine. As numerous 
contributors to the critical literature on the global food economy have 
noted (e.g. Akram-Lodhi, 2007; Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010; Friedmann, 
1987; McMichael, 2009; Nally, 2011; Weis, 2007, 2010), hunger cannot be 
divorced from the governance of agriculture and international agricultural 
trade. For McMichael (2009), these governance mechanisms give rise to a 
‘corporate food regime’ (CFR) that draws on World Trade Organization 
rules, particularly around the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), to 
enshrine and cement the power of corporations such as Monsanto, 
Cargill, or Archer Daniels Midland (ADM) and their ilk. For example, a 
central aspect of the AoA is that it pushes for reduced trade barriers in 
developing countries, which helps to create a world price for agricultural 
commodities and ‘open markets’ for corporations to access and exploit, 
but yet also allows agricultural subsidies to continue in rich, northern 
countries. These arrangements enable and encourage northern 
agribusinesses to target ‘southern markets with artificially cheapened 
food surplus exports’ (McMichael, 2008: 209). Across Africa, such food 
imports, which total about $33bn annually (Africa Renewal, 2011: 11), 
displace domestic production, causing many peasants to leave the land, 
and heightening their vulnerabilities to food price rises. WTO restrictions 
on domestic supports also reduce the ‘development space’ (Wade, 2007) 
for governments in developing countries to support their agricultural 
sectors – a shift in the place of domestic food production which 
McMichael (2008: 209) refers to as the ‘evaporation of public support of 
peasant agriculture’. Many developing world governments therefore have 
limited scope to ensure food self-sufficiency. Thus, rather than 
promoting national food security, what the WTO seeks to create is a 
world in which food import dependency persists; a world in which food 
security is privatized. To eat, one must pay.  
Perhaps the most obvious critique of the HTF report is that none of 
these general or specific features of hunger’s contemporary production 
are mentioned. This failure is especially disappointing given that Ireland’s 
Famine was in large part a product of similar forces. The disaster 
unfolding in Ireland in the 1840s was closely bound up with dominant 
liberal ideas in Britain about trade, state interventions relative to market 
forces, and personal responsibility (e.g. see Nally, 2008). Despite reports 
of desperate conditions in Ireland, leading British politicians rejected 
imposing restrictions on food exports and out of fear of disrupting 
‘market forces’ (see also Bernstein, 1995), the British state refused to 
purchase sufficient quantities of food on the international market to 
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extend support to the hungry. Other state interventions in Ireland – such 
as to feed the hungry via public works programs – were also frowned 
upon and limited by the British government. Further, although the 
British government reluctantly provided some funds for an Irish Poor 
Law system that fed many in county workhouses, it did so with the 
explicit aim of reforming the Irish character; that is, to force the Irish to 
take personal responsibility for their own circumstances. Like 
contemporary welfare and workfare policies, the Irish Poor Law and the 
workhouse sought to ‘discipline and regulate’ (Nally 2008: 733); but also 
to balance Britain’s reluctant charitable drive against the belief that the 
Famine would ‘teach the Irish crucial lessons about self-reliance’ 
(Bernstein, 1995: 534).  
It goes without saying that these same sorts of mentalities – the visions 
and dreams of imposing class power even, or indeed especially, during 
moments of intense suffering – persist today. In the 1840s, the 
connection between liberalism and hunger was at issue; today, the issue is 
about neo-liberalism and hunger. It follows from these points that, insofar 
as it invoked the Famine and was supported by the Irish political class in 
the memory of those who suffered in the 1840s, the HTF should have 
been alert to the possibility that contemporary hunger might have rather 
similar causes to the Irish case. It might therefore have considered how 
the WTO’s pro-trade, anti-interventionist rules protect corporations in 
their pursuit of profit, even if they employ unsustainable production 
practices such as the use of food grains as feed for livestock, which is 
unsustainable ecologically (Weis, 2010: 320-321), but which also helps to 
set a market price for grain that many poor people simply cannot afford 
to pay. Or the report could have considered how the WTO enables 
corporations to seize intellectual property rights over seeds, which creates 
a market for objects that peasant producers once controlled and which 
therefore limits their scope to access them (Kloppenburg, 2010). Nally 
(2011) imaginatively conceptualizes this process as ‘accumulation by 
molecularisation’; like Harvey’s concept of ‘accumulation by 
dispossession’, Nally’s argument is that capitalists have found a new 
arena for accumulation in investments in micro-scale biological processes 
that lead to higher-yield but also infertile crop varieties that tie producers 
to seed manufacturers or lock them out of the market. The effect of this 
accumulation strategy is to devalue the right to food (Nally, 2011: 48; 
Huish, 2008) and harm peasant producers and small-scale farmers.  
What is all the more remarkable about the above silences in the HTF 
report is not only that the authors had scope to tackle these issues but 
also that it dealt with other, related tensions in a benign and uncritical 
manner. For example, the report discusses the importance of what it calls 
‘governance failures’ at the international level and draws attention to the 
role of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, but its findings 
are far from critical. In a section titled ‘A call to action: What Ireland can 
and should do’, the report states that, ‘International Financial Institutions 
(IFIs) have often supported stringent fiscal constraints to maintain 
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macroeconomic balance at the expense of expenditure on service 
provision’ (p.45) – which is certainly one way of putting it, but is not by 
any means a sufficient statement about the role of IFIs in producing 
hunger. On top of this, the report argues that tackling failures at national 
levels requires ‘substantial increases in resources to tackle key capacity 
constraints’ (p.41), such as ‘agricultural support structures [that were] run 
down through neglect and partial privatisation’ (p.41). Unfortunately, we 
are left in the dark as to why those structures were neglected or 
privatized: the report fails to explicitly consider how structural 
adjustment programs reduced the scope for the state to support 
agricultural production by dismantling or privatizing agricultural research 
and extension (see Holt-Gimenez and Patel, 2009: 45-49). Thus, in the 
contemporary period, agricultural extension (like so many of other 
former public sector services) is increasingly provided to those who can 
afford it by private consultants while millions of producers enjoy little or 
no support. This situation is in stark contrast to Europe and North 
America, where the state extends numerous supports to farmers (albeit 
unevenly, with the largest farm units gaining the most in many places) via 
research monies, say, but also via subsidies that encourage 
overproduction and give a boost to demand for the inputs (agri-
chemicals, seeds, etc.) corporations produce.  
Another crucial point the report should have made is that neo-liberal 
logic seeks to lock in this relationship via arguing that sub-Saharan Africa 
need not pursue a protectionist stance, nor even invest in agricultural 
research and extension so long as it is cheaper to import (subsidized) 
food from abroad. In response to the 2008 food crisis, for example, 
WTO Director-General, Pascal Lamy, said, ‘we have heard calls for 
“food self-sufficiency”, with some portraying import-substitution as the 
answer to food security. What this forgets is that international trade can 
be exactly the sort of vehicle, or “conveyor belt” if you will, that would 
allow food to travel from parts of the world with a surplus to parts where 
there is a shortage’ (Lamy, 2009). The resonances with liberalism’s logic 
in producing Ireland’s famine are clear: although a ‘conveyor belt’ might 
move food to those who need it, the obvious danger is that many 
consumers will be locked out of the market if they cannot afford the 
world price. Such is the logic of hunger’s production.  
So far I have argued that the HTF report remained silent about how the 
capitalist food economy contributes to the production of hunger. But 
whilst its silences deserve critique, some of its arguments are also highly 
problematic. Consider here what changes the report argues are needed to 
boost food production. One is that the state in developing countries 
should create an ‘enabling environment’ for the private sector to take the 
lead in expanding agricultural production (p.38). The report tries to 
qualify this statement by saying, ‘The private sector in this case is 
primarily comprised of millions of small producers’, which might be the 
case, but which cannot hide the fact that many of those in the private 
sector whom the state will ‘enable’ will actually be capital-intensive, 
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commercial agri-businesses producing for export rather than domestic 
consumption. A point the report failed to address here is that structural 
adjustment helped configure a ‘neoliberal agricultural export bias’ 
(Akram-Lodhi and Kay, 2010: 275) in sub-Saharan Africa. One outcome 
is a ‘bifurcated agrarian structure’, in which capital-intensive export 
oriented commercial agriculture sits besides and in some contexts has 
begun to take precedence over a peasant sub-sector (Akram-Lodhi, 2007; 
also Barrett et al., 1999). Both sectors increasingly produce for the export 
market as ‘a means of boosting access to foreign exchange, facilitating 
debt repayments, increasing funds for investment, promoting 
technological change and boosting rural productivity’ (Akram-Lodhi and 
Kay, 2010: 263). Just like the 2008 World Bank’s Agriculture for 
Development report (see Oya, 2009), the HTF report in effect calls for 
the state to get out of the way or, if it is to spend anything, it should 
‘focus on expenditures with proven returns, for example, pro-poor 
agricultural research, education and advisory services’ (p. 39) (on other 
so-called ‘pro-poor’ initiatives, see Borras and Franco, 2010; Bakker, 
2007].  
The report also presents a flawed analysis of the place of smallholders 
within agrarian structures. As Pauline Peters (2004) has noted, for 
example, conflicts over land in sub-Saharan Africa are increasing at the 
same time as inequality over access to land grows. And related to this is 
the new ‘land grab’, via which speculators, hedge funds, sovereign wealth 
funds, and agri-businesses have begun acquiring African land, thereby 
heightening tensions over land and deepening many of the differences 
between Africa’s different, bifurcated agricultural worlds (e.g. see 
Zoomers, 2010). In some cases, there are signs that investments will re-
direct African agricultural production in ways that will further undermine 
domestic food production, such as by growing exclusively for foreign 
grain reserves.1 It is revealing, then, that the report does not consider the 
possibility that redistributive land reform might have a role to play in 
addressing smallholder productivity. Yet there is scope for agrarian 
reform all across sub-Saharan Africa and in Zimbabwe, at least, there is 
growing evidence that its ‘fast-track’ approach has begun delivering some 
positive results (e.g. see Cousins and Scoones, 2010). Promoting the 
possibilities that agrarian reform holds out would have aligned the report 
with many of the movements of peasant and small-scale farmers that 
constitute La Vía Campesina (see book review discussion on Desmarais’ 
(2007) book, La Vía Campesina in Volume two, Issue two of this journal) 
– but on the potential place of such movements the report was (tellingly) 
silent. Furthermore, although the report does at least note that 
1 Of course, this is exactly the sort of outcome that neoliberal proponents of structural 
adjustment promoted: as then-World Bank Chief Economist Lawrence Summers argued, 
Africa should capitalize on its competitive advantage, even if that means receiving western 
pollution; or, as has begun to occur, Africa’s land should be used not for local or national 
food production if the market does not allow for it, but rather for more ‘efficient’ or 
‘rational’ purposes, such as growing fresh cut flowers. 
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inequalities in access to land matter, it awkwardly couches its statements 
in terms of a ‘management’ issue. For example, the report says there 
should be an improvement at the macro-level in the ‘management of, and 
access to, natural resources since these provide the base for sustainable 
agricultural production’. It continues, ‘Unequal or insecure access to 
natural resources perpetuates poverty and can underlie devastating 
conflicts’ (p.39). Unfortunately, the report does not tell us whether land 
is included in its definition of ‘natural resources’, nor what it means when 
it calls for improved management of natural resources? Is it calling for 
new, private sector, managers?  
At the same time as the report seeks to enlist the private sector, it also 
ignores other actors with whom it could engage. For example, the report 
claims (rather vaguely) that the, ‘challenge is to build real political 
commitment to reducing hunger, to give the hungry more voice and build 
greater capacity at all levels of society to address hunger effectively and in 
a sustainable manner’ (p.41). It is not at all clear what this means. But 
perhaps the key word in the statement is ‘give’: what the report wants to 
do is give the hungry voice, not to support them acquiring that voice 
through struggle. It seems, therefore, that part of the challenge regarding 
‘governance failures’ is to find ways to more successfully govern the 
hungry, just as the Irish Poor Law sought to change the ways of Ireland’s 
hungry masses (see Nally 2008).  
In summary, then, the HTF report ignores central features of the 
capitalist food economy, such as the role of the corporate food regime, 
despite the resonances that exist between the production of hunger today 
and the production of Ireland’s Famine in the 1840s. In addition, the 
report promotes policies that will liberate private sector actors whilst 
ignoring the scope that exists for bottom-up or even state-led 
interventions that might reduce inequality in access to land. These 
failures lead me to conclude that the HTF report is a weak and benign 
intervention which fails to live up to its laudable aims of addressing the 
causes of hunger.  
The Hunger Task Force and Ireland  
What might these failures say about the place in which it emerged – 
Ireland – and on which it reflects? There are two issues here. The first is 
about how the HTF fits within Irish government efforts to occupy a 
prominent place in the world. The second follows on from the first but 
brings into focus economic changes in Ireland and how the HTF 
connects with them.  
Ireland in the world  
Certainly, immediately prior to its economic collapse from 2008 onwards 
(but perhaps even to this day), Ireland’s political class promoted a vision 
of the country’s rightful place among the world’s leading states. Its 
wealth was such, for example, that the least it could do was aim to meet 
the UN’s target of overseas development assistance of 0.7% of GDP. But 
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Ireland’s aim was to become more than just a donor. Countering views of 
Ireland as just another recipient of structural aid and inward investment 
on Europe’s periphery (consider that, much to the annoyance of its 
leading politicians, Ireland is sometimes referred to as one of the crisis-
hit ‘PIGS’ – Portugal, Italy / Ireland, Greece and Spain), efforts such as 
the HTF are intended to underscore Ireland’s capacity to lead and not 
least alongside the United States. In Ireland, therefore, it is viewed as a 
success that US Secretary of State, Hilary Rodham-Clinton, has co-
sponsored one outcome of the HTF report, the 1,000 Days partnership, 
which aims to ‘scale up’ nutrition and end child malnutrition. Indeed, as 
Kevin Farrell, Ireland’s Hunger Envoy, noted in a 2010 parliamentary 
hearing:  
On reflection, when looking back on recent years, it is in 
the area of advocacy that Ireland has made its most 
significant contribution. We have done some great work in 
agriculture. We have also done some great work, and are 
doing even more, in respect of nutrition but it is in the 
area of advocacy that we are having a real impact. I was in 
New York last September to attend the launch of the 
1,000 Days initiative, that is, the 1,000 Days nutrition 
programme that was co-hosted by […] the Secretary of 
State, Ms [sic] Clinton. […] While the meeting itself was a 
hugely significant event, the important point is that Ireland is 
now working closely with a major player, namely, the United States, 
which is actively and enthusiastically working with us on 
this initiative (Farrell 2010; my emphasis)  
This quotation says a lot about how the work of the HTF and its report 
is intended to fit within Ireland’s broader diplomatic goals. Not only is 
the aim for Ireland to become the ‘Norway of hunger’, but Ireland’s 
effort to lead the (purported) fight against hunger aims to portray a 
particular image of the country: one that builds on the ‘Celtic Tiger’ 
boom, which encouraged the Irish government to think about how it 
could occupy a new place on the world stage. Indeed, some boom-time 
Irish geopolitical maneuvers entailed purposively cultivating a view that 
Ireland was ‘between Boston and Berlin’ (Finn, 2011) – a place that 
combined the ‘best’ of US and European political and economic ideas 
and policies (e.g. a light-touch regulatory environment from the US and a 
European-style welfare state). But Ireland also developed a narrative 
about its capacity to be a bridging state that could help the US and 
Europe to communicate with each other. This was a strategic stance, not 
least because Ireland definitely had to look to its west and to its east: 
inward investment from the US, for example, was a central aspect of 
Ireland’s boom, but so too was the flow of funds from Europe that 
helped educate Ireland’s workforce and improve its infrastructure (e.g. 
see Kitchin and Bartley, 2007).  
 
129
Given this context, it makes sense to imagine that interventions such as 
the HTF report would seek to conform with, rather than challenge, 
mainstream views on hunger. What, for example, would the HTF need to 
avoid if it wanted to be taken seriously by foreign politicians, diplomats, 
and civil servants (not least by such people in the United States)? Would 
statements about corporate control over the global food economy have 
much mileage? Consider here the central role of TNCs in the production 
of hunger, an issue the HTF report ignored. The Irish government 
wanted support from the United States. Yet, as the 2009 World 
Investment Report documents, of the 10 largest TNCs in five sectors of 
the agribusiness economy, 30% of the firms are from the US (UNCTAD, 
2009). A critique of TNCs, or discussing something approximate to the 
corporate food regime, which would implicate US trade policy (see Weis, 
2007: 68-69), would not have gone down too well.  
These points about Ireland’s stance on hunger suggest that the pressure 
on states and agents mandated by them to remain diplomatic in their 
dealings regarding development curtails the scope for real, adequate, and 
critical analysis to emerge. Further, whilst there is a ‘will to intervene’ 
(Robinson, 2008) among states in the context of a world of humanitarian 
crises, the geopolitical imagination that drives such interventions is 
always tempered by other and often competing interests. In Ireland’s 
case, the HTF failed to explain hunger as a product of (or even in any 
way connected to) an unfair trade system propped up by rich-world 
national governments to benefit their corporations, or by poor-world 
governments to protect their domestic elite allies. But the HTF report 
also fails to consider that Ireland is a major recipient of EU agricultural 
subsidies; subsidies that are widely recognized as a contributing factor to 
the difficulties facing agriculture in sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. see Heinisch, 
2006). Between 2000 and 2009, for example, farmers and agribusinesses 
in Ireland received almost €17.4bn (Pers. comm. from Central Statistics 
Office, 2011). By point of comparison, Ireland’s development assistance 
during the same period totaled €5.84bn. Although these figures are not 
exactly comparable (ODA stems from government funds, whereas 
agricultural subsidies flow to private individuals and businesses), Irish 
agriculture nevertheless gains from the subsidy regime.  
Based on the above discussion, it is hard not to conclude that the HTF 
report was part of a discursive process of misrepresentation and 
avoidance; about coordinating the illusion of doing something serious 
about causes, when in reality it only seeks to address effects, admirable as 
that may be. Like the legitimizing discourses and indeed cultural politics 
that ‘constructed consent’ (Harvey, 2003: 39-63) for neoliberalization via 
the making of arguments about the state, say, or the way the market was 
represented as the solution to society’s ills (see also Frank, 2000), the 
HTF report legitimizes corporate control over the global food economy 
insofar as it defends private sector expansion in the agricultural sector, 
refuses to acknowledge the corporate food regime’s failings, and fails to 
attack trade rules. That the report spent its time and resources enrolling 
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experts and collecting evidence, whilst receiving ‘buy-in’ from some 
‘stakeholders’ (e.g. Catholic charities in Ireland’s HTF report) and 
excluding others (e.g. La Via Campesina, which the report ignored), but 
failed to acknowledge the role of corporate control over the global food 
economy, leads me to argue that it misused those resources. The outcome, 
then, is a ‘development smokescreen’ which hides the real forces and 
structures at work in the production of hunger and the position of Ireland 
within those structures.  
 
Ireland’s emerging corporate foodscape  
A second set of issues that deserves attention here is about how the HTF 
report connects with Ireland’s emerging corporate-dominated foodscape, 
which Sage (2010: 100) argues, ‘is more powerful and extensive than 
ever’. He notes for example that, ‘the spread of corporate food retailing, 
dominating the landscapes of suburban areas and towns and further 
exacerbating dependence upon cars, represents one of the most 
significant features of the “Celtic Tiger” era’ (p.95). A crucial point in 
this context is that corporate retailers’ power stems in part from the Irish 
government’s decision in 2005 to abolish the Groceries Order, thereby 
allowing retailers to attempt to gain market share by attracting consumers 
with below-cost goods, not least alcohol products. This change gave a 
serious boost to the larger retailers, who now dominate the retail market. 
Indeed, Ireland’s largest retailers, such as ‘Dunnes Stores, Tesco and 
SuperValu account for 70% of the retail grocery market in Ireland, one of 
the highest levels of retail concentration in the EU’ (Campbell, 2009). As 
is the case in other contexts (e.g. see Patel, 2007: 215-252), the retailers’ 
buying power has knock-on effects for small-scale farmers because, 
‘[w]ith corporate retailers competing aggressively for market share, 
growers have come under exceptionally intense pressure as they shoulder 
the consequences of special promotions and discounts such as “buy one 
get one free”’ (Sage, 2010: 95). 
Not only have corporate retailers flexed their muscles over small-scale 
farmers, but Ireland’s corporate sector has also managed to exert 
pressure on Irish governments to construct a regulatory regime that 
grants them considerable power. Taylor and Millar (2004) shed light on 
one example. They note that, in the context of ‘food scares’ and 
consumer anxiety about food safety (see also Jackson, 2010), ‘the Fianna 
Fáil/Progressive Democrat (FF/PD) coalition in 1997 opted to replace a 
myriad of governmental bodies responsible for food safety in Ireland 
with a “super agency” that would have sweeping powers’ (p.595). This 
shift was ‘undertaken in a manner fully cognizant of the WTO’s Sanitary 
and Phytosanitary Agreement (SPS) which ensures that measures taken to 
protect food safety impact as little as possible on free trade (p.601). And 
reflecting the Irish state’s broader willingness to work in coalition with 
the private sector, the new agency, the Food Safety Authority of Ireland, 
has a consultative council on which the agribusiness community has 
representation. According to Taylor and Millar, this arrangement 
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‘formalizes privileged access’ (p.599) to agriculture and food sector 
corporations and offers them ‘invaluable access’ (p.602) to the FSAI. The 
FSAI also passes the burden of truly judging food safety risks onto 
individual consumers. It passes on scientific information but consumers 
must decide what they want to consume. In so doing the FSAI formalizes 
‘the preference of multi-national capital that if no risk is proven, it is not 
risky’ (p.600).  
I argue that the upshot of all these policy initiatives is that Irish 
government policy has cultivated a corporate-friendly space economy in 
the food sector. Large retailers are among the winners. But Irish food 
processors have also done well. Indeed, the foodscape has been the 
springboard for two Irish corporations ranking in UNCTAD’s list of the 
world’s 50 largest food and beverage TNCs (ranked by foreign assets): 
Kerry Group (at position 38) and Greencore (at 46). In contrast, only one 
Irish corporation, CRH (at 83), ranks in UNCTAD’s list of the largest 
100 non-financial TNCs (UNCTAD, 2009). Ireland’s agri-TNCs are 
punching well above their weight and it is no coincidence that they 
originate from a state that has sought to promote their emergence.  
Some aspects of Greencore’s story are especially instructive for the 
purposes of this paper. Greencore is the name of the former state-run 
sugar corporation which was privatized in 1991 and which has since then 
grown to become a large player in Europe’s convenience food sector. Its 
privatization was controversial, in part because it was botched by Irish 
stockbrokers (Irish Times, 1993) but also because it was the first of a 
wave of privatizations via which the Irish state neo-liberalized the 
economy. Following flotation, Greencore expanded rapidly by acquiring 
firms throughout Ireland, Europe, and the world. But retrenchment 
occurred alongside expansion. In 2005, for example, Greencore gave 
indication of its intentions by closing its sugar refining plant in Carlow, a 
move the government defended thus:  
The recent decision by Greencore Group plc — Irish 
Sugar Limited to close its sugar plant in Carlow and to 
consolidate all of its sugar manufacturing in Mallow was a 
commercial decision taken by the board […] Greencore’s 
rationalisation programme involves an investment of €20 
million to €25 million which clearly demonstrates a 
commitment to maintaining an efficient sugar processing 
industry in Ireland (Coughlan, 2005).  
One year later, Greencore used payments from the European 
Commission to close its last remaining sugar plant in Mallow, County 
Cork, which employed 230 workers. Sugar farmers who supplied the 
factory also received compensation from the EC. However, in a report 
on European Commission (EC) spending released in November 2010, 
the European Court of Auditors found that the EC had mistakenly paid 
Greencore and Irish sugar beet farmers a total of €131m. The payment 
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was questionable because Greencore used 2001 production figures to 
justify closing the Mallow plant; yet figures from later in the decade 
showed that the plant would still have been profitable today. So why did 
Greencore want to close its factory? The key issue was the potential value 
of the 160 hectare site for property development (Irish Times, 2011): why 
operate a factory when the site could be transformed into apartments? 
Greencore, which was part-owned by a prominent Irish property 
developer, had caught the Irish property market bug. Needless to say, in 
the context of Ireland’s collapsed property bubble, the undeveloped 
factory site now holds nowhere near the sort of value Greencore 
expected it would. At the time of writing (June 2011), Greencore’s share 
price has dropped almost 78% since its peak in 2007.  
In many respects, the Greencore story is emblematic of Ireland’s woe: 
misplaced faith in speculative property investments. But attention to the 
Greencore case and recognizing the company’s prominence within 
Ireland’s domestic capitalist class reminds us that the country’s agrarian 
sector remains important: the boom might have helped Ireland to change 
positions in the international division of labor, but the agrarian sector 
still has a strong presence within Irish society and economy. Indeed, as 
the size of Kerry Group and Greencore indicates, some of domestic Irish 
capitalism’s greatest ‘successes’ are in the agribusiness sector. It goes 
without saying that the corporate food regime empowers prominent Irish 
firms. Crucially, as Ireland tries to map a route towards economic 
recovery, it is becoming increasingly clear that government policy will try 
to strengthen its position here. Food exports from Ireland are already 
worth approximately €8bn each year. Ireland is the largest EU exporter 
of dairy products and the fourth largest beef exporter in the world. And 
although most of Ireland’s food exports stay within the EU (e.g. 99% of 
beef exports are sold in EU states), its farming and agribusiness sector 
stands to gain from new EU trade deals, such as the opening of Turkey’s 
market to EU beef exports in January 2011 (RTE, 2011). The revised 
Cotonou Agreement between the EU and 79 countries from Africa, the 
Caribbean and the Pacific also holds out the prospect that Ireland can 
capture new markets. For a small capitalist economy such as Ireland, it is 
no surprise that state policy is slanted towards capturing new export 
markets. From the perspective of the state, then, the pro-corporate 
transformation of Ireland’s domestic foodscape and the success of 
corporations such as Kerry Group and Greencore is something to be 
celebrated. But what is striking about the HTF report is not only that it 
failed to consider the corporate food regime but also that it ignored 
Ireland’s position within it. As with the report’s silence on the issue of 
EU agricultural subsidies, Ireland is not registered as a player with a 
strong vested interest in the politics of food and hunger, but rather as a 
coordinator or referee. The HTF claimed it wanted to tackle the root 
causes of hunger, but the reality is that some of domestic Irish 
capitalism’s best prospects lie in the continued survival of the same 
global food economy that produces hunger. Truly trying to prevent 
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hunger - truly aiming for ‘nothing less than its eradication’ - would entail 
Ireland acknowledging its role in the subsidy regime and then seeking to 
move towards a radically different stance on the world stage.  
 
Conclusion 
The HTF was one realization of boom-time Ireland’s new vision for 
itself; the sense that Ireland could act out a new role on the global stage. 
In trying to play out this new role, however, Ireland confronts numerous 
contradictions. For example, the HTF’s purported drive to tackle hunger 
is undermined by Ireland’s determination to form alliances with the U.S. 
and by the reality that domestic Irish capitalism is pinning its hopes on 
future profits from companies such as Greencore leading the economy 
out of its current crisis. Further, at the same time as the agrarian sector’s 
historical and cultural meaning in Ireland compels its political and civil 
society to form the HTF and take a stance on the global development 
stage, the agrarian sector’s other side – its contemporary material 
meaning – relies on the reproduction of relations, networks, institutions, 
and structures that help create the precise condition of hunger that the 
HTF purports to attack. The HTF failed to deal with these 
contradictions. Rather, it aims to pursue agrarian changes in developing 
countries but without also addressing the emerging and highly 
problematic place of Ireland’s agrarian sector. Thus, insofar as it invokes 
Ireland’s historical experience of famine and hunger as a reason for 
intervening on the global development stage, the HTF and its report 
actually exploits the tragic history of Ireland’s agrarian sector whilst 
promoting – or at the very least, not damaging - its contemporary 
geopolitical and economic interests. At the point at which Ireland’s 
attempt to speak up and be heard had the chance to say something 
meaningful, serious, and critical about the causes of a form of suffering 
that it had known so deeply - hunger – its representatives on the HTF 
bailed out.  
 
Given the scale of its economic crisis, another sort of bail out (led by the 
European Central Bank and the IMF) now preoccupies Ireland. The 
confidence with which Ireland sought to make its mark on the world 
stage – the sense that Ireland was going to be, like Norway, a resource-
abundant country that could tackle global problems – has been eroded. 
And at least in part because of the crisis, it now looks highly unlikely that 
Ireland’s (once much-lauded) ODA will reach the United Nations 0.7% 
of GDP target by 2012. Nevertheless, the government’s Hunger Envoy 
continues his work and some of the reforms called for in the HTF report 
are being implemented. And so there remains some scope for post-crisis 
Irish governments to pursue a new stance on the production of hunger. 
Rather than situating its efforts within the development space of other 
nation-states and their diplomatic classes, perhaps Ireland might begin to 
position its agenda on hunger relative to some of the grassroots, bottom-
up players that constitute organizations such as La Vía Campesina 
(Desmarais, 2007) and that argue for an agro-ecological solution to 
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hunger (Pretty, 2009). The HTF report did not do justice to the memory 
of Ireland’s Famine; but future efforts could begin to rectify that.  
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CHAPTER 27 
 
SYLLABUS CHANGE, STUDENT LEARNING AND TEACHER 
EXPERIENCES 
 
SHELAGH B. WADDINGTON 
 
First published in New Zealand Geographer (2010), 66, 189-195. 
 
In the Republic of Ireland, secondary education is a unitary system; most 
schools follow the national curriculum. Virtually all students in lower 
secondary school study geography, with 92% completing the Junior 
Certicate (JC) course in 2008 (State Examinations Commission (2010)). 
Of these students, 49% also take geography to Leaving Certicate (LC) 
level, completing the programme at 18 years old (State Examinations 
Commission (2010)).  
 
The national curriculum has not been subject to frequent change. The 
current LC syllabus was implemented in 2004, replacing a curriculum in 
use since 1971. The stability between 1971 and 2004 proved helpful for 
teachers and students as it provided a degree of condence about 
requirements. However, a number of major concerns had risen over time, 
focusing on the content-based nature of the syllabus and an assessment-
based curriculum. As there was a long content list, programmes were 
generally limited to those aspects that featured regularly in the 
examination paper. Textbooks and other resources concentrated on these 
and as a result, students could successfully complete the course without 
developing a general understanding of geography. The programme was 
assessed by means of a single three-hour terminal examination that was 
composed of four questions for higher level students plus a world map 
question for ordinary level students.  
 
The 2004 curriculum is a radical departure from this, with clear aims and 
objectives, a core programme and alternative pathways. The assessment is 
also different, with a terminal examination consisting of multiple-choice, 
short and long (essay) answers plus a geographical enquiry carried out 
and submitted prior to the nal examination. We discuss differences 
between the two approaches in detail.  
 
Stage one: issues and methodology  
We investigated the effects of the changes on the student experience of 
geography at LC level using the following questions:  
 
1. In what ways is the new curriculum different from the 1971 
statement? 
2. Does the new syllabus have any impact on learning outcomes?  
3. What are the teachers’ responses to the change? 
4. Will the teacher expectations be realised?  
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The initial phases of the study involved an examination of course 
materials and the collection of data from teachers. The ndings from this 
study helped us design an instrument to explore student learning 
changes.We examined and compared the documentation relating to both 
programmes. We also conducted semi-structured interviews with 26 
teachers during the summer and early autumn of 2004. We employed a 
snowball technique to recruit participants. Interviews were recorded, 
transcribed and NuDist was used to analyse the responses. At the time of 
the interviews, teachers had received the syllabus document and some in-
service training. Textbooks and other materials had also begun to 
appear.We assumed that teachers had a basic understanding of the 
curriculum, although the interviews revealed wide variation in knowledge.  
 
Identifying the perceived changes  
The earlier syllabus had been criticised for being limited in its guidance, 
outdated and containing a large amount of content; it was impossible for 
teachers to plan programmes to complete all requirements. The 
assessment had become predictable, focusing on a limited number of 
course sections. This outcome encouraged teachers to design 
programmes based on a selection of areas favoured in the exam. 
Candidates had to answer four questions, one based on an Ordnance 
Survey (OS) map, one on regional geography and two others selected 
from physical, social and economic geography. It was possible to avoid 
either one of the last two sections by completing a eldwork project or 
developing skills in working with aerial photographs as these two topics 
were included as full questions in the examination. Teachers often stated 
that eldwork was important for the developmental understanding of 
physical and human environments, but it was not mandatory. Many 
schools did not conduct eldwork, and since the related examination 
question had a consistent format, some students memorised reports on 
projects they had not actually carried out.  
 
Few schools studied social geography despite a teaching objective that ‘a 
student should have had the opportunity of developing positive attitudes 
to such matters as the interdependence of peoples and the need for social 
co-operation at all levels’ (Department of Education 1988, p. 332). 
Teachers were encouraged to be aware that ‘geography should be taught 
from motives... which go beyond the narrow and traditional objectives of 
imparting geographical knowledge and the training of students in the 
recall of facts’ and were advised that they should use ‘a methodology that 
includes many and varied techniques and skills’ (Department of 
Education 1988, p. 332). However, teachers had no guidance on how to 
achieve these goals, and the assessment process did not encourage them 
to make the attempt.  
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The 2004 syllabus was very different from its predecessor. It had broad 
aims and specic objectives focussing on:  
 
• Knowledge of physical, environmental, social, cultural and 
economic phenomena and processes, plus interactions and 
interrelationships between these processes  
• Developing citizenship ‘to understand the opportunities for, and 
challenges of, global interdependence’ and ‘to assist students to 
become well-informed and responsible citizens’  
• Facilitating lifelong learning ‘to provide students... with an 
interesting and enjoyable experience and imbue them in a lifelong 
love of their natural and cultural environment’  
• Developing ‘… skills which will help them make informed 
judgments about issues at local, national and international levels, 
including: maps, gures, statistics, photographs, pictures, textual 
sources, presentation and communication; investigative, social and 
evaluation skills; and the use of information and communication 
technologies’ 
 
There was a compulsory core curriculum plus options that allowed 
teachers to select aspects of geography of interest and relevance both to 
their students and themselves.  
 
All students had to take one of two elective modules. In order to allow 
for differentiation by ability, the option modules were available only to 
Higher Level (more able) students. At this level, emphasis is on the need 
for integration of various aspects and on the importance of skills and 
active learning. The assessment format ensured that all candidates 
completed the core modules, including a geographical enquiry. These are 
assessed using multiple-choice or one-word answer questions and by a 
report submitted before the nal examination. There were no longer 
questions dealing either exclusively with OS maps or with aerial 
photographs.  
 
Detailed assistance was provided in ‘Guidelines for Teachers’ 
(Department of Education and Science 2004) that included guidance on 
assessment, teaching the syllabus (including an exemplar programme 
structure), sample lesson plans and a resource list. ‘Guidelines’ 
emphasised the need to teach for understanding, noting that ‘knowledge 
does not always imply understanding. In particular, knowledge acquired 
for the short-term goal of performing well in examinations does not 
transfer to life situations’ (Department of Education and Science 2004, p. 
64).  
 
Understanding and developing learning  
In our study, we selected male and female teachers. We interviewed 
teachers from a range of schools, including mixed and single-sex schools, 
day and boarding schools and schools with varying student catchments. 
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The mean length of teacher service was 17 years, with a range of four to 
29 years.  
 
While the respondents had some reservations about the changed 
programme, all of them welcomed the change overall. The reasons for 
these positive attitudes are practical. One teacher stated, ‘I think it’s 
actually going to be good because we know exactly where we’re going’ 
(T003), and ‘also, it’s going to be shorter’ (T006). Others considered that 
change itself was important, saying, ‘I’m glad it’s come in, the old course 
is stale’ (T008). Other responses reported increased satisfaction with the 
new course. For example, ‘part of my passion for geography is because 
it’s such a general thing, it’s an integrator, if you like, across a whole 
spectrum’ (T004). Another noted, ‘I’m looking forward to it because it’s a 
change and I need to change for myself to keep myself active. It gives me 
scope to use a lot more case studies’ (T010). One nal area of positive 
feedback was that it would no longer be possible to select such a small 
part of the syllabus for study ‘then you have areas where you focus on. I 
like that idea that you do everything, you don’t just pick and choose, you 
cover so much more’ (T021).  
 
A major concern was that the course could lack depth, for example, ‘we 
are going to know a little about a lot of countries, places, but not enough 
about anything in particular’ (T002) and ‘it could be a bit bitty and you 
know you have to cover things and master things . . . quickly. Less seems 
to be done in depth as well to master it’ (T018). Some reservations 
appeared to be pragmatic. For example, ‘I had it down to a ne art, 
looking at certain elements of the course to the exclusion of others. It 
now means that I have to tap into other areas’ (T007). Some also felt that 
the course might be too challenging for students, while others considered 
that it might not provide sufcient challenges – in this, there was no 
consensus.  
 
Development of global and local citizenship  
Many of the interviewees considered that the new course increased the 
focus on these aspects of geography. For example, one teacher stated 
that ‘they have to know what’s going on currently, be it political, or 
human, the catastrophes that are going on, the earthquakes whatever, 
bring it right up to date’ (T001), while another noted, ‘it gives the 
students a broader base, things like culture, identity, ecology, things like 
that’ (T011).  
 
Generally, the changes were viewed positively. For example, it was noted 
that ‘it’s the kind of stuff that everybody should know’ (T008). Another 
teacher considered that ‘if we tackled it well, we could perhaps educate 
people in such a way that we could prevent difculties relating to racism’ 
(T007). Some also commented that the move away from the Eurocentric 
focus of the previous syllabus would be helpful in developing global 
citizenship and mutual understanding, for example, ‘Asia didn’t exist 
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apart from development and how we can help them and the problems 
they have’ (T016).  
 
A small number of participants expressed reservations based on the 
diverse and changing nature of the course. For instance,‘I nd a lot of 
the social geography very hard to keep up with because it’s changing so 
frequently’ (T010). Others had concerns regarding the level of student 
comprehension of complex concepts and issues, suggesting that weak 
understanding may lead to ‘wafe’ in assessments. A nal group 
considered that some suggested topics might lead to difculties, ‘I 
thought the Northern Ireland issue too close to home to get a good, 
unbiased discussion going’ (T020).  
 
A nal concern was that the new programme did not address a perceived 
deciency of the old programme – a requirement for students to learn 
about Ireland in any depth.  
 
I think denitely if the children are in Ireland... you start at 
local level. If a child has some understanding of... space 
around them at local level... you’ve some chance of 
extending it into the broader world. (T007)  
 
Skills  
Positive comments on the development of skills were relatively limited, 
focusing on continuation from the prior (JC) course and the need for 
more varied use of media for students who are ‘so used to visual stimuli 
(that) we were falling behind’ (T002). However, some concern was 
expressed about changing from a content focus to a skills focus. For 
example, ‘what kind of skills, and do you have time for the skills?’ (T017) 
and ‘if we’re going to go down that road... there’s going to be a lot of 
time involved in looking all that up’ (stimulus materials) (T003).  
 
The skill area that excited most comment was map work, specically in 
relation to OS maps. Two interviewees considered that the integration of 
OS maps into the whole programme was a positive move. ‘I do think that 
maps will be brought in more, linked in to the physical questions more 
than they have been and I think that’s a good idea’ (T023). However, 
most of the comments about OS work were concerns about the change 
from the previous approach. Some of the respondents considered this 
focus important because map work is a fundamental aspect of geography. 
‘Maybe leave the OS as a question on its own, to have skills, I think that’s 
something that’s lacking in a lot of subjects’ (T012). One respondent with 
concerns about the possible loss of map skills commented that ‘we are 
losing the skills, but on the other hand if we concentrate on the skills 
without knowledge then it’s no good either’ (T020). Although the term 
‘knowledge’ is used, the respondent’s denition of knowledge 
corresponded more closely to an understanding of relevant content 
rather than just facts. Others felt that the concentration on map work 
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supported by the full examination question was helpful for weaker 
students – ‘a lot to be gained from continuity and particularly if you are... 
trying to practice their map drawing skills, their map reading skills’ 
(T018).  
 
Stage two: student-based surveys  
We designed a questionnaire to obtain data on the effects of changes on 
student outcomes with a sample based on student availability. Level 1 
and level 2 students at the National University of Ireland, Maynooth were 
available. Although these students are not an entirely representative 
sample of LC geography candidates, there is no reason to suppose that 
their experience of the two programmes was atypical. We completed the 
survey in October 2006 when level 1 students would have followed the 
new programme and those in level 2 the older one.  
 
The questions established students’ experiences of geography along with 
prole data and information on programmes of study within the 
university. Other questions either were designed by teachers or arose 
from the syllabus. These related to sustainability-/environment-/ 
citizenship-related issues, global events and map interpretation. The 
questions about map interpretation examined the teacher-predicted 
decline in OS map skills. The questions reect the work of Boardman 
(1983), and Gillmor and Waddington (1993). In the Gillmor and 
Waddington study, teachers were asked to rate the difculty of a wide 
range of skills involved in using and interpreting the OS maps. Findings 
showed that teachers considered the use of compass directions and 
understanding contours were straightforward skills to learn but that the 
interpretation of cross-sections and estimation of height between contour 
lines were more difcult. Boardman’s earlier work showed that students 
who were less experienced and/or took a less challenging geography 
course were less likely to be able to identify heights between contour 
lines than those actually on contour lines. 
 
We coded and analysed the questionnaires using SPSS. A classication 
system was used to code the answers – with answers being classied 
using a four-fold system ranging from correct (a dictionary-standard 
denition) to wrong. We used a cross-tabulation procedure to compare 
the two cohorts, and a chi-square test was used to assess the strength of 
differences between the two groups.  
 
Outcomes of student survey  
The questionnaire was completed by 523 students. The entire rst-year 
cohort studied geography, while the second-year group included both 
geography students and people studying other subjects. A total of 406 
students had taken LC geography, and 370 stated the year in which they 
completed the programme. Of these students, 281 (75.9%) took the old 
course, while 89 (24.1%) had completed the new programme.  
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The two multiple-choice questions were in the environment-
/sustainability-/citizenship-related area. They related to the issues of 
greenhouse effect and shing as a resource and they indicate some 
difference between the two cohorts. These differences were small, with 
the old course students having a slightly higher level of knowledge about 
the former (74% correct – old course, compared with 70.8% – new 
course) and the new course of the latter (66.9% old and 68.5% new). 
Thus, for these questions, there was no support for the hypothesis that 
the new programme allowed students to develop a greater understanding 
of these global issues.  
 
Two open questions revealed evidence that the changed curriculum 
inuenced learning outcomes for participants. When the respondents 
were asked to dene desertication, clear differences in understanding 
between the two groups were revealed. A higher proportion of new 
course respondents showed more under-standing of the concept (23% 
compared with 10% of old course people) (see Fig. 1).  
 
Figure 1 Understanding of desertication.  
 
 
Further, while only 4% of the new course cohort indicated that they 
could not answer the question, 41 people (15%) of the old course group 
gave this response (Fig. 2). The difference is statistically signicant (P = 
0.002) and provides support for the suggestion that the emphasis in the 
new syllabus objectives on environmental and sustainability aspects of 
citizenship has an increased effect on student’s understandings of these 
issues.  
 
When urban sprawl was examined across the two groups, it was found 
that there was a statistically signicant difference in understandings of 
this concept (P = 0.002), with the new group indicating a better 
understanding of the concept. A small percentage of both groups 
reported a full understanding (13.5% new and 11% old), but a 
considerably higher percentage of the new cohort showed a partial 
understanding (76.4% (new) compared with 57.1% (old)) (see Fig. 2). 
This, again, suggests that the change (from old to new) has had a positive 
inuence on outcomes.  
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Figure 2 Understanding of urban sprawl.  
 
There were differences between the two cohorts on global events, but 
these were small. The older programme group generally indicated a 
higher level of knowledge about earthquakes and the most likely location 
to experience a tsunami. However, the question on Hurricane Katrina 
was answered correctly by 46.6% of the new course respondents 
compared with 31.0% of the old programme participants. It would be 
hard to support any suggestion that an emphasis in the new programme 
on students becoming ‘well informed . . . citizens’ has been achieved on 
this evidence.  
 
Figure 3 Identification of heights using contour lines. Height A (on 
contour-70 m) Height B(between contours-85 m). 
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With map work, the analysis revealed that approximately 83% of both 
groups were able to identify the correct compass direction, and none of 
the participants indicated that they did not know the answer. The old 
course respondents were slightly better at identifying the correct 
orientation of the cross-section compared with those who had taken to 
new course (79% old/75% new). However, when the respondents were 
required to identify height between contours, there was a much greater 
difference between the two groups (P = 0.0005), with 81% of the old 
course group correctly identifying the height compared with only 48% in 
the new course group (see Fig. 3). 
 
These ndings provide clear support for the teachers’ contention that the 
decreased emphasis on OS map work has led to a decrease in the 
development of these skills for students. Since an understanding of maps 
is clearly a fundamental skill for geographers and indeed, arguably a life 
skill, we believe that this nding is a cause for concern. 
 
Conclusions  
It would appear that the change in the programme has had effects on the 
learning outcomes for students. There is some indication that general 
knowledge and knowledge of events, particularly natural disasters, had 
increased. Further, students have gained more understanding in some 
areas of the environment, sustainability and global citizenship aspects as 
shown by the improved performance of the new course group in dening 
urban sprawl and desertication. Of course, it is also important to 
acknowledge that this change has been limited. Further investigations 
may reveal other changes of a positive nature, but unfortunately, time 
and resources did not permit this.  
 
However, the new programme does appear to have a detrimental effect 
on map skills as predicted by the teachers. While the new programme 
places considerable emphasis on the use of maps, the removal of a 
compulsory question has (as predicted by the teachers) led to some 
decrease in the required skills. It can not, of course, be argued that map 
skills are of more importance than all other skills aspects, but an adequate 
understanding and use of maps is clearly an important area of 
geographical education as are the life skills that they have the potential to 
provide. Further, these skills are quintessentially geographical in nature, 
and in a time when the inclusion of subjects in curricula may be 
questioned, it is important that these remain an obvious and well-
developed part of geography. We therefore suggest that a review of the 
use of maps within the programme might be appropriate. It must, 
however, be acknowledged that any changes to the current programme 
might result in other aspects being assigned as less important, and 
therefore, difcult choices need to be made. In the words of one 
teacher/interviewee, ‘I mean, you can never nish teaching geography’ 
(T004).  
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This study has shown that curriculum changes do affect outcomes and 
that teachers are, to some extent, able to predict what these changes may 
be. Future work may involve further exploration of the impact of 
changes in the stated requirements on outcomes, focusing on other 
curricula and/or other subjects.  
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Introduction   
Lisdoonvarna, in County Clare on the west coast of Ireland and Te 
Aroha, on the eastern edge of the Hauraki-Waikato plains in New 
Zealand, are two distant locations that share a series of commonalities. 
Both feature sets of historic buildings framed by the natural mineral 
waters around which they were initially constructed. They now exist as 
contemporary replicas of the Victorian spa town. Both are examples of 
what health geographers refer to as therapeutic landscapes, places that 
have achieved lasting reputations for providing physical, mental and 
spiritual healing (Kearns and Gesler, 1998). In their roles as therapeutic 
landscapes, deeper and contested relationships between health and place 
can be identified while both towns can be described as 
contemporaneously ‘typical and unique’ (Strang, 2004). Their relative 
typicality and uniqueness will form an essential part of our narrative but 
also point towards how the colonial spa town was a metaphor for 
contested understandings of a traditional therapeutic landscape form 
(Williams, 2007).  
 
In this paper, we explore narratives of these towns’ historical 
development and wider themes around the commodification of health in 
place. Our rationale is that similarities are often observable across 
different examples of therapeutic landscapes in terms of their structural 
processes and experiential expressions (Geores, 1998; Gesler, 2003). Our 
intention is to examine a set of health histories in place, through co-
considering two places on different sides of the world with similar 
provenance. We contend that, notwithstanding their cultural and spatial 
distance, the examples of Te Aroha and Lisdoonvarna reflect ways in 
which the spa town was developed within a global template during the 
19th century. While local cultural forms shape such spaces, we maintain 
they are also part of wider global cultural networks, in these cases, the 
British Empire. To us, it is instructive to consider the different ways in 
which such local-global networks operated.  Through this dual case-study 
approach, we offer an advance on many singular studies of therapeutic 
landscapes which are carried out in isolation, or within individual 
 Abbey Wheeler and Robin Kearns, School of Environment, The University of Auckland, 
New Zealand. 
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jurisdictions. In a comparative study, we argue, there is also much to be 
learned about spatial similarities and variations in a process whereby 
place is commodified and sold on its reputational therapeutic 
characteristics.  
 
The paper is laid out as follows. Initially the concept of the therapeutic 
landscape is introduced, to clarify associations between health and place. 
As a classic example of such a landscape, the literature discussing the spa 
town will then be examined from which two broad themes will be drawn, 
relating specifically to the commodification of the spa town, and the 
contested identities associated with such settings. The histories of the 
two study towns, Te Aroha and Lisdoonvarna are then briefly noted 
before the sources and methods used in the study are noted. The 
empirical heart of the paper illustrates the thematic concerns with 
commodification and contested identity, noting the similarities and 
differences apparent within both settings. Finally, discussion and 
conclusion sections identify a set of theoretical and applied ideas from 
which wider work on the spa town as a representative therapeutic 
landscape could be developed. 
 
The Spa Town as Therapeutic Landscape  
The therapeutic landscape concept has, since its initial introduction by 
Gesler (1993), developed as a significant focus within health geography as 
well as influencing disciplines such as anthropology (Williams, 2007; Lea, 
2008) With theoretical foundations in cultural ecology, structuralism and 
humanism, the idea offers a conceptual and analytical framework for 
natural, built, social and symbolic environments as they pertain to healing 
or well-being in place (Williams, 1999). Initial studies focused on 
European locations famed for their healing powers, including spas and 
religious-spiritual sites (Gesler, 1996). Other foundational landscapes 
included natural settings for asylums and retreats as well as wilderness 
settings that emphasised more phenomenological connections to healing 
in place (Tuan, 1974; Palka, 1998; Williams, 1998). More recent debates 
within the field have contested earlier understandings of the term. In 
particular, Conradson (2005) identifies the notion of a therapeutic 
experience and suggests that places and landscapes offer healing through 
individual experiential engagements in place, but that these can equally be 
negative or health-endangering. This perspective is strongly linked to the 
notion of places as generating contested behaviours. Collins and Kearns 
(2007) identify the beach as a good example of a landscape which can 
potentially both enhance (through exercise, fresh air and retreat) and 
damage (through drownings and melanoma) health.  
 
While the focus of this paper is on the traditional therapeutic landscape 
of the spa town there are traces of this contested understanding of health 
to be found in such settings. This is especially true of therapeutic 
landscapes whose original health/healing identities shift, as at Bath or 
Brighton, to new identities where leisure and tourism assume more 
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significant positions (Gesler, 1996; Towner, 1996; Foley, 2010). In such 
identify shifts, the central roles of local economics and the 
commodification of health and place are arguably under-emphasised 
dimensions in therapeutic landscapes research (Williams, 2007; Smith and 
Puczko, 2009; Foley, 2010). In many settings the explicit marketing of 
health in place was central to the production and maintenance of their 
curative reputations. 
 
Spa towns are represented in a range of locations and forms (Gesler, 
1993; Porter, 1990; Smith and Puczko, 2009). They date back to the 12th 
century city of Spa in modern-day Belgium, and had a long development 
in mainland Europe through the 15th and 16th century in towns like Lucca 
and Bagnères. The period from the end of the 17th century to the end of 
the 19th century marked their heyday in Europe and in those global 
settings shaped by European cultural expansion. Thus spa towns were 
developed in colonies as far afield as the US, Canada, New Caledonia, 
Australia and New Zealand (Rockel, 1986; Connell, 2006). Importantly, 
the spa tradition combined healing with socio-cultural and class-related 
practices, so that the spa town developed a complex mix of curative and 
socialised identities (Mackaman, 1998; Gesler, 2003). In their 
construction, promotion, and framing of place, such towns also 
incorporated ensembles of both physical and human landscapes (Foley, 
2010). Common features of spa towns included the hot, warm and cold 
mineral springs that provided the core ‘medicinal’ product, as well as 
commercial edifices such as hotels, pump-rooms and bath-houses that 
were built to house and treat visitors and patients.  The ‘spa town 
ensemble’ also encompassed the development of specific socio-cultural 
practices. The spa town identity was therefore shaped by curative 
stories/narratives as well as more liminal social meanings associated with 
assembly, status and matrimonial prospects (Mackaman, 1998). 
 
In a classic example of these combined medical and social-economic 
dimensions, Geores (1998) discussed the entrepreneurial history of the 
town of Hot Springs in South Dakota, whose mineral waters were central 
to its construction in the late 1880s. Here, the metaphor ‘Health = Hot 
Springs’ was created, maintained and adapted within historical contexts 
of class, medical-health thinking, advertising and available technology to 
attract  visitors from afar. The metaphor was embodied throughout the 
town’s history, with health commodified through the restorative power 
of the waters and wider landscape (Geores, 1998). Indeed the notion of a 
health history was extensively used in Hot Springs, where an earlier 
identity as an American Indian site of sacred healing featured in its 
marketing. Other North American spa towns such as Radium Hot 
Springs and Saratoga Springs, employed similar narratives (Wightman and 
Wall, 1985; Valenza, 2000; Sterngrass, 2001). This linking of a discursive 
connection between older or ‘native’ health histories associated with the 
‘place’ is reflected to an extent in both our study area towns. Here, the 
Māori antecedents at Te Aroha and the holy well traditions at 
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Lisdoonvarna were used to legitimise the historic healing power of place 
(Wells, 2003; Foley, 2010). This legitimisation was therefore invoked in 
cultural as well as curative terms both of which fed in to the marketing of 
health in place.  
 
In terms of how spa towns were sold, the typical narrative was one which 
had a distinctly place-making flavour. In a common sequence of events 
the healing waters were discovered by entrepreneurs who in turn had 
those waters tested for their constituent minerals. Once this chemical 
evidence was in place, the next step was to identify a medical benefit, 
generally developed through known cures associated with specific 
minerals. Individual health biographies were then used to ‘verify’ the 
cures. Once the biomedical evidence was in place, preliminary 
accommodation was built to bring in visitors. Over time commercial 
demand drove the development of not only the built-environment of the 
spa but also the social and economic reputation of the associated town 
(Brockliss, 1990; Hamlin, 1990; Cossick and Galliou, 2006). In the classic 
example of Bath, earlier Roman and pagan narratives of spiritual healing 
were linked to chemical testing and curative narratives in the 16th century. 
This shaped the town’s development as a medical place which was 
subsequently strengthened via a calculated commodification based on 
fashionability, social mixing and cure (Gesler, 1998). The specific place of 
spa medicine was always relatively uncertain, reflecting Porter’s astute 
observation that spa towns represented, ‘the hypochondriacal interplay 
between organic medicine and the half-acknowledged underground realm 
of the psychosomatic placebo cure’ (Porter, 1990: xi). Over time one can 
trace a shift in health practices from immersions in, and consumption of, 
the spa waters to more complex and medicalised hydrotherapy treatments 
within which technology and referral played a greater role (Foley, 2010). 
While one can distinguish at times between a specific selling of health 
and a specific selling of place, in most spa towns commodification 
(selling) and associated marketing and place promotion (telling) were 
fundamentally co-dependent (Towner, 1996). The selling and telling of 
health in place were also represented across time and space in a rolling 
process of re-selling and re-telling.  
 
While the towns themselves were sold on the health metaphor, wider 
social narratives and practices were also essential to their contested 
development. Many social practices associated with the spa town had 
distinctly unhealthy outcomes that emphasised their parallel liminal 
reputations (Porter 1990; Urry, 2002; Conradson 2005). To elaborate, the 
more leisure and tourism-based attractions developed around the spa, the 
more they departed from being solely health-focused and relied instead 
on narratives of liminality, gluttony, sex and matrimony, wherein the 
social reputations fed the healing identities and vice versa (Foley, 2010). 
These social practices, an essential part of the spa town image, 
paradoxically managed to simultaneously deepen and weaken the power 
of the therapeutic space/place. In considering the traditional therapeutic 
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landscape in this contested way, newer theoretical understandings of the 
‘pharmacon’ (a drug that can both kill and cure) can be applied, wherein 
different experiences, inhabitations and performances shape a range of 
therapeutic outcomes (Andrews and Holmes, 2007; Collins and Kearns, 
2007).  
 
A second form of contestation related to how the model of the ‘colonial 
spa’ reflected indigenous and local populations and practices. The 
development of relatively wealthy clienteles, for whom the spa town 
became a locus of class identity formation was underpinned by a notion 
of exclusivity (Mackaman, 1998). The great European spas, wherein the 
nobility and aristocracy mixed and deepened their identities, was 
reproduced in global colonial settings with strong class aspirations. 
Within colonial settings, these exclusive identities were also associated 
with a range of exclusionary practices around ownership, regulation, 
power and profit, wherein the local populations had limited access and 
proscribed roles (Gesler, 2003; Kelly, 2009; Foley, 2010). 
 
In applying these broader theoretical themes to specific spa towns in 
Ireland and New Zealand, our aim is to examine the processes of 
telling/selling health and place and assess how similar these processes 
were across ‘colonial’ space. In critically examining the factors shaping 
the (re)production of a commodified construction of health-in-place we 
also address two associated objectives. Firstly, we examine the tangled 
narratives of health and place which act as metaphors linked in to 
material places and which were utilised in the production of both 
Lisdoonvarna and Te Aroha. These narratives, we contend, provide 
valuable evidence of both typical and unique processes of therapeutic 
landscape production, and within such narratives mobile health and place 
meanings are also identified to illustrate the importance of time, 
inhabitation and economics. Secondly, we re-examine the two spa towns in 
terms of being contested therapeutic settings, wherein conflicting health 
and leisure practices and identities were mirrored in exclusive and 
excluding relations between dominant colonial ownerships and historic 
‘native’ meanings and practices. In considering to what extent these 
contested understandings of a watering-place-for-health were erased or 
incorporated into the narratives, we identify wider socio-cultural factors 
which may have applicability for other colonial spaces and places both 
within Ireland and New Zealand and also in wider jurisdictions. 
 
Settings and Method  
 
Te Aroha  
 
Te Aroha remains a unique place by virtue of a narrow line 
of geothermal springs which emerge from a south-west 
facing slope at the foot of Te Aroha Mountain. Without 
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these special waters, it is unlikely that a settlement of any 
kind would have endured here. (Wells, 2003, 11). 
 
The rural town of Te Aroha (2006 population: 3,760) is located on the 
North Island of New Zealand in the eastern Waikato District at the foot 
of the volcanic mountain of the same name (Figure 1). Originally known 
to the local Māori as Waipuia, the hot springs on the site became better 
known during the local goldrushes in the 1870s. The original Māori 
landowner, Te Mokena Hau entered a deal with the Crown in 1878 for 
entrepreneurs to develop the site and the first hotels were commissioned 
the same year. Over time a separate domain area (Figure 2) was created 
around the different springs (primarily alkaline with soda, sulphur and 
chalybeate) and a range of bath-houses, tea-houses and treatment rooms 
were built. In the town itself, the development of a range of 
accommodation and services were augmented in 1886 with the arrival of 
the railway.  
 
Figure 1. Location Map of Te Aroha. (Source: Matamata-Piako District 
Council) 
 
 
 
Te Aroha was founded as a premiere spa destination for upper-class 
international visitors. The town was part of an ambitious wider project to 
establish tourism and spas in colonial New Zealand and was itself based 
on the spa of Daylesford in Australia (Rockel, 1986). Its popularity and 
repute peaked in the late 1800s and early decades of the 20th Century. 
This was followed by a period of decline into the later 20th Century, and a 
subsequent revitalisation with a heritage orientation. The rural setting and 
shifts in health-place notions as well as spa culture were additional 
154
factors associated with the town’s historical development (Rockel, 1986; 
Wells 2003). 
 
Figure 2. Map of Te Aroha Domain. (Source: Matamata-Piako District 
Council) 
 
 
 
Lisdoonvarna  
There was a very short description of the remote Clare village in Rutty’s 
(1757) guide to the spas of Ireland (Figure 3). Though the waters were 
known and used, there was little or no development evident in first 
edition Ordnance Survey maps dating from around 1840. A very 
intensive period of growth in the 1850s and 1860s occurred with 67 
houses in place by 1872. By then the town had developed around the 
roads leading into the square, mainly along the north-south axis, with 
some development east-west and to the south-east below the main spa 
(Figure 4). While the town did not initially have an enclosed domain, the 
presence of a range of different wells (chalybeate, copper and sulphur) 
were central to its development, though they were cold rather than hot.  
 
After 1876, Lisdoonvarna developed even more rapidly and, with the 
coming of the West Clare Railway to Ennistymon in 1887, probably 
outstripped the most sanguine expectations of Westropp and Stacpoole, 
the original entrepreneurs associated with its development. The town’s 
peak seems to have been from the 1880s through to the 1920s with the 
decline of the Anglo-Irish clientele being replaced by a partial popularity 
in the new state. The spa season declined from the 1940s on but its 
original social identity lives on in the Matrimonial Festival in September, 
now the focal point of the town’s social and economic activity. The 
waters at the main pump room are still consumed from May to the end of 
September. There have been unfulfilled plans to revive the treatment 
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rooms, but nothing as active as those at Te Aroha. Outside of the main 
sulphur well, the other wells have declined. The Double Wells are a relict 
feature; the Copper Well is inaccessible, while the Twin Wells are usable, 
but protected behind grilles. The town’s identity is evident in surviving 
hotel names including; The Royal Spa, The Imperial, and of course the 
Hydro (Furlong, 2006) 
 
Figure 3. Location Map of Lisdoonvarna. (Source: © OpenStreetMap 
contributors, CC-BY-SA) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Map of Lisdoonvarna, 1890s. (Source: Ordnance Survey 
Historic Map Series) 
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Table 1. Comparative Spa Town Elements: Lisdoonvarna and Te Aroha 
 
Element Lisdoonvarna (Ireland) Te Aroha (New Zealand) 
Initial Development 1860s and 1870s 1880s 
Peak Period 1880-1920 1890-1920 
Type of Water Cold: Chalybeate, Sulphur, 
Copper, Magnesium 
Warm: Alkaline with Soda, 
Chalybeate, Sulphur (trace) 
Key Buildings Hotels, Guest Houses, 
Treatment Rooms, Assembly 
Rooms 
Hotels, Guest Houses, 
Treatment Rooms, 
Assembly Rooms, Bath 
Houses 
Curative Services Hydropathy, Electrical baths, 
Spa doctor 
Hydropathy, Electrical 
baths, Spa doctor 
Listed Cures Rheumatism, paralysis, 
neuralgia, sciatica, gout, skin 
diseases, gravel 
Skin diseases, acne, eczema, 
rheumatism, gout, 
scrofulous, swellings, bone 
diseases 
Clienteles Anglo-Irish (Colonial Settlers) Colonial Settlers 
Access Road, Steamer, Indirect Rail Road, Steamer, Direct Rail 
Practices Imbibing, Walking, Dancing, 
Bathing 
Imbibing, Walking, 
Climbing, Dancing, Bathing 
Liminal Elements Drink, Romance, 
Revolutionaries 
Drink, Romance, 
Revolutionaries 
Compared with Harrogate Vichy 
Contestations Health superseded by Social 
meanings 
Health and Social meanings 
about the same 
Exclusions Native Irish Native Maori 
Contemporary 
Status 
Heritage & Tourism, Waters 
still potable 
Heritage & Tourism, Waters 
still potable, Hot pools 
 
Method 
In the case of both towns, we used a range of secondary material and 
primary observation to examine the development of the healing places 
and identify narratives, cures and treatments that made the places. In the 
case of Te Aroha’s evolution as a spa town, and the changing role of its 
healing reputation and mineral waters, early place-promotional material 
was investigated, along with more recent publications that reflected the 
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decline of the town and its contemporary survival. Within historical 
materials and accounts, significant agents who promoted the waters serve 
as a useful point of analysis and these were supplemented by selected 
brochures and media publications that confirmed Te Aroha’s 
development, construction and place identity. Historic newspaper, 
brochure and magazine articles provide secondary data about the place 
and its contested identities (Wright, 1887; Spooner, 1895; Te Aroha 
Borough Council, 1980).  
 
For Lisdoonvarna, a similar range of historical source documents 
included material from local histories, national spa guides and colonial 
accounts (Hembry, 1997; Dooley-Shannon, 1998; Furlong, 2006). In 
addition, summaries of the minutes of the local management companies 
in both towns were valuable sources as was more experiential material 
found in traveler's accounts and historic photographs (Cowie, 1888; 
Lynd, 1998; Foley, 2010). Information on local social and cultural 
practices, recounted in both official and unofficial documentation, were 
used to identify clienteles, specific curative practices and wider social 
behaviours. Given the nature of the coloniser’s descriptions, the 
narratives of the native occupants, Māori and Irish, were often 
overlooked. These remained a strong presence, yet evidence was hard to 
come by given the predominantly oral nature of both cultures at that 
time. 
 
Core Themes 
 
Selling Health 
 
As recently as five years ago Te Aroha was, but to a very 
few persons, a Terra Incognita, but the facts of several 
remarkable cures…having been published and proven to 
have been effected by the hot mineral springs which are 
here situated, soon began to bring it into favourable 
image…. during the past three years many sufferers have 
resorted thereto from all quarters, and in many instances 
have returned to their homes completely restored to health. 
These have…personally testified to the wonderfully curative 
properties of the Te Aroha thermal waters, their fame thus 
becoming extended further and wider (Wright, 1887, 
unpaginated). 
 
The above passage from Dr Alfred Wright’s Te Aroha: Its Thermal Mineral 
Waters, was published for the Hot Springs Domain Board that employed 
him as a physician (Wells, 2003). The figure of the spa doctor loomed 
large in many spa town narratives, while plans for the development of Te 
Aroha are clearly enunciated in the above quote (Mackaman, 1998). The 
centrality of the ‘several remarkable cures’ was always the starting point 
around which key interested parties including local hoteliers, 
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entrepreneurs and medical men, linked the ‘health-giving’ waters to the 
marketing discourses central to their development. In addition, the 
medical credentials of Dr Wright as well as references to ‘many sufferers 
… completely restored to health’, add authority to early discourses of the 
spa as a quality therapeutic resort. The entrepreneurial vision of early 
figures and their influence on the domain board were reflected in 
aspirational claims that the waters’, ‘medicinal and therapeutic properties 
are such as cannot fail to bring them into the highest repute, and as their 
rare virtues become more generally known, it is confidently expected that 
Te Aroha is destined ere long to become the chief sanatorium of the 
Australasian colonies’ (Wright 1887; Ingram, 1892). Spooner (1895) 
subtitles his booklet on Te Aroha ‘the Sanatorium of the Million’ and 
“the most popular health resort of the Southern Hemisphere’. To deepen 
narratives of healing reputation, specific cures were always explicitly 
listed, ‘Many marvellous cures have been effected by the springs and by 
drinking the waters, more especially…rheumatism, paralysis, neuralgia, 
sciatica, gout, skin diseases, gravel etcetera’ (Ingram, 1892). The common 
‘patient biography’ tactic was also used with testimonials of people 
returning to ‘near perfect health’ included to support the healing claims 
(Wright, 1887).  
 
A later 1924 brochure from the Department of Tourist and Health 
Resorts claimed Te Aroha to be one of the country’s principal resorts. 
The description of the town and its location were similar to those from 
thirty years previously: photographs of a bustling Domain were depicted 
along with the nearby forest park, within which Mount Te Aroha was 
given a prominent place. Recreational activities continued to be colonially 
inspired and similar to those of the late 19th century. From a specifically 
curative perspective, the description of the mineral waters and baths 
identified alkaline and bicarbonate baths as still the most abundant and 
important. A particular selling point was that unlike the larger springs at 
Rotorua, Te Aroha’s springs were not sulphuric. More significantly, 
various electrical massage treatments were introduced, with qualified staff 
members employed to administer these treatments (Wells, 2003). This 
age of electrotherapy represented an increasingly medicalised role in the 
selling of health in place. In addition, marketing Te Aroha’s spring water, 
arguably the core medicinal product, involved a range of entrepreneurs 
who in time were subsumed into the soft drink industry (Rockel, 1986). 
Wells (2003) also notes the contestations associated with the potential 
benefits from drinking mineral waters, and indeed that these are still 
debated. Today, the water from the drinking pump holds mere novelty 
value, as is the case at Lisdoonvarna.  
 
At Lisdoonvarna, narratives identifying the specific make-up of the 
mineral waters, and subsequent direct linkage to a set of cures and 
treatments were told and sold in almost identical ways. The different 
springs, chalybeate, copper and sulphur, did not mimic Te Aroha’s 
unusual soda content, but provided similar cures, being considered, ‘most 
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efficacious in cases of scaly skin diseases, in acne and eczema, in chronic 
rheumatism, rheumatic and atomic gout, scrofulous swellings, also in 
some diseases of bones and joints’ (Mapother, 1871). Over time the 
waters were augmented by a set of treatments, and these were specifically 
associated with the same forms of ‘patient biography’ encountered in 
New Zealand. A local doctor, Edgar Flinn, noted that, ‘Personally, I am 
aware of patients who after several courses of treatment at Harrogate 
pronounced that they got more benefit and personal relief from the 
Lisdoonvarna waters than any other’ (O’Carroll, 1982: 13). The latter half 
of the 19th century marked the arrival of a specific ‘spa doctor’, William 
Henry Stackpoole Westropp. He updated the dispensing methods for the 
sulphur springs and introduced bath pumps for both hot and cold baths. 
As in Te Aroha, there was a distinct shift towards more medicalised 
hydrotherapies from the end of the 19th century, supervised from the 
doctor’s residence, Maiville House, built in 1876 directly above the 
sulphur wells (Figure 5). These mobile health narratives reflected a 
shifting focus from natural healing waters to more produced forms 
including electrical baths that created a new ‘currency of health’. As 
noted in a historical guide from the turn of the 20th century, 
Lisdoonvarna had developed its selling of health so that,  
 
The curative treatments now available and yearly being 
improved and supplemented, comprise, in addition to the 
hot and cold sulphur water baths, the needle bath, the 
general electric; the Schnee bath (Galvanic, Faradic or 
combined), Ionization and electro massage. Various 
medicated baths as prescribed, are also given, such as Acid 
Alkaline, Bran, Pine, Peat, Nauheim (Dooley-Shannon, 
1998).    
 
While the relative power and importance of the traditional Anglo-Irish 
clientele at Lisdoonvarna was waning, nonetheless the early decades of 
the 20th century still saw the town at a relative zenith as marked by a visit 
by the Lord Lieutenant in 1906 to reopen the Thomond Hotel. A range 
of treatments, sulphur baths and the various waters continued to be 
avidly consumed in the summer season (Keena, 2007). A new clientele of 
middle class farmers and professionals emerged in the early decades of 
the new Irish Free State and carried on the health practices in place. But 
the economic downturn after the Second World War and improvements 
in wider health care provision put paid to the town’s traditional healing 
function (Furlong, 2006). It is still possible in summertime to consume 
the sulphur waters at Lisdoonvarna and bottled water is still sold on site, 
but that process is now primarily a heritage function. 
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Figure 5. Gowlaun Well and Spa Doctor’s House, Lisdoonvarna. (Source: 
Lawrence Collection, National Library of Ireland) 
 
 
 
. 
 
Selling Place 
In both settings, the telling and selling of health was inextricably 
connected to the selling of place. The metaphors of the therapeutic 
landscape were in part framed by their therapeutically verifiable 
dimension but just as much in the social and cultural landscape of the 
towns and their surrounds (Foley, 2010). In addition there were elements 
of more deliberate forms of tourism/place building bound up in the 
development of the spa town. This was easier in towns such as Spa or 
Baden-Baden, where long-established reputations provided enduring 
economic support. Tourism/place building was harder to reproduce on 
the fringes of Empire. While it was left to individual landowners and 
entrepreneurs to sell their ‘own’ watering-places, there was a more 
deliberate state function in other settings, especially New Zealand. Dr. 
Arthur Stanley Wohlmann was appointed as the first official Government 
Balneologist in 1902. His positioning within a new department named 
Tourist and Health Resorts neatly encapsulated the dual functions of 
health and place selling (Johnson, 1990). This development was a 
variation to the processes encountered in other countries where that 
place promotion was ‘bottom up’ rather than ‘top down’ (Porter, 1990). 
Additional spatial factors, including the physical setting and surrounding 
therapeutic landscape, location, transport infrastructures and catchments 
all played a role in the production of the watering-place. Finally more 
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imaginative connections were also central to the selling of place, wherein 
anticipated social and cultural encounters were a major driver for the 
reputation and popularity of the associated resort (Foley, 2010). 
 
In selling Te Aroha as a healthy place, the wider setting of the Domain 
was a significant factor in discussions of the power of nature and 
landscape. Both Spooner (1895) and Wright (1887) discuss “majestic” Mt 
Te Aroha, asserting that it provides the ‘grandest, most romantic and 
extensive views in the province’, and Wright (1887) comments that the 
mountain is accessible to those with ‘ordinary powers’. Native forest, 
scenery, the river and gardens are positively discussed by these writers, 
and associated with the therapeutic quality of the place. Ingram (1892) 
describes the Domain as, ‘…laid out in a most attractive manner, the 
winding walks being romantic and attractive, including paths, flower-beds 
and seating’, representing an early form of therapeutic design which 
reflects Gesler’s (1992) identification of the natural and built dimensions 
of a therapeutic landscape. A government-appointed board was 
responsible for managing the Springs and Domain, with responsibilities 
for improvements and beautification (Ingram, 1892). Te Aroha’s climate 
was also included in varying discourses on its healing properties and 
overall quality, which Ingram (1892) describes as being ‘most healthful, 
invigorating and enjoyable’ throughout the year.  Under ‘new landlords’, 
Te Aroha’s later spa era, in which the arrival of the railway played a 
prominent part, marked a significant new phase (Rockel, 1986; Wells, 
2003). Here the connection of the town to its catchment ‘markets’ in 
Auckland and Hamilton saw it prosper temporarily before a more 
powerfully promoted place, Rotorua, took both reputational and 
economic precedence (Johnson, 1990). Indeed a particular example of 
how these different elements coincided was the introduction of special 
invalid carriages on the Auckland-Te Aroha trains in the late 19th century 
(Wells, 2003). Prior to this time, traveling to Te Aroha from Auckland 
involved a seven hour train journey, or taking a steamer and coach via the 
Firth of Thames and Paeroa. The deeper telling and selling of place 
involved an attempt to make Te Aroha into a ‘world class resort’. Class-
related ideologies, the formation of the Domain board, and legislation to 
banish animals from the Domain (Wells, 2003) represented a significant 
reordering of space in Te Aroha and the construction of a specific kind 
of healing place suited to a certain clientele. The invocation of other spas 
and water quality comparisons, a common global aspect of spa towns, 
was used in Te Aroha. European spas such as Vichy were regularly 
invoked in posters and promotional material (Mackaman, 1998; Foley, 
2010). 
 
Despite its greater proximity to the ‘colonial metropole’, it was equally 
difficult for Lisdoonvarna to sell itself in competition with more 
established spas (Hembry, 2007). In part this was due to the perception, 
at least to colonial eyes, of Ireland’s general backwardness. An account 
by Barry (1998) of an 1864 visit noted that only one of the five wells was 
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attended and that the Lisdoonvarna spring waters needed upgrading, 
‘under cover of a splendid saloon, and be made to issue from the mouth 
of a nymph, a lion or the like’, to attract English visitors. Despite 
considerable local attempts to develop the springs and a large increase in 
the number of visitors in the 1870s and 1880s, a scathing comment from 
a European guide noted, ‘Ireland is very poor in wells of all kinds. The 
wells of Swanlinbar and of Lisdoonvarna scarcely deserve mention as far 
as their mineralisation is concerned, nor do they offer such 
accommodation as can attract strangers’ (McPherson, 1869 cited in 
Henchy, 1958, 210). Despite these external dismissals, the town did 
expand the number of hotels, the individual wells themselves, as well as 
associated elements such as pavilions, promenades and a local park 
reminiscent of the ‘Kurpark’ (‘Cure Parks’) found in German spas 
(Keena, 2007). Chemical and medical analyses were regularly reproduced 
to further sell the town’s virtues, at least to domestic markets. Visitor 
numbers expanded from around 1,500 in 1870 to 5,000 in 1878 and rose 
to 18,000 in 1896 (Dooley-Shannon, 1998). One significant change in this 
period was the slow transfer of the ownership and management of the 
wells from the original landowners, the Stacpooles, to a Local 
Improvements Committee (Dooley-Shannon, 1998).   
 
Unlike Te Aroha, the setting was less celebrated and was described by 
Hembry (1997) as, ‘a straggling, unprepossessing place in bleak and 
uninteresting surrounding country’, while other accounts noted the 
climate as ‘bracing’ (Weber and Parkes-Weber, 1898). In time the town’s 
proximity to the sea became an additional selling point as coastal 
watering-places became more popular (Kelly, 2009). Whereas Te Aroha 
benefited from the arrival of a direct rail link to the nearby metropolis, 
Auckland, Lisdoonvarna was never directly connected by train and the 
nearest that the West Clare Railway got to it was a station at Ennistymon, 
seven miles away. A set of ‘carmen’ were on hand there to transport 
people to the spa while a popular route prior to the arrival of the railway 
was to go by train to Galway, take a steamer across the bay (reflecting 
earlier routes to Te Aroha) and then travel on by car (often sponsored by 
the individual hotels) from small harbours on the North Clare coast 
(Furlong, 2006).  
 
A core promotional document in both settings was the tourist guide, 
wherein both the health and social facilities were listed and invariably 
over-praised. Guides to Te Aroha from the late 1800s emphasise beliefs 
about the healing qualities of the springs and the town. Ingram’s 1892 
Guide for Invalids provides an introduction to the place and its healing 
waters, where, ‘…Te Aroha hot Springs have, within a remarkably short 
period, gained for themselves, by their wonderful curative powers, a 
deservedly very high reputation among sanatoria of New Zealand, and 
their fame is everyday extending to the sister colonies’. Ingram and 
Wright (1887) both asserted that sufferers of ‘nervous disorders…can 
obtain perfect serenity and repose’. The Baths, buildings and drinking 
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springs were thoroughly described, including their temperatures, minerals 
and disorders they would purportedly cure. Spooner’s 1895 guide 
provides an analysis and technical description of the spring’s chemical 
composition along with treatment capabilities and recommendations. 
While guesswork may have been involved, proponents of the healing 
waters were enthusiastic advocates of their quality and more specifically 
in how the waters should be applied, under scientific-medical guidance, 
to heal. According to Wright (1887, unpaginated),  
 
“The mineral waters are exceedingly interesting and will 
prove of great value medically. They closely resemble some 
of the European mineral springs so justly celebrated… You 
may rest assured that all you can do for your springs in the 
shape of improving the facilities for their use is entirely 
justified by the character of the water”.  
 
While the waters of Lisdoonvarna were compared to other spas, in 
particular in an 1875 report which pointed out that the sulphur spring 
was three times more powerful than that of Harrogate, it seemed as if 
wider aspirations were limited given its relatively late development in the 
wider cycles of spa histories (Dwyer, 1998, Kelly, 2009, Foley, 2010). The 
role of reputation and the wider narrative powers of the place were 
regularly invoked however. ‘The wonderful cures which result from these 
spas are everywhere spoken of. One thing is certain, that a fortnight 
spent at Lisdoonvarna renews the constitution, gives new energy and 
animation, and the invalid in most instances leaves a place which has 
made a new man of him in every respect’ (Unidentified newspaper 
clipping, 23rd August, 1863), It should also be noted that there were 
considerable contrasts between the negative accounts of Lisdoonvarna in 
British publications and more positive local publications such as A 
Handbook to Lisdoonvarna and its Vicinity, written in 1876 under the 
pseudonym P.D. This more focused text was eager to acknowledge that 
the chapter on the Medicinal Properties and Effects of the Spas of Lisdoonvarna 
was the work of Dr. Westropp of Lisdoonvarna while the expressed 
purpose of the guide was a perceived duty ‘to alleviate human suffering 
and to promote innocent recreation’ (O’Ceirin, 1998).  
 
Contested Identities: Health/Leisure 
As was the case in most spa towns, the curative reputations and 
purported power of the springs’ minerals were only one part of the story. 
Just as in more elegant and established settings like Bath, Spa or Carlsbad 
(Karlovy Vary), the seasonal inhabitations and practices encountered in 
place were as much social as medicinal. One key reason to visits a spa 
was to meet others of one’s own social station and have a pleasant break 
from normal routines. In addition the locations of the spa, neutral 
settings where one could expand one’s own circle of contacts, marked 
them as liminal spaces. One example was the specific identity of a spa 
town as a site of potential romantic contact (Mackaman, 1998, Foley, 
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2010).  Evidence for this is less clear in Te Aroha (though the name 
means ‘love’ in Māori and hot springs were traditional sites for 
encounters between young Māori men and women) given the less classed 
character of  New Zealand society. The social function of Lisdoonvarna 
as a site of ‘matrimonial promise’ did however, reflect wider spa 
narratives. Given the relative dispersal of the small but powerful Anglo-
Irish class across Ireland, the watering-place was a convenient site for 
prolonged exposure to potential partners, both in business and pleasure. 
It might be reasonable to assume that Te Aroha played a similar function 
for Pakeha (white settler) society in New Zealand. In both cases the 
extended seasonal visits to the spa and associated performative practices 
of promenading, dining, dancing and drinking (of both mineral waters 
and stronger spirits) created spaces for connections to be made (Wells, 
2003). It should be noted that these socialised practices were often a 
direct contestation of the curative ones so that the gains made by 
drinking the recommended ‘two to eight tumblers’ of water (1 to 4 pints) 
in the morning might be wiped out by the embodied losses sustained in a 
night’s claret drinking and card-playing. Te Aroha’s proximity to nearby 
gold-fields and the relative lawlessness of early colonial society was 
slowly transformed to a more socially-ordered place, within which the 
waters and treatments had an increasing role. It would be fair to say that 
Te Aroha did not have the same reputation for alcohol or liminality as at 
Lisdoonvarna, where the social excesses became part of the town’s 
identity and saw it described as ‘like Lourdes in the morning and Monte-
Carlo at night’ (Keena, 2007). While this was in part a comment on the 
increased presence of clerics of all denominations, the all-night dancing 
and gambling became central to the town’s identity. Even in the 21st 
century the town’s matrimonial reputation has been sustained into a 
month-long festival in September of each year. This tradition, with 
regularly shifting clienteles, has lasted from the Anglo-Irish period of the 
mid 19th century into the present day (Keena, 2007).  
 
Equally significantly, the relative importance of social over medicinal 
identities was also shaped by a wider narrative, wherein spa medicine in 
general was slowly discredited by the newly professionalized medical 
classes. Even though curative practices changed over time and increased 
medicalisation became a feature in both towns, The Lancet continued to 
lampoon the assumed quackery and dubious outcomes associated with 
the spa (Price, 1981). Thus, in Lisdoonvarna, a qualified approval was 
given in a report from 1902 but only to the sulphur springs, the others 
being considered medically unreliable or unproven (Hembry, 1997). 
Given that the development and management of spa medicine in New 
Zealand was explicitly linked to a governmental development of ‘health 
tourism’, the town’s health and leisure identities were deliberately blurred, 
with both identities given equal formal prominence. As a result it is less 
easy to identify a judgemental ‘medical gaze’ being turned onto Te 
Aroha’s waters, with the wider merits of the location being given equal 
value. Wells (2003) discusses a questioning of the curative powers of the 
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mineral waters and the wide range of ‘hydropathists’ using them, from 
medical doctors to quacks. He suggested that hydropathy undoubtedly 
improved some medical conditions, with warm bathing and bicarbonate 
in the drinking water being the main benefactors at work. But the 
evidence largely entailed guesswork and the idea of mineral elements 
curing specific ailments were relatively unfounded in a scientific sense. 
 
Contested Identities: Colonial/Native 
As a second form of contestation, it is also valuable to consider the 
different cultural groups who met and mingled in such settings. While 
most spa towns in Europe had relatively elitist clienteles, at least in their 
initial formations, and these shaped a form of class-based ‘inhabited 
ownership’, contestations of space became more apparent at the colonial 
spa.  Although a much less dominant narrative in Te Aroha, healing 
associations and journeys could be traced back to pre-European history. 
Wells (2003) identified over six hundred years of Māori presence in the 
Hauraki region and a widespread regional knowledge of the waters, 
including spiritual meanings, land connections, relief from aches and 
pains, and use for pleasure. Thus, Te Aroha served as a local healing 
place long before it was adopted and developed into a spa town by 
Europeans (Te Aroha Borough Council, 1980). Wells (2003) discusses 
discriminatory attitudes within spa-era Te Aroha and the segregation of 
Māori to a designated bathhouse, where the relative ‘whiteness’ of Te 
Aroha served as a point of assumed superiority. Wright’s brochure (1887) 
discusses ladies’ usage (times and spaces), areas suitable for children, and 
Māori, where ‘a bath-house a distance from the rest…is set apart for the 
sole use of natives’. The construction and assignation of the No. 7 bath 
house (Figure 5) further signals the particular ordering of space in 
constructing the spa town of old. In addition the ambiguous word ‘apart’ 
can be read simultaneously as being excluded (apart) and included (a part) 
in the same space. Thus, a definite, if often overlooked cultural aspect 
and alternative story and significance can be traced within the 
construction of Te Aroha as a therapeutic space (Wilson, 2003). It was 
also the case that indigenous Māori knowledge and therapeutic practices 
were much less fully used in the subsequent branding of Te Aroha than 
in Rotorua, a town seen as less British in its character and identity (Wells, 
2003). 
 
This sense of ambiguous positionality was also evident in Lisdoonvarna, 
though perhaps less visibly marked than in Te Aroha. Indeed there were 
different responses to exclusion here when, in 1867 the Anglo-Irish 
landlord, Stacpoole, attempted to block access to the spa waters. This 
was met with a literal explosive response with newly built locked gates 
being blown up in the middle of the night. This was partly a political 
response given that, ‘These were Fenian times and the right of public 
access was asserted by dynamite’ (O Ceirin, 1998). While the natives 
worked at the spa, they were there to serve the wealthier clienteles. Even 
a local character such as ‘Biddy the Sulphur’, a local woman who doled 
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out waters at pump-room, was actually a relative of the landowning 
family. Gradually in the early twentieth century, these contestations of 
ownership saw the management of the wells passed across to a local 
committee (after a lengthy legal struggle) and this more collective 
ownership fed through into the newly independent state after 1922 and 
up to the present day. This more co-operative ownership model 
developed in Te Aroha too, although it took until much more recent 
times for Māori rights to be reasserted. Te Aroha also reflected the slow 
shift across to more democratic local utilizations at Lisdoonvarna, as 
local farmers from the Waikato plains became significant visitors to the 
town and sustained its activities. While it is tempting to frame these 
examples of contestation as ‘local/inclusive’ versus ‘colonial/exclusive’ 
dualities, the narratives were always more complex on the ground. The 
local resistances in Ireland were reflected in the successful campaigns to 
keep the waters free and open. Yet during the First World War, a request 
to the Lisdoonvarna Improvements Committee in 1916 to use the town 
as a rehabilitation centre for wounded troops (common elsewhere in 
Ireland and Scotland) was declined (Dooley-Shannon, 1998; Durie, 2006).  
The ‘place’ of the Māori at Te Aroha was also ambivalent, given that 
access to the springs was originally granted by a Māori chief. Yet at the 
same time an early visitor to the spa identified that its best prospect of 
success lay in the ‘the absence of Māoris and the presence of a railway’ as 
key ingredients (Wells, 2003: 15). 
 
Figure 6. Māori Bath-house No. 7, Te Aroha. (Source: Wells, 2007) 
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Discussion 
In a relational sense, the colonial spa sat in a space which was distant 
from the metropole but also distant from more centralised models of spa 
town networks in mainland Europe. While attempts were made to 
replicate and reproduce the typical spa town ensemble observable 
elsewhere, local and unique elements also shaped practice and form. Thus 
Te Aroha’s and Lisdoonvarna’s locations rendered them both 
geographically and culturally remote which in turn shaped the cures and 
health care performances found in the two towns. While competition 
played a role in the telling and selling of health in both settings, these 
practises were also framed by place characteristics and the entrepreneurial 
alliances involved in that production. The wider circulations of health 
paradigms, as nature-based water medicine was replaced by hydrotherapy 
and increasingly biomedical discourses, were observable in both settings, 
despite their enormous geographical separation. This tension between the 
relational in both spatial and cultural terms was also visible in the 
contestation of native/othered spaces as well. Indeed the connections 
between the sites also allow them to be seen as what Hoyez (2007) refers 
to as ‘globalising therapeutic landscapes’, wherein cultural forms are 
reproduced across vast distances which often bear little relationship to 
specific local settings. 
 
The mineral water resources in both towns were central to the changing 
ideas, practices and place constructions regarding health and well-being. 
In establishing facilities and a healing reputation, Te Aroha’s spa town 
settlement originated and was organised around mineral springs. This 
project of establishing the antipodean spa scene in New Zealand was one 
way in which colonialism could be inscribed upon, and reflected in, the 
landscape. The process of creating the envisaged scene involved not only 
building place in physical terms. Attracting clients as well as reputed 
experts and using their narratives to promote townships like Te Aroha 
was also an essential endeavour. It was hoped that New Zealand spas 
would come to rival the famed resorts of the Northern Hemisphere, 
given the long history of thermal watering places in Europe (Rockel, 
1986). The traditional patronage of these spa towns was mostly 
comprised of society’s upper classes, and along with serving as locations 
for therapy, spas were also places to see and be seen (Mackaman, 1998). 
In addition, travel and tourism for health and well-being remained 
significant dimensions of spa cultures. The extent to which this remained 
the case with respect to Te Aroha, was a central question. The 
transposing of spa culture onto a burgeoning New Zealand society and 
rural landscape entailed the challenge of applying its principles within a 
quite different context (see Rockel, 1986).  
 
While closer to the metropole, Lisdoonvarna was ironically even more 
marginal than Te Aroha. Both suffered deeply from a lack of 
fashionability, a core and understated element in the reputationally-
formed therapeutic landscape of the spa town. Scale, proximity and 
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competition from other therapeutic landscapes were also significant. In 
Lisdoonvarna’s case it suffered direct competition from both British and 
Continental watering-places but also from sea-bathing resorts closer to 
home (Foley, 2010). For Te Aroha, the competition came from 
Australian spas like Daylesford but also from the expanding resort of 
Rotorua, heavily promoted by Wohlmann, the Government-appointed 
balneologist, who focused much of his energies on that resort (Johnson, 
1990). The reputation of many a European spa was also founded on royal 
patronage (Cossick and Galliou, 2006). In the case of both Te Aroha and 
Lisdoonvarna the nearest they came was a visit from the de facto heads 
of state, the Lord Lieutenants, in both jurisdictions. A visit to 
Lisdoonvarna in 1906 by Lord Aberdeen, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland 
was regarded as providing a significant boost to business, whereas a very 
early visit by Lord Grey, the Lord Lieutenant of New Zealand to the 
waters of Te Aroha as early as 1849, was considered in hindsight, a lost 
opportunity (Furlong, 2006; Wells, 2003). Yet both sites also had more 
dissident political associations. A visit by the ‘infamous’ leader Te Kooti 
to Te Aroha, where he was warmly welcomed by local iwi (Māori tribal 
groups) was negatively reported in the wider press. A parallel dissident 
identity was reflected in the use of the Spa Assembly rooms of 
Lisdoonvarna for a revolutionary speech by Eamon de Valera in 1919 
(Dooley-Shannon, 1998).  
 
Early promoters of the spa sought to boost Te Aroha’s credibility as a 
therapeutic space via ‘scientific’ analysis of the waters and medicalised 
discourses around their application. As well as the waters, wider place 
qualities were included in the constructed healing package, with 
testimonials a significant factor in the assertion of therapeutic effects. 
The healing benefits of the waters and framings as a therapeutic space 
were at the heart of tourism that was essential to Te Aroha’s earlier days. 
Subsequent decades saw a decline of the spa and, following the war, the 
town functioned as a rural service centre, connected into the Waikato’s 
agricultural industry until the end of the ‘long-boom’ period of 
unprecedented economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s. It was not until 
the years following socioeconomic restructuring that the heritage value of 
Te Aroha’s spa era was recognised and became a major aspect of the re-
emergence of  tourism efforts in the town. A surprisingly similar history 
was evident in Lisdoonvarna in the 1930s and 1940s, though in its wider 
economy, Ireland, unlike New Zealand, remained relatively stagnant. 
While the matrimonial festival kept up some sort of seasonal business in 
September, it too functioned as a small rural service centre, but without 
the same richness of agricultural land. But like Te Aroha, there was a 
recognition of heritage value and various ambitious plans were made in 
the 1970s to revive the town through the development of a specialist 
centre for rheumatic disease. Ironically a part of that proposed 
development saw the town seek, in what might be termed a ‘post-post-
colonial’ move, to rejoin the British Spa Federation (Clare Champion, 
1996). In a quite different sense, and after rapid colonisation, spa 
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development and ensuing decline, Māori are now reasserting the 
importance of the waters at Te Aroha (Wells, 2003). The connection 
between healing at different (and holistic) levels, and for groups as 
opposed to only individuals, is worth mentioning here in both a curative 
and a commercial sense.  The springs’ healing qualities are not only 
sought by Māori for physical comfort, but also to relieve grievances 
around ownership and the dishonouring of the original partnership 
agreement regarding the Domain. 
 
Conclusion 
In both Te Aroha and Lisdoonvarna, the identification of parallel 
‘sellings’ and ‘tellings’ of health/place linkages was a prime motivation 
for the investigation. In considering the historical development of both 
towns, a commodifying cycle of discovery-authentication –promotion-
development was apparent, with the final stage in particular being marked 
by a parallel social dimension which produced similar identities and 
narratives of place. We have noted tensions in how health and place were 
sold in both places and shown that competing narratives were key to 
place production (Gesler, 2003).  
 
Contested identities of place were also framed by social behaviours and 
the commercial exploitation of visitors to the sites. Te Aroha never 
seemed to have the same liminal reputation that Lisdoonvarna had, 
though perhaps this was in part due to the relatively settled nature of 
society in New Zealand in the later 19th century. In addition there was an 
ongoing tension in both settings in the development of a more 
medicalised hydrotherapy which contrasted with more holistic indigenous 
understandings of the healing power of water. However, the stories of 
both spa towns reveal similar trajectories and discourses of contestation 
around their holistic and biomedical beliefs, as well as between their 
curative and social reputations and colonial and native inhabitations. Yet 
even these are often false dichotomies in that the different identities and 
dimensions of the towns were deeply embedded and intertwined. While 
the contestations became clearer or were elided over time, they still 
reflected the fact that the framing of spa towns as globalised therapeutic 
landscapes was also balanced around these elements. The social identities 
of the spa were founded on their formative meanings as therapeutic 
places, while their development could not have been sustained without 
their being sold as sites of liminality, leisure and pleasure (Towner, 1996; 
Gesler, 2003; Foley, 2010). 
 
While there were significant variations in the settings, both geographical 
(one had hot springs, the other cold) and commercial, between the two 
towns, there were also surprising commonalities around the production 
of classic colonial watering-places. In this they were identifiably typical 
and unique. It might be useful to extend this consideration of the 
colonial spa town to other specific towns in the two jurisdictions though 
places like Rotorua and Mallow had unique characteristics of their own 
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(Myers, 1984; Rockel, 1986). It might also be valuable to consider how 
spa towns were ‘sold’ and ‘told’ within the wider colonial cultures where 
such towns were situated (Gesler, 2003). Finally, the common ways in 
which spa towns emerged as cultural forms in countries without colonies 
might be considered in terms of cultural, rather than political, influence. 
The great European spas of Baden-Baden and Carlsbad remained a 
model, equally contested in their medicinal and liminal identities, against 
which smaller spas measured themselves (Porter, 1990). Finally the model 
of the wider European or Anglophone spa might be usefully considered 
in relation to other cultural forms of watering-place such as hammams or 
sauna which operated in different scales and settings in the Arab and 
Scandinavian worlds (Aaland, 1978). In revisiting these traditional forms 
of water-based therapeutic landscapes, more contemporary notions of 
contestation, inhabitation and performance can be (re)placed within a 
wider consideration of culture, health and place (Gesler and Kearns, 
2002; Williams, 2007).  
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Introduction  
In recent decades, census data have been the basis for much research into 
the spatial distribution of disadvantage in Britain as a result of their 
national population coverage and potential for spatial disaggregation. 
Although the census is not designed with the explicit intention of 
measuring poverty, a range of census indicators of wider disadvantage 
have been used to make inferences about the geography of poverty in 
contemporary Britain, including worklessness, car ownership, housing 
tenure, overcrowding, household amenities, occupational class, 
educational attainment, and ill health (see Champion et al, 1987; Dorling 
and Thomas, 2004; Gordon and Forrest, 1995; Green, 1994; Philo, 1995). 
Recent advances in computing and GIS methods have facilitated 
improved opportunities for data visualisation and analysis using census 
data, for example, through the use of population cartograms (Thomas 
and Dorling, 2007), and by applying historical GIS methods to examine 
long-term patterns of disadvantage (Gregory et al, 2000). These studies 
convey a very consistent message: the incidence of disadvantage in 
Britain is consistently highest in geographically peripheral regions, and 
especially in urban, metropolitan, and (post)industrial areas. However, 
although spatial inequalities are enduring, inequalities between places 
have widened further in the period since 1981. In this paper our principal 
concern is to understand how the geography of poverty has changed. We 
have combined four decades of census data with poverty survey data to 
estimate levels of poverty in a consistent way over time.  
 
None of the questions included in recent censuses was intended to 
measure poverty directly, and the indicators used in existing studies 
should at best, therefore, be considered proxy measures. In the absence 
of income data, which have been consistently excluded from the UK 
census questionnaire, and will be excluded again in 2011, analysis of 
census data has focused upon the measurement of living conditions. 
Since deprivation is multifaceted, analyses of singular indicators of 
'disadvantage' have rarely been sufficient and an alternative and 
influential approach has therefore focused upon developing various 
indices of deprivation using multiple indicators derived from 
 Eldin Fahmy & Dave Gordon, School for Policy Studies, University of Bristol; Danny 
Dorling, Department of Geography, University of Sheffield; Ben Wheeler, Peninsula 
College of Medicine and Dentistry, John Bull Building, Plymouth.  
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administrative and/or census sources (eg Breadline, Carstairs, DETR 
Index of Multiple Deprivation, DoE Index of Local Conditions, Jarman, 
Townsend).  
 
Although deprivation indices have been highly influential in shaping our 
understanding of the geography of poverty, their construction and 
validation have been subject to intense discussion as a result of 
considerable differences in the ranking of areas at a local level (eg 
Carstairs and Morris, 1991; Deas et al, 2003; Lee et al, 1995). Such 
disparities arise as a result both of differences in the conceptualisation of 
poverty and deprivation and in their empirical measurement.  
 
Although definitional clarity is essential for accurate measurement, 
existing indices do not always proceed on the basis of an explicit 
theoretical model of poverty (eg Carstairs and Morris, 1989; DETR, 
1998; Jarman, 1983; ODPM, 2003). Very rarely is the same theoretical 
model used for more than one point in time. We therefore begin by 
outlining a theoretical framework for understanding poverty from the 
perspective of relative deprivation that is applicable over many decades. 
Similarly, methodologies for deriving census weightings do not always 
reflect an accurate picture of the social profile of poverty vulnerability 
within the population it is intended to measure. This is certainly true 
when a methodology design for just one point in time is applied ten or 
twenty years later. To solve this problem we build on the approach 
developed by Gordon (1995), going on to propose a method for deriving 
longitudinally consistent small-area poverty estimates for the 1971-2001 
period. We then present long-term trends in the spatial distribution of 
poverty for 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001, on the basis of population-
weighted cartograms and measures of spatial polarisation. We conclude 
by commenting on the changes these new methods have uncovered.  
 
The theory and measurement of poverty  
The 'rediscovery' of poverty from the 1960s onwards, associated with the 
work of Townsend (1974; 1979) and others, reflects the now widely 
accepted 'relative deprivation' understanding of poverty as exclusion 
from contemporary living patterns, customs, and activities arising from 
insufficient resources. Within this perspective, households are said to be 
poor when they have both a low income and a low standard of living 
relative to contemporary understandings of the 'necessities of life' 
(Gordon, 2007). Whilst this approach has been hugely influential 
worldwide, in Britain, surprisingly there have been only four nationally 
representative scientific surveys of poverty in the past fifty years which 
have focused explicitly on direct measurement of living standards (ie 
material and social deprivation). These were conducted in 1968/69 
(Townsend, 1979), 1983 (Mack and Lansley, 1985), 1990 (Gordon and 
Pantazis, 1997), and 1999 (Gordon et al, 2000).  
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All four surveys were undertaken by academic researchers and were on a 
relatively small scale, involving samples of between 1500 and 2000 
households. Despite the restricted sample sizes, the aforementioned 
surveys reflect a comparable relative deprivation approach to the 
definition and measurement of poverty, that is, relative to contemporary 
understandings of the 'necessities of life'. Through secondary analysis of 
these datasets it is therefore possible (for the first time) to derive 
theoretically consistent national estimates of poverty at the household 
level over the period 1968-99 based on low income combined with 
material and social deprivation.  
 
Using a 'synthetic modelling' approach, it is also possible to examine the 
changing spatial distribution of poverty at a small-area level over this 
period by applying the resultant sample survey models to national census 
data for 1971 to 2001. Deriving census weights which reflect the real-
world pattern of vulnerability to poverty at a household level is essential 
to accurate estimation at a small-area level. This can be done using the 
national poverty survey data, by estimating the multivariate odds of 
poverty and applying the resultant regression weights to British census 
data for 1971 (combined with the 1968/69 national poverty survey), 1981 
(1983 survey), 1991 (1990 survey), and 2001 (1999 survey). This paper 
describes the methodology used to derive both theoretically consistent 
models of poverty as applied to 1971-2001 census data, and presents an 
overview of the findings relating to the extent and spatial distribution of 
poverty in Britain over this period. It establishes a method that can be 
scientifically repeated when the 2011 Census results are released during 
the year 2013.  
 
Aims and methods  
Here, we estimate two different models of poverty: breadline poverty and 
core poverty. The breadline index reflects a consensual approach to 
relative poverty measurement which, as discussed above, is now well 
established in mainstream poverty research. This approach defines 
deprivation with reference to contemporary public perceptions of those 
items and activities constituting the material and social 'necessities of life' 
within a given society (see eg Gordon and Pantazis, 1997; Gordon et al, 
2000; Mack and Lansley, 1985; Pantazis et al, 2006). By applying the 
breadline methodology on a consistent basis to the above surveys, 
households can be identified as experiencing breadline poverty where 
they have both a low income and lack, because they cannot afford them, 
many of those items considered at each point in time (ie in 1968/69, 
1983, 1990, and 1999) by a majority of the British public to constitute 
contemporary necessities of life.  
 
The breadline approach therefore allows for change over time in the 
public's perceptions of the necessities of life which occur as a result of 
rising overall living standards and cultural and technological change. This 
approach involves the construction of reliable, valid, and additive 
178
deprivation indices for each of the four surveys, and the estimation of 
contemporary poverty thresholds which maximise the statistical fit 
between material and social deprivation and low income (Gordon, 2007). 
Using a logistic regression approach the socio-demographic predictors of 
poverty are then estimated and the resultant regression coefficients are 
applied to census small-area statistics.  
 
Census-output geography has changed for each census since 1971, 
making longitudinal comparisons for consistent boundaries difficult or 
impossible. Here, we therefore apply census-tract geography which has 
been specifically designed to facilitate longitudinal analysis, with areal 
units ranging in size between around 5000 and 38 000 households in 
2001 (mean 18 600) (see Dorling, 1994; Dorling and Pritchard, 2010).  
 
In contrast, the 'core poverty' model is derived theoretically drawing 
upon Bradshaw's (1972a; 1972b; 1994) 'taxonomy of need'. Within this 
perspective, people are said to experience a combination of 'normative', 
'felt', and 'comparative' poverty - for example, where people are 
simultaneously income poor, deprivation poor, and subjectively poor (see 
Bradshaw and Finch, 2003). The concept of 'core poverty' is therefore 
applied here to describe households which are simultaneously income 
poor, deprivation poor and subjectively poor. Income-poor households 
are those with a net weekly household income less than 70% of the 
contemporary equivalised household median - this is the income 
threshold used by the UK government to officially measure child poverty 
when combing low income and material deprivation. This income 
threshold is laid down in statute in paragraph 4(2) of the Child Poverty 
Act 2010.1
  
 
Following Whelan et al's (2001) analysis, households are identified as 
'deprivation poor' where they lack any items comprising the Basic 
Deprivation Index.2
  
Households are therefore defined as experiencing 
'core poverty' if they have a low income and they are basic deprivation 
poor and they also consider their household to be genuinely poor 
'sometimes' or 'all the time' (ie they are subjectively poor). Since the 
selected deprivation items are the same for each time period, they define 
an 'absolute' deprivation threshold. As such, we might expect a decline 
over time in the number of households experiencing core poverty 
assuming a general (and equitably distributed) increase in living 
standards.  
1 http //www.0psl.g0v.uk/acts/acts2010/ukpga 2010000g en 2#pt1-pb1-11g4 
2 These are: in arrears on rent/mortgage, utilities, or hire purchase; buys second-hand, not 
new, clothes; cannot afford meat, chicken, or fish every second day; cannot afford to keep 
home adequately warm; cannot afford to replace worn out furniture; cannot afford one 
week's annual holiday away from home; cannot afford to have friends/family for a meal 
once a month. Whelan et al (2001) use 'inability to afford to replace worn out furniture'. 
This variable is not available in the 1968/69 and 1983 poverty surveys, and is replaced with 
'Cannot afford chairs for household residents' and 'Cannot afford carpets in living areas', 
respectively. 
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In order to facilitate longitudinally consistent measurement of both 
breadline and core poverty, survey definitions and measures need to be 
harmonised across time (ie between national poverty surveys), and 
between data sources (ie between sample surveys and decennial census 
returns). This is in itself a nontrivial exercise, but also means that the 
changing geography of poverty described here is constrained by the 
suitability of census indicators as predictors of poverty vulnerability. 
Alongside harmonisation of indicators, the survey data themselves must 
also be reweighted to reflect the population distribution within the 
relevant census decennial data to which the model weights will 
subsequently be applied. This can be achieved through poststratification 
weighting for key demographic variables (in this case: age group, tenure, 
sex). This is done in order to ensure that survey data are representative of 
the social distribution of the British population for the relevant census 
period.  
 
An ideal deprivation index should be preference free, valid, reliable, and 
genuinely additive (Gordon, 1995), as described below. The construction 
of such indices is a complex process. The remainder of this section 
describes the construction of the 'breadline deprivation index' as applied 
to the national poverty surveys, before going on to describe the 
construction of breadline deprivation indices in general, the estimation of 
breadline poverty thresholds, and the application of the resulting models 
of both breadline and core poverty to national census data.  
 
Defining breadline deprivation indices 
Firstly, items to be included in a breadline definition should be defensible 
on the grounds that the components are items that most people would be 
unlikely to want to do without (preference free). Within the 'consensual' 
approach to poverty measurement only items that a majority of the 
population view as necessities of life are considered as potential 
deprivation indicators, and households are considered 'deprived' only 
where they lack items because they cannot afford them rather than 
through choice. The 1968/69 Townsend survey does not contain data on 
whether households lack items through choice or because they cannot 
afford them and, in the absence of such data, only items lacked by a 
minority of households in 1968/69 were included. Whilst there is some 
evidence of age variations in public perceptions of necessities within the 
1999 survey, which may reflect changing cultural differences and tastes, 
the general pattern is of a high degree of consistency between social 
groups in perceptions of what constitute the necessities of life: for 
example, with regard to gender, social class, and poverty status (Pantazis 
et al, 2006).  
 
Secondly, the construct validity of the items can be established by 
determining the extent to which experimental measures correlate with 
some criterion measure whose validity is known and accepted. This can 
be done by calculating the relative odds ratios for the index components 
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against established correlates of deprivation whilst controlling for other 
known covariates. Here, the following established covariates of 
deprivation were used to validate the indicators, using logistic regression 
and ANOVA: limiting illness/general health; subjective poverty/income 
adequacy; and household equivalised income.  
 
Thirdly, the internal consistency (reliability) of the index and its 
components can be established statistically using classical measurement 
theory. Here, reliability analysis is conducted iteratively to select the most 
reliable subset of indicators for each national poverty survey dataset. 
Finally, it is important that index components are additive: for example, 
we should expect that households who lack both central heating and a car 
are poorer than those who lack only one of these items. To establish 
additivity, we estimate ANOVA (analysis of variance) main effects and 
produce interaction plots for deprivation items against equivalised 
household income. For each pair of items, respondents who lack both 
items should have significantly lower incomes than those who lack only 
one item or none.  
 
Tables A1 and A2 (appendix) describe the final harmonised deprivation 
indicators for the four surveys. Table A1 shows public perceptions of the 
necessities of life and the proportion of households lacking these items in 
1968/69, 1983, 1990, and 1999. Rising overall standards of living are 
reflected in a declining prevalence for virtually all selected deprivation 
indicators over the 1968-99 period. However, as items become more 
widely available, public perceptions of what constitute the 'necessities of 
life' change to encompass a far wider range of goods, services, and 
activities. As predicted by the relative theory of poverty, public 
perceptions of the 'necessities of life' closely reflect the activities and 
styles of living widely available to the British population at the time.  
 
Table A2 shows the items deleted from the deprivation indices for 
1968/69, 1983, 1990, and 1999 with regard to criteria proposed by 
Gordon (1995), namely: public acceptability, construct validity, scale 
reliability and additivity. Many items (eg car, dressing-gown, fortnightly 
night out) consistently lack public acceptability (ie are not considered 
necessities of life by a representative majority of the general public), and 
were therefore excluded although, as noted above, the increasing public 
acceptability of some items (eg telephone, heating, best outfit) reflects 
their growing availability. Many other items (eg indoor toilet, 
bath/shower, television, beds for everyone) are now so widely available 
that their absence is no longer clearly associated with poverty (ie they 
lack validity), and where they remain valid indicators their inclusion in 
any case adds little to the precision of deprivation indices (ie they lack 
reliability). A number of further items (eg three pints of milk per person 
per week; cooked meals every day; medicines from GP) were excluded 
because their combination with other deprivation items is not associated 
with significantly lower mean household equivalised incomes (ie they lack 
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additivity). Table A3 summarises the indicators selected for inclusion 
within the models of breadline and core poverty for 1968/69, 1983, 1990, 
and 1999.  
 
Estimating breadline poverty thresholds 
Within the breadline approach, households are considered poor where 
they are both income poor and lack the necessities of life according to 
the prevailing standards of the time. Determining optimal deprivation 
thresholds for the national poverty surveys is therefore of critical 
importance. Crucially, this involves establishing the level of income 
below which the incidence of deprivation begins to increase 
disproportionately (Townsend, 1979). The relationship between 
household income and deprivation can therefore be modelled formally, 
using ANOVA and logistic regression techniques which maximise the 
covariation between variables on the basis of the goodness-of-fit 
statistics (F-ratio and model X2
 
respectively) (see Gordon, 2007). 
Households are defined as poor where they report both high (above 
threshold) levels of deprivation and have household incomes less than the 
mean of nondeprived respondent households.3
   
In line with best practice 
in income measurement (Rio Group, 2006), estimates are based upon 
equivalised household incomes, which adjust income by need based upon 
household size and composition in order to allow for economies of scale.  
 
Here we model the statistical fit between Poverty and Social Exclusion 
Survey (PSE) equivalised household income and various binary 
deprivation index thresholds (ie 1+ item, 2+ items, etc) controlling for 
household composition using ANOVA and logistic regression 
techniques.4 
 
Table A4 presents goodness-of-fit statistics based upon one-
way ANOVA (F-ratio) and logistic regression (model X
2 
) for different 
deprivation thresholds in order to identify optimal thresholds for the 
1968/69, 1983, 1990, and 1999 indices. For example, the optimal 
deprivation thresholds with regard to the 1990 and 1999 surveys are 3+ 
items and 2+ items, respectively.  
 
Deriving weightings for census deprivation indices 
Based upon the above approach, we estimate the multivariate odds of 
poverty using harmonised variables common to the poverty surveys and 
the relevant census, and subsequently apply the model(s) to British 
census data at a variety of spatial scales. Our dependent variables are:  
 
 core poor: household income less than 70% of equivalised median 
and deprivation poor (Basic Deprivation Index) and subjectively 
3 The contemporary weekly equivalised household income thresholds for the nondeprived 
group were £104 (1968/69), £170 (1983), £205 (1990), and £365 (1999). 
4 Whilst most researchers agree that income adequacy should take account of variation in 
household size and composition, there is little consensus upon the most appropriate 
weighting scheme. Here, we adopt the income-equivalisation methodology adopted within 
the 1999 PSE; for further details see Gordon et al (2000) and Gordon (2006). 
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poor 'sometimes' or 'all the time'  
 breadline poor: deprivation poor (Breadline Index) and low PSE-
equivalised household income  
 
With the aid of a logistic regression approach (described further below), 
the estimated number of poor households in any census areal unit based 
upon these models can be expressed as an additive function of the model 
coefficients (see Gordon, 1995). As applied to GB census headcounts for 
the relevant variables (N), the number of poor households (Npoor) is a 
function of the sum of the model regression coefficients (βl…i). Since the 
models do not provide a perfect fit with the observed data, they will not 
correctly classify all cases. The model estimates will usually undercount 
the actual incidence of poverty, and the regression coefficients must 
therefore be adjusted by applying a suitable correction factor (w) so that 
the predicted census estimates match the actual estimates based upon the 
survey frequencies. The number of poor households in any given area is 
therefore:    
 
 
 
Results  
The extent of breadline and core poverty 
Whilst our main focus here is on the changing spatial distribution of 
poverty at a small-area level, it is important first to examine the 
characteristics of the synthetic models of breadline and core poverty 
upon which these data are based. Table 1 shows trends over the 1971-
2001 period in estimates of breadline and core poverty and disaggregates 
these data by household type, tenure, occupational class, and economic 
status. Table 1 shows that during the 1970s, levels of breadline and core 
poverty both dropped at fairly similar rates, declining by around a third 
over the decade. During the 1980s, breadline and core poverty increased 
substantially, effectively reversing the improvements seen in the previous 
decade. During the 1990s, breadline poverty rates continued to rise, 
reaching an unprecedented 28% of households, whilst the proportion of 
households experiencing core poverty actually dropped to levels similar 
to those of 1981.  
 
In understanding these overall trends it is instructive to examine the 
changing pattern of social vulnerability to poverty - for example, with 
regard to household type, tenure, occupational class, and economic status 
- as illustrated in Table 1. During the 1970s the proportion of single 
pensioners living in poverty declined dramatically and, despite a general 
decline in levels of poverty, breadline and especially core poverty became 
more concentrated amongst semiskilled/unskilled occupational groups. 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed rising rates of poverty but this trend was 
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especially dramatic amongst single parents (with nearly 70% classified as 
breadline poor by 2001), and to a lesser extent amongst couples with 
children. In the 1980s and 1990s, residential tenure became increasingly 
important, with the 1980s witnessing a significant concentration of 
poverty amongst council tenants [perhaps as a result of council house 
sales (see Forrest et al, 1996)]. In the 1990s, breadline poverty rates 
amongst both social and private rental tenants increased dramatically, 
which is now believed to be partly as a result of declining housing 
affordability in the private housing market, the reduced availability of 
social rental provision and the 'residualisation' of council housing provi-
sion. In general, analysis of the nonparametric associations (Cramer's V ) 
presented in table 1 suggests that socioeconomic factors (eg occupational 
class, employment status) were of greater significance in the 1970s and 
1980s, and that housing tenure assumed increasing importance in the 
1980s and beyond.  
 
Table 1. Breadline and core poverty (%) by household type, tenure, 
occupational class, and employment status, 1968-1999.  
 
 
 
KEY: All Cramer’s V statistics significant at .001 level. ‘[ ]’ Insufficient data to 
provide reliable estimates. Survey data (in brackets) are re-weighted to census 
data for: 1971 (1968/9); 1981 (1983); 1991 (1990), and; 2001 (1999). 
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Table 2. The multivariate odds of breadline poverty regression 
coefficients and derived census weights, 1968-99.  
 
 
 
KEY: Estimates are logistic regression odds ratios (exp[B]) based upon 
backward stepwise estimation (likelihood ratio method).  All model coefficients 
significant at .001 level. 
 
The 1980s and 1990s witnessed rising rates of poverty but this trend was 
Based upon logistic regression, Tables 2 and 3 present multivariate 
estimates of the odds of experiencing breadline and core poverty for a 
series of harmonised variables used to predict the incidence of poverty. 
For each census period, the models identify the best-fitting subset of 
predictor variables based upon backward stepwise selection. Table 2 
shows the multivariate odds (exp β) of breadline poverty for each variable 
included in the final model (ie taking into account the intercorrelations 
between predictors themselves). For example, in 1971 private rental 
tenants are predicted to be more than three times as likely (1: 3.1) to 
experience breadline poverty in comparison with nonprivate rental 
tenants. Similarly, in 1971 private rental tenants are predicted to be twice 
as likely (1: 2.0) to experience core poverty in comparison with 
nonprivate rental tenants. As expected, the best predictors of poverty 
change over time, as a reflection of the changing pattern of poverty 
vulnerability illustrated in Table 1 (eg with regard to indicators such as 
single pensioner, pensioner couple, and single parent).  
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Table 3. The multivariate odds of core poverty regression coefficients 
and derived census weights, 1968-99.  
 
 
 
KEY: Estimates are logistic regression odds ratios (exp[B]) based upon 
backward stepwise estimation (likelihood ratio method).  All model coefficients 
significant at .001 level. 
 
The regression models correctly classify between 78.1% and 91.3% of 
cases, with observed 'hit rates' (correct classifications) well in excess of 
the proportional by chance (PC) criterion and in most cases also in excess 
of the proportional reduction in error criterion (see Hosmer and 
Lemeshow, 2000). Nevertheless, even using the best subset of census 
indicators available, error rates of between approximately 1 in 5 and 1 in 
10 remain as a result of the limitations of existing census indicators in 
predicting poverty, with substantial variations evident across datasets, 
over time, and between measures (sadly, no better questions are being 
added to the 2011 Census form which will, instead, ask many new 
questions about nationality and immigration status). In general, however, 
whilst the core poverty models perform better in accurately classifying 
respondents in comparison with breadline poverty models, this largely 
reflects the more unequal distribution of the former variable. Based upon 
the PC criterion, the breadline poverty models outperform the core 
poverty models for each period, and the overall model 'fit' as indicated by 
quasi-R2
 
values is better for the breadline measure for every period with 
the exception of 2001.  
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The geography of breadline and core poverty 
Methodological rigour is necessary, but our main concern in this paper is 
with the changing spatial distribution of poverty. Here we find that social 
polarisation declined during the 1970s, prior to a period of further 
significant growth in the spatial concentration of poverty at the small-
area level in Britain in the 1980s. During the 1990s breadline poverty 
continued to become both more spatially concentrated and more 
widespread whereas the reverse is true with respect to core poverty. This 
is illustrated in Figures 1 and 2 which describe the changing geography of 
poverty in Britain resulting from the use of a universal data mapping 
approach in which each tract is proportional in area to its population, 
whilst seeking to keep adjacent units together (see Thomas et al, 2009). 
Whilst this distorts the traditional cartographic projection of Britain, it 
gives a much clearer picture of urban poverty. Since tracts are roughly 
proportionate in size to their populations, the cartogram is also a more 
'democratic' view of population geography, effectively according each 
person the same space on the map.  
 
Figures 1 and 2 show the changing spatial distribution of breadline and 
core  poverty over the 1971 -2001 period by applying the models derived 
from the (re-weighted) national poverty survey data for 1968/69, 1983, 
1990, and 1999 to the relevant decennial census tract data. Figure 1 
shows that breadline poverty rates generally vary between about 10% and 
30%, with higher rates tending to be found in the north of England, 
Wales and Scotland. Rates of over 30% are only found in inner London, 
in the cities of the North and West Midlands, in Scotland (especially 
Glasgow), and in the valleys of South Wales. By 1981, poverty levels had 
decreased almost everywhere, with high-level pockets remaining in inner 
London, Glasgow, and some cities of northern England. Areas with 
poverty levels below 10% are now much more prevalent than in 1971. 
This trend is reversed during the 1980s, with the map for 1991 
resembling that for 1971, with even higher levels evident in places like 
Glasgow, the West Midlands, and many northern cities. The trend of the 
1980s continues through the 1990s, with the map for 2001 showing levels 
above 50% in a number of cities, and no areas remain with rates below 
10%. 
 
As Figure 2 shows, the changing geography of core poverty over the 
1971-2001 period is quite similar to that of breadline poverty up to 1991. 
Although the overall incidence of core poverty is considerably lower than 
that of breadline poverty, it is again primarily concentrated in 
(post)industrial areas and the major urban conurbations, including the 
industrial conurbations of south Lancashire, Liverpool, Manchester and 
West Yorkshire, in the South Wales valleys, in the West Midlands, and in 
the central belt of Scotland. However, after 1991, and unlike breadline 
poverty, core poverty levels decline in many areas, though less so in 
(post)industrial and metropolitan areas including Glasgow, the North, the 
West Midlands, and London. Moreover, although overall levels of core 
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poverty declined somewhat over the 1970 (17.7%) to 1990 (14.1%) 
period, the geography of core poverty has changed strikingly, with the 
urban clustering of core poverty being much more pronounced in the 
later census periods, especially for inner-city areas.  
 
Figure 1. The changing geography of breadline poverty, (a) 1970, (b) 
1980, (c) 1990, (d) 2000.  
 
 
 
Note: Based upon synthetic estimates derived from national poverty surveys 
conducted in 1968/69, 1983, 1990, and 1999. Survey data reweighted to census 
distribution for 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001, respectively. 
 
The general concentration of poverty in urban and (post)industrial areas 
is corroborated by other studies examining the spatial distribution of 
poverty and other indicators of disadvantage (see eg Champion et al, 
1987; Dorling and Thomas, 2004; Gordon and Forrest, 1995; Green, 
1995; Philo, 1995; Robson et al, 1995). Whilst based upon different 
methods, datasets, time periods, and geographies, they collectively draw 
attention to the ways in which the distribution of poverty reflects spatial 
processes of economic marginalisation. Poverty rates are highest in areas 
experiencing deindustrialisation as a result of the decline of traditional 
extractive, primary, and manufacturing industries in the major cities and 
urban conurbations, including inner London, the South Wales valleys, the 
West Midlands, the North West, the West Riding, Tyneside, and 
Glasgow. Based upon consistent definitions, methods, and geographies, 
these data confirm the spatial segregation of these 'poor areas' and also 
suggest that, unlike the 1970s, processes of spatial polarisation in poverty 
became more pronounced during the 1980s and 1990s.  
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Figure 2. The changing geography of 'core poverty', (a) 1970, (b) 1980, (c) 
1990, (d) 2000.  
 
 
 
Note: Based upon synthetic estimates derived from national poverty surveys 
conducted in 1968/69, 1983, 1990 and 1999. Survey data reweighted to census 
distribution for 1971, 1981, 1991, and 2001, respectively. 
 
Poverty and spatial polarisation 
Whilst changing headline rates and their social distribution are worthy 
objects of study in themselves, what these data tell us about the widening 
socioeconomic gap in living standards between areas is perhaps of greater 
policy significance. In order to assess the changing degree of polarisation, 
we replicate a method developed by Dorling and Woodward (1996). 
Here, we examine the poverty trajectories of census tracts by studying 
their movement over the 1971-2001 period between fourteen categories 
defined as proportions relative to two fixed and essentially arbitrary 
thresholds: breadline poverty (BP)-20%; and core poverty-10%. Table 4 
describes the changing distribution of the population between census 
tracts for each decennial census interval, as well as across the 1971-2001 
period as a whole. Positive values in the upper half of the table indicate 
an increase in the number of households living in relatively affluent 
tracts. Similarly, positive values in the lower half of the table indicate an 
increase in the number of households living in poorer tracts. For 
example, with regard to breadline poverty, Table 4 shows that from 1971 
to 1981, the proportion of the British population living in tracts where 
less than 10% of households were breadline poor increased by about 7%, 
and the proportion of households living in areas with breadline poverty 
rates in excess of 20% declined in all cases. Similarly, Table 4 shows that 
during the 1991-2001 period, the proportion of the population living in 
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tracts where between 15% and 20% of households were classified as 
experiencing core poverty declined by around 18%.  
 
As Table 4 illustrates, overall trends with regard to breadline poverty 
suggest that during the 1970s British households became much less 
concentrated in areas of high poverty, but that this process was reversed 
during the 1980s and 1990s with an increasing concentration of British 
households in 'poor places'. Over the 1971-2001 period as a whole, Table 
4 suggests an increasing concentration of households in areas with 
breadline poverty rates in excess of 30% (ie BP > 1.5): worse-off British 
households have become increasingly concentrated in enclaves of high 
breadline poverty. With respect to core poverty, a broadly similar trend is 
evident during the 1970s and 1980s with a declining concentration of 
households in areas of high poverty in the 1970s and an equally striking 
reversal of this trend towards greater social -spatial equality during the 
1980s.  
 
Table 4. Change in the proportion of households living in population 
tracts by breadline poverty (BP) and core poverty (CP) rate, 1971 -2001 
(%).  
 
 
 
KEY: ‘BP’ Breadline Poverty: threshold value=20%. ‘CP’ Core Poverty: 
threshold value=10%.  E.g. Values for BP bin category 2.0+ indicate the change 
in proportion of households living in tracts with Breadline Poverty rates in 
excess of 40%. 
 
However, Table 4 also shows that during the 1990s there are divergent 
trends with regard to the profile of breadline and core poverty. Whereas 
British households became more concentrated in poor areas with regard 
to breadline poverty (continuing a trend first observed in the 1980s for 
both measures), of core poverty there is a decline in the concentration of 
households in poor areas. This is also reflected in divergent trends across 
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the period of observation as a whole for breadline and core poverty. 
Over the 1971-2001 period, British households have become more 
concentrated in areas of high breadline poverty (ie areas with breadline 
poverty scores in excess of 30%). At the same time, and although the 
magnitude of overall change is much smaller, households appear to be 
less concentrated in areas of high core poverty (ie areas with core poverty 
scores in excess of 15%). 
 
Discussion  
How then should we explain these apparently divergent trends in 
breadline and core poverty since 1991? Do these trends reflect real 
underlying changes in the incidence and distribution of poverty defined 
in various ways, or is this apparent divergence since 1991 merely 
artefactual? Analysis of the survey data upon which these models are 
based demonstrates a substantial overlap between breadline and core 
poverty classifications and, since the incidence of core poverty is much 
less prevalent at every time point than breadline poverty, it may be that 
core poverty taps 'extreme poverty' as opposed to the broader 
conceptualisation reflected in the breadline index. Certainly, this is the 
general interpretation accorded to core poverty by Whelan et al (2001) in 
their original operationalisation of this concept. Indeed, analysis of 
chronic and persistent poverty using a comparable methodology is 
suggestive of such a decline (Gordon et al, 2000). It could be, therefore, 
that whilst poverty has become more widespread during the 1990s, 
extreme poverty may have simultaneously become less prevalent.  
 
Alternatively, this divergence may reflect more basic differences in the 
definition and measurement of poverty. We have seen that core poverty 
measurement is based upon a set of deprivation indicators which are time 
invariant. Given rising levels of affluence across the period as a whole, 
we would therefore expect to find a corresponding general decline in 
core poverty and in general this conclusion is corroborated by these 
results. Thus, core poverty declined dramatically in the 1970s and again 
to a lesser extent in the 1990s. The exception here is the 1980s, when 
poverty levels rose so dramatically that even absolute indicators record an 
increase (though of a much smaller magnitude than is the case for 
breadline poverty). In contrast, the breadline index is based upon a 
relative concept in which poverty is understood as an enforced lack of 
socially perceived necessities-necessities which by definition are subject 
to change across time (see eg Gordon, 2007; Townsend, 1974; 1979; 
1987). Whilst the breadline indices presented here are conceptually and 
methodologically consistent over time this does not therefore imply 
adoption of a common set of deprivation items. Indeed, since the 
public's perceptions of the 'necessities of life' change over time, this 
should be reflected in poverty measurement. On this basis, we argue here 
that breadline poverty represents the best available approach to the 
definition and measurement of poverty, the adequacy of which can be 
formally assessed on the basis of established criteria of validity, reliability 
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and additivity as discussed above. Research comparing different small-
area deprivation indices has reached broadly similar conclusions (eg Lee 
et al, 1995). However, in times of great and adverse social upheaval such 
as the early 1980s (and again perhaps today), the core poverty indicator 
can show when absolute rates of poverty are rising and where such 
poverty is concentrated.  
 
What then are the substantive conclusions to be drawn from these 
analyses in explaining the increasing spatial concentration of breadline 
poverty over the 1971-2001 period? In terms of the overall concentration 
of breadline poverty, it may that poorer populations have grown fastest 
in poor areas, replacing households not classified as breadline poor who 
have dissolved, left, or died. Alternatively, it could be that more affluent 
people have been moving out of poor areas and into more wealthy 
places, though clearly in both respects the underlying mechanisms are 
likely to vary from place to place. Certainly, earlier analysis of population 
trends across tracts since 1971 suggests that the poorest decile of census 
tracts in 1971 (according to the breadline poverty indicator) experienced 
a substantial decline in population losing approximately one fifth of their 
population by 2001 - with a corresponding growth in population in the 
most affluent (ie least poor) decile of census tracts over the same period. 
Much of the decline in the population of the poorest tracts in 1971 
occurred during the 1970s, and to a lesser extent in the 1980s, perhaps 
suggesting a process of out-migration associated with the decline of 
traditional extractive and manufacturing industries (as well as higher 
mortality rates and reduced in-migration in these areas). Nevertheless, 
earlier analyses suggest that during the 1990s these areas have in fact 
experienced a modest population increase. This may reflect changes in 
the impacts of economic 'restructuring' arising from the 1990/91 
recession which particularly affected the types of service sector 
employment more prevalent in relatively affluent areas concentrated in 
the southeast of England. At the same time, this may also partly reflect 
the demographic structure of poor areas, which tend to have younger 
populations such that losses due to deaths and out-migration may also be 
outweighed by birth and in-migration gains (see Dorling et al, 2007, pages 
39-40, for further details).  
 
Conclusions  
In recent years an increasing interest in the spatial distribution of poverty 
has been facilitated by methodological developments associated with the 
applications of GIS approaches, better availability of suitable spatially 
referenced data at a small area level, and the growing prominence of area-
based initiatives in tackling poverty in Britain and elsewhere. For the first 
time, it is possible to estimate the spatial distribution of poverty across 
time on the basis of consistent methods and indicators. That is what this 
paper demonstrates. Based upon such an approach, we conclude that the 
overall incidence of poverty at the household level has increased 
substantially over the 1971-2001 period in Britain, and that poverty has 
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also become increasingly spatially concentrated during this period. The 
former finding is very much corroborated by existing research into 
national trends in the distribution of income inequality and poverty at the 
household level (eg Brewer et al, 2006; Gordon, 2000; Sefton and 
Sutherland, 2005). Regrettably, much less work exists on the spatial 
consequences of these trends with regard to the geographical distribution 
of poverty and inequality in Britain, though existing research in this area 
is consistent with these findings (eg Dorling and Rees, 2003; see also 
Gibbons et al, 2005; Noble and Smith, 1996).  
 
However, before considering the policy implications of these findings it 
is important also to acknowledge the limitations of this approach, and 
therefore the potential for further work in this area. Firstly, whilst it is 
clearly vital to describe accurately the changing spatial distribution as 
detailed above, it is equally important to explain such trends if we are to 
develop effective policies directed at eradicating poverty. In the absence 
of suitable panel data at the household level it is not possible to explain 
trends in the spatial distribution of poverty over this period definitively. 
One further extension of this approach may therefore be to take 
advantage of Census Longitudinal Study data in order to examine 
patterns of migration at the individual level. At the same time, the 
importance of local case studies and qualitative research should not be 
underestimated. Secondly, the modelling approach adopted here assumes 
that the relationship between poverty and the social-demographic 
predictors included here does not itself vary across space. For example, 
lack of access to a car is assumed to have the same relationship to 
poverty in inner London as in rural Wales. This assumption of spatial 
homogeneity is unlikely to be correct, and where suitable spatially 
referenced data are available more advanced approaches such as 
geographically weighted regression (eg Fotheringham et al, 2002), might 
be fruitfully applied to investigate and map local variations from the 
global models presented here.  
 
Thirdly, it will also be instructive in future work not only to examine 
general trends in the spatial distribution of poverty but also to investigate 
in much greater detail, and on the basis of local knowledge and studies, 
spatial outliers within these data, that is, areas which have experienced 
atypical changes in poverty rates in comparison with 'global' trends across 
Britain as a whole. For example, what specific local factors and 
contingencies may help to explain the poverty trajectory of places which 
have managed to 'buck the trend' by recording lower than expected 
increases in poverty over time? Related to this point, the significance of 
place itself in shaping poverty trajectories (as opposed to generic area 
classifications) is a topic meriting much closer attention both within the 
research community, and in the development of local and national 
strategies for reducing inequalities.  
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What then are the implications of these findings for policies directed at 
tackling poverty and disadvantage? It is clear from these findings that 
increasing impoverishment of substantial sections of the British 
population is a process operating not only at an individual and household 
level, but is one associated with substantial changes in the prospects of 
places. It would be tempting to suggest, therefore, that a renewed 
emphasis upon area-based solutions to poverty is called for. However, 
the limitations of area-based approaches in tackling poverty have been 
well documented since Townsend's (1979) trenchant critique of this 
approach. In particular, despite the increasing spatial concentration of 
poverty over this period, the majority of poor households do not live in 
areas experiencing high concentrations of poverty. Equally, within these 
areas (and depending on the scale of analysis) it generally remains the 
case that a majority of household are not classified as poor. Moreover, 
the rationales offered for area-based measures frequently conflate 
compositional effects (associated with a concentration of poor 
households) with genuine neighbourhood effects (associated with the 
specific penalties attached to place) (Powell et al, 2001; see also 
Fieldhouse and Tye, 1996). Whilst targeted area-based interventions 
certainly have a role to play in tackling poverty (see eg Smith, 1999), the 
reform of mainstream policies and provision targeted at individuals and 
households is likely to be both a more effective and a more efficient 
strategy. Above all, the enduring nature of these trends suggests that 
radical policy solutions focused upon a sustained commitment to the 
redistribution of wealth (encompassing not only those at the bottom of 
society but also those at the top) will be necessary to reverse these trends 
(Dorling, 2010).  
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Appendix  
 
Table A1 the necessities of life and household deprivation in Britain, 
1968-99. 
 
 Necessities of life Lack item 
 1983 1990 1999 1967/9 1983 1990 1999 
Meat/fish (or veg 
equivalent) every other 
day 63 77 79 25 9 4 3 
A roast meat joint or its 
equivalent 67 64 56 26 10 7 3 
Two pairs of all 
weather shoes 78 74 64 3 10 5 5 
A warm water-proof 
coat 87 91 85 33 8 4 4 
Best outfit for special 
occasions .. 54 51 .. .. 8 4 
Appropriate clothes for 
job interviews .. .. 69 .. .. .. 4 
A decent state of 
decoration in the home .. 92 82 .. .. 16 14 
Two meals a day for 
adults .. 90 91 .. .. 2 1 
Medicines prescribed 
by doctor .. .. 90 .. .. .. 1 
Electricity for both 
power and lights .. .. .. 2 .. .. .. 
Replace or repair 
broken electrical goods .. .. 85 .. .. .. 12 
Replace worn out 
furniture .. .. 54 .. .. .. 12 
Heating to warm living 
areas of the home 97 97 94 5 7 3 1 
Insurance of dwelling 
contents .. 88 79 .. .. 11 8 
Daily fresh fruit and 
vegetables .. 88 86 .. .. 7 4 
Fridge 77 92 89 45 [3] 1 <1 
Radio .. .. .. 8 .. .. .. 
Dictionary .. .. 53 .. .. .. 5 
Telephone 43 56 71 [69] .. 7 1 
Toys for children  71 84 84 .. .. 1 <1 
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Leisure equipment for 
children  57 61 62 .. .. 2 3 
Bedrooms for every 
child over 10 of 
different sexes 77 82 80 .. [?] 2 3 
Child's participation in 
out-of-school activities .. 69 .. .. .. 3 2 
Weekly outing for 
children 40 53 .. .. .. 4 .. 
Children's friends 
round for tea once a 
week 37 52 59 15 .. 2 4 
Visits to school, e.g. 
sports day .. .. 81 .. .. .. 2 
Collect children from 
school .. .. 75 .. .. .. 2 
Regular savings for a 
"rainy day" .. 68 66 .. .. 32 25 
Washing machine 67 73 77 41 [7] 4 2 
Vacuum cleaner .. .. .. 22 .. .. .. 
Carpets in living areas 70 78 67 8 4 2 3 
Chairs for all plus guest .. .. .. 5 .. .. .. 
Home free of structural 
defects - - - 22 - - - 
Home free of structural 
defects dangerous to 
health - - - 7 - - - 
Celebrations on special 
occasions such as Xmas 69 74 83 18 5 4 2 
Attending family events 
(weddings, funerals) - - 80 - - - 3 
Visiting friends or 
family in hospital - - 92 - - - 3 
Visits to friends or 
family - - 84 - - - 2 
At least one 
evening/afternoon out 
in last two weeks [36] [42] 41 29 [19] 22 17 
Had friend for 
dinner/snack at home 
in last four weeks [32] [37] 64 36 [13] 11 6 
New not second hand 
clothes 64 65 50 - 7 5 6 
Damp-free home 96 98 93 - 10 2 6 
A hobby or leisure 
activity 64 67 78 - 7 8 7 
A small amount of 
personal spending 
money - - 59 - - - 13 
A week's annual holiday 
away from home 63 54 55 - 24 22 18 
Presents for family 
once a year 63 69 56 - 7 6 3 
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KEY: [ ] Item included for comparison only but excluded from deprivation 
index. ‘..’ Data unavailable. 
 
Table A2. Public acceptability, validity, reliability, and additivity: deleted 
deprivation items, 1968 -99.  
 
 1967-9 1983 1990 1999 
Television validity reliability validity reliability 
Annual holiday 
away from home acceptability * acceptability acceptability 
Beds for everyone 
in the household .. reliability validity reliability 
Dressing gown .. acceptability acceptability acceptability 
Night out once a 
fortnight .. acceptability acceptability acceptability 
Bath (not shared) .. validity validity reliability 
Car .. acceptability acceptability acceptability 
CD/record player acceptability .. .. acceptability 
Dishwasher .. .. acceptability acceptability 
Fares to visit 
friends 4 times a 
year .. .. acceptability acceptability 
Freezer/fridge-
freezer .. reliability .. additivity 
Friends/family 
round for a meal 
monthly .. acceptability acceptability * 
Garden large 
enough to sit in validity validity validity .. 
Home computer .. .. acceptability acceptability 
Indoor toilet (not 
shared) .. validity validity .. 
New not second-
hand clothes additivity * * acceptability 
Packet of cigarettes 
every other day .. acceptability acceptability .. 
Refrigerator .. reliability * reliability 
Restaurant meal 
monthly .. .. acceptability acceptability 
Telephone acceptability acceptability * * 
Video .. .. acceptability acceptability 
Washing machine .. reliability * reliability 
Air not dirty, 
smoky, or foul 
smelling reliability .. .. .. 
Attending place of 
worship .. .. .. acceptability 
Best outfit for 
special occasions .. acceptability * * 
Cooked breakfast 
most days acceptability .. .. .. 
Cooked meal every 
day in last fortnight  additivity .. .. .. 
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Daily newspaper .. .. .. acceptability 
Electricity for both 
power and lights validity .. .. .. 
Heating to keep 
living areas warm acceptability * * * 
Medicines 
prescribed by GP .. .. .. additivity 
Microwave oven .. .. .. acceptability 
Public transport 
for one's needs .. validity .. .. 
Self-contained 
accommodation .. reliability .. .. 
Three pints of milk 
per person per 
week  additivity .. .. .. 
Tumble dryer .. .. .. acceptability 
Visiting pub once a 
fortnight .. .. .. acceptability 
KEY: ‘*’ Item included in final deprivation index. ‘..’ Item not included in 
dataset. 
 
Table A3. Selected breadline deprivation index items, 1968 -99.  
 
  1967-9 1983 1990 1999 
  F Chi Sq. F Chi Sq. F Chi Sq. F Chi Sq. 
1+ item 27.5 24.2 66.8 112.3 20.6 228.6 51.9 185.3 
2+ items 113.6 94.0 48.5 98.2 26.7 255.8 70.3 241.3 
3+ items 155.0 129.7 41.2 94.9 29.6 217.2 60.3 234.5 
4+ items 160.5 149.1 40.1 87.6 15.9 172.9 56.3 221.2 
5+ items 197.6 191.2 24.4 67.7 16.2 150.4 47.7 197.2 
6+ items 162.2 157.1 16.7 59.8 9.3 136.1 36.3 150.8 
7+ items 126.4 125.5 12.6 40.9 .. .. .. .. 
8+ items 71.5 76.1 .. .. .. .. .. .. 
N (items) 17 13 27 29 
Scale Alpha 0.723 0.837 0.863 0.883 
 
KEY: Logistic regression model (Chi Sq.): dependent= deprivation threshold; 
predictors= PSE income, adults (N), children (N). ANOVA model (F ratio): 
dependent=PSE income; predictors= deprivation threshold, adults (N), 
children (N). ‘..’ Not computed. Bold Selected ‘Breadline’ deprivation threshold 
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CHAPTER 30 
 
PERFORMING HEALTH IN PLACE: THE HOLY WELL AS A 
THERAPEUTIC ASSEMBLAGE 
 
RONAN FOLEY 
 
First published in Health & Place (2011) 17, 470-479. 
 
Introduction: The Holy Well as a Therapeutic Landscape.  
 
‘Who says the well is holy? Why? If there is a fence, or a 
gate, or a covering over the well, who built them? Who has 
left these tokens, and how long ago? Are we trespassing? 
What is expected of us? Is this religion, or magic, or folk-
medicine? Is it a Catholic devotion, or something older? Is it 
unique to Ireland? If this is an ancient site of worship, why 
are there ashtrays and broken china, canteen chairs and 
modern statues? Does the water have special properties? Is 
anyone in charge? If there are stories about the well, where 
are they written? Who is this saint whose name is attached to 
it? Should we have come on a special day? (Bourke, 2001: 7)  
 
Holy wells exist as healing and spiritual sites across the globe and reflect 
wider cultural and phenomenological place connections to other forms of 
holy and healing waters like lakes and rivers (Bord and Bord, 1985; 
Rattue, 1995; Foley, 2010). In addition there are commonly found 
culture-nature expressions of the role of springs and sources as marking 
the boundaries between the human and spiritual underworlds (Shackley, 
2001). Well settings are often framed by streams, stones and trees, which 
act as markers of a connection between the grounded earth and the sky, 
spiritual and imagined home of the gods (Jones and Cloke, 2002; Shaw 
and Francis, 2008).  
 
As ‘hydro-therapeutic’ settings containing a combination of natural and 
built elements, there are approximately 3,000 holy wells currently dotted 
across the island of Ireland. While their pagan origins are debated 
(Rickard and O’Callaghan, 2001; Gerten, 2008), they contained elements 
of nature worship and hydrolatry which were subtly absorbed into early 
Christian place hagiography (Carroll, 1999; Logan, 1980; Healy, 2001). 
After a period of concentrated use between the mid 17th and mid 19th 
centuries, they fell out of favour after 1850 as a centralising church 
developed more formal sites to explicit increase its own cultural power 
(Harbison, 1991). Yet they retain a presence and power in contemporary 
society and many of the associated performances and narratives of health 
have sustained and even recovered in place.  
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Materially, they range from literal holes in the ground to substantial 
landscaped sites with a mix of natural and culturally introduced elements. 
In general, the sites contain the wells themselves, streams, stone crosses 
and covers, paths, trees and bushes, altars and statues; all of which have 
physical form but wider symbolic meanings as well (Brenneman and 
Brenneman, 1995; Foley, 2010). All express Strang’s (2004) notion of 
being ‘typical and unique’ across horizontal space and vertical time. Holy 
wells were also subject to deeper cultural and political scrutiny that 
shaped their dual roles as physical and spiritual curative sites. As 
geographical settings in which ‘faith cures’ were enacted, these in turn 
were interpreted and managed by a range of controlling agents 
(O’Cadhla, 2002). As sites of liminal behaviour and independent native 
identity, the gaze of controlling agents such as the Catholic Church and 
the ruling British colonial government was evident in different historic 
periods (Carroll, 1999). 
 
Such settings can also be described as therapeutic landscapes, places that 
have achieved lasting reputations for providing physical, mental and 
spiritual healing (Kearns and Gesler, 1998).  Initially focused on spas and 
pilgrimage sites, therapeutic landscape research has developed to include 
settings like gardens and wilderness, as well as formal health sites 
designed to induce wellness (Gesler, 1992, 1993, 1996 and 1998; 
Williams, 1999b; Williams, 2007). In seeing natural settings like 
wilderness as therapeutic, there are strong connections back to early 
humanist and phenomenological research on person-landscape 
interactions (Tuan, 1974; Wylie, 2007). These earlier studies also 
identified that phenomenological and imaginative responses to wilderness 
were often expressed as manifestations of the sacred, with the nature-
religion link often expressed in therapeutic terms (Eliade, 1961; Graber; 
1976).  
 
Broad therapeutic landscape classifications have been developed by 
Gesler (1993) and Williams (1999a) with the latter hinting at a more 
experiential dimension. A specific definition by Gesler noted that 
therapeutic landscapes consisted of two key psycho-cultural components: 
 
‘Inner/meaning (including the natural setting, the built 
environment, sense of place, symbolic landscapes, and 
everyday activities) and Outer/societal context (including 
beliefs and philosophies, social relations and/or inequalities, 
and territoriality)’ (Gesler, 1993: 173). 
 
How the ‘inner/meanings’ of such therapeutic spaces are negotiated 
against their ‘outer/contexts’ is at the heart of understanding their 
healing potential and cultural meanings in health terms. How individuals 
experience healing in place can be studied in a number of different 
settings, many of which are associated with water (Gesler, 1998). Some 
watering-places, such as modern spas, have identities of mind-body-spirit 
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health, linked to a range of new age treatments and contemplative 
spiritualities (Shaw and Francis, 2008; Foley, 2010). Yet it is an older 
form, the holy well, which provides a valuable setting to conceptualise 
more fully a broad range of health performances, enacted within a 
therapeutic space.  
 
The performative turn and therapeutic space  
Current theoretical discussions in cultural and health geographies suggest 
that the holy well has potential as a valuable representative place within 
which to study performances of health (Jackson, 1989; Kearns and 
Moon, 2002). Recent critical discussions on the nature of therapeutic 
spaces recast them as sites of therapeutic potential (Conradson, 2005). 
One cannot assume a fixed therapeutic meaning or outcome associated 
with an individual setting and at times, outcomes may even be anti-
therapeutic (Collins and Kearns, 2007; Conradson, 2007; Lea, 2008; 
Dunkley, 2009). In this contested view, Conradson (2005) suggests that 
the ‘therapeutic landscape experience’ can be viewed as a relational 
outcome:  
 
‘In these nuanced interpretations, particular landscapes are 
found to be not intrinsically healthy or unhealthy; rather they 
may be used, experienced and perceived differently by 
different people … In general terms, a therapeutic landscape 
experience might then be understood – from a human point 
of view – as a positive physiological and psychological 
outcome deriving from a person’s imbrications within a 
particular socio-natural material setting’ (Conradson, 2005: 
339). 
 
This interest in imbrication suggests a material and experiential presence 
and practice in such settings wherein individuals can potentially derive 
physical, mental and spiritual benefits. Yet these imbrications occur in 
therapeutic settings that are externally affected by wider material cultures 
and economies that shape their production and meaning.  
 
From recent theoretical debates within cultural geography, discussions 
around the ‘performative turn’, framed by phenomenology but developed 
through post-phenomenological approaches like non-representational 
theory (NRT) can also be aligned with critical therapeutic landscapes 
research (Rose and Wylie, 2006; Lorimer, 2006; Anderson, 2010). Early 
phenomenological research was important in suggesting landscapes as 
experientially ‘lived in’, where a ‘sense of place’ and crucially, well-being, 
were central (Tuan, 1974; Wylie, 2007). Performative connections were 
also drawn from the work of Ingold (2000) and Merleau-Ponty (1962) via 
inhabitations that were: ‘embodied, entwined with a lived temporality 
which is performed and enacted, in an indissoluble connection between 
person and landscape’ (Wylie, 2007: 161). Merleau-Ponty’s description of 
the senses as essentially spatial, ‘a spatiality that enacts meanings in the 
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lived-body’s engagements and negotiations with its milieu’, further 
emphasises the embodied nature of such inhabitations (Backhaus, 2009).   
 
Within post-phenomenological theory, the senses and their pre-cognitive 
dimensions are more explicitly introduced (Rose and Wylie, 2006; Lea, 
2009). In thinking through where embodiment and the senses fit within 
the wider ‘performative turn’, the word affect also features prominently 
(McCormack, 2004; Paterson, 2005). Sometimes erroneously used as a 
synonym for emotion, I prefer to see it geographically as a connective 
concept between embodied instincts and their expression in a set of 
‘places of the senses’, where emotional, pre-cognitive and subconscious 
dimensions of healing are triggered and experienced (Anderson and 
Smith, 2001; Eyles and Williams, 2008; Dewsbury, 2009; Lea, 2009). 
Affective experiences are also embodied, such that reflexive relationships 
emerge between bodies, minds, spirits, health and place.  
 
NRT concerns whereby representational approaches to landscape were 
challenged by more concrete/material engagements in place through 
bodies and the situated self were also important in reassessing the 
therapeutic landscape (Crouch, 2000; Lorimer, 2008; Thrift, 2008). 
Importantly, Lorimer suggested the term ‘more-than-representational’, as 
a better expression for NRT that accepted the continuing importance of 
metaphor, text and symbol, but set this alongside equally important 
material and inhabited expressions of place (Lorimer, 2005). All of these 
theoretical shifts towards spaces of performance and inhabitation are 
directly applicable to the holy well, where relational ownerships and 
embodied enactments of health are developed and negotiated (Rose and 
Wylie, 2006; Thrift, 2008). 
 
The potential to more fully apply performative theory to therapeutic 
landscape settings has been identified as both challenge and potential by 
Wylie (2007), who suggests the need for a new engagement in these 
themes by researchers in the field. This challenge will be met, noting that 
such phenomenological and inhabited concerns have longer histories 
than are sometimes acknowledged (Dorn and Laws, 1994; Kearns, 1995; 
Williams, 1999b; Dyck et. al., 2005). Applying these new performative 
ideas to old or ‘special’ therapeutic settings might appear retrogressive, 
given current interests in the contemporary and everyday (Milligan and 
Bingley, 2007; De Certeau, 1984).  But I believe the holy well, a 
‘somewhere-between-special-and-everyday’ place, and one which sustains 
its historical meanings in contemporary practice, may prove a valuable 
grounded study setting. As a setting which combines affect (as person-
place disposition and spirit-faith presence) and performance (as 
emotional expression and embodied practice), it sits comfortably with 
Conradson’s (2005) reworking of therapeutic experiences that 
incorporate physiological and psychological responses to place.  
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In more fully embedding connections between therapeutic landscape and 
performance, I propose a template (Table 1) for a ‘therapeutic 
assemblage’ which is shaped by specifically material, metaphorical and 
inhabited dimensions (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987;  Lorimer, 2009). 
While such a concept owes a debt to actor-network theory and in 
particular the work of Deleuze and Guattari in utilizing the notion of the 
assemblage as a set of productive connections, these are extended to an 
empirical setting with a specific therapeutic identity. The material would 
incorporate tangible bricks and water places, flesh and blood people and 
documented and experienced cures. A sense of ‘being in’ also emphasises 
the ongoing significance of an experiential and embodied imbrication 
within a therapeutic environment (Ingold, 2000; Conradson, 2005). 
Metaphors, so central to the making of therapeutic landscapes, are 
expressed in cultural narratives, reputations and crucially in a site of 
spiritual healing, beliefs (Williams, 1999a). Here the ongoing significance 
across time of a representative take on healthy place remains important 
(Gesler, 2003). Finally, and a dimension this research aims to foreground 
more fully, the inhabitation of place strongly reflects theoretical ideas 
drawn from the performative turn with its attention to more-then-
representational lived, experiential and performative dimensions of health 
in place. In considering definitions of health within the assemblage, those 
used draws from an interest in mind-body-spirit health. This is in turn 
used alongside a set of theoretical dimensions namely; embodiment, 
affect and performance, to construct a template of three by three 
interconnected themes.  
 
In designing such an assemblage, the connective ideas can be read as a 
definition of therapeutic landscape that emphasises connections, not 
always necessarily productive, between inner meaning and outer/societal 
context and the more experiential and relational dimensions required of 
contemporary work in this area (Conradson, 2005; 2007). More usefully, 
energies, a term hinted at but under-used in performative texts, is a key 
ingredient in this spatial stew, especially when associated with health and 
healing (McCormack, 2004; Lea, 2006; Lorimer, 2006). Material settings 
and bodies hold within them a range of potential energies, those energies 
have symbolic healing associations and it is through energetic 
performances of health in place that productive aspects of the 
assemblage, wherein affect becomes performance, is expressed. In 
illustrating these energies of health within the holy well, the deeper 
potential of the therapeutic assemblage will be proposed and explored. 
206
Table 1. Theoretical Model of the Therapeutic Assemblage 
 
Structures Material Metaphorical Inhabited 
Theoretical terms 
Health and well-being 
Embodiment 
Body 
Affect 
Mind 
Performance 
Spirit 
 
Data and Method 
This work draws the bulk of its empirical material from detailed study of 
ten representative wells spread across Ireland (Foley, 2010). The choice 
of wells was based on a number of criteria namely; the presence of well-
documented and archival accounts of practices, the existence of 
contemporary ‘patterns’ for observer participation and a geographical 
spread across the whole island (Fig. 1). In examining a range of holy 
wells, inhabitation has been incorporated into the methods employed in 
the research, through visits to wells, collections of oral narratives, 
conversations and participant observations. These methods also reflect 
Nash’s (2000) suggestion that putting theories of performativity to work 
in discussing specific practices makes for better theory. While a 
significant proportion of the material was drawn from the author’s own 
observer participation, this was supplemented by local informants such as 
members of local parish groups and historical/heritage organisations and 
by informal encounters with active participants at the wells. A theoretical 
justification for such an approach would also be rooted in the need to use 
a range of ethnographic, visual and performative methods to try and get 
closer to the objects and the practices of people in real time (Lorimer, 
2009).  
The specific wells included three dedicated to St. Brigid (Faughart, Tully 
and Liscannor) and wells associated with St. Declan (Ardmore) and St. 
Kieran (Castlekeeran). Another four wells, Struell, Lady’s Island, 
Tobernalt and Doon, had less explicit affiliations with a local saint while 
the last well, Father Moore’s, was named after a nineteenth century 
healing priest. All wells were visited two to four times including where 
possible, at official ritual ‘pattern’ days. The historical material on the 
wells was drawn from archival and historical sources, from which 
material on performances and medicine/health were extracted. In 
addition, the deeper secondary material on the cultural meaning of the 
holy well was identified from wider anthropological, folklore and 
historical writing (MacNeill, 1982; Taylor, 1995; O’Cadhla, 2002). While 
much of the material had an implicit relationship with place, it had not 
been used previously to draw out a deeper critical take on health 
geographies or as a ‘more-then’ representational engagement with 
therapeutic landscape.  
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Figure 1. Location Map of Representative and other Holy Wells. 
 
 
 
Material Place, Embodiment and Bodily Health 
In considering holy wells as material settings, where built/natural 
environments and human (and occasional non-human) forms interact, it 
is useful to illustrate these assemblage elements. There are aspects of 
embryonic therapeutic design implicit in constructions in and around 
holy wells (Gesler and Kearns, 2002). While for very local wells, this 
often consists solely of a literal hole in the ground or a small stone 
covering, in the larger representative wells, there are a range of designed 
elements. Five of the wells are covered, such as at Ardmore, visibly 
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housed within a 15th century stone enclosure with carved stone crosses 
and separate entrances providing access to the supervised well waters 
(Fig. 2). Both wells at Struell are enclosed within small corbelled 
buildings, one square (the Eye Well, see Fig. 3), the other circular (the 
Drinking Well); both rebuilt from previously ruinous conditions. Here 
the names of the built objects speak directly to specific embodied cures.  
Other wells, while open to the sky, are surrounded by substantial stone 
walls, some rough and old as at Tobernalt and Liscannor, others of 
smoother recent construction as at Tully and Fr. Moore’s. At 
Castlekeeran, the main well setting is partially sheltered by an 
overhanging tree with a rough limestone rock surround where visitors 
can bend to drink the curative waters (Fig. 4). At Liscannor, although the 
well itself is open, it is approached through a tunnel-like cave, about ten 
metres long within which large amounts of left offerings are piled on 
ledges and walls (Fig. 5).  In these images one can see the affective built 
settings, containing formal catholic iconography and objects alongside 
more natural elements of stone, water and wood. 
 
Figure 2. St. Declan’s Well, Ardmore 
 
 
 
Source: Irish Heritage Giftware, info@ihpc.ie 
 
In considering wider theoretical concerns with embodied health it is also 
useful to consider that physical body within this particular space. From 
their foundations, well sites have been used for a mixture of spiritual and 
curative purposes (Logan, 1980). The holy well is an assemblage within 
which healthy and unhealthy bodies co-exist. Unhealthy bodies come 
especially in search of healing and the range of attributed cures for a vast 
range of illnesses and conditions is an abiding and formative narrative at 
the well. As a strong discursive and pragmatic driver of embodied 
utilisations, documented ‘cure’ treatments ranged from those for sore 
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eyes (Struell and Faughart) and toothache (St. Kierans’s) to more 
medicalised examples such as lumbago (Ardmore), arthritis/rheumatism 
(Doon, Liscannor, St. Kierans’s) and even cholera at Tobernalt during 
the 1830s outbreak. While most wells might not withstand biomedical 
scrutiny, they are sustained by deeper narratives of a curative power and 
belief is at the heart of these expressions of an embodied ‘faith cure’.  
 
Figure 3. Struell Wells: Eye Well. 
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Figure 4. St. Kieran’s Well, Castlekeeran: Main Well. 
 
 
 
At many wells, rag trees and bushes mark a visible example of this 
process at wells such as Tobernalt (Fig. 6) and Lady’s Island. Here rags 
are rubbed on affected body parts and left on the bush or tree. In the act 
of tying that rag or other object to the tree, that object should be 
something that touched the body and thereby metaphorically transferred 
a body part, itself discursively representing a bodily illness, to the natural 
curative place. Here the wider power of the water acted on the rag to 
reduce or cure the ‘left’ symptoms/illness as the rag itself deteriorated 
over time. At Tobernalt, many of the rags are left for years, yet are also 
added to on a daily basis. Yet the body is also a site of enactment where 
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pilgrims kneel in the holes, allegedly left by the saint, as at Faughart (Fig. 
7) in a literal embodied act of spiritual cure. As an example of the 
mobility of embodied practice, it is also common to see pilgrims kneel on 
the top of this stone as well as in the grooves. In other wells, there are 
specific instructions to specific body-part cures such as a sign at St. 
Kieran’s identifying a natural curve in the limestone as being good for 
‘ailments of the back’ (National Folklore Collection, 1934; O’Connell, 
1957). In addition, the stream in front of the well was used for curing 
lame horses well into the 20th century. 
 
Figure 5. St Brigid’s Well, Liscannor. 
 
 
 
Source: Anne Rickard and Liam O’Callaghan 
 
In seeing embodiment as both a physical and imaginative experience, the 
long history of bodily healing is sustained and reproduced. Many of these 
curative narratives have a deep provenance and provide a link to a wider 
notion of health histories in place, even when applied to ‘small places’ 
(Andrews & Kearns, 2005; Cummins et al, 2007). In addition, one can 
glimpse in the material places of the therapeutic assemblage examples of 
representational objects, via more formal church elements such as altars, 
crosses and even small oratories on what were previously relatively 
natural and organic sites as at Faughart and St. Kieran’s. At Father 
Moore’s well an informant provided a narrative of a chronically damaged 
back that ‘the experts at the Blackrock Clinic couldn’t cure’. He noted 
however that upon wearing the curative object of Father Moore’s hat, 
brought out once a year to the well, his back healed sufficiently to allow 
him to return to the well with his grand-children, relatively fully mobile, 
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within a week. Such objects suggest that as well as the imagined physical 
cures that are reputationally associated with such spaces, deeper and 
often contingent healing also emerges.  
 
Figure 6. Rag Bushes at Tobernalt Holy Well. 
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Figure 7. St. Brigid’s Shrine, Faughart: Pilgrimage Stones. 
 
 
 
Metaphor, Affect and Mind Health 
While the material sites contained the curative waters, it was the 
therapeutic narratives related to a broad faith cure that cemented deeper 
health metaphors within the assemblage. There were suggestions that the 
mineral make up of the well water (they were often mixed-up with spas), 
provided an evidence base for physiological benefits (Bord and Bord, 
1975). But it was in oral traditions of dinnseanchas, the Irish term for place 
lore, that their healing reputations were maintained. While many wells 
had strong parallel identities as places of pilgrimage, Taylor (1995) noted 
that wells held stories and existed symbolically as non-silent landscapes. 
In the 1930s in Ireland such stories were recorded for a national archival 
collection with a particular attention to wells where a typical narrative for 
St. Kieran’s noted:  
 
‘ … further away still is a smaller well covered over with rock 
with an opening on either side. Water from one side is 
supposed to cure headache, water for the other side cures 
toothache’ (National Folklore Collection, 1934). 
 
In these deeper symbolic narratives, the waters were also holy and 
holistic, drawing their power from the sacred and spiritual and applicable 
to a wide range of aliments and conditions (Varner, 2002). Clearly there 
are and were contestations of this assumed curative power and rationalist 
medical responses saw and see the wells as superstitious sites of pseudo-
cure inhabited by the credulous and ignorant. A visitor to Ardmore in 
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1867 noted ‘you are expected to drink a glass of water, which is nothing 
but ordinary spring water’ (Ó’Cadhla, 2002). This contestation of the 
‘medical’ value of the site failed to take into account deeper meanings, 
many of which were associated with the energies of both the place itself 
and its affective reputation as a site of renewed energies. A traveller 
visitor to Lady’s Island in 2009 noted in a cautionary sense, that ‘you 
need to be careful with it, there’s a great cure in that well’, while the 
healing energies at wells were considered strongest on the night of 
patterns as noted by a local informant at St. Kieran’s. Given the strong 
religious and spiritual metaphors associated with the well sites, their value 
in health terms were associated with more holistic understandings of 
well-being (Bergholdt, 2008, Knott and Franks, 2007).  
 
Cures were also contingent practices, based on a suitable respect for the 
water and the spiritual identities of the place, wherein anthropological 
notions of gift-exchange were visible, with the gift of health being repaid 
by metaphorical offerings and symbols. A failure to meet these 
requirements was often considered to have an anti-therapeutic effect, 
reflecting recent concerns with contested health outcomes (Conradson, 
2005). These narratives were often punitive moral tales, for example 
water from wells was not supposed to be used for cooking and those 
who took it generally came to an unfortunate end, with sudden death 
within a fixed period  of either three days, three weeks or three months 
being a reputed punishment at Liscannor (Brenneman and Brenneman, 
1995). Yet the persistent survival of such stories serves to strengthen an 
energetic and respectful phenomenological connection between use value 
and symbolic power (Harbison, 1991). 
 
In considering the function of wells as providing a form of ‘mind 
healing’, the place of affect becomes significant. In settings where water, 
stone, wood and leaf are all present the peaceful connections with nature 
are sensually enhanced (Figs 2 to 7). These affective aspects have clear 
links to the foundational ideas of the therapeutic landscape as 
retreat/restful asylum (Gesler, 1992). This experiential engagement in and 
with place can be enacted in quiet moments by individuals or by 
communal performances such as patterns and pilgrimages which also 
sustain the healing narrative (Turner, 1973). Visitors interviewed at 
Tobernalt and Tully all spoke of the sites as places ‘to reflect and find 
peace’. Here, the sights, sounds, smells, touches and tastes are augmented 
by a core’ sixth’ sense, feeling. In their capacities as spaces of ‘stillness’, 
wells also enhance those more contemplative and spiritual dimensions of 
a personal mental health (Conradson, 2007). Indeed Tobernalt (Fig. 8) 
has one derivation of its name as a ‘well of the insane’, providing a ‘loc fás’ 
or hermitage, for patients and lepers living on a nearby island in Lough 
Gill in the 17th century. Specifically noted in an archival folklore survey 
from the 1930s, the water was to be used, ‘in all ailments but especially 
for mental ailments’ (Boylan, 2002).  
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Figure 8. Tobernalt Holy Well 
 
 
 
More recently, holy wells have developed new meanings around grief, 
hope and memorial, exemplified by left offerings marking premature 
death, serious illness and loss. The cave at Liscannor (Fig. 5) is an 
especially intense example of this, with Mass cards, childhood pictures 
and shoes, but similar offerings are found at Tobernalt (Fig. 6). Here the 
capacity of the visitor to seek, and often find, solace and peace, marks a 
further affective dimension to the role of the holy well as a site of mental 
health. While that peace may be ephemeral and momentary, it is an 
emotional response that can be profoundly affecting and become a 
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lingering ripple, as with many memorial settings, that resonates beyond 
the space into everyday lives beyond.  
 
Figure 9. Crutches and Rounding Rituals at Doon Well. 
 
 
 
Source: Irish Heritage Giftware, info@ihpc.ie 
 
At sites, both past and present, abandoned shoes or crutches were also to 
be found as markers of an affective response to place (Fig. 9). The 
abandoned crutch is of course a global metaphor for the successful cure, 
as visible in the past at Banff Springs as it is currently in Lourdes (Gesler, 
1996). This image of Doon Well at the end of the 19th century shows that 
in the absence of a physical bush or tree, pilgrims took to embedding 
their crutches in the ground beside the well, which in turn assumed a new 
status as an artificial branch around which subsequent visitors wrapped 
rags and other offerings. Here a material, yet representational act, further 
played with the sense of an assemblage that was constantly mobile and 
mutable, as noted by the actions of the pilgrims in the image.  
 
Inhabitation, Performance and Spiritual Health 
In considering inhabitation at the well, rituals and daily enactments 
exemplify the notion of a set of health performances but also reflect a 
shift from affect into action (Turner and Turner, 1978; Gesler, 2003). In 
the everyday visits to the wells, the carrying out of stations or, in Irish 
turas, are what Carroll (1999) refers to as rounding rituals, observable in 
cultures as far apart as India and Sudan. These rituals are carried out by 
the visitor/penitent in order to access the benefits of the well, both 
spiritual and physical. They are expressed through sets of specific prayers 
in specific amounts at specific points within the therapeutic setting. More 
formally, the pattern day (or week) was based on the patron saint’s 
birthday. While patterns saw a more intense practice of rounding rituals 
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they were also historically the settings for profane, even anti-health 
behaviours. In many wells, religious observances were carried out up to 
midnight on the eve of the saint’s birthday and then the rest of the night 
was given over to socializing, dancing and singing (Hall and Hall, 1843). 
At St. Brigid’s Well in Liscannor, particular attractions were singers from 
the nearby Aran Islands, who would row over en masse to perform 
through the night.  
 
However, the social aspects also saw lots of drink, which invariably led to 
a range of liminal and carnivalesque behaviours associated with violence 
(faction-fighting) and sex (Bakhtin, 1984, O’Cadhla, 2002). These were 
recorded at Ardmore in 1810 with the arch observation that the penitents 
had; ‘bloody knees from devotion, and bloody heads from fighting’ 
(Hardy, 1836). At Struell, promiscuous naked bathing by both sexes was 
followed by ‘indulging in various gratifications to which the time and 
place are favourable ... as long as the happy multitudes remain on the 
sacred ground, they cannot contract new guilt’ (Hardy, 1836: 39). 
Ultimately this led to concentrated 19th century campaigns by both 
church and colonial state, the former for reasons of morality, the latter 
due to concerns with public order; which led to the decline of well 
worship.  
 
Finally, the openness of the holy well site meant, and still means, that 
individuals are drawn to such sites of stillness to negotiate their own, 
spiritual, curative and restorative performances in and with place. 
Though as often places of sociability as solitude, these performative 
enactments, especially those related to ritual and symbol, show the strong 
connections between the bodily spaces, the curative metaphors and the 
inhabitations of the therapeutic spaces themselves (Broderick, 1998; 
Conradson, 2005).  
 
Considering these as performances of spiritual health provides an 
additional way for healing and well-being to be conceptualized as an 
affective practice. Given that the therapeutic aspects of place feature 
prominently in the literature, the wells express this in settings containing 
strong natural elements of water, stone, tree and bush. Holy wells, large 
and small, are quietly affective places. This is in part tied in to the 
physical settings, often, though not exclusively in remote places (all ten 
wells were some distance from the nearest town) where the natural and 
built components are a hybrid mix of earth and stone, light and shade, 
sounds and silences. In these contemplative spaces, one’s one embodied 
experience can be expressed in those affective dimensions of mood and 
emotion, linked to a range of health elements of anxiety, hope, belief, 
grief, but also of wonder, amusement, curiosity and joy. While 
individualized actions are allowed the need to conform to ‘ritual 
inhabitations’ are less strict than they once were. Yet the more-than-
representational practices carried out by well visitors extend these 
connections more deeply in a performative sense as active engagements 
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by individuals in their own health via transient but repeatable practices 
(Lea, 2006 and 2008). The image of the decorated interior of St. Brigid’s 
at Liscannor (Fig. 5) shows the intensity of the left offerings but also 
represent a range of affective and emotional states of hope and despair, 
characteristic of certain health statuses such as incurable disease or 
chronic illness (Conlon, 1999; De Vál, 2007).  
 
Lest it be thought that the holy well is a relict of the past, it has a 
contemporary relevance and performance as well. In looking at the 
resilience of the well through the lens of a therapeutic assemblage, 
mobilities of meaning and re-tellings of place-health identities all play a 
role. The mobility of the cure is tied to the waters of the place, both 
potable and portable, which can be consumed in situ, or equally 
importantly taken away for use as a general prophylactic in the everyday 
home place by those too ill to come. Older performances of health have 
been augmented by new meanings, still with affective health values, as 
places of memorial, gratitude and supplication. More recently patterns 
have been revived at Tully and Faughart and are often jointly celebrated 
by Catholic and neo-pagan groups though not without some tensions and 
contestations. In a new-age vision of spirituality, a concern with nature 
and new understandings of the sacred, often expressed in body-
landscape-energy terms, find natural expression within holy well sites. At 
the 2010 pattern at St. Brigid’s Well, Tully, a group of female Breton 
visitors noted that they celebrated Brigid as a neo-pagan goddess and 
provider of deep spiritual healing and as an embodied energy that could 
‘light their fire’. Yet throughout holy well histories, wider notions of a 
faith cure have sustained primarily through inhabitation and narrative, 
often as much through small everyday visits as the more concentrated 
pattern day activities. The lingering power of therapeutic place and 
healing memory deepens this affective and performative connection 
(Conradson, 2005). 
 
Discussion: The Therapeutic Landscape as Performative Setting 
Framing a holy well like St. Kieran’s (Fig. 4) as a therapeutic assemblage 
suggests a holistic description of its position within a time-space 
continuum. One can see a piece of micro-landscape of healing and 
wellness which bears material objects in a rolling topography (wells, trees, 
rocks, crosses). One can also see as a second layer on top of that, the 
complex culturally produced meanings embedded in and shaping those 
material objects; the identities, especially the health identities, invested in 
them, and the hue and shade of metaphor on the material. Finally one can 
see a third layer of people, not ghostly, but solid palimpsestic traces of 
embodied human occupation and the uses and meanings and 
constructions that those mobile inhabitations enacted on the site; through 
their agreements and dissent from given meanings, their performativities 
(cultural and curative) and embodied positionalities (as participant, 
believer, patient, cured, observer, cynic), the filling and emptying of the 
site, and the material and metaphoric footprints on this healing place.  
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In considering this description in terms of mind/body/spirit health, the 
freedom to explore such dimensions of healing are never quite so simple. 
Across history and into the present day, contestations have shaped 
practice and meaning at the holy well, linked to a range of ‘gazes’, clerical, 
colonial and medical (Foucault, 1976; Foley, 2010). Even now, the 
different constituencies who inhabit the well occasionally clash and 
tensions exist around ‘othered’ inhabitations by nominally excluded 
groups. Travellers in particular, have a deep and unique set of practices at 
the well which occasionally brings them into conflict with religious and 
settled practices. At Tobernalt only travellers walk through the stream in 
their bare feet or bathe their children as a preventative early-life cure at 
Father Moore’s well. 
 
Holy wells can be described as sites of indigenous health, a concept often 
discursively understood solely as ‘non-white, non-western’ (Evans, 1957; 
Wilson, 2003; Kingsley et. al., 2009). In the vernacular meanings and 
performances at the holy well, one can see that they also tapped into a 
deeply felt health need for an indigenous population with few other 
medical resources (Wilson, 2003). While that need was often hard to 
diagnose, it was most certainly felt, and that emotional need was in part 
met in the affective setting of the well or expressed in notes, pleas and 
votive offerings left behind. A listing of those elements, structures, 
appearances and crucially for the health geographer, cures, have helped to 
clarify what wells were, how they were materially constructed and what 
discursive therapeutic powers they held. Those performances combined 
healing and spiritual dimensions, but as pragmatic health responses in 
place they were also simple expressions of actions speaking louder than 
words (Davidson and Smith, 2009).  
 
In returning to Gesler’s definition which balanced out inner meanings 
and outer contexts, the holy well provides an initial example of a 
therapeutic assemblage that might be extended to a range of other sites 
and settings. The individual psyche is engaged with place through a range 
of affective beliefs, experiences, narratives and embodiments, and as an 
expressed ownership of self-health. Yet the sites also function as 
culturally produced settings where wider narratives, customs, meanings 
and contingent practices are expressed in nominal ownerships of place. It 
is in the mobile negotiations of these two forms of ownership and 
inhabitation that the holy well most tellingly speaks and which has wider 
applicability in other therapeutic settings. This also suggests how other 
traditional and contemporary therapeutic landscapes might be considered 
in the future (Bourke, 2001). While Rose and Wylie (2006) see ‘landscape 
as tension’, it can equally be examined through a therapeutic lens as an 
affective place with a charged background (Lea, 2009). This deeper 
engagement with the notion of energies also reflects Lorimer’s (2006) 
invocation of forces and flows that simultaneously acknowledge 
vernacular and folk knowledges, in this case through indigenous health 
practices. 
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In summary, the paper has introduced a new form of traditional 
therapeutic landscape and illustrated up to a point, how a theoretical 
performative lens can be extended to tangible empirical settings. In 
proposing an assemblage definition of the well one can also make evident 
Conradson’s (2005) notion of a relational outcome, where therapeutic 
benefits are negotiable, contingent and framed by affective and 
performative embodiment in place. The assemblage proposed in Table 1 
has a specific health brief and in part reflects the established embedding 
of relationships between culture, health and place within health 
geography. Yet in developing the model, the incorporation of recent and 
exciting theoretical ideas drawn from the broad ‘performative turn’ and 
the potential, in particular, to apply notions of inhabitation more fully 
within the study of health/medical geographies has been a strong 
motivating factor. In particular research which more deeply records and 
critically studies the places of the senses in a range of therapeutic 
landscapes seems to me to be a ripe source for future investigation. 
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Introduction  
Over the last number of decades, recognition of the fact that Deaf people 
comprise a Deaf Community which shares a common language, Sign 
Language, with its own grammar and syntax (Stokoe, 1960), cultural 
norms and values, and history (Groce, 1985; Bienvenu, 1989; Lane, 1989; 
Sacks, 1989; van Cleve and Crouch, 1989; Lane et al., 1996; Mow, 2001; 
Woll and Ladd, 2005) has highlighted the need for a socio-cultural 
perspective on Deafness, breaking away from the traditional medical view 
of hearing impairment. This rise of the socio-cultural model of Deafness, 
sometimes known as ‘Big-D Deaf’ is signied by the capitalisation of the 
word Deaf, indicating membership to a cultural and linguistic minority 
group, as opposed to lowercase deaf which signies an audiological 
deciency.1 Although those identifying with the socio-cultural model of 
Deafness do not identify as disabled (Lane, 2002), the progress made in 
establishing a socio-cultural model must be situated within a generalised 
shift away from viewing disabilities as inherently personal obstacles 
towards one which examines the role of the physical, social, economic, or 
political environment in creating disability (Oliver, 1990). While this shift 
has occurred within the social and care sciences (including Geography) 
and Deaf Studies itself, with a transference from a medical model of 
disability to various kinds of social models, the predominant mode of 
research concerning d/Deaf people in medical and educational elds still 
favours the medical model of deafness as a disabling condition best 
corrected through audiological treatment and speech instruction (as 
highlighted by research reported in journals such as Audiology, 
International Journal of Audiology, the International Journal of Language 
and Communication Disorders, and The Journal of Speech, Language 
and Hearing Research). There is little room for the role of Sign Language 
or Deaf identity in this medical model, which instead prioritises 
acquisition of speech and integration with hearing society as the goal of 
deaf education. While due consideration must be given to the 
complexities of d/Deaf identity and the difculties in implementing any 
1 Throughout this paper, Deaf and deaf will represent socio-cultural and audiological 
interpretations of d/Deafness respectively. When one interpretation cannot be clearly 
identied, the term d/Deaf will be used. See Skelton and Valentine (2003a).  
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binary between deaf/Deaf or d/Deaf/hearing (Skelton and Valentine, 
2003a) for the purpose of this paper, I will limit this discussion to the 
‘two dominant constructions of d/Deafness: medical deafness and socio-
cultural Deafness (Valentine and Skelton, 2007: 108).  
 
It is clear that this medical model, in Padden and Humphries (1988) 
terms, has a different ‘centre’ from that of their d/Deaf adult clients. As 
a result, d/Deaf children are held to standards of normalisation as 
designed by medical and educational professionals as opposed to 
standards set from a Deaf ‘centre’. As Davis and Watson (2001) observe, 
regarding children with disabilities generally:  
 
‘The child is forced to t into already existing educational 
and social processes and practices, which afford little space 
for the investigation or understanding of difference. This 
process is not so surprising when considered in the context 
that most research with disabled children has been 
preoccupied with differentiating children on the basis of 
their impairments, ‘measuring children’s bodies and minds 
against physical and cognitive norms’ (Priestley, 1998). That 
is, it is not surprising that adults in schools pathologise 
disabled children when their lives have also been 
homogenised in both social and medical research’.  
 
There are a number of possible reasons for the persistence of this 
medical model in spite of the progress outlined above, which I argue 
contributes to a hegemonic medical model of deafness. Firstly, there is a 
great deal of social authority attached to the medical  eld (Wendell, 
1996) which in turn attaches legitimacy to the medical interpretation of 
deafness. Secondly, there is a notable absence of d/Deaf people 
themselves from the medical and education elds where their presence 
could provide a counter balance to the hegemonic medical view of 
deafness currently prevalent. Thirdly, over 90% of d/Deaf children are 
born to hearing parents whose rst interaction with d/Deafness is likely 
to be largely constructed by the medical eld within which they receive 
diagnosis and early intervention (Skelton and Valentine, 2002; Valentine 
and Skelton, 2003). The medicalization of these families and their role or 
‘duty’ in the production of ‘healthy’ children is also a signicant factor in 
the continued hegemonic medical model of deafness.  
 
One of the most obvious signiers of the dominance of the medical 
model of deafness is the tentative position held both historically and con-
temporarily by Sign Language in early intervention and education with 
d/Deaf children. This is particularly the case in the Republic of Ireland, 
the site of this study, where a number of specic policy factors2 aggravate 
2 Irish Sign Language has yet to be ofcially recognised as a national language by the 
Irish Government, a move which has already occurred under the British Government 
with respect to Irish Sign Language use in Northern Ireland. Ironically, the protection 
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the position of Sign Language over that in other countries. Sign Language 
lies at the heart of the social model of Deafness, indeed, one of the major 
instigations for Big-D Deaf was the work of linguist William Stokoe 
(1960) which proved that Sign Language (in this case American Sign 
Language, but his nding was generalised to apply to other Sign 
Languages) is a full language, with its own grammar and syntax. Its 
acceptance or rejection by hearing parents (as they are inuenced by 
professionals in their midst) can therefore act as a signier of socio-
cultural and medical interpretations of d/Deafness, respectively. I will 
begin by examining the historical emergence of the social authority of 
medicine as it relates to deaf education, moving then to empirical 
evidence of the continuing medical hegemony in the Irish context. I will 
also examine instances of transgression/resistance to this hegemony from 
parents of d/Deaf children who implement Irish Sign Language as a 
method of communication for their d/Deaf children in spite of the 
medical model within which they are embedded. In light of Valentine and 
Skelton’s (2003: 317) observation that ‘it is learning [British Sign 
Language], and therefore being able to communicate with other d/Deaf 
people and to access the close-knit Deaf world, that is the most effective 
way for many young d/Deaf people to overcome social isolation and 
access the support of social network’, examining how parents decide on 
and implement Sign Language use might contribute to our understanding 
of how best to foster resilience amongst young d/Deaf people and their 
families against the negative effects of marginalisation and hegemonic 
medical discourses of deafness. However, I will conclude by examining 
why this transgression/resistance is both spatially and temporally limited 
and unlikely, as it stands to make a signicant impact on the system of 
deaf education.  
 
Situating Irish Deaf Education In Geographies Of D/Deafness, 
Disability And Power  
Skelton and Valentine (2003a) highlight that work on d/Deaf people has 
been absent from geography (although their research has come some way 
in addressing this lacuna) and that even within Deaf Studies, d/Deaf 
young people are frequently marginalised. This is also a dearth of 
contemporary work on deaf education in Ireland, perhaps owing to the 
small population of d/Deaf children and the absence of a national deaf 
education training programme. This paper therefore adds to the eld of 
deaf education as well as to an emerging body of literature in geography 
and d/Deafness, and will specically address the absence of work in the 
latter on issues regarding d/Deaf children. Previous research from 
geography on d/Deafness, has focused largely on young d/Deaf people 
(aged 16 and over) and has highlighted transition to adulthood, issues of 
inclusion and exclusion at home, school, work, and in the Deaf 
Community itself, identity formation and political participation as issues 
of the Irish language (Gaeilge) in government policy also has negative impacts on the 
Deaf Community, which will be discussed later in the paper. 
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of key interest (Butler et al., 2001; Skelton and Valentine, 2002, 2003a, 
2003b; Valentine and Skelton, 2003, 2007). While this work has agged 
the signicance of communication methods used during the d/Deaf 
child’s upbringing as well as the inuence of the medical model in 
inuencing these decisions, it reects on young d/Deaf people’s views 
retrospectively of this period. This paper will instead focus on how 
decisions are made regarding communication, the implications that they 
have in early childhood, and the issues of power and resistance inherent 
in the decision-making process.  
 
While the concept of power features in some work from Deaf Studies 
(Lane, 1992; Baynton, 1996; Branson and Miller, 2002; Ladd, 2003), it 
rarely extends to literature on communication choices amongst families 
and how concepts of power and resistance are played out between 
institutions and individual parents and children (for a notable exception 
see Komesaroff, 2008). Research is instead overwhelmingly empirical in 
nature, focusing on the descriptive experience of families as they choose 
one method or the other (Gregory et al., 1995), the need for a family-
centred intervention approach (Bodner-Johnson and Sass-Lehrer, 2003), 
or the causal relationship between home language and a number of other 
variables (Musselman et al., 1996; McDonald Connor et al., 2000). The 
focus on power in this paper, therefore, adds not only to Deaf Studies 
but also the growing body of literature in the geographies of power and 
resistance (Cresswell, 1996; Sharp et al., 2000b; Rose, 2002; Allen, 2003; 
Jessop, 2007), as well as institutional geographies (Philo and Parr, 2000). 
It makes specic reference to Foucauldian Geographies, which have been 
a topic of debate in this journal (Legg, 2005; Philo, 2005), as it is 
Foucault’s work on the rise of social medicine which frames this 
discussion. As such, it responds to Philo’s (2005) call to ‘enlarge the 
theoretical coordinates of population geography’. In particular, it 
examines how language is not only a mechanism through which power is 
reproduced and resisted (through discourse and ideology) as a means of 
controlling a particular population but can also be the target of those 
same tactics of power and resistance.  
 
Furthermore, this paper broadens the current scope of population 
geographies to question the dynamic temporal and spatial aspects of 
particular populations, in this case d/Deaf children, and how their micro-
movements, such as those between home and school, are embedded 
within a larger framework of socio-political goals. The educational, and 
indeed highly spatialised of mainstreaming children with special 
educational needs in their local school has come under examination from 
geographers (Kitchin and Mulcahy, 1999; Skelton and Valentine, 2002; 
Holt, 2003, 2004; Woolley et al., 2006), but the links between this 
phenomenon and population geographies have, to date, been tentative. 
The fact that school choice is increasingly becoming a factor in move-
ment and residential location of families (Butler, 2009) highlights the 
relevance of this area of study to population geographies.  
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The discussion is supported by ndings from a doctoral research project 
on mainstreaming of deaf education in the Republic of Ireland. The 
ndings presented here are from semi-structured open-ended interviews 
conducted with either one (usually mothers) or both hearing parents 
from 20 families with deaf children. At the time of the rst interviews 
these children were aged between 18 months and 16 years with an 
average age of 8 years. While there has been much work recommending 
the inclusion of children’s voices, especially marginalised children, instead 
of consulting parents or teachers on their behalf (Rose and Shevlin, 2004; 
Porter and Abane, 2008; Schafer and Yarwood, 2008), the consultation of 
parents in this research is justied in this context since the use and non-
use of Irish Sign Language is largely due to decisions made in early inter-
vention, when d/Deaf children are still infants. Subsequently, parents are 
the best sources of information regarding the issues surrounding 
communication choices in this early phase of their child’s life. Parents 
were recruited through schools, contacts with the Deaf Community, and 
a series of ve information nights held across the country aimed at 
promoting the research. Interviews with these parents ranged from half 
an hour to 2 hours and were conducted in spoken English, recorded 
using a Dictaphone, with the recordings transcribed and coded for 
analysis. Three of the families interviewed had migrated to Ireland while 
the remaining families all had at least one parent who was Irish.  
 
The vast majority of children involved in the research were profoundly 
deaf. Approximately half of them used cochlear implants3, while the 
other half used hearing-aids. All of the families, with the exception of 
one, began with an intervention path to provide speech to their children 
through medical intervention as opposed to using Irish Sign Language, 
with several warned outright against its use (discussed in detail below). 
Nonetheless, several of them went on to introduce their children to Irish 
Sign Language on their own initiative by learning through evening classes 
run by d/Deaf organisations. This is similar to ndings from Gregory et 
al.’s (1995) longitudinal survey of parents with d/ Deaf children in the 
UK conducted in the 1970s and again in the mid-1990s. They observed 
that in spite of the fact that all of the children involved in their research 
began on a speech-only route, 39% of parents went on to learn British 
Sign Language and 38% of their child-participants (interviewed now as 
adults) stated that British Sign Language was their preferred language, 
with a further 16% nominating Sign Supported English.4
 
The fact that 
Gregory et al.’s (1995) study included parents using a speech-only route in 
3 A cochlear implant surgically implanted device which allows people with sensorineural 
deafness to access sound. Surgery must be accompanied by intensive therapy if speech is to 
be acquired. 
4 Sign Supported English refers to using speech that is combined with signs following 
English word order for clarication of meaning. It provides a visual reference for the 
English language and, unlike Sign Language, does not have its own grammar or syntax. 
Nonetheless, it indicates that a form of signing is used by these d/Deaf people in 
Gregory et al.’s (1995) study. 
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the 1970s however highlights that Ireland is still a good deal behind the 
UK in terms of policy and practice of deaf education.  
 
The UK, amongst other countries has reintroduced Sign Language to 
some degree in the wake a resurgence in the use of Sign Language during 
the 1970s and 1980s following research into the success of Deaf children 
with Deaf parents (and thus Sign Language users) compared with deaf 
children with hearing parents (non-users) (Easterbrooks and Baker, 
2002). This gave rise to the bilingual-bicultural movement in deaf 
education which seeks to establish Sign Language as the rst and natural 
language of d/Deaf children before progressing to teaching a second 
language (e.g. English) through Sign Language. This system has been 
implemented in some schools across Scandinavia, the UK and the US to 
name a few. Skelton and Valentine’s (2002) work highlighted that these 
bilingual policies in the UK have dispelled the negative myths about 
d/Deafness and Sign Language and aided a shift in attitudes in deaf 
education. This movement has yet to make much ground in Ireland, 
however, the causes of which will be discussed later.  
 
Subsequently, while the medical model may have been more overtly 
challenged elsewhere, its prevalence is still very much felt in the Irish 
context, particularly in the organisation of early intervention services in 
relation to the use and non-use of Irish Sign Language. The Irish health 
and education systems may therefore provide a more visible example of 
how a hegemonic medical model is reproduced, and these overt examples 
may still have relevance elsewhere where the medical model, though 
challenged, still holds signicant (though more covert) authority, in 
particular since the increase in cochlear implantation could once again see 
a rise in speech-only recommendations. 
 
Power And The Social Authority Of Medicine  
There has been re-emergence in discussions around institutional and 
organisational geographies in recent years (Crang, 2000; Del Casino et al., 
2000; Philo and Parr, 2000) as well as an analysis on the complexities of 
power relations embedded within those spaces (Crang, 2000). 
Throughout these debates, it is now widely recognised that power is a 
relative concept, contingent on temporal and spatial conditions rather 
than being something that is intrinsically held within institutional spaces. 
Furthermore, the reproduction and contestation of discourses emerging 
from those spaces involves an intricate negotiation between processes of 
power and resistance. These processes, complex in nature, are 
contingent, relative and productive forces, in a continuous state of 
‘becoming’ through the various contexts in which they are embedded. 
Power, in this complex nature, cannot be understood simply as an all-
encompassing dominating force over an oppressed populace. Nor can it 
be examined as ‘centred’ (Latour in Allen, 2003), something intrinsically 
‘held’ in institutional spaces, or by high-ranking professionals. Rather, it 
must be examined as a relational effect of social interaction where power 
232
in its various guises (domination, coercion, manipulation, seduction, 
inducement, negotiation, persuasion) is engaged in a constant struggle 
with resistance in its numerous forms (non-consent, non-cooperation, 
disobedience, protest, persuasion) (Allen, 2003), producing a complex 
entanglement of power/ resistance (Sharp et al., 2000a).  
 
Nonetheless, organisations (or institutions) ‘are productive of certain 
meanings rather than others, and in this sense one can select them as 
candidates through which to view the operation of social power that limit 
what is thought, as well as a what is thought to be possible’ (Del Casino 
et al., 2000: 526). In the case of the institution of medicine, and the 
organisations/hospitals embedded within that institution, their power to 
measure, diagnose, and categorise d/Deaf children’s hearing impairment 
gives them priority with hearing parents who must obtain this diagnosis if 
they are to acquire any services for their child. This also applies to other 
children with disabilities. This power to measure, know and explain 
hearing impairment is embedded within a long history of the social 
authority of medicine. As Foucault states:  
 
‘In the patient eyes, the doctor becomes a thaumaturge; the 
authority he has borrowed from order, morality, and the 
family now seems to derive from himself; it is because he is 
a doctor that he is believed to possess these powers … [the 
patient accepts] entirely and in advance all his prestige’. 
(Foucault, 1965 in Rabinow, 1984: 163)  
 
As a result, the social authority of medicine and the subsequent respect 
and trust that parents place in doctors is the starting point for examining 
how a hegemonic medical model of deafness is established and 
reproduced. This social authority gives legitimacy to the medical model 
and can be contrasted with the lack of legitimacy afforded to the Deaf 
Community (for examples on this lack of legitimacy in the public media 
see Winterson, 2002; Young, 2006). In examining this issue, I will focus 
on the work of physician Jean Marc Gaspard Itard at the National 
Institute for Deaf-Mutes in Paris to exemplify the origins of the medical 
model of deafness, and the authority of the doctor in steering deaf 
education (Lane, 1976).  
 
Itard began working at the Institute in 1800, at a time when the eld of 
medicine had been rmly established across Europe. Foucault traces the 
development of the social authority of medicine and doctors in particular 
during the previous century stating that medicine ‘assumes an increas-
ingly important place in the administrative system and machinery of 
power, a role constantly widened and strengthened throughout the 18th 
century’ (Foucault, 1980 in Faubion, 2002: 100). Much of this authority is 
embedded in the fact that from the 18th century onwards, science places 
an increasingly signicant emphasis on the normalisation of bodies, and 
doctors are the chief individuals responsible for identifying, categorising, 
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and eradicating deviance amongst those bodies. This culminates in the 
fact that  
 
‘the doctor becomes a great adviser and expert, if not in 
the art of governing at least in that of observing, 
correcting, and improving the social “body” and 
maintaining it in a permanent state of health’. (Foucault 
1980 in Faubion, 2002: 100) 
 
This social authority meant that, in spite of the fact that Itard never 
learned Sign Language in his 40 years working at the Institute, and that 
he consistently worked with very small numbers of the school population 
for a limited time each day, the claims he made about deafness carried 
great legitimacy not only in the running of the Institute but in the 
implementation of deaf education across much of Europe and the US 
(Lane, 1976). Most controversially, and relevant to the discussion at 
hand, Itard predicted that better success could be achieved in oral 
training if students were isolated from Sign Language, signalling the 
beginnings of a negative discourse of Sign Language:  
 
‘[We must] allow no means of communication other than 
spoken language between the hardof-hearing child and the 
people who take care of him; failing this, the rst means of 
training [by speaking loudly and slowly to the child] 
becomes ineffective’. (Lane, 1976: 204)  
 
‘exclude the use of sign language and … oblige the 
students and the professor to communicate among 
themselves only by speaking or by the intermediary of 
writing. It is of the greatest importance that, at this nal 
stage of instruction, the deaf-mute should cease thinking on 
his inherently defective and abbreviated language in order to 
translate his ideas into our own, as he is in the habit of 
doing this’. (Lane, 1976: 240 emphasis mine)  
 
While Oralism swept across Europe and the US throughout the late 19th 
and early 20th century, it was much later when the Irish education system 
came on board. While the slow uptake of Oralism has been attributed to 
the isolation of the Catholic orders involved in deaf education (Crean, 
1997) as well as economic factors (McDonnell, 1979), it is also very likely 
that the dominance of Catholicism as a social authority over that of 
medicine in early 20th-century Ireland was a signicant factor in 
maintaining Sign Language as a means of instruction for d/Deaf 
students, a method which was always favoured by religious orders 
(Baynton, 1996). Nonetheless, Oralism gained ground around the 1950s 
and soon tactics such as surveillance, segregation, negative discourse 
were being used to discipline children (Saunders, 2004 lists signing as a 
‘sin’ to be confessed in the school for d/Deaf girls in Dublin). The fact 
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that those students throughout this Oralist period who could not acquire 
speech were segregated from their classmates, labelled as ‘oral failures’, 
and kept in the junior section of the school highlights the negative 
attitude towards Sign Language during this time (personal 
communication Deaf Community). Failure to acquire speech was also at 
times attributed to perceived intellectual disability (Department of 
Education, 1972) as opposed to any fault with the methodology of 
instruction. The Oralist system implemented in the 1950s continued with 
little challenge up until the 1980s when a limited amount of Sign Lan-
guage began to reappear, out of necessity, in the schools for the Deaf 
(personal communication, teacher of the deaf).  
 
In spite of this minor resurgence in Sign Language, the deaf education 
system in Ireland is still for the most part an Oralist system, and has not 
seen the benets of bilingual education policies instigated elsewhere. 
Oralism remains particularly strong since the overwhelming majority of 
d/Deaf children are in place in mainstream schools, where access to Irish 
Sign Language is very limited (discussed further below). Since Oralism is 
entrenched in the medical model, doctors and other medical 
professionals (such as audiologists, speech and language therapists and 
psychologists) continue to hold great authority regarding educational 
interventions for d/Deaf children. These professionals are now the  rst 
port of call regarding not only diagnosis, but the means of early 
intervention to be pursued, appropriate educational placement, and 
communication choice. These services are framed within a medical 
discourse of deafness, prioritising the acquisition of spoken language, to 
which Sign Language can be seen as a threat.  
 
Silencing Deafness: The Exclusion Of Deaf Adults  
The prevalence of the medical model of deafness and the legitimacy of 
this model is aggravated by the absence of Deaf adults from the medical 
and educational (Moores, 2008) professions internationally. Ireland has 
particular difculties in this area whereby policy measures mean there is 
almost a complete absence of teachers who are themselves d/Deaf 
working in the primary deaf education system. Prociency in the Irish 
language (Gaeilge) is required to become a qualied teacher at primary 
school level. However, d/Deaf people are exempt from learning Irish 
while at school, subsequently disqualifying them from enrolling in many 
teacher training programmes later on. Gaeilge is not required for second 
level teaching, and a small number of d/Deaf people have succeeded in 
becoming teachers at this level. However, since this research focuses on 
early and primary education, the presence of these teachers at second 
level is not examined. Subsequently, hearing professionals not only 
overwhelmingly outnumber d/Deaf professionals in the medical arena (as 
they do in most other countries), but also almost completely within the 
early education sector.  
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As well as the absence of d/Deaf teachers, hearing teachers are not 
required to have Irish Sign Language to work in this profession, nor are 
qualied Irish Sign Language interpreters provided in schools. While 
several teachers may take some evening Sign Language classes (usually 
only to intermediate level) they would by no means qualify as Sign 
Language role models to the extent that native/uent signing Deaf adults 
would. As a result, the use of Sign Language in classrooms across the 
country is limited to the haphazard training acquired by hearing teachers. 
As a tokenistic recognition that this situation is unsatisfactory, Deaf 
adults will occasionally be employed in the capacity of special needs assis-
tants to work with d/Deaf children who need access to Irish Sign 
Language in the classroom. However, this role as assistant carries with it 
a distinct power dynamic whereby Deaf adults are subservient to the 
hearing teachers with whom they work.  
 
Several hearing teachers interviewed over the course of this research 
spoke of tensions between themselves and Deaf staff as the teacher felt 
their authority was being undermined:  
 
‘[My principal tells me] “you just have to put the foot 
down and say it” and I go “I know” … “you have to show 
her you’re the teacher, you’ve been trained.” [The special 
needs assistant] “didn’t study, didn’t go to college. You’ve 
done all of this.” ’ (Teacher 13)  
 
As a result, while the hearing teacher may have difculties 
communicating with their d/ Deaf students who use Sign Language, and 
may have no experience or training in deaf education, the Deaf adult 
must concede to their authority because, unlike the hearing teacher, they 
do not have a university degree to legitimise their role in the classroom.5
 
As a result, the value of having a native Irish Sign Language role model in 
the classroom, as well as someone with rst-hand experience of Deafness 
and the deaf education system is undermined in favour of a model which 
prioritises spoken language, hearing professionals and the authority of 
the medical model.  
 
This absence of Deaf adults allows for the monopoly of the medical 
model to continue. It also limits the potential impact of international 
developments in deaf education, such as the bilingual movement 
mentioned above. Since bilingual education for d/Deaf children requires 
native or  uent Sign Language role models, and these are absent from 
the Irish education system, this model has yet to make ground in Ireland. 
5 It might be of interest to note that a number of Deaf special needs assistants do not 
have degrees in education but hold third level qualications in other areas, occasionally 
to Masters level, but these qualications do not entitle them to teach. They are 
subsequently on a signicantly lower salary than paid teachers and hold authority in the 
school. 
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It also leaves families of d/Deaf children in a position whereby they are 
very unlikely to encounter a Deaf professional while making decisions for 
their children’s communication, a situation aggravated by gate-keeping of 
information and the creation of a negative discourse of Irish Sign 
Language by hearing professionals.  
 
Gate-Keeping, Power Relations, And The Negative Discourse Of 
Irish Sign Language  
 
‘The family is no longer to be just a system of relations 
inscribed in a social status, a kinship system, a mechanism 
for the transmission of property; it is to become, a dense, 
saturated, permanent, continuous physical environment 
that envelops, maintains, and develops the child’s body’. 
(Foucault, 1980 in Faubion, 2002: 96)  
 
In The Politics of Health in the Eighteenth Century, Foucault (1980 in Faubion, 
2002) cites childhood as problematic, a phase within which to secure an 
optimal and healthy development. It is the family which becomes the 
pivotal source of securing the production of healthy children, as set down 
by the (Medical) State. Foucault refers to this move as ‘the privilege of 
the child and the medicalization of the family’ (1980 in Faubion, 2002: 
96). The family environment became one which is ‘dense, saturated, 
permanent, continuous … that envelopes, maintains, and develops the 
child’s body’ with the health of children becoming ‘one of the family’s 
most demanding objectives’ (1980 in Faubion, 2002: 97).  
 
It is the hearing family, through the advice of medical and education 
professionals (from which Deaf people are excluded) that steer the 
‘healthy’ development of d/Deaf children. For the vast majority of 
hearing parents, the birth of their d/ Deaf child will be their rst 
interaction with deafness. Therefore, as Gregory et al. highlight ‘advice 
from professionals carries a lot of weight, especially with a group of 
parents of deaf children who may not know other parents in a similar 
position and thus have nothing with which to compare the advice they 
receive’ (1995: 49). In addition to this, to counteract parents accessing 
information through their own research or chance encounters with the 
Deaf Community, gate-keeping of information, as well as tactics of 
power such as seduction, inducement, and coercion used by these 
professionals through the creation of a negative discourse of Sign 
Language all come into play. It is important to highlight that this 
exercising of power as it relates to deaf education is heterogeneous and 
context dependent, with individual variation across professionals and 
parents causing variation in the advice/ direction given, the manner in 
which it is given, and the reaction from parents. However, general 
observations can be made indicating the tactics used to maintain the 
hegemonic medical discourse on deafness.  
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Citing Lipovetsky, Allen (2003) stresses that the central component of 
seduction is that the subject can opt out of a particular action through 
the presentation of choice, thus framing decisions as subject-made. In 
Ireland, parents are ofcially provided with the ‘choice’ of teaching 
speech or Irish Sign Language to their child with speech and language 
therapy and Irish Sign Language Home Tuition services provided 
respectively. However, while parents are ofcially given these ‘options’ 
this research saw evidence of gate-keeping of access to information about 
Sign Language. Many of the parents involved in this research were not 
informed of the benets of using Sign Language with their deaf children:  
 
‘I don’t think we were even, I can’t even remember if they 
even asked me “do you want Sign Language?” ’. (Parent 
02)  
 
Instead, early intervention services revolve around the continuous use of 
hearing aids, the possibility of cochlear implantation, and the provision 
of speech and language therapy. All of the parents receiving a diagnosis 
in Ireland were immediately provided with hearing aids, advised regarding 
cochlear implantation when appropriate, and referred for speech and 
language therapy (although long waiting lists for this service persist). 
Parents are seduced into the medical model with the sometimes 
misleading promise that their child will acquire speech:  
 
‘You know, you were just sent home with hearing aids on 
and … you just have to get him talking and that’s it. I 
didn’t really realise, when they give you hearing aids, you 
have to teach them to talk. I didn’t realise that until later. I 
just thought “oh right, he’ll probably start talking once he 
keeps wearing these hearing aids.” ’ (Parent 02)  
 
On the other hand the Irish Sign Language Home Tuition service was 
often not promoted or even advertised by those responsible for 
informing parents (the Visiting Teacher of the Deaf). Over 25% of the 
parents interviewed for this study had never heard of this service at the 
time of the interview. Of the remaining 75% of parents who knew about 
the service, only two of them had been told by the visiting teacher about 
the service with the remainder nding out through their local Deaf 
organisation which they approached independently:  
 
Interviewer: How was communication in the house then at 
that point, were you all, em, learning Sign Language? 
[Mother nods] Was that the way that, is that what the 
Visiting Teacher Service again sort of recommended?  
 
Mother: No, I did this off my own … And it was actually a 
girl, she’s a Special Needs Assistant who used to look after 
Noel, her friend eh, was looking after a girl who was deaf 
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from [name of town]. And it was through her that we 
found out. Otherwise we wouldn’t have known anything 
about classes or anything. (Parent 09)  
 
Subsequently, the ‘choice’ that parents make to use speech over Sign 
Language is often guided by limited access to information on the benets 
of Sign Language and information regarding services available in Sign 
Language. 
 
For many parents however, when the reality of the time and effort 
needed to teach speech, as well as the frustration of having a young child 
with whom you cannot communicate becomes a reality, the power of 
seduction wears off. Also, as their shock after diagnosis wears off and 
parents begin to proactively research deaf education, perhaps engaging 
with their local Deaf organisation, the use of Sign Language becomes 
more of an option. To maintain non-use of Sign Language, a second 
tactic, inducement, becomes implemented. Here we begin to see a small 
element of force, often appealing to common sense on the practicality of 
speech, and parents are won over to the advantages of their ‘choice’ and 
subsequently cease to resist and fall into line (Allen, 2003: 101):  
 
‘And eh …o they were recommending that we didn’t teach 
Hazel6 Sign Language because Hazel would become reliant 
on sign, and where she was living in a hearing world, it was 
better that she develop her oral [sic] as much as possible’. 
(Parent 17)  
 
This is combined with coercion, whereby if parents continue to resist, 
negative sanctions are threatened or imposed until they comply (Allen, 
2003: 31). The negative sanctions in this case are implicit and 
psychological, by incorporating a negative discourse of Sign Language 
whereby parents run the risk of ‘damaging’ their child by introducing 
them to Sign Language.  
 
‘They said to me that they were against Chris getting Sign 
Language because he is still gaining, he is still trying to gain 
language and it could set him back a lot, that’s what the new 
teacher for the deaf was telling me’. (Parent 02)  
 
Sign Language, instead of being upheld as a valuable mode of language 
acquisition for d/ Deaf children is instead labelled as a ‘crutch’, making 
children ‘lazy’ in their use of speech and causing deterioration in English 
grammar.  
 
‘They said she’ll use it as a crutch’. (Parent 04)  
6 The names of children and parents in this research have been replaced to conceal 
their identities. 
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‘I think somebody told [my husband] at some stage you 
know that they could get lazy using sign and that it can 
prohibit the speech coming’. (Parent 10)  
 
‘[Using Sign Language], the grammar can just go straight 
downhill, that they just go from here (gestures 
downwards), [the visiting teacher] said denitely not at the 
moment [. . .] I remember they were just saying “No Sign 
Language if you want to get him talking” ’. (Parent 02)  
 
This causes an internalised self-disciplining amongst parents who wish to 
provide their children with the ‘opportunities’ available through speech in 
a hearing world and avoid jeopardising that through use of Irish Sign 
Language. For parents who are struggling to implement the speech-only 
route, yet aware of the negative sanctions of using Sign Language, there 
are a number of tactics provided to help prevent signing, such as ignoring 
their child when they signed, encouraging them to speak instead of sign, 
or restraining themselves while they communicated with their child:  
 
‘It was terrible ignoring her … you know she’d ask me for 
a drink [demonstrates sign] and we were like “ah, what? I 
can’t hear you.” Ah, it was horrible’. (Parent 04)  
 
‘I can remember at the time being distinctly told … I was 
to hold my hands behind my back when I was talking to 
Hazel because I could not help using my hands …   so the 
way that we were to sort of counteract that was to, when 
we talked to her, we found that we were using our hands, 
to put our hands behind our back and just, just use the 
verbal, rely on the verbal only. And so we did that … 
‘(Parent 17)  
 
Many of the parents recounted stories like this, signalling the relative 
success of the hegemonic medical model in implementing a speech-only 
route. It is interesting to compare these ndings once again to those 
mentioned by Gregory et al. (1995) in their research during the 1970s, 
which found parents being warned off Sign Language as it caused 
‘laziness’ and prevented speech from developing, indicating the use of 
similar tactics in the UK almost 40 years ago. However, it also emerged 
that there was an element of resistance to this system. In spite of the fact 
that almost all of the parents in Gregory et al.’s study started on a speech-
only route, only one family continued on that route without ever learning 
Sign Language with all other families using Sign Language at some stage 
in their child’s development.  
 
 
 
 
240
Resistance/Transgression And The Necessity Of Irish Sign 
Language  
Acts of resistance, as Rose (2002: 383) states ‘strategically subvert, 
appropriate, and contest hegemonic spaces and the dominant relations 
they stand for’, subsequently the use of Irish Sign Language by parents in 
spite of the hegemonic medical model within which they are embedded 
could qualify as such an act. However, Valentine and Skelton (2003: 314) 
problematise the notion of resistance stating that ‘it conceals a diverse 
range of practices, degrees of intentionality, and reexivity that might be 
more effectively differentiated’. Similarly, there is the danger of roman-
ticising resistance (Cresswell, 1996), viewing any incidents of parents 
using Irish Sign Language as an act of resistance when in fact they 
frequently lack an intentional motivation to ‘strategically subvert’ the 
medical system. These acts could instead be viewed as transgressions, 
unintentional in nature yet with a visible result that counteracts the 
intentions of the dominant group, in this case medical and educational 
professionals (Cresswell, 1996). As Rose highlights,  
 
‘unintentional resistance encompasses acts that have 
subversive and potentially emancipatory effects but which 
are not conceptualised in terms of conscious ideological 
struggle … whereas the rst form [intentional] of 
resistance is a direct response to power, the second 
[transgression] is motivated by interests and desires that lie 
outside the purview of hegemony’. (2002: 385)  
 
Therefore, while strategic acts from the Deaf Community such as 
organising protests, Sign Language pride marches, or active promotion of 
the use of Sign Language amongst parents might be considered 
resistance, the actions of parents is often framed, not as an ideological 
struggle but rather out of practical necessity within the home. It has, 
nonetheless, the potential to develop into resistance. Therefore, I refer to 
these as acts of transgression/resistance signalling not only the difculty 
in distinguishing between these acts, but also the uidity from acts of 
transgression to acts of resistance over space and time since these acts 
are frequently spatially and temporally limited, often being conned to 
early childhood before spoken language has developed and occurring 
only in the family home. For this reason, as a counteraction to the 
hegemonic medical model, their success is limited because they lack the 
intentional and collective action that would more likely cause an overhaul 
of the system. Nonetheless, these acts are of signicance in that they 
affect the daily lives of parents with d/Deaf children as they try to 
negotiate the everyday implications of a hegemonic medical model.  
 
The forms of transgression/resistance evident in this research were non-
compliance, protest, and public revelation. Non-compliance was fre-
quently cited on the grounds that following a speech-only route with 
their young d/Deaf child simply was not practical, with frustration cited 
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as the most common reason for opting for Sign Language.  
 
‘We went to the Sign Language classes, just to have a 
means of communicating because obviously you couldn’t 
go through life without being able to communicate. And if 
he wanted something out of the press [cupboard] I’d end 
up emptying the whole press to see what it was he wanted’. 
(Parent 07)  
 
Parents did not conceal their use of Sign Language from medical 
professionals, although a few of them did speak of feeling guilty or con-
cerned about the lack of approval they would meet from professionals. 
However, pragmatic resistance was often accepted by medical pro-
fessionals, although it was usually seen as a short-term measure until 
cochlear implantation or other services were in place, once again under-
mining the long-term role of Sign Language in the development of 
d/Deaf children. In the case of the mother quoted above who 
implemented Sign Language out of frustration, the cochlear implantation 
of her son saw a change from the medical professionals in their 
acceptance:  
 
‘So then Michael, well once he got the implant they said 
“that’s it you’re not allowed to sign any more”. And we 
were like “what are we going to do, he can’t, he doesn’t 
understand this?” ’. (Parent 07)  
 
Outright protest was less common amongst parents, but tended to 
emerge as a characteristic with those who had contact with the Deaf 
Community and saw their child as part of that community:  
 
Interviewer: Have you had any sort of conict with, with 
going to [hospital name], I’m not saying conict in the, 
sort of you know, them ghting with you sense of the 
word . . .  
 
Mother: (anticipates question) not to use Sign Language?  
 
Interviewer: yeah, have..?  
 
Mother: (interrupts) no.  
 
Interviewer: have they been supportive of it?  
Mother: (speaking assertively) I put my point across; ‘I use 
the baby sign with her and that’s it’.  
 
Interviewer: mmm.  
 
Mother: (continuing in an assertive manner) I say it and I 
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sign it, but I mean the way it was with Elaine we’d no way 
– we’d no communication [. . .] with her at all, and people 
just accepted that that’s the way …  
 
Interviewer: so they [the cochlear implant team] had no 
problem with it at all?  
 
Mother: oh no problem with it whatsoever (Parent 05).  
‘I want him to have Sign Language because I feel he’s 
going to be a part of the Deaf Community in some way at 
some stage in his life, in some way. I just, em, I want him 
to have it’. (Parent 10)  
 
As a tactic of resistance, this seemed to be the most successful with 
parents encountering little in the line of coercion or inducement from 
medical and educational authorities. Nonetheless, there are negative 
implications felt by parents who use Sign Language as a method of 
communication. Most notably, the choice of educational placement 
becomes limited as Irish Sign Language interpreters are not provided in 
mainstream schools.7 The only Deaf parent interviewed for this research 
recounted her experience in trying to secure a mainstream education for 
her child. She was refused a Sign Language interpreter on the grounds 
that she could send her son to the school for d/Deaf children if she 
wanted his education to be conducted through Irish Sign Language. With 
only one residential school for d/Deaf boys in the country, this is a 
difcult decision to make and places restrictions on those parents 
wishing to use Sign Language as the primary mode of communication 
with their child.  
 
Parents of older d/Deaf children in this research were more likely to 
resist in an intentional and collective fashion, informing other parents of 
the value of Irish Sign Language or campaigning for access to and 
information about Irish Sign Language, perhaps out of growing 
condence as parents of a d/Deaf child as well as recognising difculties 
their d/Deaf children are experiencing. Several parents with older d/ 
Deaf children spoke of using the research itself as a means of resistance:  
 
‘Now, I have all Hazel’s books kept, because I hoped and 
prayed one day this day would come, where somebody 
would come and ask me what happened’. (Parent 17)  
7 As was mentioned earlier, occasionally a d/Deaf person will be employed as a special 
needs assistant to work with deaf children who use Sign Language in mainstream 
environments. However, this is not directed by or guaranteed in policy, and is actually 
contrary to the requirements of special needs assistants that they refrain from engaging 
in any educational role. Furthermore, with the recent educational cutbacks special 
needs assistants are being removed from d/Deaf children. Subsequently, the place of 
Irish Sign Language continues to be undermined in the deaf education system. 
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A number of these parents with older children were quite adamant and 
angry that they had been misled about the use of Sign Language, yet they 
had not directly tackled those responsible.  
 
‘[Y]ou know, that was a complete, that was a huge mistake. 
She should have been helped, she should have had Sign 
Language right, all the time’. (Parent 17)  
 
‘We can’t help thinking we’ve made all the wrong decisions 
we should have left [him] as part of the Deaf world. He 
doesn’t have any d/Deaf friends and he has nobody he can 
communicate with who understands his plight  .  .  .  who 
can empathise with him really  .  .  .  I mean he doesn’t 
have that group, that’s the worst’. (Parent 07)  
 
‘As soon as I saw the children [at an event for d/Deaf 
children] using all the different [modes of communication], 
I just said “that’s ridiculous!”  .  .  .  you know what’s the 
point of trying to force something [speech-only] on her if 
it’s not going to work?’ (Parent 05)  
 
‘Em, I have spoken to [the visiting teacher] about this and 
she feels that I’m going down the wrong route by going 
down the sign language route. And I don’t agree with her 
after what I’ve seen in [an event for d/Deaf children]’. 
(Parent 06)  
 
Once again, Gregory et al.’s study also highlighted a great deal of 
resentment from those parents who had been badly informed in the 
1970s regarding the benets of Sign Language. One father of a Deaf 
adult man said ‘We ought to have been taught to sign and we ought to 
have been encouraged to sign from the word go’ (Gregory et al., 1995: 
51). While it could be argued that advances in technology make 
comparisons between those raised in the 1970s and the children in this 
research unfair, it should be observed that three of the four parents 
quoted above have children with cochlear implants, suggesting that 
cochlear implantation does not negate parental regrets at not learning 
Sign Language as their children grow.  
 
Noticeably, however, none of the parents directly challenged the medical 
and educational professionals whose advice they felt had been biased and 
inappropriate, signalling again perhaps the power embedded within the 
authority of the medical model. The fact that these parents did not 
directly confront the system may be due to the fact that all of the hearing 
parents interviewed are still within medical and educational services, and 
may be uncertain about challenging the system upon which they are so 
reliant, signifying the authority held by these services in their ability to 
grant or deny easy access to services. Therefore, while parents use trans-
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gression/resistance to implement Sign Language within their own homes, 
and often extend this to networking with other parents, there was little in 
the way of systematic challenge from the parents interviewed. The overall 
feeling was one of trying to achieve a balance of not confronting the 
system so directly that it would jeopardise their child’s access to services. 
For some parents, this was a daunting and worrying task:  
 
‘It’s very difcult to confront a system when you are not 
professional and nobody, you don’t really, you don’t really 
have … It was like, it was like being out in the ocean, and . 
. . And it was like there was nothing there around to help 
except you were in a small wee life-raft, and I found it 
incredibly difcult, and I remember going home, I 
remember going home different days from school and I 
was very, you know I was very upset by all of the things 
that we had experienced in school. And, I remember 
praying continuously for about two weeks that God would 
give me guidance on how to speak to the teachers in a way 
that it wouldn’t offend them but that it would get the best 
outcome for Hazel’. (Parent 17)  
 
Overall, while there are individual acts of transgression/resistance from 
parents, these acts are often spatially and temporally constrained and lack 
a collective and intentional challenge to the system. Where parents feel 
they have been let down by the system, and there is the possibility of 
their actions to develop into resistance through intentionality, they are 
reluctant to bite the hand that feeds them, implying a fear of negative 
repercussions from service providers. Parents rely a great deal on the 
scant services provided by medical and educational professionals, and the 
authority (actual or perceived) held within those services, either through 
their ability to provide or deny speedy services, acts as a great deterrent 
to parents to challenge the system within which they are embedded.  
 
Conclusion  
While power is complex, heterogeneous and context dependent, and any 
seeming hegemony is unstable and comes with the possibility of 
resistance, the Irish deaf education system in its present state is 
characterised by a robust hegemonic medical model. This is in spite of 
calls from the Deaf Community to be recognised as a cultural and 
linguistic minority group and to accept and promote the value of Sign 
Language in the social and academic development of d/ Deaf children. 
The hegemonic medical model must be viewed within the context of a 
long history of the social authority attributed to medical and educational 
professionals, which legitimises their goals, in spite of their limited 
knowledge of Sign Language, or interaction with the Deaf Community. 
The result is a view of deafness as a decient condition which can be 
remedied through the use of speech instruction and by avoiding the most 
obvious signier of Deafness: Sign Language.  
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Several tactics are used to reproduce and maintain this hegemony, 
including gate-keeping access to information about Sign Language, 
seduction, inducement and coercion of parents into using a speech-only 
approach, and excluding Deaf professionals through policy measures thus 
maintaining a monopoly of power amongst hearing professionals. Thus, 
as Allen (2003: 26) observes ‘some people and some groups have more 
power than others, not by accident or by a series of fortunate events, but 
by virtue of the structure of relations of which they are part’. However, 
Allen also states that power is relative and is frequently met with 
resistance.  
 
In spite of the system within which they are embedded, and the tactics 
described above, many hearing parents of d/Deaf children in Ireland still 
continue to choose Irish Sign Language as a means of communicating 
with their child. This transgression/resistance initially indicates some 
hope that the future of deaf education in Ireland will be guided more by 
the social model of Deafness than it is at present. However, the fact that 
this transgression/resistance is temporally restricted (often only taking 
place in early childhood) and spatially limited (conning itself to the 
family home) decreases the potential impact that this move could have on 
the overall system. This is more so the case now than before because of 
the mainstreaming movement taking place. Subsequently, the nature of 
transgression/resistance from parents in introducing Irish Sign Language 
to their children has a somewhat fractured result, preventing intentional 
collective action that might truly challenge the hegemonic medical model 
currently at play.  
 
This is further aggravated by the fact that the overwhelming majority of 
d/Deaf children (90%) are in place in mainstream schools, limiting their 
interaction with d/Deaf peers as well as the interaction of their parents 
with other parents of d/Deaf children. This lack of collective action is 
changing the potential geographies of resistance within deaf education. 
While residential schools for d/Deaf children have long been heralded as 
bases of resistance where Deaf Culture and Sign Language is transmitted 
from one generation to the next, often in spite of anoralist philosophy in 
place within the school (Ladd, 2003), the mainstream environment limits 
this intergenerational contact. Furthermore, deafness is usually only one 
generation thick, with most d/Deaf children having hearing parents, and 
most d/Deaf parents having hearing children. Subsequently, collective 
resistance through family networks is restricted to the 10% of d/Deaf 
people born into d/Deaf families. It is for this reason that 
mainstreaming, rather justiably is often viewed as ‘[destroying] the 
embryo of the Deaf Community’ (Crean, 1997: 128), as it limits not only 
the interaction of d/Deaf children amongst each other, but denies the 
development of information networks and collective action possible 
amongst their parents.  
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The long-term implications of this hegemonic medical system are unclear, 
but it is likely that d/Deaf children will continue to struggle in their 
identify formation as young adults while a medical model prevails which 
forever views them as ‘not quite hearing’. As Davis and Watson (2001: 
673) highlight  
 
‘[i]n the case of some children the imposition of medically 
dened and adult-imposed notions of difference and 
normality lead to their identity only being described in 
terms of labels derived from the eld of educational 
psychology,’  
 
and in the case of deaf children – audiology. While it was out of the 
scope of this paper to examine in detail concepts of identity, others have 
noted the complex nature of d/Deaf identity and the important role of 
Sign Language as it ‘opened up the Deaf world for them to enter and 
become a part of’ (Skelton and Valentine, 2003a: 456). While parents of 
d/Deaf children may be able, to some degree, to shield their children 
from learning Sign Language, as these children grow up, they are likely to 
question those communication decisions made by their parents when 
they were younger. While there will be those who remain in the hearing 
world, using speech for communication, there will be others who will 
transition to the Deaf world (Valentine and Skelton, 2007), learning Sign 
Language and identifying as Deaf. For those making this transition, their 
relationship with their parents may suffer (Gregory et al., 1995; Skelton 
and Valentine, 2002) owing to the gap in communication between them. 
The persistence of a medical model which provides biased and inaccurate 
information to parents, therefore, could be damaging for many more 
years to come in terms of identity formation, parent–child relationships, 
and for the successful uptake of the Deaf Community’s call for a socio-
cultural model of Deafness.  
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CHAPTER 32 
 
WOUNDED CITIES: MEMORY-WORK AND A PLACE-BASED 
ETHICS OF CARE 
 
KAREN E. TILL1 
 
First published in Political Geography (2012), 31, 3-14. 
 
‘Project Prometeo: Acts I & II’, downtown Bogotá, December 2002 and 2003   
A man in his late thirties wearing a tuxedo walks onto a stage with a lit 
torch. He sits down, sentinel-like as if at a doorway stoop, and begins to 
light matches. We are seated outdoors at night in downtown Bogotá; 
candles and spotlights illuminate the gures of the performers who move 
across a ‘stage’ in a very large empty eld. Furniture brought in or 
improvised by the actors suggests rooms in now empty houses that once 
were occupied. Around the ‘stage’, former streets are marked out with 
candles in white paper bags. Behind the performers, two very large 
screens, each more than three-storeys high, project images and sound 
recordings of the neighborhood that once existed here, known locally as 
El Cartucho, as well as images of Project Prometeo: Act II as it is being 
performed (Fig. 1). The videos and sounds of El Cartucho include on-site 
interviews with residents, historical images, maps, and scenes of 
destruction.  
 
The performer does not speak but continues lighting matches; the sounds 
and images of a taped recording of an interview of him describing his 
experiences in the neighborhood runs on one of the large screens behind 
him. Other performers begin or continue to enact their own 
interpretations of Heiner Müller’s The Liberation of Prometheus.2 (In 
addition to the basic story – Prometheus brings re to the humans and is 
consequently banished by the gods for his transgression, lashed to a 
remote craggy rock where his liver is pecked at by an eagle for eternity – 
Müller added a twist: After hundreds of years, Heracles offers to let 
Prometheus go, who is unsure if he wants to leave his horrible situation 
because he has become codependent on the eagle and fears what freedom 
might mean.) We see a married couple sitting throwing matchbooks like 
dice on the dining room table; a woman in a pink gown eating re (Fig. 
2); a woman dressed in white silk carrying candles to the stage to create a 
makeshift altar; a man standing up from a seat, silently pointing out 
1 The author wishes to extend her deep thanks to Phil Steinberg for organizing this plenary 
issue, and to Rob Shields, Jeff Garmany, and Kevin Ward for their generous and thoughtful 
responses. A special thanks also to Mapa Teatro, the District Six Museum, the residents of 
Roanoke, and Mindy Fullilov. 
2 Heiner Müller was an East German dramatist, poet, writer and theater director. He is, after 
Berthold Brecht, considered Germany’s most important dramatist of the twentieth-century. 
His work contributed to postmodern drama and postdramatic theater. See Kalb (2001) and 
Kushner (2001). 
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where he used to live and what used to be in his neighborhood in real-
and recorded-time; a little boy sitting in a chair, dangling his feet, while in 
a video track he proclaims ‘I am Heracles!’; a clown puts on makeup and 
releases white doves from his magic box.  
 
These residents are performing amidst the ruins of their former homes, 
in a historic part of downtown Bogotá. By the late 1980s, with economic 
restructuring, suburbanization, refugee movements resulting from the 
rise of drug cartel-paramilitary warfare, and from other reasons, the 
neighborhood El Cartucho had become a dangerous place, known for its 
informal economies, sex work, and drug trade.    
 
Figure 1. Project Prometeo: Act II. Former residents of El Cartucho perform 
in downtown Bogotá, December 2003.  
 
 
 
Photograph: Courtesy of Mapa Teatro Laboratory of Artists.  
 
The mayor of Bogotá from 1998 to 2001, Enrique Peñalosa Londoño, 
called the neighborhood ‘a symbol of chaos and of government 
impotence’; part of his successful mayoral campaign included the promise 
to ‘reclaim El Cartucho for the public’ (Mance, 2007). Replacing a 
‘symbol of chaos’ with the promise of a public park reinforced Peñalosa’s 
claim to clean up the city by making it ‘green’ and ‘sustainable’.3 Twenty 
3 As I describe elsewhere (Till, 2010a), Peñalosa initiated ve mega-projects between 1998 
and 2001: the bank of lands; a parks system, including a bike paths network; a system of 
libraries; the Transmilenio mass transit system; and road construction, maintenance and 
renovation. Not all were completed under his tenure, but his ambitious initiatives were 
made possible, in part, because of former mayor Jaime Castro’s nancial reforms; a 
relatively independent city council; and existing traditions to encourage a sense of safety in 
public spaces (such as Domingo Ciclovia (Cycling Sunday) launched by Augusto Ramierz in 
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hectares (200,000 square meters), or the entirety of historic Santa Inés, 
was razed from 2000 to 2004, including historical buildings, streets, 
place-bound local economies, homes, and social networks; tens of 
thousands of residents were displaced without compensation. In 2005, 
not long after the performance of Project Prometeo: Act II, the new ‘Park of 
the Third Millenium’ was unveiled.  
 
Figure 2. Project Prometeo: Act II. Former residents of El Cartucho perform 
as a place-based act of care; downtown Bogotá, December2003. 
 
 
 
Photograph: Courtesy of Mapa Teatro Laboratory of Artists. 
 
Implicit in such urban renewal projects is a both a fear of the ‘other’ as 
well as a desire to clear out the untidy elements of the ‘informal city’ and 
to shape a developed, ordered postindustrial city (compare Sandercock, 
2003). Yet projects such as these continue to fail by their own self-
proclaimed ‘progressive’ goals, such as the claims to take back the city for 
‘the public’ or to ‘green’ the city, as well as by its not-so-progressive 
unspoken agendas of preventing squatting and relocating the homeless 
from the center of the city. Although the Third Millenium Park in 
Bogotá, for example, received architectural awards, it is now a rather 
sterile space and considered unsafe by many of the city’s residents. 
Because this ‘solution’ did not address the needs hundreds of thousands 
of residents who continue to live in impoverished conditions, moreover, 
by 2010 marginalized citizens occupied the park for protest actions, 
creating a ‘tent city’ of squatters to demand more public housing and care 
1982 and followed in other cities worldwide; and the Ciudana Cultura public art projects 
initiated by Antanas Mockus (who was mayor prior to and following Peñalosa).  
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for the city’s homeless for more than three months (Mapa Teatro, 
personal conversation, 2011).  
 
As Lefebvre (1991 (1974)) reminds, the discourses, practices, and the 
desires tied to urban pasts, presents, and futures are inherently political 
because they inform how individuals make and justify their decisions and 
actions. At a conceptual level, it is important to document both the 
structural problems that lead to urban inequities as well as the urban 
imaginaries and managerial strategies that result in these projects and 
their failures. Yet when critical analyses of urban space privilege 
representations of the city as property or according only to development 
trajectories, we, as scholars, ignore the complex spatialities and 
temporalities of the lived city for most residents in the world, thus 
limiting our appreciation both of the possibilities for urban change and 
the prospects for more just urban futures. A deeper appreciation of the 
lived realities of inhabitants of the city – including cultural identities, 
dynamics of the everyday and symbolic worlds – would enable planners, 
policy makers, and urban theorists to consider more appropriate and 
sustainable urban transformations than those that continue to legitimate 
disciplinary forms of governmentality.  
 
Should not we, as urban and political scholars, consider performances 
such as Project Prometeo – as well as the ways that residents talk about and 
care for places and the city more generally – as more than merely 
‘subjective’, ‘biased’, or ‘ill-informed’, but as signicant data challenging 
the current models of the city that pathologically designate districts as 
either good or bad, and entire cities as ordered or chaotic? Indeed, the 
actor-residents of Project Prometeo, through their performances and stories, 
raised ethical questions about the politics of place-making in the name of 
progress and called attention to the signicance of art, memory, and 
imagination in understanding and creating a more just city. The memory-
work and creative practices of these displaced residents offer signicant 
lessons about retheorizing the city and thinking differently about the 
possibilities of urban politics in at least three ways. First, residents 
performing in Project Prometeo challenged city authorities’ understanding of 
them as invisible; they called attention to the fact that ofcial claims to 
build a ‘sustainable’ city did not include all of its residents. Through their 
stories and performances, residents documented their presence (how they 
used, moved through, and made their neighborhood and city), thus 
asserting basic individual, collective, and temporal claims to having rights 
to their city. Second, they communicated and enacted their experiences 
of place and the city as inhabited, an understanding based upon psychic 
attachments, materialies, bodily and social memories, and fragile social 
ecologies. Performing atop the ruins of their former homes in the 
historic Santa Inés-El Cartucho neighborhood, their interpretations of 
the Prometheus myth also invited the audience to consider the tensions 
between the acceptance of everyday violence in their city as well as the 
fears of the unknown that most residents face when trying simply to 
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survive. Finally, Project Prometeo resulted in acts of witnessing, not so 
much of so-called ‘slum clearance’, but of remembering life in an 
otherwise previously marginalized community in the city. As 
Abderhalden Cortés (2006) of Mapa Teatro testied: ‘the community’s 
stories were a substantive part of the architecture of the neighborhood’s 
memory. A form of resistance in the face of oblivion, a potential 
footprint among the ruins’ (np). Residents worked collaboratively with 
the artistic group Mapa Teatro Laboratory of Artists and other former 
residents on Project Prometeo over a number of years. Rather than treat the 
audience as spectators, they called upon guests and residents to attend to 
their city as an inhabited place by considering how the unfolding and 
open-ended pathways of memory might offer possibilities of shared 
belongings. At the end of their performance, the performers invited all of 
the guests to dance atop the ruins to live bolero music.  
 
Inspired by the stories, actions, and creative practices of ‘local experts’ 
who live with violent histories of displacement, in this article I offer an 
alternative way of understanding the city that challenges dominant 
Western models. By considering cities as ‘wounded’, urban space cannot 
be understood as property only. If cities and their inhabitants are 
understood as having been wounded by state and dominant social-
political practices, other imaginaries of place, temporality, and the city 
might focus attention on why places, peoples, groups, environments, and 
non-human natures continue to be injured. Through memory-work and 
what I call a place-based ethics of care, historical and current resources 
might sustain more just possible futures. In this paper, I use examples 
inspired from my ethnographic research about activist and artistic 
projects in Bogotá, Colombia, Cape Town, South Africa, and Roanoke, 
Virginia USA to illustrate how attending to, caring for, and being cared 
for by place and those that inhabit place are signicant ethical and 
political practices that may work to constitute more democratic urban 
realms.  
 
I intend that this article might open up a conversation about why political 
and urban geographers need to do more work in theorizing and teaching 
about the city in ways that are recognizable to the inhabitants of the city. 
In the following section, I review recent scholarly discussions about 
postcolonial urban theory, memory politics, and the right to the city to 
situate my arguments. Next, I discuss the concept of root shock as tied to 
my concept of wounded cities, drawing upon my ethnographic research 
and upon theoretical work by social psychiatrists, urban social ecologists, 
and medical anthropologists. I then discuss memory-work and outline a 
place-based ethics of care, drawing upon feminist political theory and 
creative and ethnographic research practices. Through ethical, creative, 
and ethnographic practices, residents, scholars, and global citizens might 
begin to explore pathways of belonging based upon the multiple pasts 
and possible futures that move towards creating and taking care of more 
socially and environmentally just cities.  
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Retheorizing urban politics  
In recent years, postcolonial scholars researching cities in the so-called 
global South have called for radical retheorizations of ‘the city’ to 
understand how to transform structures of inequality and recognize the 
lived realities of most urban residents (Bayat, 2000; Holston, 2007; 
Pieterse, 2008; Robinson, 2006; Simone 2010). With some urbanists and 
planners analyzing North American and European cities (Healey, 2006; 
Sandercock, 2003), they challenge the inherent Western bias of models 
and theories of modernity, urbanization, urban development, and 
governance.4 They argue that within a number of Western-based models 
of urban transformation is a fear of the ‘other’ and a desire for order. 
Western-based models of urban development either ‘tame’ or 
‘romanticize’ the messiness that is so central to the mobilities, spatial 
practices, and connectivities of the lived city. Underlying such models is a 
belief in the power of rational planning to solve ‘problems’ by ordering 
space and thereby attening out, separating, and drawing boundaries 
around the complex spatialities, temporalities, and potentialities of the 
lived city. From a postcolonial perspective, therefore, the real challenge is 
‘to rethink epistemic categories’ (Pieterse, 2008, p. 111) and develop 
theories about cities that conceptualize the urban spaces and realities of 
most of the people living in the world as ‘ordinary’ not ‘other’ (Robinson, 
2006).  
 
When models of the city that implicitly assume that neighborhoods are 
parcels of property circulating through networks of the global economy 
are privileged, inhabited places are treated as empty stages upon which 
the drama of conict over future development potential takes place; 
residents, at best, are treated as victims. Perhaps for this reason, a 
number of scholars maintain that so-called slums, as well as suburbs, 
central business districts, and retail spaces, must be theorized as 
constitutive of, not aberrant to, the city (Bayat, 2000; Holston, 2007; 
Pieterse, 2008; Simone, 2010). To address the persistent problems of 
urban inequality, privileged network infrastructures, and unequal forms 
of citizenship, Pieterse (2008) argues that the everyday ‘must be the 
touchstone of radical imaginings and interventions’ (p. 9). For example, 
the numerous, often contradictory, everyday processes, mobilities, and 
practices that residents living cities of the global South use to ‘just get by’ 
are what Simone (2010) calls ‘cityness’. Bayat (2000) similarly describes 
‘the encroachment of the ordinary’ in Middle Eastern cities as including 
such quiet and pervasive advances that people make upon the propertied 
and powerful elite to survive and improve their lives.5 Through silent 
encroachment, sometimes alone and sometimes through collective action, 
residents gain cultural and political autonomy from the state, as well as 
4 While these postcolonial theorists advocate new ways of thinking about urban and political 
theory, they also draw upon a range of theories, in particular Western poststructural 
theories, to think about urban space as postmodern, relational, and/ or as assemblages and 
rhizomes.  
5 My overview of Bayat is taken from Pieterse (2008), Chap. 6-7.  
258
redistribute social goods and opportunities. Holston’s (2007) detailed 
ethnographic study of more than thirty years of land struggle and home 
construction in the outskirts of São Paulo also suggests that silent 
encroachment may result in empancipatory practices. Most Brazilians live 
‘illegally’ as a result of a history of ‘inclusively inegalitarian’ citizenship (p. 
41) that barred most citizens from land rights. Rather than accept 
privileges under ‘clientelisitic relations of dependence’ (p. 235), however, 
after years of home auto-construction and conicts over land use and 
ownership, residents have demanded legal rights to more inclusive and 
differentiated forms of citizenship. Microlevel forms of creative politics 
and what Holston calls ‘insurgent’ forms of citizenship operate at the 
interface between social mobilization (direct action) and symbolic politics 
(discursive action) according to Pieterse (2008), challenging hegemonic 
understandings of who and what constitutes the urban public. (I return 
below to a discussion of who constitutes the public.)  
 
Retheorizing the city from a postcolonial perspective thus means to pay 
attention to forms of urban political life, everyday survival, insurgency, 
and creative practice that animate the city and make it liveable for most 
people who inhabit and move through the city. I draw upon and add to 
these discussions about alternative models of the city by introducing 
and/or developing the concepts of wounded cities, memory-work, and an 
intergenerational place-based ethics of care. By exploring how cities, as 
places of inhabitation, may be understood as ‘wounded’ yet as also 
providing environments of care, urban space must be understood as 
inhabited worlds infused with many forms of value, rather than as 
property or according to capitalist forms of exchange-value only.  
 
Wounded cities 
Following Lefebvre (1996 (1968)), I understand the city as oeuvre (p. 101), 
as constituted by its inhabitants through ongoing acts of making places. 
As human and non-human lives move, interact, and engage with others 
through complex temporal and spatial pathways, the symbolic and 
material places they make also become part of their bodies-selves-
environments, a point I develop in the next section. I dene ‘wounded 
cities’ as densely settled locales that have been harmed and structured by 
particular histories of physical destruction, displacement, and individual 
and social trauma resulting from state-perpetrated violence. Rather than 
harmed by asingular ‘outside event’, these forms of violence often work 
over a period of many years – often decades – and continue to structure 
current social and spatial relations, and as such also structure 
expectations of what is considered ‘normal’. Such legacies are typical of 
many postcolonial societies but also haunt Western cities. In this respect, 
my denition is quite distinct from denitions of cities as ‘wounded’ or 
discussions about ‘resilience’ that describe the city as damaged following 
singular, while extreme, ‘outside’ events, from so-called ‘natural’ forces to 
war (dened in a traditional sense) to forms of globalization. In the 
edited collections Wounded Cities and The Resilient City (Schneider & 
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Susser, 2003; Vale & Campanella, 2005), for example, the city is 
understood organically, according to bounded territories or as a systems 
model, such as the body politic metaphor, or as a ‘a site where powerful 
external forces intersect’ (Schneider & Susser, 2003, p. 1), or, again, as a 
node through which power, capital, things, and people ow.6  
 
My use of the term ‘wounded’ signals far more complex temporalities 
than the approaches to the city described above, which tend to 
circumscribe urban space-time according to either a before/after events-
oriented model or a dependent-pathways systems model (that has pre-
dened starting points) (compare Till, 2011). Rather than adopt a 
Western systems model of the city, such as the ancient notion of city as a 
circulatory system, or a model that suggests spatially-bound and managed 
forms of life, such as the body politic metaphor that legitimates the 
juxtaposition of political territory with state sovereignty and forms of 
governance, the temporally and spatially dynamic metaphor of the 
‘wounded city’ works metonymically (the daily mazeways and social 
ecologies of places also constitute urban processes) and psychosocially 
(individuals and groups have intimate relationships with places and the 
city). As I describe in the next section, if individuals and neighborhoods 
are wounded through displacement, material devastation, and root shock, 
so too is the city and its inhabitants. Moreover, cities become wounded in 
very different ways, as tied to the particular histories, processes, and 
traumas of displacement. These differences matter, particularly in terms 
of intergenerational relations and silences, and the individual and group 
capacity for repair. At the same time, urban social environments and 
inhabited and formerly inhabited places – as simultaneously material, 
metaphorical and imaginative, experiential and perceptual – do not deny 
its residents the possibilities of care and healing.  
 
My use of the organic metaphor of wounded cities draws inspiration 
from both activists and artists (Till, 2005). During the 1980s in former 
West Berlin, activists who opposed the construction of a highway across 
the former site of the National Socialist Reich Security Service and 
Gestapo Headquarters, engaged in a protest action. They dug up the 
‘forgetful’ layers of grass and denial that covered up a shameful national 
past and were surprised to nd artifacts and cellar building remnants. 
(The city reclaimed that the area, after dynamiting this and other 
buildings following the war to expunge all of the physical traces of the 
former Nazi power center as the American Allies had requested.) The 
exposed landscape seemed to reveal physically the refusal of the state to 
come to terms with its violent past in the attempt to become a ‘good’ 
democracy through economic recovery. With the rubble of the former 
Gestapo cellars now present in the urban imaginary, the urban 
development plans were revoked. As part of the 750th anniversary of the 
6 David Harvey’s (2003) discussion of the city as body politic offers a more complex and 
nuanced understanding of the city than Schneider & Susser.  
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Berlin, historians and activists involved in this protest action created a 
temporary exhibition that later became the international documentary 
center and landscape known as ‘The Topography of Terror’.  
 
The terrain uncovered and preserved was described by activists as the 
‘open wound’ of the city. I believe their use of this concept was inspired 
by the work of German artist Joseph Beuys who was one of the rst 
artists to directly discuss German responsibility for the crimes of 
National Socialism. Beuys promoted an ‘expanded idea of art’, meaning 
that art applies to human work in general, thus unifying artistic thinking 
with human action (Lerm Hayes & Walters, 2011). His artistic 
environment, ‘Zeige deine Wunde (Show Your Wound)’ (1974-1975), was 
created to be installed in a bleak pedestrian underpass in the city of 
Munich and included pairs of: mortuary dissecting tables under which 
stood two glass-covered galvanized iron boxes containing fat; lamps; test 
tubes; preserving jars with gauze lters; bird skulls; clinical thermometers; 
the heads of two iron agricultural tools (chisels) mounted on bark sticks; 
two double-pronged pitchforks with cotton scarves placed atop two 
pieces of slate; wooden planks; two chalkboards; and two issues of the 
Italian LOTTA CONTINUA (The Ongoing Struggle, a newspaper published 
by the far-left, militant Italian organization of the same name, founded in 
1969 following a split in Turin’s student-worker movement) mounted in 
white wooden boxes (Städtische Gallerie im Lenbachhaus und Kunstbau 
München, nd; Tate Modern Museum of Art, 2005). The wound is a 
recurring theme in Beuys’ work and refers to personal, social, and 
political traumas, decay, and death. (The installation alludes to his 
personal injuries suffered during and after World War II; the injuries 
Germany perpetrated on its own citizens and others under National 
Socialism and after the war through denial; and the political division of 
the state into two Germanies as a consequence of National Socialism.) 
Stachelhaus (1991) writes that ‘when Beuys was asked what he really 
meant by this environment, he answered that his primary concern was 
“to make visible the death zone toward which today’s society is rushing 
with great speed”’ (pp. 161-162). The doubles, as double identities, reect 
opposition and unresolved conict, yet the chalkboards and Italian 
newspapers may be interpreted as a call to action to confront the past 
critically and accept responsibility for past crimes, to engage in the 
difcult work of mourning (which entails a transformation of the self), 
and to imagine and create a new society.  
 
Drawing upon these activist and artistic notions, I understand the 
moment of the wound as unfolding, as neither singular nor inevitable, 
nor coming from an outside source. Through mourning and memory-
work individuals and groups may confront and take responsibility for the 
failures of the democratic state and its violences. Moreover, multiple 
pasts and futures are resources for residents, providing the possibilities to 
imagine more socially just cities through place-based practices of care.  
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Memory-work 
My work on wounded cities contributes in signicant ways to the vast 
interdisciplinary literature on memory politics in the city. The scholarship 
on the politics of memory demonstrates how stories about the past are 
always ‘entangled’, to use Marita Sturken’s(1997) concept, with already 
existing memorial topographies of a city and national histories (Boyer, 
1996; Crang & Travlou, 2001; Huyssen, 2003; Till, 2003). Groups and 
individuals often struggle with one another for authority to represent 
their version of the past in the built environment, the media, and in legal 
arenas. When social groups inscribe their particular perspectives and 
stories about the past onto and through a public space, the results are 
contentious. For example, to make repressed stories more tangible in the 
built environment groups and individuals may establish places of memory 
at historic sites of cultural trauma to reclaim national pasts and imagine 
more just futures. Political, postcolonial, and historical geographers 
writing about the politics of memory have examined ofcial 
commemorative practices and sites of memory (statuary, streetscapes, 
memorials, monuments, stamps, tourist attractions, urban renewal 
projects, bodies), as well as contestations to claims to national identity 
(DeLyser, 2005; Dowler, 2001; Duncan, 1990; Dwyer, 2004; Foote, 2003; 
Forest & Johnson, 2002; Hoelscher & Alderman, 2004; Johnson, 2003; 
Kearns, 1993; Raento & Brunn, 2005; Till, 2005; Whelan, 2003). The 
politics of memory thus includes the processes of negotiation about 
whose conception of the past should prevail in public space. Because the 
meanings of a city are not stable in time or space, the politics of memory 
also refers to the practices and motivations whereby groups attempt to 
‘x’ time and identity by deploying the material and symbolic qualities of 
particular places and landscapes. Indeed, some memorialization projects 
attempt to close off public discussion by bounding time through place, 
while others seek to keep open the process of historical reection 
through dialog, changing landscape forms, and community capacity-
building.  
 
Paying attention to the politics of memory is signicant for any 
understanding of the city, particularly in postcolonial or post-
authoritarian societies that have experienced difcult national histories of 
state-perpetrated violence and are undergoing political and social 
transition (Bosco, 2004; Forest, Johnson & Till, 2004; Jelin, 2003; Nuttall 
& Coetzee, 1998). However, much of the work on memory in political 
geography has been limited to an approach that I have described as the 
‘biography of a site’ (Till, 2006). Such an approach draws from concepts 
in key works, such as Foucault’s (1975, 1980) ‘counter-memory’, 
Hobsbawm’s (1983) ‘invented traditions’, Nora’s(1996-1998) ‘lieux de 
mémoire’ and Halbwachs’ (1992 (1952, 1941)) ‘social frameworks’ and 
‘topographies’ of memory, and provide detailed descriptions of how 
national histories, memorial cultures, and shared stories are remembered 
and forgotten within a given country. Site biographies, however, are often 
narrow in their analyses of social exchange and power relations, typically 
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framing contestation as ‘resistance’ to dominant forces. Research is often 
limited to print media coverage (without critical analyses of the role the 
media plays in the process of public memory) as supplemented by public 
documents (city plans, competition guidelines) or the occasional 
interview to provide evidence of coherent group or political agendas. 
Ethnographic, phenomenological, or psychoanalytic approaches are rarely 
used to analyze how transgenerational encounters, performances, and 
rituals transmit and circulate understandings about the past across 
historical and lived times and through social spaces.  
 
Places and sites of memory have meanings that exceed their forms as 
authored representations of the past because of the ways individuals and 
social groups experience them affectively, a point I examine in detail in 
the next section. Indeed, debates about difcult pasts often emerge in 
wounded cities at zones of transition through those very places where the 
city becomes out of joint in terms of Cartesian space and chronological 
time (Till, 2005; Till & Jonker, 2009). In and through the neighborhoods 
that were razed for ‘future development’, former residents who have 
inherited what Fullilove (2004) calls the ‘root shock’ of forced removal 
(see below), encountering and confronting the violence, injustice, and 
trauma of displacement throughout the city.  
 
More attention therefore needs to be paid to artistic interventions such as 
Project Prometeo that advance the difcult ‘work’ of memory in wounded 
cities marked by particularly violent and difcult pasts. In cities 
undergoing political transition, memory-work signies more than past 
and ongoing resistance to the status quo or conict-resolution 
approaches to land rights and other disputes (although memory-work 
does indeed include that political work; compare Jelin, 2003). Such 
projects also may offer possibilities of place-based mourning and care 
work across generations that build self-worth, collective security, and 
social capacity (Till, 2008). Materially, memory-work motivates the 
creation of social capital, provides a range of memorialization activities, 
creates new forms of public memory, and is committed to 
intergenerational education and social outreach (Till, 2011). This 
capacity-building work can, in some instances, provide individuals with a 
kind of ‘social shell’ (Kearns, 2006) that offers social stability and 
security, despite the ongoing ruptures of geographies of displacement and 
exclusion. I consider memory-work as a form of what Pieterse (2008) 
calls ‘recursive political empowerment’ that enhances individuals’ capacity 
to act in ways that may be transformative and are embedded in collective 
possibilities across and through time and space.7 Place-based and 
collaborative memory-work may also create new forms of governance 
through what Healey (2006) describes as a needed combination of ‘hard 
infrastructure’ that challenges, constrains, and modies dominant centers 
7 According to Pieterse (2008), ‘People’s sense of possibility is closely tied to culturally 
shaped assessments of opportunities and threats . Such calculations, in turn, are intertwined 
with a sense of being and self in relation to place and particular communities’ (p. 7).  
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of power, with ‘soft infrastructure’ that develops ‘social, intellectual and 
political capital’ based on mutual learning (emphasis in original, p. 200).  
 
Those engaged in memory-work often demand public visibility, political 
transparency, and accountability, demands that implicate residents’ rights 
to the city. Residents’ calls of ‘never again’, to ‘give voice’ or ‘make 
visible’ their stories indicate the ways that past forms of injustice 
constitute the present and imagined possible future. The right to 
represent the past therefore can be considered a right to the city and is 
intricately tied to the processes of democratization. Following the 
English-language translation of Lefebvre’s collected Writings On Cities 
(1996), scholars have explored the idea of the ‘right to the city’ by 
examining the ways that democratic states deny residents equitable access 
to resources in their city, including housing, public space, free speech, 
voting rights and, as I have suggested here, the right to narrate pasts 
through legal and material means (Dikeç, 2002; Mitchell & Staehli, 2007; 
Till, 2011; Wastl-Walter, Staeheli & Dowler, 2005). Further, the idea of 
urban rights as related to inhabitance fundamentally questions 
understandings of political community based upon liberal understandings 
of citizenship as dened by the state (Attoh, 2011; Azoulay, 2008; 
Holston, 2007; Purcell, 2003).  
 
Questions about the fair access to resources often lead to examinations 
of where and by whom the ‘public’ is constituted in democratic states. 
Sandercock (2003) notes that with the enhanced awareness and/or fear 
of differences in postmodern societies, urban inequality (and segregation) 
has intensied rather than decreased; social classes follow distinct 
pathways and occupy different zones of the city so that the privileged 
rarely encounter their ‘other’. Within cities, ‘unwanted’ groups, such as 
the homeless, potential terrorists, ‘dirty’ or ‘irresponsible’ mothers, 
radical hippie types and others, have been discursively and physically 
excluded from the city (Cresswell, 1996; Dowler, 2002; Mitchell, 2003). 
This fear of the other, as well as images of the necessity of a strong-
armed state to protect its citizens from the other beyond state 
boundaries, has changed dominant understandings of ‘the public’ to 
legitimate new forms of urban forms surveillance and war, particularly 
following September 11, 1991 (Graham, 2004). As Mitchell (2003) argues, 
‘to assure that public spaces remain “public” rather than hijacked by 
undesirable users ... the solution to the perceived ills of urban public 
spaces over the past generation has been a combination of environmental 
change, behavior modication, and stringent policing’ (p. 4). While 
Mitchell’s discussion is based upon his research in U.S. cities, his 
argument resonates in the case of Bogotá and elsewhere. Existing 
‘problems’ as dened by urban elites are cleared away from sight and 
blamed on ‘unwanted peoples’; solutions are drawn upon Western visions 
of the city, as promoted and sold by city management strategists and 
economic development players located in ‘global cities’. In Bogotá, for 
example, city authorities casually referred to the residents of El Cartucho 
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as ‘disposables’ (Abderhalden Cortés, 2008). Most residents of the area 
were displaced as a result of the park project without compensation, 
perhaps because they ‘didn’t exist’ according to the state. In the early 
stages of the project, some residents were temporarily housed, so that 
they could be ‘processed’ and ‘receive’ a state-sanctioned identity. In the 
later stages of the project, other residents were located in a nearby 
slaughterhouse when the vast scale of displacement resulted in increased 
homelessness and a public fear of encountering those who once lived in 
El Cartucho in middle-class neighborhoods and downtown areas. As I 
have suggested above, however, through Project Prometeo the memory-
work of displaced residents gave voice to supposedly invisible citizens 
and called attention to their rights to the city.  
 
A place-based ethics of care 
Much of the discussion about the right to the city has been made 
according to rst generation rights such as civil and political rights. 
Pieterse (2008) argues that second-and third-generation rights – to peace 
or a clean environment – are as signicant because they are tied to larger 
political concerns about social and ecological sustainability. Jones (2005), 
for example, describes how the right to health and socio-economic rights 
may lead to socially enabling environments, critical political spaces, and 
inclusive forms of governance. He offers a successful case of ‘rights-
based development’ achieved through social mobilization to demand 
people-driven institutional access and health rights for individuals with 
HIV-AIDS in South Africa. These multi-generational rights, even as they 
are grounded in liberal values such as justice and equity, challenge liberal 
understandings of universal rights as rst generational rights only, and 
thereby offer a ‘normative anchor’ to ground political struggles towards 
more sustainable urban futures (Pieterse, 2008). I contribute to these 
discussions about multi-generational rights to the city by introducing 
what I call a place-based ethics of care, a concept I develop in section 
four of this paper.  
 
Although there has been much work about care in human geography in 
recent years (Barnett, 2005; Lawson, 2007; McEwan & Goodman, 2010; 
Milligan & Wiles, 2010; Popke, 2006; Smith, 1998), inspired initially by 
feminist political theory (Gilligan, 1982; Tronto, 1993; see also Garbardi, 
2001), very little has been published on the politics and ethics of care in 
this journal. For example, the two articles that have been published in the 
last fteen years in Political Geography have examined the restructuring 
of the welfare state through housing markets (Smith, 2005), and 
therapeutic and health policies (DeVerteuil & Wilton, 2009). As Smith 
(2005) has rightly argued in one of these articles, the scarcity of work on 
care represents a conspicuous silence on this topic within debates about 
the marketplace, the spaces of the state, and the social contract (and I 
would add the city). Not only has the political theory of an ethics of care 
been relegated to the gendered realms of the home and community, 
Smith also argues that it has not been used to theorize democratic 
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citizenship. She draws upon Sevenhuijsen’s (2000) critique of Giddens’ 
‘third way’ politics to argue that citizenship should also include ‘equal 
access to the giving and receiving of care’(p. 10; see also Sevenhuijsen, 
1998).  
 
I agree with Smith’s (2005) reading and argue that a place-based ethics of 
care offers possibilities to create and plan for more socially just cities. I 
draw in particular upon the work of Tronto (1993) who argues that care, 
unlike interest, duty or obligation, is an ethical practice and attitude that 
implies a reaching out toward something other than the self. Tronto 
outlines four types of care-giving that can result in ethical qualities – and 
I would add geographies – that I discuss in detail in section three of this 
paper. I add to Tronto and Fischer’s work by including practices of 
attending to, caring for, and making place, what I call a ‘place-based 
ethics of care’; these practices are grounded in memory-work and are 
fundamental in the establishment of differentiated and active forms of 
belonging and political community that might constitute more just and 
equitable democratic societies. Indeed, as Smith (2005) argues, ‘place 
caring as an activity and a set of social relations [should be] at the heart 
of social policy’(p. 10).  
 
Wounded cities, root shock and the social ecologies of place  
 
I venture to propose that displacement is the problem the 
twenty-rst century must solve. Africans and aborigines, 
rural peasants and city dwellers have been shunted from 
one place to another as progress has demanded, ‘Land 
here!’ or ‘People there!’ In cutting the roots of so many 
people, we have destroyed language, culture, dietary 
traditions, and social bonds. We have lined the oceans with 
bones, and lled the garbage dumps with bricks (Fullilove, 
2004, p. 5).  
 
Contemporary cities in different parts of the world continue to be 
structured by histories of settlement clearances, geographies of 
displacement, and state-perpetrated violence. In her study of the urban 
renewal program from the 1940s to the 1980s in the United States, 
Fullilove (2004) examined the devastation wrought on the fabric of cities 
and across African American communities through multiple generations. 
Between 1949 and 1973, 2500 neighborhoods were bulldozed in 993 
American cities, displacing at least a million people. Today, in cities such 
as Roanoke, Virginia, neighborhoods such as Gainsboro that were 
affected by waves of urban renewal beginning in the late 1940s – and that 
did not get the improvements or housing promised by city planners – 
have streetscapes with many empty lots, buildings held by absentee 
landlords, and decaying infrastructure (Fig. 3). Except for a few 
community centers, in particular the library, an important focal point of 
political resistance and intergenerational learning, the landscapes of this 
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neighborhood do not communicate healthy social webs maintained 
through everyday use. Despite its central location and its historic 
centrality and vibrancy for the city as a whole, the neighborhood has 
become what Marcuse (1997) calls an ‘outcast ghetto’, an area of the city 
that is even more segregated from mainstream political, social, cultural, 
and economic urban life than was the case in the 1950s to 1970s.  
 
Roanoke is what I would consider a ‘wounded city’; the social, cultural, 
and political histories of institutional racism that underlay the national 
policies of urban renewal in post-World War II America, and how they 
were interpreted and implemented in this city in a Jim Crow Southern 
region, continue to structure the larger urban geographies of Roanoke as 
well as the more particular attitudes toward this neighborhood and its 
inhabitants more than fty years later. To understand my notion of 
wounded cities as working metonymically and psychosocially, it is 
important to describe the complex interface between bodies, memory, 
social groups and the lived city, and affect.  
 
Fullilove (2004) interprets the history of urban renewal and African 
American displacement according to her concept of ‘root shock’. Root 
shock is ‘the traumatic stress reaction to the destruction of all or part of 
one’s emotional ecosystem’ (p. 11). Fullilove draws a parallel of root 
shock to the physiological shock experienced by a person who loses 
massive amounts of uid as a result of injury, a shock that threatens the 
whole body’s ability to function. Citing geographers such as Doreen 
Massey, planners such as Jane Jacobs, and social psychologists such as 
Kai Erikson, Fullilove describes place as having a central function in an 
individual’s emotional and social ecosystem (compare Tuan, 1977). For 
Fullilove, place is a kind of exoskeleton (personal conversation with 
author, 2009). As such, we can understand place as always becoming, as 
within and beyond us, and as functioning as a kind of social protective 
shell, an understanding that has resonance with some Native American 
philosophies of human-environment relations.  
 
When we move through and navigate our environments according to 
unlimited possible pathways, our patterns of movement are a kind of 
‘mazeway’ that also provides us with security: ‘Just as the body has a 
system to maintain its internal balance, so too, the individual has a way to 
maintain the external balance between himself and the world’ (Fullilove, 
2004, p. 11). 
 
Similarly, according to medical anthropologists Arthur and Joan 
Kleinman, bodily memory is often limited to discrete analyses of the 
brain, body, mind, or person only (Kleinman & Kleinman, 1994). They 
introduce the concept of ‘enacted assemblages’ to account for the 
‘interconnected cognitive, affective, and transpersonal processes’ of 
body-social memory (p. 719). Drawing upon Chinese conceptions of 
everyday life and social relations, the Kleinmans argue that the local 
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interpersonal world is the primary means through which sociosomatic 
processes shape the body and bodily processes shape social space.  
 
Fig. 3. Map of vacant properties in the Gainsboro neighborhood in 
Roanoke, Virginia, 2010.  
 
 
 
Note: GIS and image courtesy of Josephine V. Arbaugh. 
 
I understand Fullilove’s (2004) notion of mazeways and the Kleinmans’ 
concept of enacted assemblages helpful in understanding how embodied 
social spaces provide a personal and social shell (compare Kearns, 2006); 
when individuals are forced to leave their neighborhoods and their 
protective mazeways are destroyed and/or cannot be made, root shock, 
according to Fullilove, may stay with a person for a lifetime. Fullilove 
argues, moreover, that the physical fabric of the neighborhood one grows 
up in also provides the cues and opportunities for the intergenerational 
transmission of stories, and as such root shock may affect multiple 
generations. Thus root shock can be inherited through social, bodily, and 
place memory. Places, even when materially demolished, remained 
haunted by what Casey (2000) describes as the ‘unresolved remainders of 
memory’. For Casey, memory traces are ‘re-discovered’ with evolving 
circumstances through time (belatedness). These unresolved remainders 
‘do not consist of depositions laid down – as is assumed in theories 
preoccupied with leaving marks and traces in an unchanging material 
base – but in pathways that branch off every more diversely into a 
multiple futurity’ (p. 277). At some moments in time and in some places, 
we might encounter those residuals and move through pasts to possible 
futures and return differently to presents. Places are thus both personal 
and social, made of human and non-human lives. Through making and 
maintaining places, individuals sustain the mazeways and enacted 
assemblages created through personal, bodily, social, and material worlds.  
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Maintaining built environments, social relations, places, and everyday 
routines is also signicant in maintaining what Klinenberg (2002) 
describes as healthy social ecologies of place. For Klinenberg, the 
distinctive nature of urban life lies in its spatially distributed structures 
and textures. Ecological characteristics provide structure for individuals and 
social groups, and may include places of worship, schools, marketplaces, 
and parks. Social institutions that are located throughout neighborhoods 
offer regular activities and rhythms for local and social communities. The 
morphological qualities of place are the material and social environments that 
nurture inhabitants and offer support through familiarity, routine, 
aesthetically comfortable spaces, and a sense of belonging and security. 
Taken together, these social ecologies of place include everyday routines, 
social institutions, material landscapes (the fabric, taste, sounds, and 
scents of places), symbolic systems of meaning and identity, and shared 
memories. When those ecologies are damaged, individuals or groups will 
most likely experience root shock.  
 
Finally, the metaphor of wounded cities works psychosocially according 
to the intimate relationships individuals and groups have with places, and 
hence the city. In my ethnographic research, residents, former residents, 
and some of their children in cities as distinct as Roanoke and Bogotá, 
refer to particular places and to the city more generally as a kind of meta-
subject. I believe this is the case because, as I have argued above, places 
become part of us, even when held in common, through the intimate 
relationships individuals and groups have with places (Till, 2008). Yet 
these familiar resonances are not about territorial forms of marking or 
claiming ‘my’ spaces, but rather these attachments form the affective 
networks that give thick meaning to an inhabitant’s experience of place 
and the city. Rather than treat affect as emotions writ large, I follow 
Bennett’s (2005) understanding that ‘affects arise in places rather than 
human subjects’ (p. 10). This means that rather than analyze affect 
according to ‘identicatory relationships’, an approach that assumes that 
the origins of affect lie within individual human subjects, it makes more 
sense to understand the functions of affect according to its motility 
(Ibid). Such an understanding resonates with the ways that residents and 
artists speak about places, as having distinct presences – material, sensual, 
spiritual,and psychic – yet also acknowledges that places are also shared.  
 
While these everyday, embodied knowledges of inhabited places may be 
taken for granted, when residents are forcibly relocated to other parts of 
the city, individuals may become aware of the intensity of their place-
based attachments which have become severed, which may give rise to 
another level of loss that is deeper-seated and more chronic than the 
immediate losses resulting from destruction and/or displacement. When 
places are physically demolished, not only is the stability of the taken-for-
granted rhythms destroyed, an individual’s personal and intrasubjective 
emotional ecosystems become damaged. At the same time, Fullilove 
notes that when individuals try to reconnect after root shock, their 
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personal understanding of structural and institutional violence and 
injustice might result in the creation of healing places. I understand such 
place-making activities as a form of memory-work that may offer 
opportunities for relatedness – what psychiatrists call ‘milieu therapy’ 
(after Fullilove, 2004) – and forms of care.  
 
Towards a place-based ethics of care  
In June 2003, the skeletal remains of about 3000 slaves and members of 
the colonial lower classes were unearthed by construction workers at the 
historical area known as Prestwich Place in Cape Town, South Africa.8 
The 2800 square meter plot was once part of a much larger set of 
seventeenth and eighteenth century informal burial grounds. It is now 
located in the inner city precinct Green Point, where the highest priced 
real-estate in the country existed at the time of the unearthing. For more 
than a year, activists claiming descent from those buried at Prestwich 
Place halted the construction of a high-end boutique apartments, hotel, 
restaurant, and conference center, The Rockwell, by protesting the 
heritage authorities’ failure to provide an adequate public consultation 
process. The ‘Hands Off Prestwich Place’ protest resulted in a 
compromise solution, whereby the bones were exhumed and reburied in 
a more central memorial and exhibition complex in the city (Jonker & 
Till, 2009). As one activist reected:  
 
SA: .We kept candlelit vigils there [at Prestwich Place], 
letting the bones know we were there, that we were 
present, we were with them. As we stood, with the wind 
coming down from the mountain, the candles ickering, it 
was as though the bones were speaking to us.  
 
KT: And what did the bones say?  
 
SA: That they should not be forgotten again. They 
acknowledged our presence, grateful that we were with 
them (Abrahams, interview with author, Cape Town, 
2005).  
 
Stan is a highly educated and experienced person, whose experiences 
under the apartheid regime and following democratization would qualify 
him as a wise elder. Rather than cast away his comment as subjective or 
not meaningful, I understand Stan’s comment as a way to talk about the 
signicance of places in societies that have experienced extreme forms of 
violence. The memory-work of citizen groups and the ancestral dead that 
haunted Prestwich Place shifted the taken-for-grantedness of urban space 
in the city. No longer only considered real-estate to be marketed to 
foreign investors in the ‘new South Africa,’ activists claimed this place as 
belong to them as citizens of a larger society. Through candlelit vigils, 
8 My discussion of Prestwich Place is largely taken from Jonker and Till (2009).  
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legal challenges, public processions, public hearings hosted by 
community groups, and other actions, new political organizations were 
formed and national heritage legislation challenged. Activists’ protests 
and memory-work communicated their claims in terms of ancestry and 
the social right to determine the city’s future (Fig. 4).  
 
Fig. 4. ‘Hands Off Prestwich Place’ citizen protest actions, Cape Town, 
South Africa, 2003.  
 
 
 
Image courtesy of The District Six Museum.  
 
Their attentiveness to Prestwich Place also indicated a powerful spatial 
imaginary, one that clearly communicated that present and past are not 
inevitable. As part of us and yet socially shared, places may act as 
thresholds through which the living are able to make contact with those 
who have gone before, with human and nonhuman lives born and yet to 
come. Residents thus felt a moral and ethical set of obligations to this 
place and each other across multiple generations. Indeed, many activists, 
including Stan, were forcibly displaced from the homes during apartheid 
and relegated to extreme forms of hardship in marginal lands in the 
townships of the Cape Flats. Through their personal experiences of 
displacement and state-perpetrated racial violence, they connected with 
their ‘ancestors’’ histories of displacement during the colonial era. In 
other words, residents’ actions and voices communicated an experience 
of the city – their city – as inhabited by both the dead and the living, as a 
reservoir of multiple histories and stories, and as offering a range of 
possible futures, many of which are not yet ‘visible’ in dominant 
representations of the contemporary urban landscape. They also 
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understood their obligation to care for this place as a means to take care 
of each other.  
 
If one takes root shock seriously, then caring for place is a way to repair 
our worlds that may help create socially sustainable cities across 
generations (compare Spelman, 2002). According to Tronto (1993), and 
drawing upon her work with Fisher, care is a type of engagement with the 
world that is both rational and affective. It is a ‘species activity that 
includes everything that we do to maintain, continue, and repair our 
“world” so that we can live in it as well as possible’ (p. 103). There are 
four types of care that Tronto identies. First, ‘caring about’ someone or 
something asks individuals to recognize need in others, thereby resulting 
in attentiveness. Here I would include ‘caring about places’ as a type of 
care that encourages attentiveness in the ways that places are both deeply 
personal as well as socially shared. Second, ‘taking care of’ someone or 
something – and here I add place – means that one realizes he or she can 
get something done and sets that realization into action. Place-based 
caring can be as simple as picking up trash on the beach to hosting a 
neighborhood potluck to organizing political protest actions; such 
feelings and actions produce responsibility to oneself, to others, and to 
places, neighborhoods, and social communities. Third, ‘giving care’ 
means that the feeling of responsibility for doing the work of caring 
oneself and getting that work done produces competence in caring work. 
For example, as I have found working with residents in Roanoke, 
individuals may gain self-condence, leadership skills, and social respect 
when collaborating over months and years, and successfully creating a 
neighborhood community garden, particularly when confronting hostility 
or racism from city ofcials, environmentalists, and outsiders, and/or 
apathy amongst fellow neighbors. Fourth, ‘receiving care’ means that one 
makes sure the care work has been done and it has made things better; 
such a commitment produces responsiveness. This fourth type of care I 
would argue is not only the most difcult; receiving care also means that 
one must allow others to share in the responsibility of caring for oneself. 
To do this means to recognize the ‘other’ as different than the self in 
ways that might allow for an inclusiveness and openness, including also 
listening to others, enhancing one’s own sense of self-worth, and crafting 
new social shells. The responsiveness tied to accepting care means to 
engage from the standpoint of the other, but by not simply presuming 
that the other is exactly like oneself.  
 
To illustrate a place-based ethics of care I return to the opening 
performance of Project Prometeo to describe creative practices based in 
what I would call an ethnographic responsibility of giving back to those 
who share their stories and understandings about place. Project Prometeo 
was one of ve multi-year collaborative projects that constituted the 
series Art, Memory, and the City by the artistic collaborative Mapa Teatro 
Laboratory of Artists and El Cartucho residents during 2001-2005, 
during and after homes and neighborhoods were razed (Mapa Teatro 
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Laboratoria des Artes, nd). The initial stages of Project Prometeo were tied 
to a larger initiative by the City of Bogotá Mayor’s Ofce, commissioned 
by Antanas Mockus who was mayor from 2001 through 2003. 
 
When he was elected mayor in 2000, he could not stop the park project 
underway, but once in ofce secured United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP) funds and provided local funding for what became 
known as ‘Cúndua’, a series of collaborations and projects with 
anthropologists, historians, and artists working with local residents from 
two ‘slums’, including El Cartucho (Abderhalden & Aristizábal, nd). 
While this liberal approach to recognizing past wrongs did not resolve 
larger social and structural inequities in the city, nor did it provide direct 
economic assistance to displaced residents, there were unexpected 
collaborations and outcomes resulting from these projects with local 
citizens. When Mapa Teatro’s creative practice of working with residents 
on open-ended projects that had no stated clear ‘outcomes’ clashed with 
ofcial demands, they began to work independently and raised their own 
funds to continue their collaborations. Rather than create projects that 
were limited by external demands, either to work within locations and 
timelines dictated by developers or according to government outcomes-
based criteria, Mapa chose instead to let the creative practice guide 
outcomes and processes, thereby exploring new spaces of imagination 
with residents that resulted in performances, exhibitions, and installations 
in different public spaces in the city.  
 
The many years of collaborative engagement involved in the place-
specic performances of Project Prometeo included all the types of care and 
ethical qualities previously discussed (Till, 2010b). Caring about places 
and inhabitants began at the outset when Mapa confronted their own 
biases and stereotypes about the neighborhood, and later developed 
relations of trust with a small group of residents initially at their homes 
(before demolition) or visiting displaced residents in temporary housing 
structures. According to Abderhalden Cortés of Mapa Teatro (interview 
with author, 2008), the realization that the city’s patrimony was to be 
materially lost initiated a creative and relational artistic process. That 
realization was tied to ‘taking care of’ and ‘giving care’ to residents, their 
stories, and their neighborhood being razed. After getting to know some 
residents, listening to their needs and offering what assistance they could, 
they began to work with residents on documenting their stories, 
memories, and experiences of their neighborhood in transition, recording 
on-site interviews, developing memory walks, locating historical images, 
creating mental maps, and videotaping scenes of destruction. They later 
organized workshops at an old building that they were later to purchase, 
where they met for group meals (a social ritual), bodywork, 
brainstorming, developing writing and acting circles, and facilitating 
support sessions; through these regular workshops, residents ‘received 
care’ as well cared for each other during their transitions.  
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According to Tronto, care challenges the Western Enlightenment 
assumption that individuals are autonomous and self-supporting, forcing 
us to recognize that not all humans are treated equally in society. Mapa 
Teatro acknowledged and honored the expert knowledges of locals and 
of inhabited places, and explored those situated knowledges through 
open-ended and intuitive creative practices. Even as residents were 
unfairly and structurally excluded from accessing the central spaces and 
resources of the city as a result of urban renewal, the artists created a 
shared symbolic space and later offered a temporary material place for 
displaced individuals to return. As they worked in teams of different 
capacities in unanticipated ways, residents could share their fears and 
memories with others; they could feel unsettled about their loss and 
unwanted transition as they explored their attachments to a place that 
would always be within them. Both artists and residents thus ‘received 
care’ in unexpected ways, changing how they worked and interacted with 
others and the city. Some of those relationships continued beyond the 
life of these projects. Moreover, not only did the performances ask other 
residents, politicians, and audiences to ‘care about’ the stories, lives, and 
places attached to El Cartucho, their creative work with residents was a 
form of ‘taking care of’ a neighborhood and larger city that was 
wounded, even as they were experiencing root shock. By performing 
their myths and stories, residents gave and received care by sharing their 
intimate relationships with place.  
 
The outcomes of Mapa Teatro’s collaborations with residents made the 
quotidian textures of place visible to a more general public through city 
mappings and walks; domestic installations; video projections on exterior 
walls of buildings and in public squares; street, body, and landscape 
ethnographies; intergenerational memory books; and post-demolition 
archeologies. Through multi-and mixed-media, site-specic and traveling 
installations, exhibitions and performances in different settings and with 
different audiences, the artist-resident teams invited guests and 
performers alike to move between realms of the real and symbolic, the 
material and the metaphorical, the perceived and remembered, the 
experienced and imagined. Signicantly, these artforms should not be 
interpreted as art according to ‘crude empathy’ that exploits embodied 
perception to promote critical awareness (after Bennett, 2005). The 
performances of place by former residents had the potential to transform 
memories of violence to shared stories of relevance and critical self-
reection through the co-construction of what Mapa call ‘temporary 
communities of the imagination’ (Mapa Teatro webpage, nd). I 
understand these temporary communities as a form of political 
witnessing. For performance theorist Talyor (1997), witnessing is an 
active, not passive, role for audiences. Drawing upon the history of the 
Greek chora, it is the witness’ job to challenge the plot, interrupt actions, 
and reinterpret events. Speaking of Latin American theater, Talyor notes 
that witnessing demands an acceptance of ‘the heavy weight of sorrow’, 
but it may also ‘broaden the scope of the possible, expand the audience, 
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and allow for a wider range of responses’ (p. 265). The performances of 
Project Prometeo thus did not invite empathy grounded in afnity, such as 
indicated with the phrase, ‘I feel for you’, a response based upon 
imagining what it would be like to be another person, to occupy 
another’s situation and life experience. Rather, the performances offered 
audiences what Bennett (2005) calls ‘empathic vision’, or affective and 
critical forms of awareness based upon ‘a feeling for another that entails an 
encounter with something irreducible and different, often inaccessible’ 
(p. 10). Project Prometeo conveyed shared traumas and memories – as 
inhabited by different people – and offered moments, through art, 
imagination, experience, and reection, of collective witnessing rather 
than spectatorship (compare Ranciére, 2009).  
 
Concluding notes  
What would it mean to think about cities marked by past structures of 
violence and exclusion as wounded but also as environments that offer 
its residents care? What the artists and residents in wounded cities teach 
us through their memory-work and practices of care-giving and -receiving 
is to respect those who have gone before, attend to past injustices that 
continue to haunt current planning and governance styles, and treat the 
past as a dynamic resource in imagining different urban futures. Casey 
(2000) suggests that in body memory, place memory, and social rituals 
these unresolved residuals of memory nd refuge. People need to be 
recognized and recognize themselves in their social and physical 
environments to be able to give and accept care across generations. 
When individuals return to places that have witnessed pain and violence, 
but are now being cared for and may offer care, they can be again 
surrounded by living memory and emotional attachments, providing a 
safe space for personal self-reection, discovery, and change.  
 
I began this paper asserting the need to retheorize the city across theory, 
inhabitation, and praxis, and why such an approach and attitude must 
inform urban political agendas. North American urban geography has 
tended to emphasize economic and Marxist interpretations of the city 
when seeking to imagine possible political change and more just urban 
futures. As Lefebvre has reminded us, however, a class-based revolution 
is not enough. We also need love and play (after Shields, 1999), which is 
why Lefebvre turned to Nietzsche to negotiate Marx. While this paper 
has been a more modest discussion than Lefebvre’s about the city as 
oeuvre, there are some similarities. It is informed by philosophy, social 
psychiatry, and creative practice, and is grounded in an ethnographic and 
ethical sensibility that I believe needs to be at the heart of retheorizing 
the way we, as political geographers, think, write, and educate about 
urban politics, about what the city means, and about more socially just 
futures.  
 
Neighborhood transition must be considered as both loss and 
opportunity. When some parts of the city become disconnected from 
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other social spaces, one approach to creating more socially sustainable 
neighborhoods in the future might include artistic experiments with 
communities and interim spaces of encounter (compare Till, 2011). 
Through experimental communities, residents, city professionals, and 
visitors can explore the lingering and possible pathways of remnant 
landscapes, material objects, forms of belonging, and transgenerational 
revenants that exist in and through place. Interdisciplinary teams (that 
should include residents, practitioners, and artists) should be required for 
conceptualizing, designing, and implementing particular planning and 
development projects. These teams would acknowledge different forms 
of expertise. I have suggested here that artistic practices may enable a 
place-based ethics of care that also respects unfolding and open-ended 
pathways of memory and belonging. Memory-work thus contributes to 
what Pieterse (2008) describes as ‘radical incrementalism’, a ‘sensibility of 
ethical searching’ that trusts ‘deliberate actions of social transformation 
through ‘a multiplicity of processes and imaginations’ (p. 7-6). The 
projects that result from these open-ended exploratory practices, 
moreover, honor and encourage residents’ right to the city by respecting 
the particular histories and social networks of neighborhoods and cities 
as already-lived-in places, and encourage responsibility and respon-
siveness to the city and other inhabitants. If, as citizens, we understand 
that part of our rights and duties include a responsibility to each other 
and to the places we inhabit, then we may move from audience to witness 
to care-giver. This place-based ethical responsibility, tied to a sense of 
active citizenship and radical democracy, also demands a new way of 
understanding urban planning, policy, development agendas and 
transformation, a point that I leave for future conversations.  
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CHAPTER 33 
 
THE GEOGRAPHICAL IMAGINATION OF LUKA BLOOM 
 
GERRY KEARNS 
 
First published on NUIM Geography’s Eye on the world, 
http://nuimgeography.wordpress.com, Sept 26, 2011. 
 
There are very many geographical themes and metaphors in the songs of 
Luka Bloom. If we take Geography as being concerned with, to 
paraphrase Alexander von Humboldt (1769-1859), the study of the Earth 
as our home and if we follow the common practice of identifying Space, 
Place, and Environment as the fundamental building blocks of 
geographical theory, then, Luka Bloom’s art is profoundly geographical. 
 
Let me begin with environment or nature. About half the songs written 
by Luka Bloom have nature as a direct concern or a central metaphor. 
Antinuclear politics are evident in several songs including, ‘Rainbow 
Warrior’, a celebration of the Greenpeace campaign to end French 
nuclear testing in the Pacific Ocean. There is also a surprising 
commentary upon the environmental damage wrought by consumerism 
expressed in a song of respect for a homeless man whose ‘CO2 emissions 
are pretty much zero […] a model urban citizen’ unlike the singer for ‘if 
everyone lived like me, we’d need about four planets just to keep it all 
going’ (‘Homeless’). Metaphors drawn from nature are ubiquitous from 
the contemplation of endless change in ‘Here and Now’, to the 
comparison of the fever of love to the rush of a rain in ‘Love is a 
Monsoon’. There are dozens more and certain motifs return. For a child 
of the Midlands, Bloom has a perhaps surprising love of the sea. 
‘Moonslide’ treats the plunge of commitment as akin to swimming while 
‘Salt Water’ treats swimming in the sea as perhaps an activity out of time 
that releases someone, at least for a time, from the claims of history. 
There is something pagan and pantheistic about the reverence for nature 
in these songs. It is ‘[o]utside the churchyard walls’ that one Sunday, the 
singer offers the sacrament of song, for ‘[e]very note is sacred | Every 
word’s a little prayer | As the blackbird’s call | Or the last leaf’s fall’ 
(‘Sunday’). In ‘The shape of love to come,’ the singer remarks that 
‘[p]eople are leaving God’s houses | Looking for footprints in the sand’ 
and goes on to anticipate a love of nature celebrated in the open air of a 
circle rather than the cloistered space of a church. 
 
If place is a sort of effect produced by people being in each other’s 
presence, then, as we know, this can produce a strong sense of 
rootedness although that is certainly not the only form of place that 
matters. Luka Bloom was born in Newbridge, Kildare. The region 
features in several of his songs. I just described as a broadly pagan 
account of the worship of nature, ‘The shape of love to come,’ yet the 
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song also recalls Brigid with her ‘cell of oak’ and Luka Bloom has shown 
a particular reverence for the memory of the patron saint of Kildare. In 
1995 he was involved with a music festival associated with St Brigid’s 
feastday, ‘singing The Curragh of Kildare to accompany the lighting of St 
Brigid’s flame on the Hill of Allen’ although in talking of this event he 
made a fairly secular pitch for tourism: ‘[t]he fire has been lit and there’s 
no going back […]. From now on we have to make sure that Kildare is 
seen as a place to come to rather than to come through.’1 More recently, 
in praise of Maura ‘Soshin’ O’Halloran (1955-82), a young Irish-
American woman who trained as a Buddhist monk in Japan but who then 
died in a coach crash while on her way back to Ireland to set up a Zen 
centre, Luka Bloom offered that ‘She could have become a 20th Century 
Brigid.’2 The Brigid that he cherishes in ‘Don’t be afraid of the light that 
shines within you’ has more to do with nature and the seasons than with 
any specifically Christian witness and it is perhaps the goddess Brigid 
who rather presides over his prayer: ‘[o]ut of the cold, dark winter space 
| We come together, looking for Brigid’s grace | We dip our open hands 
deep into the well.’ 
 
Kildare as a place is championed in the very funny, ‘I’m a bogman,’ a 
song which challenges what the singer feels as the condescension of so 
many towards the Midlands, a place with ‘[n]othing to do for the body | 
Nothing to do for head.’ For Luka Bloom, though, the bog promises 
‘[t]urf smell’ that ‘warms hearts | ’Til the huggin’ and kissin’ starts | Bog 
love surrounds you | A beautiful place to come to.’ He even called one 
of his albums, ‘Turf’ (1994). 
 
There is an achingly beautiful evocation of place in another song that 
relates place to memory, to death, and to continuity. In ‘Sanctuary’, Luka 
Bloom contrasts the ‘calm’ of the Kildare fields with the ‘shock’ of time 
passing, as registered in the ‘loss’ of someone very dear to the singer. But 
he can ‘leave daffodils where you lie’ and be warmed by a memory that is 
as ‘[a]n easy voice making everything all right | Sanctuary.’ A sense of 
rootedness is produced by the association of one’s co-presence with 
someone very dear in that place, and then of one leaving that person’s 
body into the soil of that place. Yet, not all is dead and interred with their 
bones. In another arresting elegy, ‘The man is a alive’, he sings of being 
‘brought up near the riverside | In a quiet Irish town | An eighteen-
month-old baby |the night they laid my daddy down.’ This did indeed 
happen3 but in the song Luka Bloom finds that his father is yet alive, 
‘[a]live and breathing | The man is alive in me.’ If the son brings the 
father with him, so will home, place and people also travel. In ‘Tribe’, 
1 Katie Donovan, ‘Kildare festival remembers St Brigid,’ Irish Times (3 February 1995) 2. 
2 Quentin Fottrell, ‘Reviews, cues and predictions,’ Irish Times (3 January 2009) B16. Luka 
Bloom has himself written a song in her honour, ‘Soshin. 
3  Andrea Smith, ‘Brothers striking a chord: Christy Moore and Luka Bloom have inspired 
each other through lives filled with music,’ Sunday Independent (9 August 2009). 
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Luka Bloom asserts that ‘[h]ome’s a place inside, I take it with me | I 
meet my tribe wherever I may be.’ This conclusion was wrested from the 
strict schoolmaster of the open road and it recalls directly the central 
chapter in James Joyce’s Ulysses where another Bloom, Leopold, the 
Irish-Jewish man, is baited with the question, ‘But do you know what a 
nation means?’4 In the song, Luka Bloom is dissatisfied with those who 
‘stand saluting, saying this is who I am | A piece of cloth, a field, an 
island’ and recalling that ‘Joyce lies in Zurich, Beckett lies in France’ asks 
‘[w]hat anthem has the tune to their dance’ before posing the rhetorical 
question, ‘[w]ho is my tribe, is it only green | Or is it the rainbow of my 
dreams.’ 
 
Those dreams were, in large part, ‘Dreams in America.’ The wisdom of 
‘Tribe’ comes from travel, diversity of experience, and the different 
lessons to be learned from the various ways of living of different people 
in different places. Recalling among other things perhaps, W. B. Yeats 
criticism of the fanatic that ‘[h]earts with one purpose alone | Through 
summer and winter seem | Enchanted to a stone,’5 an early song about 
leaving Ireland used the image of the ‘Treaty Stone’, to represent 
Ireland.6 Although the Treaty Stone recalls the conquest of 1691, the 
notion of an Ireland ossified by an inglorious treaty could as easily apply 
to the state of politics in the Republic at the time that the song was 
published (1978) with the contending parties of national politics claiming 
to distinguish themselves from each other on the basis of their attitude 
towards the Treaty that created the Irish Free State in 1921. In the song, 
he promises soon to ‘leave the treaty | Say goodbye to the stone’ 
admitting only that he is ‘sometimes sad to go.’ In another early song, 
‘Mother, father, son’, a son tells his parents that he has no wish to go 
back to their home, ‘[n]o I won’t go back there | Not this time’ for 
‘[c]hasing wealth and discipline | Have been your only goals’ and he can 
no long live with the injunction to ‘[h]ide your feelings.’ In his mid-
twenties he spent time in Holland but in his early thirties, he left Ireland 
for the United States and Barry Moore now became Luka Bloom, after 
the affecting Suzanne Vega song about child abuse, ‘My name is Luka,’ 
and the pacifist hero of James Joyce’s Ulysses, Leopold Bloom. 
 
Using the relations between how life is lived at different locations to 
think about proper conduct is certainly to invoke the geographical 
framework of space. One of the songs on his first album as Luka Bloom 
concerned a Chilean exile, ‘Rodrigo’, living in the United States but who 
is drawn home by fond memories. But he arrives to find the place turned 
into a charnel house by the vicious military and ‘[o]ne young Chilean 
soldier smiles to his friends |And douses Rodrigo’s body in gasoline.’ 
4 James Joyce, Ulysses (London: Bodley Head, 1986 [first edition, 1922]) ch.12, l. 1419. 
5 W. B. Yeats, ‘Easter, 1916’ [1916], ll 41-3, in idem, The Poems (London: Everyman, 1990) 
229. 
6 The Treaty Stone is in Limerick and is reputedly the surface on which the treaty of 1691 
was signed. 
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Nostalgia is a treacherous siren. Safe in New York, Luka Bloom took 
pleasure in being ‘An Irishman in Chinatown’: ‘[s]he says “I come from 
China” | I says “I’m from Ireland” | And “Isn’t this a fine small world.”’ 
A ‘fine small world’, indeed, and several songs from this period give a 
sense of comparisons being made. In ‘100,000’, he explains why illegal 
Irish workers want to stay in the United States since back home in 
Ireland is no place for ‘a young lad | there is only bitching and 
begrudging and there’s no jobs.’ In ‘Colourblind’, he sings of ‘[a] rainbow 
of faces’ that ‘walks alongside me, right beside me.’ The melting pot of 
New York promises a chance to ‘let go of all the pain I left behind,’ to 
‘leave my Irishness at home,’ to ‘leave all sense of race behind | To be 
among you colourblind.’ But four years in the United States was enough 
and he sang in ‘This is your country’ of feeling a ‘tug […] | Inside your 
heart’ which recalls the happy days of youth ‘[b]efore the age of the cruel 
and the unkind’ and which ‘is your country waiting for you | Come back 
home.’ 
 
But a mind enriched by life in Europe, in the United States, and soon 
nourished also by extended stays in Australia, would not confront Ireland 
in quite the same way as before. Local engagements could now be 
nourished with foreign experience. 
 
Thus in ‘Freedom Song’, the attempted eviction of a Dublin traveler 
community is resisted by one woman who stood her ground to assert her 
dignity and her dream that her children should be ‘loved | As Irish 
brothers and sisters by and by’ and in the song Nan Joyce is inspired 
directly by the example of Rosa Parks with her comparable fight for fair 
treatment on behalf of African-Americans through the bus boycott in 
Montgomery, Alabama: ‘[s]he lit the flame and the fire is still burning | 
Inside every heart that’s longing to be free.’7 
  
In ‘Gypsy music,’ he turns the comparison around and uses the freedom 
and mobility of the traveler lifestyle as a new paradigm for the post-1989 
Europe where ‘[a]ll the old walls are tumbling down | Bringing us 
freedom for moving around.’ The mobility of movement in space is a 
very important imaginative resource in Luka Bloom’s songs. In ‘Change’, 
he enjoys ‘the moment of change […] when the road is clear.’ Just as he 
celebrates freedom as movement, so that means he accepts the immigrant 
as readily as he does the emigrant. With the brilliant phrase, ‘No matter 
7 Nan Joyce is a traveller woman who has collected songs and stories and whose life story 
has been published: Nan Joyce, Traveller: An autobiography (Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1985). 
There is a discussion of this book in Paul Delaney, ‘Sean Maher and Nan Joyce,’ Studies: An 
Irish Quarterly Review 93:372 (2004) 461-472. Rosa Parks (1913-2005) was a civil rights activist 
in the United States who began a boycott of local buses in Montgomery, Alabama, when, on 
1 December 1955, she refused to move out of a seat in the whites-only (front) part of the 
bus when asked. You can watch an inspiring interview with her at the following address: 
http://eclipse.wustl.edu:7070/iml04/iml04_vid_parksI2.mp4.
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where you go, there you are,’ Luka Bloom knits together space and place. 
In this marvellous song, a young Muslim forced out of his country by his 
refusal to go to war, finds a new home in the sound of the Irish music he 
first hears in Paris and that he follows to Galway, ‘[f]or the music in his 
spirit, is his shelter and his home | Mohammed’s fir ignited with the 
ancient jigs and reels.’ 
 
These connections and comparisons between here and there might be 
thought of as a sort of spatial moral imagination. With ‘I am not at war 
with anyone,’ Luka Bloom insists that he doesn’t ‘need to be friends with 
everyone |But I’d like to live in peace with everyone | This rush to war 
is wrong | And so I sing this song | I am not at war with anyone.’ In 
‘Listen to the hoofbeat,’ Luka Bloom sings of a Native American 
‘medicine man’ who brings the tribes together, calling for ‘[s]haking off 
ancient pains’, ‘a wiping of tears’ and thereby ‘mending the sacred hoop.’ 
The relevance to Ireland was only implicit in that song but has been 
explicit in some of Luka Bloom’s newer songs about Irish history. He 
invites people to set past hurts aside for there is little to be gained in 
‘[c]ounting our sins on the path to forgiveness | Hoping we’re heard by a 
merciful witness.’ Far better, as in the title of the song, to engage with 
‘Right here, right now.’ Making peace with the past is the only way to 
engage fully with the present and in ‘Forgiveness’ he sings of the ‘[o]ne 
word’ which ‘[b]rings freedom home at last’: ‘Forgiveness … | For the 
ancient wounds still hurting | For the wrongs I’ve never known | For all 
the children left to die | Near fields where corn was grown.’ In ‘The 
miracle cure,’ he promises ‘[n]o losers, no winners | In forgiveness | 
Together we’re free.’ 
 
It may be that only someone who spent time away from Ireland could 
put forgiveness and the famine in the same song, only the imagination of 
space and not just place could recognize that much hurt is indeed for 
wrongs that the present generation has never truly known. This fierce 
adherence to nonviolence has been nurtured by the travels of Luka 
Bloom. It has been fed by his appreciation in the United States of the 
achievements of the civil rights movement there, and has also been 
watered by Buddhist teaching. Luka Bloom has great respect for the 
Dalai Lama and has not only written a song about him, ‘As I waved 
goodbye,’ but also has performed the song as the curtain raiser for the 
monk’s Australian concerts. In ‘Primavera’ Luka Bloom continues with 
his reflections upon the need to cultivate an ethic of nonviolence as the 
only salve for ‘this cold, dogmatic world | Where the righteous are on 
song | They talk God on every side | And all humility is gone.’ 
Cultivating humility through experience is part of this troubadour’s 
métier and while ‘Background Noise’ dramatizes doubt – ‘[w]hat the hell 
do I know– | Crying out for love,’ it also gives the reassurance of lofty 
ambition – ‘[w]e all need a new speech– | The words of love.’ There is 
true grandeur in the geographical imagination of Luka Bloom. 
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Introduction 
Conceptual Rainfall Runoff (CRR) models forced with regional climate 
change scenarios downscaled from Global Climate Models (GCMs) are 
widely employed to assess the impacts of climate change at the catchment 
scale. This approach is subject to a range of uncertainties associated with 
future emissions of greenhouse gases, the response of the climate system 
to these changes at global and local scales, and uncertainties associated 
with the impact models. These uncertainties then cascade through the 
climate change impact assessment methodology with potentially large 
uncertainties associated with critical future impacts at the local scale 
where key decisions are required in order to increase the resilience of 
water supply management and infrastructure to future changes. Given 
that uncertainty in modelling will not be significantly reduced in the short 
or medium term future, ensuring that potentially expensive and 
irreversible adaptation decisions made now are robust to the uncertainty 
in future climate change impacts means that considerable effort is 
required in investigating and quantifying sources of uncertainty.      
 
Output from GCMs are based upon the fundamental laws of physics 
embodied within models and assumptions on the concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. As these GCMs differ in the way 
they simplify the climate system, and aggregate the process in space and 
time, future projections of water resources are dependent upon the 
choice of GCMs employed (Prudhomme et al., 2003). Utilization of 
information from different models has been widely used to address these 
uncertainties. Giorgi and Mearns (2002) introduced the Reliability 
Ensemble Averaging (REA) method for calculating uncertainty ranges 
from ensembles of different Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation 
Models (AOGCMs). Similarly, Tebaldi et al (2005) extended the REA 
method and proposed a Bayesian statistical model that combines 
information from a multimodal ensemble of AOGCMs and observations 
to determine probability distributions of future temperature change on a 
regional scale. Several studies have used the output archived in Coupled 
Model Inter-comparison Projects to account for uncertainty in GCMs 
(e.g., Solomon et al., 2007), while several others have used the output 
from perturbed physics ensembles to evaluate the uncertainties arising 
from GCM model formulation (e.g.,Murphy et al. 2007). 
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Output from GCMs reproduce the global and continental scale climate 
fairly well, however, they are inadequate in impact studies due to the 
differences in the spatial scale of the GCM and the output needed for 
impact studies (Wilby and Wigley, 1997). This limitation has been widely 
addressed through the use of regionalisation techniques to downscale 
large scale simulations from GCMs. In the last decade a number of 
methods have been employed, particularly empirical statistical 
downscaling and the deployment of Regional Climate Models (RCMs), 
with techniques differing in the way they reproduce various statistical 
characteristics of observed data (Wilby and Wigley, 1997, Khan et al., 
2009).  
 
In an attempt to quantify major sources of uncertainties associated with 
climate change impact assessment, New and Hulme (2000) presented an 
approach to quantifying uncertainites associated with the estimation of 
future greenhouse gas emissions, the climate sensitivity, and limitations 
and unpredictability in GCMs. Similarly, Horton et al. (2006) analysed the 
uncertainty induced by the use of different state of the art climate models 
on the prediction of climate-change impacts on the runoff regimes of 11 
mountainous catchments in the swiss Alps.  
 
However, most of the studies utilized a single hydrological model and 
ignored the modelling uncertainties associated with the structure of such 
models. Hydrological models are inherently imperfect because they 
abstract and simplify real patterns and processes that are themselves 
imperfectly known and understood. Furthermore, experiences with the 
calibration of hydrological models suggests that their parameters are 
inherently uncertain. Though many studies have addressed the issues of 
parameter uncertainty, very few have looked at the uncertainties related 
to model structure, particularly in the context of climate change 
assessments.  
 
Since the role of uncertainties derived from hydrological modelling in 
impact assessment has received much less attention, this study attempts 
to identify the role of the selection and parameterisation of hydrological 
models on the overall uncertainty envelop involved in evaluating the 
impact of climate change on water resources at the catchment scale. The 
paper is structured as follow: Section 2 considers the sources of 
uncertainties in rainfall runoff modelling and techniques employed to 
quantify prediction uncertainties. Section 3 provides an overview of the 
study basins and climate scenarios, the hydrological models employed 
and methods employed to account for the different uncertainties that are 
associated with studying the impact of climate change on water resource. 
Results are outlined in section 4.   
 
Uncertainties in CRR Models 
Despite their acknowledge limitations, CRR models continue to be widely 
used for assessing the impacts of climate change on water resources and 
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for projecting potential ranges of impacts from scenarios of future 
change. CRR models use relatively simple mathematical equations to 
conceptualize and aggregate the complex, spatially distributed, and highly 
interrelated water, energy, and vegetation processes in a watershed. Due 
to the randomness in nature and the lack of complete knowledge of the 
hydrological system, uncertainty is an unavoidable element in any 
hydrologic modelling study (Beven, 2000; Gupta et al., 2003). In 
hydrological modelling, uncertainty stems from a variety of sources such 
as; data uncertainty, parameter uncertainty, model structural uncertainty 
and state uncertainty.  
 
An extensive review of the causes of uncertainty in hydrological model 
and various methods for assessing the uncertainty can be found in 
Melching (1995). The climate change/hydrological modelling literature 
has mostly focused on the prediction uncertainty arising from model 
parameters (Kuczera and Parent, 1998; Steele-Dunne et al. 2009), despite 
the fact that uncertainties resulting from dependence on a single 
conceptual-mathematical model are typically much larger than those 
introduced through the inadequate choice of model parameter values 
(e.g., Carrera and Neuman 1986). Larger differences in the model results 
are likely to occur when different model structures are used to simulate 
the hydrological impact of the postulated climate changes thereby 
increasing the uncertainty of the future discharge prediction considerably 
(e.g., Jiang et al., 2007).  
 
To examine the impact of model structure error and complexity on 
model performance and modelling uncertainty, Butts et al., 2004 used 
multi-model ensembles for the Distributed hydrological Model Inter 
comparison study watersheds. Their work suggests the importance of 
considering uncertainty for streamflow forecasting and the utility of 
multiple model ensembles to consider model parametric and structural 
uncertainty. A review on the range of strategies for assessing structural 
uncertainties in environmental modelling is available in Refsgaard et al., 
2006. These strategies can be broadly grouped into two depending upon 
weather or not target data is available. In the application of hydrological 
models in climate change impact assessment, the structure of the 
hydrological model cannot be assessed directly using observations. 
Therefore, the main strategy to account for modelling uncertainties is to 
extrapolate future conditions with multiple conceptual models.   
 
Methods for assessing uncertainty 
Among various methods for assessing the uncertainty of hydrological 
models, the Generalized Likelihood Uncertainty Estimation (GLUE) 
method (Beven and Binley, 1992) has been extensively used (e.g. Freer et 
al., 2004). The GLUE method is based on the premise that for a 
physically based hydrological model, no single optimum parameter set 
exists; rather a range of different sets of model parameter values may 
represent the process equally well. Different model structures, as well as 
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different parameter sets in a particular model structure, can be easily 
combined within this framework. The technique is based on Monte Carlo 
simulation where a model is run a large number of times with different 
parameter sets. In GLUE, it is assumed that the error associated with a 
particular model (parameter set) will be similar in prediction to those 
found in calibration. More details on GLUE can be found in (Beven and 
Binley, 1992; Freer et al., 1996; Montanari, 2005). The major output of 
the GLUE method for assessing uncertainty is the prediction interval at 
each time step bounded by the lower prediction and upper prediction 
limit. To examine the capability of the prediction intervals to capture the 
observed values, an index defined as the ratio of the number of the 
observations falling within their respective prediction intervals to the 
total number of observations is normally used (e.g., Montanari, 2005). If 
prediction bounds are large enough to include most of the observations, 
it means that parameter variability alone can compensate for other 
sources of error, such as measurement and model structure errors and 
thus it can account for the total output uncertainty. The performance of 
median values Q50 is also usually judged using the Nash Sutcliffe 
criterion. Furthermore, an average prediction interval defined by the 
average prediction bounds of a particular confidence level can be used as 
a measure to reflect the uncertainties in the modelling process.  
 
Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) is a standard statistical post processing 
tool. It can be used to account for model uncertainty by combining 
predictive distributions from different sources (Raftery et al. 2005). The 
application of BMA is growing in a multimodel ensemble of AOGCMs to 
produce mean and probabilistic climate change projections (e.g., Tebaldi 
et al., 2005; Min et al., 2007). In BMA the predictive probability density 
function (PDF) of any quantity of interest is a weighted average of PDFs 
centered on the individual forecasts, where the weights are equal to 
posterior probabilities of the models generating the forecasts and reflect 
the models' relative contributions to predictive skill over the training 
period. The BMA weights can be used to assess the usefulness of 
ensemble members, and this can be used as a basis for selecting ensemble 
members for prediction. Duan et al., 2007 explored the use of the BMA 
scheme to develop more skilful and reliable probabilistic hydrologic 
predictions from multiple competing predictions made by several 
hydrologic models. Dual et al showed that the BMA scheme has the 
advantage of generating more skilful and equally reliable probabilistic 
predictions than the original ensemble. 
 
Methodology 
 
Study region and data 
The area of focus for this study is Republic of Ireland (Fig. 1). In 
particular, the impact of climate change on water resources at the 
catchments scale is investigated using four Irish catchments (see Fig 1), 
namely the river Blackwater at Ballyduff (2302 km2), the river Suck at 
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Bellagill (1219 km2), the Moy at Rahans (1803 km2), and the Boyne at 
Slane (2452 km2). These four catchments were selected so that they 
represent the diverse hydrological responses of different catchments 
located throughout the Republic of Ireland. Table one provides an 
overview of key catchment descriptors.  
  
Figure 1. Location of case study catchments 
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Table 1. Catchment Descriptors 
 
 
 
Six sets of statistically downscaled climate scenarios derived from three 
GCMs and two emission scenarios, namely A2 and B2, downscaled for 
Ireland by Fealy and Sweeney (2007) were used to characterise future 
climate evolutions. The GCMs considered included: HADCM3 from the 
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Hadley Centre for Climate Prediction and Research (Met Office, UK); 
CCGCM2, from the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis 
(CCCMA; Canada) and CSIRO-Mk2 from the Commonwealth Science 
and Industrial Research Organisation (CSIRO, Australia).  The A2 and 
B2 scenarios represent future emissions levels that could be considered 
‘medium-high’ (A2 emission) and ‘medium-low’ (B2 emission). Though 
A2 and B2 encompass most of the range of the Special Report on 
Emissions Scenarios (SRES), the inclusion of A1F1 and B1, the high and 
low scenarios would allow a larger proportion of the range of future 
emissions to be included. A fully probabilistic assessment of future 
regional climate change and its impacts requires more scenarios of 
radiative forcing. However, they are not readily available, because no 
climate modelling centre has performed GCM simulations for more than 
a few emissions scenarios for Ireland. Though this limitation can be 
partly addressed using pattern scaling methodologies, which have been 
widely used to provide climate change projections for time periods and 
emission scenarios that have not been simulated by GCMs, the 
assumption is only weakly valid for precipitation (Mitchell, 2003), a 
primary input to hydrological models. Therefore in this study we only 
utilized the time series of downscaled data derived from three GCMs 
forced with two scenarios (e.g. A2, B2). The future potential 
evapotranspiration used is not a direct output of GCM, but is estimated 
based upon present climate using Hargreaves method, a radiation based 
empirical model popularly used for the simulation of potential 
evapotranspiration, for each of the GCMs. Furthermore, observed stream 
flow data from the Office of Public Works (available at 
http://www.opw.ie/hydro/), and observed precipitation and temperature 
data from Met Éireann, the Irish National Meteorological Service were 
used. 
 
CRR models selected 
From among the large number of models that can be used for the 
purpose of modelling flow in catchments, we selected the following four 
conceptual rainfall runoff models: 
 
a). TOPMODEL; a variable contributing area physically-conceived semi-
distributed hydrological model.  In TOPMODEL distributed predictions 
of catchment response are made based on a simple theory of hydrological 
similarity of points in a catchment. These points of hydrological similarity 
are identified by an index that is derived from catchment topography.  
TOPMODEL uses several assumptions to relate, in a simple way, the 
down slope flow rate at each point and the discharge at the catchment 
outlet which are as follows: (1) the water table is approximately parallel to 
the topographic surface; (2) the saturated hydraulic conductivity falls off 
exponentially with depth; and (3) the water table is recharged at a 
spatially uniform, steady rate that is slow enough, relative to the response 
timescale of the watershed, to allow the assumption of a water table 
distribution that is always at equilibrium. These assumptions permit 
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reconstruction of the spatial variability of catchment response to 
meteorological forcing solely from modelling of the response of the 
mean state. This quasi stochastic approach is at once computationally 
efficient while still permitting dynamic representations of physical 
processes within the system. Detailed descriptions of TOPMODEL and 
its mathematical formulation can be found in Beven et al. (1995), and a 
review of TOPMODEL applications can be found in Beven (1997). It is 
referred as TOP hereafter interchangeably. 
 
b). NAM; a conceptual lumped rainfall–runoff which was originally 
developed at the Institute of Hydrodynamics and Hydraulic Engineering 
at the Technical University of Denmark. The model has been applied in a 
large number of engineering projects covering various climatic regimes. 
The NAM model describes, in a simplified quantitative form, the 
behaviour of the different phases of the hydrological cycle, accounting 
for the water content in different mutually interrelated storages, namely 
surface zone storage, the root-zone storage, and the groundwater storage. 
The surface and interflow component of total runoff is routed through 
two linear reservoirs and the base flow is routed using a single reservoir. 
Each linear reservoir is characterized by a specific time constant. In the 
present application, the nine most important parameters of the NAM 
model were determined by calibration. The detail on the parameters and 
more detailed information regarding the NAM model can be found in 
Madsen (2000).  
 
c). The HYdrologic MODel (HYMOD); also a conceptual and lumped 
model, was originally proposed by Boyle (2001) in order to address the 
need for the development of models with complexity levels suitable for 
capturing typical and commonly measured hydrologic fluxes. The 
objective of HYMOD is to provide a research tool for scientific 
evaluation purposes (e.g., Wagener et al., 2001; Vrugt et al., 2003). 
  
d). The TANK model; a conceptual model comprised of four vertical 
tanks with primary and secondary storage. For each basin, processes of 
infiltration, unsaturated and saturated flow, and through flow, are 
represented using a simple 'non-linear tank model' approach (Sugawara, 
1995). A total of 15 parameters require to be estimated through model 
calibration  
 
Each of these models varies in the way they conceptualize the key 
hydrological processes and in complexity, primarily related to the number 
of parameters requiring calibration. Among the four selected models, 
NAM and TANK describe the behaviour of each component of the 
hydrological cycle at the catchments level by using a group of conceptual 
elements. Conversely, TOPMODEL and HYMOD are both variable 
contributing area models. In TOPMODEL the spatial variability is taken 
into account through indices derived from topography whereas in 
HYMOD, the model spatial variability within basin is modelled using a 
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probability distribution function. All four models employ a single linear 
reservoir to model groundwater. 
 
Estimation of prediction uncertainty 
In order to examine the role of model uncertainty in climate change 
impact studies and include a full consideration of impact model 
uncertainty, we explored two methods, namely the Generalized 
Likelihood Uncertainty Estimation method (GLUE) and Bayesian Model 
Averaging (BMA). 
 
GLUE 
 
In the GLUE framework a set of behavioural predictions are extracted 
from the simulation based on the selected goodness-of-fit measure. The 
most common goodness-of-fit measure is based on the sum of squared 
errors (Eq. 1). 
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where L(θi|Y) is the likelihood measure for the ith model conditioned on 
the observations, Y, 2i  is the error variance for the ith model (i.e. the 
combination of the model and the ith parameter set) and 2obs  is the 
variance of the observations. The exponent N1 is an adjustable parameter 
that sets the relative weightings of the better and worse solutions.  
 
The GLUE scheme, which is widely used to account for parameter 
uncertainty, is used to handle both parametrically and structurally 
different plausible models. A desired number of behavioural predictions 
from the entire selected hydrological models are ranked and likelihood 
weighted to characterize the parameter as well as structural uncertainty 
propagated through each of the hydrological models. As the number of 
behavioural simulations are not equal among models, a desired number 
of behavioural sets of model parameters should be sampled based on the 
prior probability attached to a model i.e., random sampling of solutions 
from behavioural sets in proportion to the prior model probability. As 
this study assumes that all models are equally probable, only the n 
numbers of behavioural solutions are randomly sampled from each 
model. This number n is selected as the minimum of the number of 
behavioural solutions among models, and the Nash-Sutcliffe efficiency 
measure (N1 in Eq. 1) is used as an informal likelihood measure. Initially, 
the threshold value of 0.6 was selected, which was fine-tuned for each 
basin so that the prediction interval encapsulates as much observation as 
possible, and maintains a good population of behavioural solutions. 
 
The implementation of the GLUE method to estimate prediction 
uncertainty associated with hydrological models can be expressed 
through the following procedure; 
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Step 1. Select K models that are structurally and/or parametrically 
different and choose the ranges of model parameters for each model.  
Step 2. Select the likelihood measure and the threshold to differentiate 
between acceptable and unacceptable solutions. 
Step 3. Run each of K sets of hydrological models with calibration data. 
At each run, a parameter set is randomly drawn (e.g., using simple 
random sampling, stratified random sampling etc.) from the range of the 
model parameters assuming the parameter follows a uniform distribution 
over its range.  
Step 4. From the number of behavioural solutions of the ith model (i.e., 
NBi where i=1, M), obtained for the specified threshold value, sample 
randomly n number of behavioural solutions and repeat this for all 
selected models. The likelihood of the accepted solution derived from the 
set of K models is then rescaled so that their cumulative sum equals 1. 
Consequently, this rescaled likelihood is used to assign weight to each 
runoff prediction. 
Step 5. Use the likelihood weights of the behavioural data set to assess 
parameter sensitivity and to compute prediction limits on hydrographs 
using: 
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where N is the number of behavioural models i.e., K*n, P is the 
prediction quantile, θi is the ith set of model parameters, tZˆ is the value of 
the variable Z at time t simulated by the model f(θi), and L is the 
likelihood measure.  
 
The uncertainty bounds estimated by GLUE have been found to be 
sensitive to a number of factors such as the likelihood measure, and the 
threshold values employed (e.g., Viola et al., 2009).  The increase in the 
value of N1 will put more weight to the best simulation, thereby 
increasing the difference between good and bad solutions.  Furthermore, 
if the threshold value grows, the width of the uncertainty bounds and 
percentage of data captured by prediction limits will decrease. Thus the 
choice of the threshold value is important since it strongly influences the 
size of the uncertainty bounds. 
 
BMA 
Bayesian Model Averaging provides a solution to the model selection 
problem by accounting for uncertainty about model forms or 
assumptions and by propagating this uncertainty to inferences about 
quantities of interest. In the situation in which several models {f1 . . . fK} 
are theoretically possible, it is risky to base inference on the point 
estimates from a single model fK. BMA allows us to account for this type 
of uncertainty as the predictive distribution of the quantity of interest, as 
shown in equation (3), is calculated as the average of the posterior 
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predictive distribution of the quantity derived from each individual model 
weighted by the corresponding posterior model probability. 
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The posterior model probability, p(fk | D), of model fk given the data, is 
given by equation (4). 
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where the constant of proportionality is chosen so that the posterior 
model probabilities add up to one. The prior probability, P(fk), in Eqn. (4) 
presents the preference of model fk before re-evaluation. Therefore, a 
model with better performance in history will have a greater weight in 
future application. Note that without any prior knowledge of model 
preference, the prior probability is assumed to have a uniform 
distribution among the N models. The quantity P (D| fk) is the integrated 
likelihood of model fk.  
 
The posterior mean and variance of Δ are as follows: 
 
(6))|()ˆ),|(()],....,|[
(5)ˆ)],....,|[
2
1
1
1
1
DEwfDVarDffVar
wDffE
K
k
kkkk
K
k
kkk





  
 
where ),|(ˆ kk fDE  (Raftery, 1993). Note that weight wk has a value 
only between 0 and 1. A larger value indicates more preference on the 
prediction by model fk. In this application, the PDF from each model at 
time t is modelled by a gamma distribution with heteroscedastic variance. 
At each time step, the chosen PDF is centred on the individual forecasts 
with an associated variance that is heteroscedastic and directly depends 
on the actual stream flow prediction. The BMA parameters i.e., BMA 
weights and variances, were obtained from historical stream flow data 
(1971-1990) using Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) sampling. In this 
study, MCMC sampling was done with the Differential Evolution 
Adaptive Metropolis (DREAM) algorithm developed by Vrugt et al. 
(2008).  
 
The probabilistic predictions of daily streamflow were derived based on 
each individual deterministic predictions obtained from each hydrological 
model and their weight and variances. The procedures used in this study 
to generate probabilistic predictions at each time step t are briefly 
described below. 
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Step 1 Select K models that can be structurally or parametrically 
different.  
Step 2 Generate model prediction sets )...2,1;,..2,1(ˆ , KkNiy ki  . 
Step 3 Calculate weights  wk and variance Vark for each of the selected 
models. 
Step 4 Generate new model-based prediction Yˆ using Eq. (5). 
Step 5 Probabilistic predictions are maid using mean (wk) and variance 
parameters (Vark) as follows:  
 Select an individual competing model (fk) with probability 
proportional to its weight. 
 Sample from the probability distribution associated with the 
output from each individual model. 
 Repeat above two steps to sample a number of values that 
represent the distribution of streamflow at time t, and 
subsequently derive the uncertainty interval. 
 
The median predictions obtained from the GLUE method form the basis 
for implementing the BMA here, thereby incorporating deterministic 
predictions from four CRR models forced with observed rainfall data in 
order to make probabilistic predictions. The BMA variance (Eq. 6), 
which contains two components: the between-model-variance and the 
within-model-variance, is essentially an uncertainty measure of the BMA 
prediction. This measure is a better description of predictive uncertainty 
than that which estimates uncertainty based only on the ensemble spread. 
In BMA, the uncertainty in model parameter values can be regarded as 
within-model uncertainty, and uncertainty in model choice can be 
regarded as between model uncertainty. Because the focus of this study is 
on the definition of uncertainty arising from a number of plausible 
models and not on the model selection problem we did not attempt to 
penalize the models depending upon the number of calibration 
parameters. This could have been incorporated within the BMA 
framework by assigning the prior probability of P(fk), in Eq. (4) that 
represents the preference of model fk instead of  sampling it from a 
uniform distribution.  
 
Experiment Design 
In order to evaluate the role of hydrological model uncertainty in relation 
to the uncertainty envelope associated with the estimation of future 
impacts on stream flow, the response of the catchments to input from 
three GCMs forced with two scenarios, evaluated from four hydrological 
models and their behavioural parameters sets was used. The results are 
presented for three bench mark periods in the future; 2020-2029 (2020s), 
2050-2059(2050s), and 2070-2079 (2070s). As it is difficult to attach 
preference to one scenario over the other, both scenarios (i.e., A2 and 
B2) were assumed equally likely. The predictions from the three GCMs 
were weighted based on the Climate Prediction Index (Murphy et al. 
2004) that reflects the ability of the GCM to reproduce observed climate 
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data. This is done by multiplying the likelihood functions of the accepted 
solution and then rescaling it, similar to a probability measure, in order to 
make the cumulative sum equal to 1.Subsequently the simulated 
uncertainties are apportioned and assessed as follows:  
 
 HYDRO: the uncertainty in future simulations due to 
hydrological model structure and their parameters 
 SCENE: the uncertainty in future simulations due to selection of 
emission scenario 
 GCM: the uncertainty in future simulations due to the selection of 
climate models  
 TOTAL: the total uncertainty in future simulations of stream flow 
from all combined sources.  
 
To examine the performance of the prediction intervals in capturing the 
observed flows, an index defined as the ratio of the number of 
observations falling within their respective prediction intervals, to the 
total number of observations (hereafter referred as Count Efficiency), 
and the average width of the prediction interval is used. 
 
Concerning the application of BMA, the following four different 
probabilistic predictions were made by combining: a) four median 
predictions obtained from the selected four CRR models (referred to as 
HYDRO) forced with the selected GCM and the scenario, b) eight 
median predictions estimated from the four CRR models forced with 
regional climate scenarios corresponding to A2 and B2 scenarios derived 
from the selected GCM (referred to as SCENE), c) 12 median 
predictions estimated from the four CRR models forced with regional 
climate scenarios data derived from three GCMs (referred to as GCM 
A2(B2)) d) 24 median predictions obtained from four CRR models 
forced with six regional climate scenarios (referred to as TOTAL). In all 
the experiment design, the BMA weight and variance parameters were 
estimated from the calibration period (1971-2000). However, depending 
upon the regional climate change scenario used, the BMA weight 
parameters were suitably modified. In this study, the calibrated BMA 
weight parameter was modified depending upon the ability of the GCM 
to reproduce climate data at a more regional scale. Furthermore, both 
scenarios were assumed equally likely in BMA i.e., the weight parameter 
derived for each GCM is equally divided among A2 and B2 scenarios 
such that the total weight sums to one. 
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Results  
 
Performance of GLUE and BMA under observations 
The hydrological discharge simulation is carried out at a daily time step 
using the four conceptual models calibrated on observed data for the 
period of 1971-1990 and validated using the period of 1991-2000.  The 
GLUE scheme was implemented to account for parametrically and 
structural different hydrological models. The number of behavioural 
predictions from each of the hydrological models was ranked and 
likelihood weighted to describe the parameter as well as structural 
uncertainty. Fig 2 (a-d) shows the prediction interval for the Boyne basin 
(1981-1983) for each hydrological model.  
 
Table 2 shows the median NSE, the Prediction Interval (PI) and Count 
Efficiency (CE) for each model. It reveals that the PI and CE estimated 
from one model on a particular basin is different from the PI estimated 
on the same basin by a different model and on different basins. The 
GLUE estimated PI, CE and number of behavioural simulations (NB) 
for each individual model and basin depend on the threshold values. The 
selections of threshold values were made based on a sensitivity analysis 
where these measures, i.e., PI, CE and the number of behavioural 
simulation (NB), were estimated for different threshold values, namely 
NSE of 0.3, 0.5, and 0.7. For all models the PI, CE and NB increased 
with a decrease in value of the threshold and vice versa. However, the 
rate of decrease of PI, CE, and NB are (5%, 15%, 40% respectively for 
PI, CE and NB) much lesser when moving the threshold value from 0.3 
to 0.5 than when moving it from 0.5 to 0.7 (25%, 37% and 73% 
respectively for PI, CE and NB). In this study, the threshold value of 0.6 
was selected for Boyne and Moy and 0.5 for Blackwater and Suck basin.  
 
This is done so that the sufficient numbers of behavioural samples for 
each model can be obtained and at the same time the benefit in terms of 
improving the value of CE with decreasing threshold is small. Even with 
the decreased threshold (0.3), the 90% confidence interval could not 
encapsulate 90% of the observation data. 
 
The PI showed a tendency to grow wider with increasing discharge and 
with increasing variance in discharge. Moreover, it varied among 
hydrological models.  In general, the prediction interval estimated from 
TOPMODEL and NAM are marginally smaller than the PI estimated 
from HYMOD and TANK, with PI estimated from TANK being the 
widest. It is interesting to note that the TANK model has the highest 
number of parameters followed by NAM, HYMOD and TOPMODEL 
respectively. Despite having fewer parameters, the PI estimated from 
HYMOD is, in most instances, bigger than NAM. 
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Figure 2  Prediction intervals for Boyne basin including median and 
observed flow produced from; a) HYMOD , b) NAM, c) TANK, d)TOP 
for the selected period ( 1981-1983) 
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Table 2 The performance of median prediction, the percentage of 
observation encapsulated within the prediction interval (CE), and the 
average width of the 90% prediction interval (PI) for each model during 
the calibration and validation period 
 
 
Moreover, this comparison does not reveal any distinct relationship 
between the number of calibration parameters and the prediction interval 
or uncertainty in model prediction. For the Suck and Blackwater 
catchments, the PI simulated by TOPMODEL only encapsulated 30% of 
the observations, whereas the percentage of observations that are 
encapsulated within the PI are higher for HYMOD and TANK. This 
clearly indicates that the extent of uncertainty in prediction explained by 
model parameterization alone varies among models. Though the PIs 
estimated from different models show a general increase in count 
efficiency with wider PIs, the increase in CE is not proportionate with 
the increase in the PI, e.g., in the Boyne the PIs simulated by NAM and 
TOPMODEL are very similar but there is an apparent difference in the 
count efficiency for the PI resulting from these two models. Therefore, 
these four models, which differ in their conceptualization of hydrological 
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processes and their variability, produce apparently different simulations 
and descriptions of the uncertainty in the prediction. Therefore, both 
GLUE and BMA that weight model prediction based on model 
likelihood are utilized to address the model uncertainty. Concerning the 
application of BMA, the median prediction of the individual model 
obtained from the GLUE scheme i.e., four individual time series of 
prediction obtained from each hydrological model, is processed. The 
probability density function from each model at any given time is 
modelled by a gamma distribution with heteroscedastic variance. The 
weight (Fig 3) and variance parameter of the BMA was estimated from 10 
yrs of calibration data (1971-1981). The weight of HYMOD is apparently 
higher than that of the other three models.  
 
Figure 3 Weight parameters for Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) 
estimated from calibration period (1971-1990) 
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Fig 4 (a) shows the daily 90% PI (the results for only a three year is 
shown), derived using the GLUE, for the Boyne when all four models 
and their behavioural parameter sets are taken into account. The width of 
the prediction interval – expressed in terms of cumecs – increased when 
different models are considered. In addition, the count efficiency of the 
prediction interval improved when different model structures are 
incorporated. Fig 4(b) shows the daily PI for the Boyne when the median 
output from the all four CRR models are combined using BMA. The 
prediction intervals estimated from GLUE are sharp as compared to 
BMA. Furthermore, posterior model output, estimated from BMA is 
more symmetrical than GLUE, which is skewed towards the lower 
bound.
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Figure 4. Prediction interval for Boyne basin including median and 
observed flow produced from Multimodal ensemble of four selected 
models using a) Generalized Uncertainty Estimation Method (GLUE) 
and b) Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) for the selected period (1981-
1983) 
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The Table 3 shows that the PIs estimated from GLUE are narrower than 
the same obtained from BMA. Consequently, a larger proportion of 
observation are encapsulated within the PI estimated from BMA than 
from GLUE for the selected threshold value. Furthermore, the median 
model performance obtained after processing different plausible 
predictions through the BMA is better in terms of NSE than individual 
predictions. The inadequacies of the prediction interval estimated from 
GLUE in capturing the observations can be attributed to the subjectivity 
involved in the selection of threshold values and likelihood measures. 
The threshold value selected for implementation of GLUE will have 
effect on the PI and subsequently on the capability of the PI to capture 
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the observed runoffs. Apart from that, the percentage of runoff 
observations bracketed by the prediction limits is still subject to a 
number of factors that affect the rainfall–runoff modelling efficiency. In 
addition, the uncertainty associated with the input data was not explicitly 
accounted for in both methods. 
 
Table 3. The performance of median prediction, the percentage of 
observation encapsulated within the prediction interval (Count Efficiency 
i.e., CE), and the average spread of the 90% Prediction Interval  (PI) for 
each model during the calibration and validation period 
 
NSE (median) CE PI (m3/s) 
Sn Basin Scheme 
Calib Valid Calib Valid Calib Valid 
1 Moy 0.81 0.72 0.85 0.80 43.32 46.8 
2 Boyne 0.80 0.78 0.90 0.92 31.8 33.4 
3 Suck 0.79 0.69 0.74 0.70 19.2 20.9 
4 Blackwater 
GLUE 
0.66 0.74 0.68 0.76 36.52 37.32 
4 Moy 0.90 0.79 0.97 0.92 64.03 66.76 
5 Boyne 0.80 0.75 0.96 0.96 44.67 48.26 
6 Suck 0.82 0.76 0.96 0.93 30.90 32.19 
7 Blackwater 
BMA 
0.73 0.76 0.91 0.93 78.10 80.90 
 
Contribution of CRR models to the envelope of future simulations 
Fig. 5 shows the uncertainty in model prediction, expressed in terms of 
the Average Width of Prediction Interval (% of long term average flow) 
(AWPI) arising from uncertainties associated with parameterization of 
the hydrological model for the period from 1971 to 1990 and from 2050 
to 2059, when forced with six regional climate scenarios. It reveals that 
the prediction uncertainties arising from parameterization depends upon 
the characteristics of CRR models, the regional climate scenarios and the 
type of catchment. On average, the PI (%), expressed in terms of 
observed flow, grew wider with time. The uncertainty in prediction for 
the future time period is highest for the Boyne catchment and smallest 
for the Blackwater, closely following the results obtained during model 
calibration. The variation of uncertainty among basins is likely to arise 
due to the variation in the applicability of CRR models and the variation 
in physical parameters of a basin, which plays an important role in 
characterizing the response of a basin to a given input. In the selected 
basins, the PI (%) grew with a decrease in runoff coefficient and wetness 
index. Both of which tend to increase the nonlinearity in the basins 
response.  
 
307
Figure 5. Average width of the prediction interval simulated from 
behavioural set of model parameters for four conceptual rainfall-runoff 
models for the period 1971-1990 and 2050-2059 
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Fig 6 illustrates the response of the Boyne basin simulated by the 
behavioural parameter sets of four different hydrological models to 
climate scenarios derived from HADCM3 for the A2 scenario. The 
median estimates from the selected models are not significantly similar 
(α= 90%, two tail) with the exception of the median estimate from TOP 
and TANK.  Consequently, the prediction intervals derived from GLUE 
are wider in comparison to the estimates from each individual CRR 
model.  
 
Figure 6. The 90% prediction interval (shaded region) simulated by the 
behavioural parameters sets of four hydrological models forced with 
climate inputs from HADCM3 (A2) for two periods namely, 1971-1990 
and 2050-2059 and median predictions from each individual hydrological 
model (continuous lines) for Boyne catchment. 
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Fig 6 shows the seasonal prediction interval for the period from 1971 to 
1990 and from 2050 to 2059.  The prediction interval was constructed 
based on the behavioural predictions obtained from the models that were 
ranked and likelihood weighted to produce upper 95%, lower 5% and 
median 50% quantiles.  For each basin, five different prediction intervals 
were calculated depending upon the sources of uncertainty included in 
the analysis. The ‘hydrological model’ scheme (referred as HYDRO 
hereafter) is assumed to quantify the uncertainty in hydrological model, 
the scheme ‘scenario’ (referred to as SCENE) is assumed to quantify the 
uncertainty arising from the selection of scenarios along with 
hydrological model, scheme GCM_A2 (GCM_B2) is assumed to quantify 
the uncertainty in GCM along with Hydrological model and the scheme 
‘TOTAL’ is assumed to define the full consideration of impact model 
uncertainty.  
 
Fig. 7 shows the average width of the PI expressed in terms of the 
percentage of long term average flow for the three time periods, namely 
2020s, 2050s and 2070s. The average width of the PI arising from 
uncertainties associated with parameterization of CRR models is nearly 
50% of the average flow and it increased, on average, to 70%, when 
different CRR model structures are included.  However, this does not 
indicate that the role of hydrological model uncertainty is less than 
parameter uncertainty as sources cannot be disintegrated as there is no 
true value of model parameter or structure that can be estimated from 
field measurements.  
 
The width of prediction interval nearly equalled the average flow when 
both scenarios are taken into account. It further grew to nearly 120% of 
the average flow when three GCMs with A2 (B2) scenarios are 
entertained, and nearly equalled to 140% of the average discharge when 
the total uncertainty is incorporated. Similarly, the uncertainties arising 
from the hydrological model varied among basin, climate scenario and 
the selected GCM highlighting the importance of conducting impacts 
assessment for individual catchments. In addition, the uncertainty derived 
from the choice of GCM is greater than that derived from emission 
scenario.  
 
However, the full range of emission scenario and GCM sensitivities are 
not sampled here and therefore results are only indicative, nonetheless 
they agree with the majority of research reported to date (e.g. Wilby and 
Harris, 2006; Prudhomme and Davies, 2007). The hydrological 
uncertainty seems to be fairly constant for each future time period, but 
the effect of GCM is apparently different among three time periods. Fig 
8 shows the BMA estimates for five experiment design, namely for 
HYDRO, SCENE, GCM A2 (B2), and TOTAL (averaged across basin) 
for three time periods. The widths of the prediction interval (%) 
estimated from BMA are higher than the same estimated from GLUE. 
From the figure, it is apparent that the role of hydrological model 
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uncertainty is considerable and warrants routine inclusion in impacts 
assessment, particularly where robust adaptation decisions are required. 
 
Figure 7. The uncertainty in prediction for a) 2020s, b) 2050s and c) 
2070s arising from uncertainty in the hydrological models (HYDRO), 
uncertainty in the selection of scenario and HYDRO (SCENE), 
uncertainty in the selection of Global Circulation Model (GCM) forced 
with A2(B2) scenario and HYDRO (GCM (A2(B2)), uncertainty in the 
selection of GCM, selection of scenario and uncertainty in hydrological 
models (TOTAL). The prediction uncertainty estimated from Bayesian 
Model averaging (BMA) is also shown for the same time period. 
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Figure 8. width of the Prediction interval (%), averaged across basin, 
estimated from Generalized Likelihood Uncertainty Estimation method 
(GLUE) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) associated with various 
sources of uncertainties. 
 
 
 
Similarly, Fig 9 shows the total uncertainty envelope derived from six 
climate scenarios and four hydrological models for the four study basins 
and each future time period using both GLUE and BMA. Although the 
median prediction obtained from both GLUE and BMA are significantly 
similar, the upper 95% and lower 5% prediction quantile estimated from 
BMA are wider than the same estimated from GLUE. 
 
As the suitability of application of any selected model and the extent of 
nonlinearity in input output relationship differs among basins the 
uncertainty in prediction associated with parameter uncertainty and 
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selection of hydrological model is likely to be different among basin. The 
runoff coefficient for the Boyne and Suck are markedly lower than the 
Blackwater and Moy, and the nonlinear behaviours are common in basins 
that have low runoff coefficients (e.g., Nemec and Schaake, 1982).  
 
Figure 9. Total uncertainty envelope derived from six climate scenarios 
and four hydrological models for the four study basins and for three time 
periods using Generalized Likelihood Uncertainty Estimation method 
(GLUE) and Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA). 
 
 
Moreover, the Boyne is the driest basin among the four selected. The 
physical characteristics of the basins, such as area, runoff coefficient and 
wetness therefore play a key role in explaining the variation in the PI 
among basins. The catchment characterized with largest catchment area, 
lowest runoff coefficient and lowest wetness index resulted in the widest 
prediction interval in all the five experiments designed in this study. 
Owing to the limited number of basins used in this study, we do not 
intend to make a regional relationship for the extrapolation of results 
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beyond the basins used in this study. Further work is currently underway 
in relation to this.  
 
Figure 10 Percentage change in monthly streamflow, median perdiction 
derived from hydrological models forced with downscaled outut from 
three global climate models, and two emission scenarios using 
Generalized Likelyhood Uncertaity Estimation method,  in the 
Blackwater, Boyne, Moy and Suck catchments for three future time 
periods, namely,2020s, 2050s and 2070s 
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Fig 10 shows the percentage change in simulated monthly flow regime 
for each future time period. For all the basins, there is a tendency of an 
increase of flow in winter and decrease of flow in summer when moving 
from the 2020s to the 2070s and similar decreases in summer discharges 
as the century progresses, with associated implications for water 
management. 
 
Conclusion 
There is a cascade of uncertainty in climate change impact assessment 
that begins with the construction of future emission scenarios and ends 
in impact assessment. This study addresses the uncertainty in the 
projection of future water resources by incorporating four plausible yet 
conceptually diverse CRR models, forced with regional climate scenarios, 
using BMA and GLUE. In terms of the climate change signature there is 
a tendency for an increase of flow in winter and a decrease of flow in 
summer. As the magnitude of increases and decreases, as well as the 
uncertainty from each source considered vary among the basins selected 
it is critically important that a full impact assessment that accounts for 
the full range of uncertainties (including CRR model parameter and 
structure) be conducted where important decisions are required to adapt 
to climate change.  
 
The uncertainties derived from the use of behavioural model parameters 
for each model is nearly 40% of the average river flow. The Prediction 
Interval (PI) and Count Efficiency (CE) estimated from GLUE varied 
among selected models and basins with no distinct relationship observed 
between the number of calibration parameters and the prediction 
interval. Furthermore, the 90% confidence prediction interval did not 
encapsulate 90% of the observations. However, an improvement in the 
reliability of the prediction interval was apparent when the uncertainty in 
the selection of model structure was accounted for. The widths of the PI 
obtained from BMA are wider than obtained by each model and 
combination of entire models within the GLUE framework, for the 
selected threshold values and likelihood measures. The smaller value of 
the GLUE PI in comparison to BMA can be attributed to the selection 
of a threshold value and likelihood measure. Furthermore, the GLUE 
implemented in this study uses a simplistic MC sampling scheme to 
sample parameters from their prior distributions. While this method is 
adequate for simple models, complex models may require improved 
sampling strategies (e.g., Blasone et al., 2008). 
 
The same tool was further used to identify the role of the uncertainty in 
the hydrological models in the overall uncertainty envelopes by utilizing six 
scenarios derived from three GCMs forced by two of the SRES emission 
scenarios representing and medium high (A2) and medium low (B2) 
GHG evolution, to force each CRR model along with their behavioural 
sets of model parameters identified during calibration. The uncertainties 
derived from the use of behavioural model parameters for each individual 
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model was nearly 50% of the average river flow. However, it increased to 
70%, 100%, 120% and 140% respectively when uncertainty in CRR 
model structure, emissions scenarios, GCM and total uncertainty were 
accounted for.  
 
This application therefore shows that hydrological model uncertainty has 
a significant role in the uncertainty envelopes of future climate change 
impacts and should be routinely considered in assessments, particularly 
where adaptation decisions are required to be robust to uncertainty. In 
addition to GLUE, BMA was also used to examine the uncertainties 
associated with future estimation of streamflow at the catchment scale. 
BMA probabilistic predictions were made by combining 24 median 
predictions (from GLUE) obtained from six climate scenarios and four 
hydrological models. BMA is found to be a useful approach for 
application in climate change impact studies, allowing predictions from 
different models forced with input from different scenarios and GCMs to 
be combined in an efficient manner. Quantification of CRR uncertainty 
(parameter and structure) using BMA resulted in an uncertainty band that 
is apparently similar to the same estimated from GLUE. Clearly, any 
approach to modelling data that considers a set of competing models has 
merit. In our application, there were clear differences in individual 
predictions obtained from four models. Hence, use of BMA and or 
GLUE is likely to add value to a prediction by helping in avoiding 
predictions obtained with an inappropriate model and allowing a truer 
sense of uncertainty to be incorporated into future simulations, thereby 
increasing the information content available for decision making.  
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CHAPTER 35 
 
ADAPTING WATER SUPPLY SYSTEMS IN A CHANGING 
CLIMATE 
 
JULIA HALL and CONOR MURPHY 
 
First published in Quinn, S. and O'Neill, V. (2012) Water Supply Systems, 
Distribution and Environmental Effects. Hauppauge, New York, USA: Nova 
Science Publishers. 
 
The traditional approach in water resource planning and management has 
been based on the assumption of stationarity of the hydrological system. 
However, the assumption that the past will be the key to the future is no 
longer valid. The climate and therefore the entire hydrological system is 
changing, and relying on the traditional planning approach increases the 
risk of mal-adaptation, water shortages and monetary losses. However, 
the methods to identify the future changes in water resources due to 
climate change are very uncertain. This cascade of uncertainty stems from 
the assumptions made about the state of future society and the 
greenhouse gas scenarios affiliated to these states. The uncertainty 
envelop expands further when the greenhouse gas scenarios are used to 
drive the global climate models, which are then downscaled to the 
regional models, and finally more uncertainty is added through local 
impact models. Such uncertain simulations are problematic when 
decisions on future adaptation have to be agreed upon to avoid expensive 
mal-adaptation.  
 
This chapter examines climate change as emerging pressure on water 
supply and the evidence of climate change from climate records. Future 
impacts of climate change on water resources are highlighted and the 
challenge of adaptation is reflected on. Being confronted with deep 
uncertainty, the need for alternative approaches, shifting the paradigm 
away from the traditional “predict and provide” approach, seeking an 
optimum adaptation solution, is highlighted. Instead, alternative 
approaches are needed that allow the development of water supply 
systems that are robust to the uncertainty framing future changes in 
water resources. International examples of these approaches are 
described; including a case study of the Boyne catchment's water supply 
system in the east of Ireland. The uncertainties involved in generation of 
future catchment hydrology are discussed and the vulnerability of the 
case study water supply system to a changing climate is investigated. 
Where vulnerability exists, sample plausible future adaptation options are 
then assessed to their robustness to uncertainty, to quantify the water 
supply system response, to aid decision making. This chapter concludes 
that water managers will have to engage with alternative methods for 
climate change adaptation in conjunction with future observational 
evidence of change.  
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Climate change as emerging pressure on water supply  
Climate plays a central role in water resource management, as it 
influences the hydrological cycle at all stages. But the climate is changing. 
Increasing atmospheric temperature, due to increasing atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases, can lead to an intensification of the 
hydrological cycle, as evidence of several studies reviewed by 
Huntington, (2006) suggests. For example, as consequence of increasing 
temperature models suggest an approximate global average precipitation 
increase of 3.4% per degree Kelvin of temperature (Allen and Ingram, 
2002), leading to more intense but less frequent precipitation periods.  
 
However, effects of a changing climate will not be uniform on the earth 
and will differ at different locations. For example, climate models suggest 
a greater warming at high latitudes and less warming in the tropics 
(Hegerl et al., 2007), while precipitation changes will not occur uniformly 
around the globe. On a regional scale, some locations will receive more 
rainfall, whereas others may suffer from extended drought periods. These 
changes in precipitation will also for example influence surface runoff, 
with an increase in higher latitudes (i.e. of North America and Eurasia) 
and a decrease in southern Europe, the Middle East, mid-latitude western 
North America, and southern Africa (Milly et al., 2005).  
 
Historically, pressure was put on water supply systems mainly from 
increasing water demand; however, with a change in climate, water 
demand could further increase while water supply may be reduced. 
Therefore, a changing climate is a key driver of the future availability of 
raw water resources. Predominately changes in the timing, frequency and 
intensity of precipitation can have a significant impact on the 
hydrological system. For example, the shifting of seasonal precipitation 
patterns or reduced precipitation can lead to reductions in stream flow 
and groundwater recharge rates, which can affect the quantity and quality 
of the available water. Increasing temperatures can result in higher 
evaporation losses and increasing water demand. Whereas increasing 
precipitation can damage water supply systems due to flooding or 
increased erosion, and water abstraction can be affected due to high 
turbidity and decreased water quality. Such climate-induced changes can 
pose a challenge in various ways to any water supply utility.  
 
However, the effect of climate change on water resources and supply 
systems will not only depend on the location and the degree of chances 
in the hydrological system but also on the water supply system itself. 
Depending on the main characteristics of water supply systems, the same 
change in climate can have various effects on different water supply 
systems. For example, robust systems with plenty of excess headroom are 
likely to cope with large changes, but where water supply systems are 
already under pressure and operating at, or close to their design capacity, 
a small change can have a big impact. Therefore, an assessment of the 
balance of future water supply and demand of individual water supply 
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systems or even a single water abstraction point is crucial taking future 
climate and the future development of non-climatic pressures into 
account. The quantity and/or the quality of the water resources can be 
affected by climate-independent factors such as population changes, 
increasing wealth, the political and legislative framework, economic 
activity, technological and monetary potential, land-use change and 
urbanisation. Demand increase due to population growth, the emergence 
of water-intense industry or agricultural practices for example reduces the 
overall water availability even without the occurrence of climatic change. 
Whereas, the introduction or rise of water charges (if water is already 
priced) can result in water saving, or the water loss reduction can increase 
the amount of water that can be provided to the individual water users. 
These key climatic and non-climatic factors need to be combined in an 
assessment to determine future vulnerabilities of a water supply system.  
 
There is a consensus that climate change will have a small effect on water 
supply systems compared to growing demand over near term planning 
horizons. However, future hydrological simulations suggest that climate 
change will significantly alter catchment hydrology over medium and long 
time scales. In response to these anticipated changes; long-term 
adaptation has to take place locally, at the catchment scale. This need for 
adaptation is supported by the evidence of climate change from 
observations.  
 
Evidence of climate change from observations   
Climate is the most central driver of the hydrological cycle. A change in 
either the climate system or water cycle would induce a change in the 
other due to their intimate association (Kundzewicz, 2004). The earth’s 
climate system has changed since the pre-industrial period with an 
accumulation of evidence suggesting an anthropogenic increase of carbon 
dioxide being the very likely cause (IPCC, 2007). Global average surface 
temperature has increased, with warming accelerating to 0.13oC per 
decade over the past 50 years (IPCC, 2007). The average atmospheric 
water vapour content has amplified since at least the 1980s over land and 
ocean and corresponds to long-term increasing trends in precipitation 
amount over North America, northern Europe and northern and central 
Asia (IPCC, 2007). Warming of the climate is in theory expected to bring 
about increases in evaporation and precipitation, leading to the 
hypotheses that one of the major consequences will be an intensification 
(or acceleration) of the water cycle (Held and Soden, 2000; Huntington, 
2006). Huntington (2006) explains the theoretical basis for this 
intensification is summarised in the Clausius-Clapyeron relation that 
implies specific humidity would increase approximately exponentially 
with temperature.   
 
Globally, evidence of direct human influences on the hydrological cycle is 
now apparent (Gedney et al., 2006; Huntington, 2006; IPCC, 2007; 
Barnett et al., 2008). However, for a number of components of the water 
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cycle, for example groundwater, the lack of data has made it impossible 
to determine whether their state has changed in the recent past due to 
climate change. Gedney et al., (2006) suggest that raised carbon dioxide 
levels are already having a direct influence on the water balance at the 
land surface, increasing runoff and therefore freshwater availability. 
Increases of precipitation that occur outside the explanation of internal 
climate variability attributed to anthropogenic forcing have also been 
detectable with significance (Zhang et al., 2001). Dai et al., (2004) present 
large variations in yearly river flows for the world’s 200 largest rivers but 
highlight that only about one third of the catchments show statistically 
significant trends over the study period 1948-2004. Furthermore, the 
majority of significant trends were associated with reductions in 
discharge. Trends were consistent with precipitation and modes of 
variability being driving forces, with the exception of Arctic drainage 
basins were increasing trends in flow are more likely associated with 
increasing temperatures (Dai et al., 2004). Syntheses of evidence 
compiled by Huntington (2006) further defend the case for considerable 
global change in both key global climate and hydrological variables. 
Kundzewicz, (2004) highlight the role of climate change leading to the 
acceleration of the hydrological cycle and may cause increases in the 
frequency and severity of extreme hydrological events. Yet, to date, there 
is little concrete evidence of significant large-scale climate-induced 
change for floods and droughts (Kundzewicz, 2004), nor is it yet possible 
for rainfall trends below the global scale to be attributed to human 
influences (Lambert et al., 2004; Fowler and Wilby, 2010).   
 
At the scale most relevant for the effective management of water supply 
and water infrastructure, the detection of climate-driven trends is far 
more problematic due to high inter-annual and decadal variability of river 
flows (Burn and Hag Elnur, 2002; Wilby, 2006; Fowler and Wilby, 2010) 
and the effects of human intervention in natural catchment systems 
(Marsh, 2010). Detection of climate change at regional and local scales is 
inherently difficult because of the relatively weak climate change signal 
compared with large interannual variability of rainfall and river flows, the 
choice of index, spatial and temporal scale of aggregation, strengths and 
assumptions of statistical tests and significance testing and confounding 
factors such as land use change, channelization and arterial drainage, 
which all require careful consideration (Kundzewicz and Robson, 2004; 
Radziejewski and Kundzewicz, 2004; Legates et al., 2005; Svensson et al., 
2005; Wilby et al., 2008; Fowler and Wilby, 2010). 
 
For example: The choice of indices can be monthly, seasonal, annual, 
based on river flow or water levels, maxima, minima, cumulative totals, 
counts of peaks over thresholds, point or area averages, based on 
individual records or pooled. The period of record has a huge bearing on 
derived trends where analysis of long records can refute the significance 
of trends from series of shorter duration that may be overly influenced 
by outliers or natural variability. The record length required to detect 
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trends can vary depending on the strength of the trend, the variance 
about the trend, the probability of type one and type two errors. The 
power of statistical tests to detect trends (monotonic or step change) can 
vary hugely and in the case of hydrological data assumptions of tests may 
be violated and increase the likelihood of false identification of trend. 
Factors such as changes in site instrumentation, observing or recording 
practices, land cover change, water abstraction, arterial drainage, channel 
engineering can all confound the detection and interpretation of trend.   
 
Short records have proven to be particularly problematic. The number of 
years of record needed to detect a statistically significant trend depends 
on: the strength of the trend; the amount of variance about the trend; the 
probability of erroneous detection (type 1 error); and the probability of 
missing a real trend (type 2 error). Preliminary estimates using data for 
river basins in the United States and the United Kingdom suggest that 
statistically robust, climate driven trends in seasonal runoff are unlikely to 
be found until the second half of the 21st century (Ziegler et al., 2005; 
Wilby, 2006). In Australian river basins an even greater change may be 
required for detection as the interannual variability of flows is twice that 
of Northern Hemisphere river basins (Chiew and McMahon, 1993).   
 
As shown by Wilby (2006) detection time relationships can also be 
inverted to estimate the strength of trend required for detection by 
specified time horizons. For example, analysis of UK winter and annual 
precipitation totals suggests that changes of ~25% would be needed for 
detection by the 2020s in the most sensitive basins (such as the River 
Tyne). Although attribution of changes is not yet possible at regional 
scales, techniques are being developed for detection of trends in indices 
at river basin scales, and for estimating the time taken for specified 
anthropogenic climate change signals to emerge from climate variability 
(Fowler and Wilby, 2010). For the moment at least it would appear that 
water managers will have to balance water demand and assess the 
functionality of supply systems for future climate, without any statistical 
evidence that climate change from local observations. Therefore, as 
discussed further below the challenge emerges of maintaining the 
functionality of critical supply systems under conditions of considerable 
uncertainty.  
 
Future impacts on water resources  
Water resources will be one of the most affected sectors by changes in 
climate (Bates et al., 2008). As discussed above, the main climatic drivers 
influencing the availability of the raw water resources are precipitation 
and temperature (especially where catchment hydrology is influenced by 
snow accumulation and snowmelt). Generally, by altering the 
hydrological cycle, climate change can have an effect on the quantity 
(intensity and frequency of flood, normal, or drought conditions) and 
quality of water resources (nutrient and oxygen content and, temperature) 
an their seasonal distribution. Changes in amount, intensity, and timing 
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of precipitation, the type of precipitation (rain or snow) and evaporation 
determine stream flow, and water levels in lakes and wetland as well as 
groundwater levels and recharge rates, as do increased evapotranspiration 
and a reduction in soil moisture. This in turn determines how much 
freshwater can be utilised for ecosystem and human needs. Additionally, 
changes in vegetation cover resulting from changes in temperature and 
precipitation and consequently changes in land use management practices 
can also influence the hydrological cycle.  
 
The future effects of climate change and non-climatic pressures on water 
resources with regard to their extremes and their likelihood of occurrence 
is summarised in Table 1 (after Bates et al., 2008). Noticeable is the 
global scale at which results are summarised due to the confounding 
factors that moderate climate change at more local scales. As discussed 
later, as he resolution of climate change projections is increased to scales 
that are most relevant to assessing future impacts in water resources, the 
uncertainty of impacts grows considerably.   
 
Climate change will impact both the available water resource through 
altering hydrological processes and the human water demand through 
increasing temperature. Other stresses are also likely to further increase 
the water demand such as increased competition for resources among 
water users, particularly for irrigation purposes. Further, additional water 
need to be allocated to ecosystems, where sensitive aquatic species have 
evolved which can only to deal with small changes in water temperature. 
At the catchment scale, changes in seasonality are likely to alter available 
resources while a change in the magnitude and frequency of extreme 
events are likely to result in increased risk of failure of critical 
infrastructure and increased maintenance cost. In relation to the latter for 
example, higher intensity rainfall is likely to increase the sediment load of 
rivers and therefore the rate of sedimentation in reservoirs, resulting in 
reduced water storage capacity. Catchment geology can play a strong role 
in offsetting large reductions in river flow, where permeable geologies 
and productive aquifers contribute to base flow to sustain river flow over 
dryer periods. However, where a reduction in rainfall in the recharge 
period occurs, drought conditions can be quite severe and long-lived.   
 
Therefore, it is quite a complex issue to extract more catchment specific 
results. Indeed many have concluded (e.g. Prudhomme and Davies, 2007) 
that the complexity and uniqueness in response of individual catchments 
means that we need to assess climate change impacts on a catchment-by-
catchment basis. The lessons we can gleam from such assessments is that, 
at the very least, water management is going to become a more complex 
issue in the future and the successful management of those resources will 
require adaptation to future climate. 
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Table 1. Future changes, their likelihood and effects on water resources 
(c.f. Bates et al., 2008)  
 
Change Projection  Likelihood (21st 
century) 
Effects on water resources 
Precipitation increases in high 
latitudes and parts of the tropics 
very likely and 
likely 
Increase in water resources.  
 
Annual river runoff increase at 
high latitudes and in some wet 
tropical areas 
high confidence  
(by the middle 
of the century)  
More frequent and more 
serious floods 
Precipitation decreases in some 
subtropical and lower mid-latitude 
regions  
likely Decrease in water resources  
 
Annual river runoff decrease over 
some dry regions at mid-latitudes 
and in the dry tropics 
high confidence  
(by the middle 
of the century) 
More frequent and more 
serious droughts 
The frequency of heavy 
precipitation events increase over 
most areas 
very likely  
 
Risk of rain-generated floods  
Increase in continental drying in 
summer (especially in the 
subtropics, low and mid-latitude) 
likely  More frequent and more 
serious droughts  
Decline in glaciers and snow cover 
(important in regions supplied by 
melt water) 
high confidence  Reduced water availability 
(seasonal shift in stream flow, 
reductions in low flows  
Higher water temperatures and 
changes in extremes, including 
floods and droughts 
high confidence 
 
water quality and exacerbate 
many forms of water 
pollution 
Sea-level rise extends areas of 
salinisation of groundwater and 
estuaries 
high confidence  Decrease of freshwater 
availability in coastal areas.  
Globally, increase in population 
and affluence and urbanisation; 
high confidence  
 
Growing water demand  
 
Regionally, changes in irrigation 
needs due to climate change and 
land use change  
high confidence  
 
Growing irrigation water 
demand  
 
 
Considering Adaptation   
In order to accommodate future impacts of climatic change and meet 
future water demands, some degree of adaptation will have to take place 
within the water sector. Indeed adaptation is considered an important 
response option or strategy, along with mitigation efforts in the face of 
climate change. However, what is meant by adaptation is not entirely 
clear-cut. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 
defines adaptation as: ‘Adjustment in natural or human systems in 
response to actual or expected climatic stimuli or their effects, which 
moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities’ (IPCC, 2007). 
Whereas, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) defines adaptation as ‘Actions taken to help communities and 
ecosystems cope with changing climate conditions, such as the 
construction of flood walls to protect property from stronger storms and 
heavier precipitation, or the planting of agricultural crops and trees more 
suited to warmer temperatures and drier soil conditions’(UNFCCC, 
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1992). There are many other treatments and definitions of adaptation in 
the literature. UNFCCC treats adaptation in the narrowest sense — as 
actions taken in response to climate changes resulting from 
anthropogenic greenhouse-gas emissions. The dominant approach in 
dealing with adaptation in response to the UNFCCC definition has been 
the ‘predict-then-act’ approach, where the key focus of assessments have 
been on climate and a predominantly scientific approach. In contrast, the 
stance taken by the IPCC tends to recognize other processes that act in 
conjunction with climate change in order to induce vulnerability to future 
change. Adaptation assessments based on the more human centred 
philosophy of the IPCC have been based on assessing vulnerability and 
resilience to climate change. The IPCC’s definition of adaptation is 
probably more aligned to water system which can be viewed as an 
inherently socio-ecological system; sensitive to both changes in natural 
resources and human traditions and behaviours. Indeed, in many 
instances it can be difficult to differentiate between the two.   
 
In addition to considering definitions of adaptation, we can also think 
about how adaptation is likely to take place in time and the degree of 
strategic vision involved. Adaptation can take place with different levels 
of spontaneity, and can be distinguished into autonomous or planned 
adaptation (Bates et al., 2008, Fankhauser et al., 1999). Autonomous 
adaptation is not purposely designed to deal with climate change, but 
rather a non-coordinated mostly spontaneous response to changes by 
individuals or communities. Whereas planned, often policy driven, 
adaptation aims to directly make allowance for climate variability and 
climate change in order to reduce the negative impacts or gain from the 
changed conditions. The following paragraphs focus on planned 
adaptation to climate change impacts.   
 
Adaptation can also be characterised depending on the timing, into 
reactive and anticipatory adaptation. Anticipatory adaptation predicts and 
responds to vulnerabilities before damages are incurred. Reactive 
adaptation limits the recurrence of damage only after effects have been 
felt and damage has been done. An example of an anticipatory adaptation 
is the construction of a reservoir to store winter rainfall to supply water 
during drier summer months. The goal of this anticipating adaptation is 
to minimize the impact of climate change by reducing vulnerability of the 
water supply to drier conditions. Reactive adaptation on the other hand is 
likely to lag persistently behind the emerging risks, which is particularly 
problematic when changes occur rapidly. The more rapid the rise in 
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, the faster the rate of climate 
change and the less effective reactive adaptation is likely to be (Repetto, 
2008).  
 
In dealing with anticipatory, planned adaptation Arnell and Delaney 
(2006) highlight considerations that are important in adapting to climate 
change. In particular, they highlight the need for decision makers in the 
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water sector to consider their adaptation strategy and what they term the 
‘adaptation space’. The adaptation strategy defines what an organisation 
is seeking to achieve by adaptation and how this is intended to be 
achieve. Possible aims include continuing to provide the same standard 
of service or product to customers (using different methods if necessary), 
providing different products and services which broadly meet the same 
function, ceasing to provide the product or service at all, or ignoring 
climate change and relying on “muddling through”(Arnell and Delaney, 
2006).   
 
The adaptation space is defined as the set of options, which are 
potentially available to deal with possible climate and other changes. The 
need to adjust to changing pressures and climate variability over centuries 
and millennia has meant that the adaptation space for water management 
is considerably large. For simplicity, we might consider the adaptation 
space in terms of supply side options and demand side options. 
Examples of the former would include the building of new or enhanced 
reservoirs, inter-basin transfers, desalinization and new abstractions. 
Supply side options can also extend to improving resource utilization, 
such as increasing the connectedness of the network, seasonal forecasting 
and institutional behavioural change. Demand side options have been 
commonly used to reduce water use and in many cases have proven to be 
considerably less expensive than supply side solutions. Common 
strategies for demand reduction include the incentivisation of water 
efficient equipment and fittings, educational campaigns on behaviours to 
conserve water, controlling new development, encouraging the use of 
rainwater etc., the list is quite extensive.   
 
Clearly some of the options within this adaptation space will be more 
feasible than others, for technical, legal, economic or cultural reasons, 
and some may not be perceived at all by an organization (Arnell and 
Delaney, 2006). The adaptation space is dynamic, as new options become 
available through, for example, technological development, and as 
understanding of the characteristics of change develops. In previous 
water management planning, the main focus was placed onto technical or 
so called ‘hard’ adaptation options, often involving engineering solutions, 
and less consideration was given to ‘soft’, non-technical options which 
are designed to influence socio-economic behaviour. In the situation 
where water management is ever more aware of the fact that humans are 
only one user of resources, the preference for soft strategies has 
increased. Soft strategies also have a lot to offer to climate change 
adaptation. The main advantage of ‘soft’ adaptation options is, that they 
are often more adaptable and more flexible than ‘hard’ adaptation. ‘Soft’ 
adaptation is therefore preferred more, as this form of adaptation keeps 
other options open and allows for modification as new information 
becomes available. ‘Hard’ technical adaptation options like new large 
infrastructural projects have a long lead-time and are designed for a long 
lifetime. They should only be considered carefully, as with the selection 
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of such a ‘hard’ option the water supply system runs the risk of becoming 
dependant on a single future development path. This can easily result in 
expensive mal-adaptation, when the main assumptions of change on 
which such a project is based are over or underestimated.   
 
To cope with the possible impacts of climate change on fresh water and 
water supply systems, careful consideration is required about how to 
plan, evaluate and prioritise adaptation action. Overall, it is important 
that the planned anticipatory adaptation measures are kept flexible to 
allow for further adaptation and not to be limited by our own actions. 
This is especially important for water supply systems where it is essential 
to balance between future water demand and future water supply. To 
maintain this balance, supply side as well as demand side measures can be 
adapted to abate climate change impacts. Supply side measures generally 
imply a supply increase whereas demand side measures aim to reduce the 
water demand. However, to agree upon a measure or a combination of 
measures to adapt to climate change still remains a challenging task.  
 
The challenge of uncertainty  
Within the water sector many decisions, particularly investment in new 
infrastructure and the protection of existing assets, come with long-term 
commitments, which can be very climate sensitive and require an 
estimate of what future conditions are going to be like over the design 
life of the investments (Hallegatte, 2009). Therefore, when building and 
designing water infrastructure to balance the supply and the demands of 
the future we need to account for the future changes that can be 
expected. The provision of this has proven to be a significant obstacle 
for climate science, particularly given the high levels of precision required 
by engineers in order to derive optimal solutions. This is a rather 
disconcerting position when it is contextualised by the fact that more 
than US$ 500 billion are invested every year in the water sector (Milly et 
al., 2008). Additionally, the concept of stationarity, on which water 
systems throughout the developed world have been designed, cannot be 
retained as a foundational strategy for defining and designing optimum 
performance (Milly et al., 2008). Changing climate variability, changes in 
extremes and means imply that water management cannot keep using the 
stationarity hypothesis for its investment decisions. An alternative 
approach is required.   
 
Therefore, adaptation to climate change in the water sector is a 
challenging task and one that will perhaps require a paradigm shift in how 
we go about designing and operationalising the systems upon which so 
much of society depends. Producing future climate scenarios and future 
impacts of climate change in order to inform adaptation is by no means 
an exact science. Conventional approaches to adaptation have been 
driven by the scientific, scenario, or impacts led approaches. Such ‘top-
down’ approaches can be characterised as a number of discrete steps as 
follow;  
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1. Scenarios of the evolution of future climate are derived from Global 
Climate Model.  
 
2. In the majority of cases, some approach is used to downscale these 
scenarios to scales relevant of catchment scale hydrological processes. 
These approaches range from simple change factor approaches, through 
statistical downscaling, to the deployment of complex regional climate 
models.   
 
3. Following downscaling these scenarios are used to force impacts 
models, most commonly conceptual rainfall-runoff models, which have 
been trained to capture the dynamics of a specific catchments hydrology.  
 
4. Finally outputs from of hydrological response have been used as a 
means to inform policy and decision making in adapting to future 
changes.  
 
Wilby and Dessai (2010) note that while there is an abundance of such 
applications that follow the ‘top-down’ approach or a similar framework, 
the number of such studies that have resulted in tangible adaptation 
strategies being implemented has been rather limited. A key reason for 
this is the large uncertainty associated with impact projections, as a result 
of the cascade of uncertainty in the methodological steps identified (see 
Figure 1).   
 
Figure 1. Cascade of Uncertainty (modified after Wilby and Dessai, 2010) 
 
 
 
The largest source of uncertainty is associated with Global Climate 
Models (GCMs). These models, developed using fundamental laws of 
physics, differ in the number of grid cells used to represent the land 
surface, atmosphere and oceans. They also differ in the way they 
aggregate or parameterise climatic processes in space and time. Stainforth 
et al. (2005) show the range of simulations for equally acceptable GCMs 
in simulating the global climate sensitivity, defined as the temperature 
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change at a doubling of carbon dioxide concentrations. Furthermore, 
Prudhomme et al. (2003) show that future projections of water resources 
are very much dependent upon the choice of GCM. Many techniques 
such as Reliability Ensemble Averaging (REA) (Giorgi and Mearns, 2002) 
and the Impact Relevant Climate Prediction Index (IRCPI) (Wilby and 
Harris, 2006) have aimed at catering for such uncertainties in future 
climate. Others have sought to develop large scale modelling experiments 
that assess inter- and intra-model uncertainty, examples being 
climateprediction.net and the Coupled Model Inter-Comparison Project 
(CMIP) to account for uncertainty in GCMs.  
 
While the outputs from GCMs reproduce the global and continental scale 
climate well, they are not so successful at higher resolutions (national. 
regional or local scales), the scales most appropriate for impact 
assessment (Wilby and Wigley, 1997). In dealing with this, limitation 
numerous regionalisation approaches have been developed ranging in 
complexity from the application of complex dynamical Regional Climate 
Models (RCMs), through empirical statistical downscaling to change 
factor analysis where changes in simulated future time series are applied 
to observations. Both regional climate modelling and statistical 
downscaling have been the most widely applied with pros and cons 
associated with each; most notably the computational costs and data 
demands of RCMs and the assumption that statistical links between local 
and large scale climatic variables will remain consistent under future, 
changed climate conditions. No one method has emerged as the 
optimum, as all approaches are subject to considerable assumptions.   
 
Conceptual Rainfall Runoff (CRR) models have been the most widely 
applied models for assessing local scale hydrological impacts. Such 
models are characterised as simplified representations of catchment 
hydrology using conceptual stores to represent different components of 
catchment storage and response. Despite their widespread use such 
models are also subject to uncertainties given that they represent 
complex, dynamic catchment systems. Key uncertainties in the 
application of CRR models include input data uncertainty, particularly 
rainfall, as well as model state, structure and parameter uncertainty. 
(Beven, 2000; Gupta et al., 2003).Numerous approaches have been 
proposed for propagating uncertainty in CRR models, most common 
being the Generalised Likelihood Uncertainty Estimation (GLUE) 
method, based on the concept of equifinality, and Bayesian Model 
Averaging.   
 
The outcome of such a propagation of uncertainty throughout the 
modelling process is shown in Figure 2, with the largest uncertainty 
ranges associated with the information used for decision-making. 
Consequently, Hall, (2007) draws attention to the heavy criticisms 
proffered to the ranges of future changes presented in the IPCCs fourth 
assessment report, for not providing sufficient information on which to 
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base decisions about the future and the conception that uncertainty 
ranges are so large as to be useless (Hall, 2007).   
 
In light of the criticisms of the scenario approach, many practitioners, 
particularly in the water sector, have called for probabilities to be 
associated with future impacts projections. However, given the 
uncertainties outlined above, probabilistic approaches are subject to the 
same difficulties as the scenario approaches presented, particularly 
epistemic uncertainty, and can only represent a fraction of the uncertainty 
space. Hall (2007) highlights that probabilistic outputs are highly 
conditional on the assumptions made in their construction, the models 
used and even the statistical methods adopted. For example, two 
commonly applied techniques for propagating uncertainty in hydrological 
models are Bayesian Model Averaging and the Generalised Likelihood 
Uncertainty Estimation (GLUE) method. A recent study by Bastola et al., 
(2011) for a selection of catchments in Ireland has applied both of these 
approaches using the same regional climate scenarios and hydrological 
models as employed below and derived quite different ranges of 
outcomes depending on the technique used. Fundamentally, Hall (2007) 
highlights that the traditional use of probabilities in engineering for 
optimisation of performance in design is potentially dangerous in the 
context of climate change if the severe ambiguities in the information 
they present are not made transparent. Indeed, he also highlights that the 
calls to reduce all of the uncertainty in climate change impacts modelling 
to a single probability distribution function are to misrepresent and place 
unrealistic demands on current scientific knowledge.  
 
As a result of uncertainties, adaptation to climate change in the water 
sector has been hindered by decision makers procrastinating on making 
commitments until either uncertainty is reduced, or until a clearer picture 
of which simulations are correct emerges as climate change signals 
become detectable within observational records. While it is agreed that 
early detection of climate change is essential for minimising adverse 
environmental and societal impacts (Ziegler et al., 2005), it is becoming 
clear that waiting for climate change signals to emerge from records is 
unacceptable as an adaptation approach. As noted above, robust 
attribution of changes in hydrology at the catchment scale is not feasible 
at present. However, techniques have emerged for estimating the time 
horizons for formal detection of trends. Preliminary estimates using data 
for river basins in the US and UK suggest that statistically robust climate 
driven trends in seasonal runoff are unlikely to be found until at least the 
second half of the 21st century (Zeigler et al., 2005; Wilby, 2006). In such 
situations adaptation will have to take place in the face of uncertainty and 
well in advance of change being detected.   
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Figure 2. Uncertainty in future simulated monthly flow regimes derived 
from six climate scenarios and four hydrological models for the river 
Boyne in Ireland for three time periods (2020s, 2050s and 2080s) using 
Generalized Likelihood Uncertainty Estimation method (GLUE) (Bastola 
et al., unpublished).  
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Moreover, the additive nature of uncertainties in climate change 
modelling and impact assessment means that it is highly unlikely that we 
can reduce uncertainties significantly in the time scale required for 
implementing adaptation options. This conclusion is supported by Dessai 
et al., (2009) who draw attention to the fact that after in excess of twenty 
years intense study, the uncertainty ranges for climate sensitivity 
(temperature response of the global climate to a doubling of carbon 
dioxide levels in the atmosphere) has not been significantly reduced. In 
fact, the outcome of further developments in understanding key 
processes and feedbacks is likely to result in the opposite case where 
unveiling limits to our knowledge will result in further unknown 
processes, thereby increasing uncertainty. Recently this is evidenced by 
the increased uncertainty associated with sea level rise due to the 
discovery of previously unknown processes involved in the melting of 
large land based ice sheets. 
 
Robust adaptation   
In spite of the adaptation challenges presented, adaptation to anticipated 
climate changes has to take place, as uncertainty cannot be avoided or 
eliminated through more research (Langsdale, 2008). The traditional 
framework of approaching such challenges (‘predict-then-act’ framework 
(Lempert et al., 2004)) is rooted in the assumption that the future is 
predictable. In this framework, different adaptation options are evaluated 
against probabilistic scenarios and a few options or a single optimal 
adaptation solution are selected with the help of evaluation criteria. 
 
However, being confronted with deep uncertainties in a climate change 
vulnerability assessment, where no subjective likelihood judgments 
should be assigned and risk is not quantifiable; such an approach is no 
longer valid. Additionally, probabilistic scenarios are not capable of 
capturing the full uncertainty extent and therefore only represent a part 
of the total uncertainty (Hall, 2007). This is particularly problematic 
when, like in the water resource sector, extremes (low flows (droughts) 
and floods) are important planning components and adaptation decisions 
are made based on probabilities, without taking the total uncertainties 
into account. Not adequately considering the residuals of potential future 
outcomes, can result in non-appropriate adaptation decisions and may 
result in mal-adaptation. Hallegatte, (2009) additionally states that 
uncertainties in future climate change impacts are so large that traditional 
planning approaches, often seeking an optimum solution when designing 
infrastructure and other long-lived investments, are insufficient. For 
example, depending on the models used to predict impacts on water 
supply systems, the optimal adaptation strategy can differ considerably.   
 
In such a setting, adaptation to climate change impacts is manly about 
dealing with uncertainties as precise climate change impacts on water 
supply systems are not available and will not be feasible in the near term 
future, making the quest for an optimum strategy infeasible. Therefore, it 
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is important that the deep uncertainty surrounding the challenge of 
selecting adaptation options is communicated to decision makers, to 
enable them to understand and base their decisions on adaptation 
strategies that reflect the deep uncertainty encountered.   
 
Consequently, new approaches other than the traditional ‘predict-then-
act’ or ‘predict-then-adapt’ methodology to anticipatory climate change 
adaptation are required and need to be established. For example, Lempert 
and Schlesinger, (2000) suggest that adaptation strategies should be 
sought that are robust against a wide range of plausible climate change 
futures. This means that alternative future strategies need to be evaluated 
against a wide range of plausible futures to determine those that are 
insensitive to future uncertainties. Adder et al., (2005) also identify 
robustness to uncertainty as one of the two key indicators of 
effectiveness of an adaptation option, besides the flexibility or the ability 
of a system to respond to changes. Possible adaptation strategies that 
improve robustness to uncertainties and challenges presented before have 
been highlighted in international literature. A review of the some leading 
papers in this area highlights some important characteristics of robust 
adaptation options as follows (Fankhauser et al., 1999; Lempert and 
Schlesinger, 2000; Adger et al., 2005; Hallegatte, 2009; Wilby and Dessai, 
2010). 
 
Development Path Independency  
Measures taken do not compromise other future adaptation options.   
 
Economic Efficiency  
Adaptation measure that result in benefits, which exceed the costs. 
However, non-monetary benefits are often difficult to relate to costs 
(Adger et al., 2005).  
 
Flexibility and Reversibility 
According to Adger et al., (2005) two key indicators of effectiveness of 
an adaptation option are flexibility and reversibility. These indictors need 
to be considered when planning for adaptation measures. Flexible and/or 
reversible adaptation measures are dynamic by design to allow changes or 
to withdraw the adaptation strategy, as new climate change information 
evolves or when boundary conditions change.  
 
Functional under Wide Uncertainty Ranges 
Uncertain futures require robust adaptation strategies that aim to be 
insensitive to the wide range of climate change uncertainties. Robustness 
to uncertainty is one of the key indicators of the effectiveness of an 
adaptation action (Dessai and Hume, 2007). Robustness to uncertainty 
helps to ensure benefits and satisfactory performance under various 
future presumptions and scenarios.  
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Low/No-Regrets 
Adaptation options with low implementation costs that are projected to 
have large benefit under various future scenarios. The Low or no-regrets 
adaptation criterion is important for infrastructural development 
considerations. No-regrets measurements are cost-effective and effective 
under current and projected climate given their long life design 
(Hallegatte, 2009.)  
 
Reduced Decision Horizon 
Lifetime reduction and therefore cost reduction of possible climate 
change vulnerable projects (Fankhauser et al., 1999, Hallegatte, 2009)   
 
Safety Margins 
Strategies that can reduce climate change vulnerability by adding extra 
safety margins at null or low costs in current infrastructure or allow for 
easy retrofitting (Hallegatte, 2009).  
 
Win-Win 
Adaptation to climate change requires the implementation of 
management options and policies that reduce the vulnerabilities caused 
by climate change, but also offer the most benefits from changed 
conditions.   
 
The key to identify robust adaptations strategies, which are both 
insensitive to specific future states of the system and are beneficial under 
a wide range of possible futures, is a paradigm shift away from the 
‘predict-then-act’ approach. As an alternative, the ‘assess-risk-of-policy’ 
approach (Lempert et al., 2004) overcomes the need to assign (subjective) 
probabilities to climate change and model outputs, as this approach does 
not aim to identify the optimum adaptation solution. Instead, a robust 
decision making framework aims to assess the robustness to uncertainty 
of a wide range of adaptation actions, without any likelihood judgment 
attached to them. Such decision making is mainly coherent with 
established optimum seeking analysis, but the traditional assessment 
order of uncertainty assessment and adaptation decision is reversed 
(Groves and Lempert, 2007). Thus robust approaches have often been 
characterised as bottom up assessments, in contrast to the top-down 
‘predict-then-act’ approach.   
 
Bottom-up approaches begin with an identification of vulnerabilities. If 
vulnerabilities exist, the consideration of future adaptation options 
becomes necessary. In the robust decision making framework, an 
inventory of different adaptation options is compiled (see paragraph 5). 
Then through an exploratory modelling approach, the performance of 
selected adaptation measures is appraised against a wide range of future 
scenarios (Wilby and Dessai, 2010), with the aim of finding strategies 
which perform well and are insensitive to the most significant 
uncertainties. Whereas, the traditional top-down approach examines the 
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variability of model outcomes against different (uncertain) input variables 
and ranks the options according to their performance. A robust decision 
making framework also has an iterative and flexible component, which 
evolves over time in response to emergence of new information or 
scenarios ensuring adaptivity of adaptation decisions.  
 
Adaptation strategies have to be evaluated regularly according to the 
newest knowledge available and reconsidered if necessary. This ensures 
flexibility and the ability to respond to changes, to ensure that future 
adaptation options are not development path dependent and constrained 
by previous adaptation decisions, reducing the risk of mal-adaptation. 
Matthews and Le Quesne, (2009) therefore support the application of a 
process-oriented “vulnerability thinking” instead of “impacts thinking” 
approach in adaptation planning. A vulnerability thinking approach 
combines flexibility of planning over longer time horizons and 
monitoring with adaptive management, recognising the uncertainty in 
projected future hydrological changes.   
 
It needs to be noted that different water supply systems might show a 
different degree of sensitivity to different uncertainties in climate change 
and hydrology models. Therefore, an individual exploratory modelling 
approach to identify robust adaptation options for each water supply 
system might be necessary. This is especially important, as climate change 
is only one of several factors and it is difficult to separate climate change 
adaptation decisions or actions from actions triggered by other social or 
economic events (Adger et al., 2005). Therefore, robustness (insensitivity) 
to key uncertainties needs to be implemented as an important criterion 
for adaptation strategy decision making.  
 
Some Best Practice Case Studies   
In meeting the challenges of uncertainty, a number of approaches are 
emerging within the international literature, which are showing significant 
potential. In relation to engineering safety margins into the design of new 
infrastructure, Prudhomme et al., (2010) have developed a novel 
framework for undertaking climate change impact studies, which can be 
used for testing the robustness of precautionary climate change 
allowances used in engineering design. In analysing the functionality of 
the UK Governments 20% increase on peak flows strategy, the authors 
employ a change factor analysis of the IPCC AR4 GCMs and the 
UKCP09 RCMs to analyse the sensitivity of catchment responses to a 
plausible range of climate changes. By combining current understanding 
of likelihood of the climate change hazard with knowledge of the 
sensitivity of a given catchment, as indicated by its response signal, 
Prudhomme et al., (2010) contend that it is possible to evaluate the 
fraction of climate model projections that would not be accommodated 
by specified safety margins. This approach enables rapid appraisal of 
existing or new precautionary allowances for a set of climate change 
projections, but also for any new set of climate change projections for 
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example arising from a new generation of climate models as soon as they 
are available, or when focusing on a different planning time horizon, 
without the need for undertaking a new climate change impact analysis 
with the new scenarios.  
 
In Ireland, Hall and Murphy, (2010) using measures of vulnerability of 
public water supply infrastructure and the use of natural resources have 
produced a vulnerability analysis of future public water supply for the 
Moy catchment over the coming decades by accounting for the design 
capacity of current infrastructure, population growth, changing patterns 
of water demand and usage. Where vulnerability hotspots were found to 
exist potential adaptation options were screened for robustness using 
exploratory modelling to assess the robustness and functionality of 
adaptation options identified for the catchment. In the case of the Moy 
catchment, a realistic reduction of losses from leaking water 
infrastructure greatly reduced the vulnerability identified under all climate 
scenarios investigated up to mid century; a low regret strategy that is 
robust to uncertainty (Hall and Murphy, 2010).   
 
In a similar study of the Wimbleball water resource zone in southwest 
England, Lopez et al., (2009) used the ensemble of the 
ClimatePrediction.net experiment to test the performance of different 
adaptation options under climate change. By analyzing the frequency of 
failures to meet peak water demand it was concluded that the previously 
identified option of increasing reservoir capacity was not enough to 
tackle successive dry years and that demand reduction measures were also 
needed (Lopez et al., 2009).  
 
Evident from these studies is that adaptation measures have to be 
context specific, as one set of adaptation options may work in one region 
but may not be applicable in another. Adaptation has to be planned and 
implemented on international (for trans-boundary river basins), national 
and regional (basin) level. National planning and water management at 
the river basin scale can help to understand current and future 
vulnerabilities and insufficiencies which need to be recognised and 
subsequently addressed (Stakhiv, 1998). Individual river basins are the 
level at which detailed adaptation plans have to be implemented. The 
fine-tuning of these plans ideally takes place with a broad range of 
stakeholder involvement, to ensure that all possible options are 
considered. With stakeholder involvement, adaptation can allow water 
users to influence the adaptation process, enhancing the likelihood of 
success. However, formulating a final adaptation strategy remains 
complicated because of the number actors involved as well as range of 
measures available. The definition of the criteria for success of an 
adaptation strategy is always context specific and final decisions can 
always be argued (Dessai and Hume, 2007).  
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A closer look at robust adaptation to climate change: a case study 
from Ireland  
The case study presented in this chapter is based on the assumption that 
the deep uncertainties in climate change and hydrological modelling are 
not quantifiable and therefore have no likelihood judgement (subjective 
probabilities) attached. Therefore, a robust decision making framework is 
applied aiming to assess the robustness to uncertainty of adaptation 
options through an exploratory modelling approach.  
 
The application of a robust adaptation decision making framework is 
presented using the case study of the Boyne catchment's water supply 
system in the east of Ireland (Figure 3). Ireland has a moist, temperate, 
maritime climate, mainly influenced by the moderating influence of the 
Atlantic Ocean and the Gulf Stream’s northern extension towards 
Europe, the North Atlantic Drift, which carries warm water towards the 
coast of Ireland. Climate data from the synoptic station at Mullingar is 
used to drive the Boyne catchments hydrology. The 30 year-annual 
average climatology (1961-1990) is about 931mm for precipitation and 
8.8C mean temperature (Met Éireann, 2010).   
 
In Ireland, the majority of public drinking water (83.7%) originates from 
surface water (abstractions from rivers and lakes) (EPA, 2009). As 
surface water abstractions are directly influenced by changes in 
catchment hydrology induced by a changing climate and are the bulk 
source of drinking water, this case study focuses on river abstractions in 
the Boyne Catchment. The six surface water abstraction points shown in 
Table 2, are assessed to identify their vulnerability to climate change and 
if vulnerability is indicated, the robustness of adaptation options is 
assessed. 
 
A stepwise modelling approach is applied (Figure 4) aiming to 
incorporate uncertainties from climate and hydrological models into the 
robust decision making framework.  
 
Step 1: Regional climate scenarios for Ireland were derived from a 
combination of two greenhouse gas emission scenarios (A2 and B2) and 
statistically downscaled output from three Global Climate Models (GCM) 
(HadCM3, CCCma and CSIRO) which were modelled in previous 
research (see Fealy and Sweeney, 2007 and Fealy and Sweeney, 2008 for 
details) to incorporate climate model uncertainty.   
 
Step 2: To additionally include hydrological model structure and 
parametric (model parameters) uncertainty, 500 Monte Carlo sampled 
behavioural hydrological model runs (generated with the Hydrological 
Simulation Model (HYSIM)) are driven by the six climate scenarios of 
step 1 for two future time slices: the 2020s (average of 2010-2039), 2050s 
(2040-2069). This approach increases the possible uncertainty space from 
339
six plausible futures (if only one hydrological future is modelled) to an 
ensemble of 3,000 possible future hydrological time series. 
 
Figure 3. Study Area - The Boyne Catchment. Including Water 
Abstractions, Stream flow Gauges, Synoptic Stations, Towns and 
Catchment Elevation.  
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Boyne Catchment Surface Abstractions studied and   
Water Supply Information (CDM, 2009, EPA, 2009)  
 
Scheme Name  Scheme Code  Population Served Volume (m3/day)  
Athboy Water Supply   2300PUB1001 3000   2200 
Drogheda 2100PUB1019 23077 27692 
Kilcarn: Navan/Midmeath 2300PUB1016 5600 2800 
Liscarthan: Navan/Midmeath 2300PUB1016 22400 11200 
Oldcastle / Kells 2300PUB1011 2024 1447 
Trim Water Supply 2300PUB1009 8000 3200 
 
 Step 3: Vulnerability assessment of the water supply system with the 
help of a water resource model (Water Evaluation and Planning model 
Version 21 (WEAP21) Yates et al., 2005). The current features of water 
supply systems in the catchment are extrapolated into the future 
(Business as Usual-Scenario (BAU)). The performance of the system is 
assessed under the range of future hydrological conditions (3,000 
plausible futures) generated in step 2.  
 
Step 4: Where vulnerability under the BAU-Scenario exists, the key steps 
in the robust decision 
340
making framework, step four and five, are modelled. In step four 
different adaptation options are modelled and these strategies are 
assessed with regard to their robustness to uncertainty over the wide 
range of hydrological scenarios.  
 
Step 5: The final step in this modelling approach involves the 
identification of robust adaptation strategies, which function well across 
the wide range of possible future hydrological scenarios, according to the 
performance measures selected. Robust adaptation strategies can then 
result in an adaptation option/policy options. The identified adaptation 
measures are flexible and can be revised as soon as new criteria are 
selected, new scenarios emerge or the characteristic of the water resource 
system change.  
 
Figure 4.Flow chart of the case study modelling approach. 
 
 
 
The following section focuses on the detailed assessment of step three to 
step five.  
 
Step 3: Vulnerability Assessment 
To assess the vulnerability of the water supply systems in the Boyne 
catchment, with the help of a water resource model, current 
characteristics of the system are extrapolated into the future as follows. 
The future Business-As-Usual (BAU) scenario for the water supply 
systems is based on the population growth rate projections from the Irish 
Central Statistics Office’s (CSO) Report on Population and Labour Force 
Projections (CSO, 2008), the estimates of unaccounted for water 
(leakage) are derived from theAssessment of water and waste water 
services for enterprise (Forfás, 2008).   
 
Scenario A —‘Business as Usual’. The population of 2008 of the water 
supply system is extrapolated into the future using the projected annual 
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average change of the CSO. The per capita water abstractions and the 
supply infrastructure remain constant. The amount of unaccounted for 
water (water lost through leakage) is of the national average of 43%.  
 
The vulnerability of the water abstraction points is assessed using the 
Water Use-to-Resource Ratio (URR) (Raskin, 1997).The URR 
vulnerability measure is used to determine a quantitative indication of the 
pressure (water stress) imposed on the water supply system. This physical 
vulnerability index is the ratio of the water used (withdraws) to the 
available water supply on average (Raskin, 1997 and Arnell, 1999), and 
provides a local index of water stress (Vörösmarty et al., 2000). The 
original URR-index is adjusted to the Irish water resource context, where 
on average over 80% of municipal water abstractions are taken from 
surface water with pronounced seasonality of water availability, and no 
water storage facilities. To take these characteristics of the Irish water 
supply system into account, the original URR-index is refined using 
monthly totals, compared to the original index which is calculated on an 
annual basis, (Hall and Murphy, 2010).   
 
The URR-index is divided into four Water Stress classes, ranging from 
No Water Stress to High Water Stress, as shown in Table 3. A ratio of 
withdrawal to available water resources greater than 20% can ‘begin to be 
a limiting factor for economic development’, whereas the other stress 
classes are literature-based estimates by Raskin (1997).   
 
Table 3. Monthly Water Use-to-Resource Ratio (URR) Classes (adapted 
from Raskin, 1997) 
 
URR <10% 10%-20% 20%-40% >40% 
Classification No stress Low stress Medium stress High stress
 
In the case study area, vulnerability is analysed for each abstraction point 
individually, using 3,000 future hydrology scenarios previously created in 
step two. Monthly URR indices are calculated and then analysed over 
seasonal periods (Winter (Dec, Jan, Feb), Spring (Mar, Apr, May), 
Summer (Jun, Jul. Aug), Autumn (Sep, Oct Nov)).  
 
Vulnerability under the BAU-Scenario  
The water abstractions at Drogheda, Kells and Liscarthan indicate 
various levels of Water stress. Figure 5 shows the Water Use-to-Resource 
Ratio for the summer and autumn season and for the abstraction points 
indicating Water Stress. The 3,000 model runs are presented using violin 
plots, which show the kernel density of the data at different values 
(similar to a histogram), and a marker for the median of the data at that 
time step.In summer and autumn, Drogheda Water Supply URR values 
ranging from NoWater Stress to Water Stress, whereas for Kells and 
Liscarthan all Water Stress Classes are present. In winter and spring, all 
simulations for Drogheda, Kells and Liscarthan remain below the Low 
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Water Stress threshold. The only exception was the year 2055 (not 
shown) where some simulations of the Kells and Liscarthan water supply 
system indicate Low Water Stress in spring. The remaining water 
abstraction points do not indicate any vulnerability (water stress) under 
the future simulations of the Business-As-Usual Scenario and are not 
included in any further analysis.  
 
Step 4: Adaptation Strategy Assessment 
For presentation purposes, only the results for the abstraction of the 
Kells water supply, which indicates the highest water stress, are presented 
and described from this step onwards.  
 
Three future adaptation options different to the BAU-Scenario are 
constructed to allow for the evaluation of water management 
strategies/policy into the future. In this case study, scenario thinking is 
used as a planning tool to test and assess the future vulnerability of 
different strategies used in the water resource sector. The aim is to learn 
about the future by understanding the vulnerability of the different water 
supply systems. Therefore, the water resources modelling tool (WEAP21) 
is not used as an optimisation tool or as a planning tool for designing 
future water resource systems, but rather to indicate the robustness of 
different adaptation options to uncertainty by exploring possible future 
states of the water supply system. 
 
Here, for each adaptation strategy described below, water abstractions are 
based on the same assumptions described for the BAU-scenario for each 
water supply system individually.   
 
The four future adaptation strategy scenarios’ comprise of the ‘no-
measure’ (BAU-scenario), a ‘demand side’, a ‘supplyside’ and an 
‘integrated’ measure shown in the Scenario Matrix (Figure 6). The aims of 
this exploratory scenario modelling approach are to assess the 
vulnerability of the abstraction point, to investigate the interaction 
between different measures and to evaluate their robustness to 
uncertainty as well as to compare the impacts of climate change to other 
non-climatic pressures.   
 
343
Figure 5. Use-to-Resource Ratio (URR)-Analysis (with median trend line) 
of abstraction points, in the Low, Medium or High Water Stress 
Category.  
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Figure 6. Scenario Matrix; showing the four investigated Adaptation 
Strategies. 
 
The following is a brief description of the scenarios and assumptions 
made;  
 
Scenario A—‘Business as Usual’. Extrapolation of the water supply 
system characteristics as described above.  
 
Scenario B—‘Reduced Water Demand’. Increasing water conservation 
measures results in a stepwise per capita water demand reduction of 5% 
of the 2008 value by 2020. The level of unaccounted for water remains 
constant at 43%.  
 
Scenario C—‘Reduced Leakages’. Water supply infrastructure 
improvements reduce the leakage level in annual steps from 43% to 25%, 
by the year 2015. Leakage reduction is based on the Department of the 
Environment, Heritage and Local Government (DEHLG) Water 
Conservation Programme estimates (CDM, 2004). The per capita water 
demand persists on its 2008 level.  
 
Scenario D—‘Reduced Demand and Reduced Leakages’. Combination of 
Scenario B and Scenario C. Water demand and leakage level reductions, 
as described above.  
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Step 4 - the Adaptation Strategy Assessment - of the modelling 
framework is conducted, which means that the future demand side, 
supply side and integrated strategies (Scenario B, C and D respectively) 
are modelled. The three alternative strategies/scenarios selected can be 
characterised as “low or no regrets” and “win-win-strategies”, which are 
able to cope with climate uncertainty and provide benefits, even in 
absence of climate change (Hallegatte, 2009). Therefore, in uncertain 
conditions their application is to be favoured over high cost, potentially 
high regret strategies. In the following sections, the capacity of these 
strategies to successfully adapt to the vulnerabilities indicated in step 
three is assessed. 
 
Results for the Adaptation Strategy Assessment  
The outcomes of the adaption-strategy assessment show that in summer 
and autumn all ranges of water stress can be found within the different 
adaptation scenarios modelled. Generally, throughout the simulated time 
periods, the water Use-to-Resource Ratio (URR) increases over all 
adaptation scenarios (also indicated by the median trend lines). Figure 5 
and 7 show that as the simulation times increase so does the spread of 
the simulation outcomes. This increasing spread of data over time also 
represents the increasing uncertainty ranges. However, when looking at 
individual water resource scenarios there is a significant reduction of the 
spread of simulation outcomes with the implementation of demand, 
supply, and integrated measures compared to BAU-Scenario (‘no-
measures’). Scenario A has the highest uncertainty ranges, which are 
subsequently reduced in Scenario B and C resulting in a significant 
reduction in Scenario D. The adaptation options can be classified as 
robust, since the adaptation measures have an effect on the vulnerability, 
especially on the values different from the median and on the extremes. 
The median of all simulations is also influenced by the adaptation 
measures. For example, the median values of the BAU-Scenario (A) show 
a statistically significantly increasing trend (line) of water Use-to-
Resource Ratio. With the reductions in water demand and leakage, the 
exhibited increasing trend is mitigated (compare Figure 5 with Figure 7). 
The same applies to the median values in autumn.   
 
Figure 8 presents the increasing trend of the percentage of all summer 
simulations located in the High Water Stress Category for the Kells water 
supply system over the simulated time period. The effect of the different 
adaptation measures in reducing the amount of simulations showing high 
water stress is evident. However, even within Scenario D where 
integrated measures reduced water demand and leakage level, the 
percentages of simulations resulting in the High Water Stress Category 
are still considerably high. Especially for the water abstractions at Kells, 
in the time between 2049 and 2069, when 25% of the years have more 
than 15% of all their simulations reaching the High Water Stress 
Category.   
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Figure 7. Kells - Adaptation  Strategies: URR-Analysis (with median 
trend line).  
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Figure 8. Kells-Summer: Percentage of all Simulations in the High Water 
Stress Category.  
 
 
 
Step 5: Identification of Robust Adaptation Strategies 
Having completed the steps of this robust decision making framework, it 
can be concluded that all three adaptation measures (demand, supply, and 
integrated measures, Scenario B, C and D respectively) are robust to 
uncertainty, as they are all able to reduce the vulnerabilities compared to 
BAU- Scenario A (‘no-measures’). However, there is an indication that 
the considered No or Low Regret water adaptations measures might not 
be enough to sufficiently reduce the vulnerability of the water supply 
system, as the Water Stress levels still remain at a high level. An 
expansion of the inventory of the adaptation strategies considering for 
example additional adaptation scenarios/measures or higher water 
demand and leakage reduction is needed. This new menu of strategies can 
then again be assessed in step 4 to identify their capacity to decrease the 
vulnerability and increase the robustness of the investigated water supply 
systems.   
 
Conclusion  
Climate change presents significant challenges for water supply systems 
and their management. The results of such a change undermine the 
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assumption of stationarity, on which adaptation in the water sector to 
past pressures such as population growth has been based. In addition, the 
future evolution of the climate system is inherently uncertain, with the 
likelihood of uncertainty being reduced within the timeframe needed for 
adaptation being small. Furthermore, the large variations in local scale 
hydrology and small climate change signals mean that it is unlikely that 
climate change signals will be statistically detected in river flows before 
the middle of the century. Therefore, water managers will have to engage 
with alternative methods for adapting to climate change. One such 
framework that has been gaining considerable attention in a range of 
sectors is robust adaptation. Under robust approaches, rather than being 
prescriptive, uncertain climate change scenarios are used for exploratory 
modelling to assess the functionality of identified adaptation strategies 
across the uncertainty space. These approaches offer considerable 
potential for progress in initiating anticipatory adaptation strategies. In 
the case study conducted here, an exploratory modelling framework is 
presented that enables the assessment of both demand and supply side 
options.   
 
Looking to the future observational evidence will play a vital role in 
addressing uncertainties and achieving a fuller reconciliation between 
model-based scenarios and ground truth (Hannaford and Marsh, 2006). 
Hydrological monitoring programmes have an essential role to play in 
acquiring the hydrological data necessary to characterise variability and 
discern any emerging trends, while the identification and interpretation of 
these trends is a necessary foundation for the development of 
appropriate water policy and management responses to climate driven 
changes (Hannaford and Marsh, 2006) effecting the water supply sector.   
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CHAPTER 36 
 
LIGHTNESS AND WEIGHT: (RE)READING URBAN 
POTENTIALITIES THROUGH PHOTOGRAPHS 
 
CIAN O’CALLAGHAN 
 
First published in Area (2012), 44(2), 200-207. 
 
Red balloons on the industrial skyline 
 
An entire multiplicity rumbles underneath the sameness of the 
idea (Deleuze 1994: 344). 
 
Time ows in an extraordinarily complex, unexpected, 
complicated way... (Serres with Latour 1995:58). 
 
For Serres, the city is an imperfect citation perpetually reproducing and 
transforming itself. No matter how deep we dig into its historical layers 
‘...another point always interpolates itself iteratively, in front of it. One 
city demands another city, one history requires another; but we do not 
really know how time ows’ (Serres 1991:39, in Crang and Travlou 
2001:174). Time and space, for Serres, are ‘pleated’ in that other 
temporalities and spatialities are always suggested in any given moment in 
any given place. Thus, the city always escapes from the net of totalising 
narratives that seek to encapsulate it, wriggles free of the ‘Gods-eye’ 
view, eludes the orderly vision of what de Certeau (1984) calls the 
‘concept city’. Cities exist in a state of relational tension between 
attempts to represent them and their inherent multiplicity. As such, the 
city is a constantly shifting spasm of relations, writhing in and out of the 
ows of movement and stasis, which can be apprehended in moments of 
(perceived) unitary meaning before again dissolving into the ether of 
urban ux.  
 
The visions seated within these moments of unitary meaning can of 
course exert considerable weight, framing not only what cities are but 
forming what they will become. Nowhere is this more apparent than in 
the powerful vision of post-industrial urbanism seated within particular 
forms of neoliberal capitalist accumulation. An integral part of how the 
city has been ‘...colonized and commodied, bought and sold, created 
and torn down, used and abused, speculated on and fought over’ (Merri-
eld, 2002:89) in capitalism’s quest for perpetual growth is through the 
articulation of these relationships within urban visions (Lefebvre, 1991). 
Capitalism has been very successful in colonising cities in material and 
discursive ways, imbuing urban space with its inherent logic and 
occluding other visions. These visions exert weight, especially in their 
ability to retain an illusion of consistency while perpetually mutating. But 
these visions are also paradoxically light in the sense that they are 
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contingent upon the alignment of fragmented discursive and material 
forces.  
 
As I was preparing my PhD thesis for submission in the summer of 2008, 
these contradictions presented themselves to me in urgent and insistent 
ways. During this period the global credit crunch was underway, and the 
inklings of the national recession were beginning to be felt in Ireland. 
The context in which this research project was initiated, however, was 
quite different. The Celtic Tiger boom, which prevailed between 1993 
and 2007, transformed Ireland from a weak, peripheral nation to a high-
tech economy with a GDP double that of many of its European 
neighbours (Bartley and Kitchin, 2007). One major component of this 
boom, particularly in the period after 2002, was the cultivation of an 
ultimately fatal property bubble, which dramatically altered the Irish 
urban landscape (Kitchinet al., forthcoming). While major regeneration 
programmes had been rolled out in Dublin from the late 1980s, similar 
schemes were not implemented in Cork until a decade later, such that the 
coming to fruition of a major strategy to redevelop the city’s docklands 
coincided with the collapse of the property market, thus rendering the 
aspirations of this vision obsolete. My thesis concerned urban 
regeneration in Cork city between 2000 and 2008, and was particularly 
interested in the way in which the plans for the docklands and the 
European Capital of Culture (ECOC) event discursively stimulated new 
city imaginaries and development objectives. In many ways, these 
strategies had transformed the city (and particular spaces in it), but at the 
same time much of this functioned in terms of plans that were yet to be 
physically implemented. Signicantly, the city’s industrial waterfront was 
constructed as a space through which Cork would be ‘transformed’ into a 
modern European post-industrial city: 
 
The major opportunity site within the [Cork] city boundary is the 
Docklands area, which has the capacity for the development of a new 
modern mixed use district bringing both employment and residents back 
into the city centre, consolidating Cork as ‘a European location for enter-
prise’ (Cork City Council, 2002:8).  
 
Despite the fact that the bulk of these transformations were then only 
existent as urban plans, the images which circulated through strategy 
documents, promotional texts and developer’s plans had begun to take 
on qualities in certain ways seemingly more ‘real’ than the spaces as they 
currently were. It seemed that this change was inevitable, and we were 
just waiting for the physical to catch up with our mental image. However, 
this impending transformation was contingent upon the relationships 
between a set of conditions, the unity of which was threatened by the 
impending recession. The set of assumptions upon which my research 
was built, like the property bubble itself, were fast becoming a imsy 
foundation. As I was nishing my thesis, the city stood on the thin and 
anxious line between movement and stasis.  
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During this period I captured a photograph (Plate 1), which for me 
resonated strongly with the themes of my research, the set of urban 
relations that this was based on, and the tensions on these relationships 
that the current moment engendered. The image showed a number of old 
industrial buildings along the waterfront being suspended from what 
looked like red balloons, and gave the impression that these structures 
were levitated by the balloons.  
 
In this article I wish to use this image to illustrate a number of 
exploratory points. Drawing on recent debates on visual methodologies, I 
acknowledge that capturing images forms a situated eldwork practice 
through which we produce relations. I view images not as neutral repre-
sentations of an objective material reality but as encoding a series of 
relationships that are read in uid ways. I want to use this starting point 
to think about the value (and our use) of images in urban geographical 
eldwork.  
 
Through powerful progress visions the city can become in a sense 
enslaved by a particular urban narrative. Thus, through the discourses of 
Celtic Tiger expansion and the more uniform trend towards 
entrepreneurial urbanism, cities like Cork are bound into an uncritical 
conception of the city as a space to invest in particular forms of eco-
nomic, cultural and social functions. This view of what the city ‘should 
be’ is normalised through various intersecting discourses to the extent 
that the rationale underpinning it becomes an invisible assumption 
beyond the need for explanation. The use of images in urban studies 
literature is also contingent upon these narratives, and thus always 
implies a temporal dimension through which these images are read. 
Therefore, if we revisit and reread these images we can disrupt both the 
‘general’ hegemonic inscription and our own encoding of them.  
 
Reading the photograph through Benjamin’s ‘imagistic approach’ to the 
city and Serres’ theorising of space and time as pleated, the underlying 
agenda of the article is to nd oblique pathways to illuminate alternative 
versions of the (capitalist) city. In relation to the thrust of this article, but 
also I think applicably more generally, is the potential of the current crisis 
to provide a pivot around which we can orchestrate a rereading of the 
multiple cities inherent in images.  
 
Urban images 
The way in which social researchers understand and mobilise images as 
part of eldwork has changed much in recent years (Crang, 2003; Fyfe 
and Law, 1988; Lorimer, 2003; Rose 2003, 2007). Images are now 
increasingly viewed as one of the primary means by which we construct 
our world; not simply artefacts or records but reections of power 
relations which themselves have their own agency. This article is 
cognisant of Rose’s (2007) assertion that we need to ‘take images 
seriously’ and engages in what she calls ‘critical visual methodology’.  
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By ‘critical’ I mean an approach that thinks about the visual in terms of 
the cultural signicance, social practices and power relations in which it is 
embedded; and that means thinking about the power relations that 
produce, are articulated through and can be challenged by, ways of seeing 
and imaging (Rose, 2007:xv). 
 
Figure 1. ‘Red balloons’ over industrial buildings in Cork docklands. 
‘Balloon’, installation by Sorcha O’Brien and Eli Caamano, commissioned 
by the National Sculpture Factory, Cork  
 
 
 
Source: Photo by author 
 
As Rose (2007:2) suggests ‘. . . images are never transparent windows 
onto the world. They interpret the world; they display it in very particular 
ways’. This applies to images that urban geographers collect in the 
process of eldwork. While on the surface many such images offer 
representations of the material world, in reality they are used to 
demonstrate a range of urban processes, cultural meanings and circuits of 
capital. These images, therefore, are deeply entwined in a complex web of 
associations linking the epistemology of research practice with the 
perceived nature of evolving spatial processes. In this way they are both 
the embodiment of dominant urban potentialities and our own 
commentaries and critiques (as researchers) of them. With this in mind it 
is perhaps useful to revisit and reread our own images in order to under-
stand the ways in which we have constructed meanings through them and 
how they can begin to form new meanings and associations. 
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A sympathetic counterpart to such an agenda can be found in Walter 
Benjamin’s ‘imagistic approach’ to the city. For Benjamin, photography 
was a practice that did not simply ‘document’ the city, but situated the 
researcher at ‘important points in the sphere of imagery’ (Gilloch, 
1997:18). Benjamin’s ‘imagistic approach’ is not based on images per se 
but on the ontological implications of seeing explanatory partialities 
expressed in fragments. He suggests that ‘...image is dialectics at a 
standstill. For while the relation of the present to the past is a purely 
temporal, continuous one, the relation of what-has-been to the now is 
dialectical: it is not progression but image, suddenly emergent’ (Benjamin, 
1999:462). 
 
Benjamin’s concern with the depiction of the urban is interwoven with a 
conscious refusal of or resistance to the presentation of an overarching, 
integrated, coherent view of the city as a whole. The imagistic approach 
highlights the eeting, uid character of the modern metropolitan 
experience (Gilloch, 1997:18).  
 
While, for Benjamin, the city cannot be apprehended as a whole, it can be 
(partially but meaningfully) explicated through the broader processes 
inherent within the moment caught eetingly and extrapolated creatively 
by the researcher; ‘Indeed to detect the crystal of the total event in the 
analysis of the small, individual moment’ (Benjamin in Gilloch, 
1997:112). If we are to view images of the city in the context of 
Benjamin’s imagistic view of cities, then photographs are not 
representations of static urban relations but points through which we can 
articulate and rearticulate these relations iteratively. 
 
The fragmented aneur 
In September 2008 I was, like most doctoral candidates in their nal 
stages of writing up, a hollow shell of my former self. I had spent the 
previous few months within a narrow time–space geography that mostly 
involved a circuitous route between a few rooms as I sat writing for most 
of the day and thinking about writing for the rest. Fragments of 
sentences rattled around my head as I tried to sleep at night and I rattled 
around town on some of my few days off, the fragmented aneur 
anxiously reading my research on the city. This anxiety familiar to the 
nal stages of a PhD was not helped by the quickly shifting 
circumstances of Irish economy and society, which problematised a 
number of my ndings. I began to think that my thesis could quickly 
move from being a document of contemporary and future urban trends 
in Cork, to a piece of historical geography illustrating an aborted plan of 
expansion.  
 
As I took a walk through the city centre one September Saturday shortly 
before my submission, I was confronted by an uncanny spectacle that 
encapsulated for me both the understanding I had of urban processes in 
Cork and my anxieties about my attempts to represent them. I stood on 
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St Patrick’s bridge looking at the industrial docklands that expanded to 
the east of the city centre, both an imposing physical presence of 
concrete and steel and an ever-present weight on my consciousness. A 
number of the industrial buildings along the south docks oated under 
red balloons. In a playful exposition obliquely reecting Kundera’s (1984) 
discourse on lightness and weight, the materiality of these buildings 
seemed to be lifted through the ethereality of the balloons: heavy indus-
try made feathery by the unbearable lightness of art.  
 
For anyone familiar with the development of urban trends in western 
cities over the last 30 years, such a connection will resonate. The post-
industrial city has been characterised by the co-dependence of capital and 
culture in the replacement of industrial spaces with those of the 
knowledge economy, amenity, and art (Chang and Huang, 2005; Gibson 
and Stevenson, 2004; Gospodini, 2006; Hannigan, 1998; Kong 2000; 
Miles, 1997; Soja, 2000). The image also resonates with a more localised 
manifestation of this urban narrative. From the beginning of the previous 
decade a dual strategy has evolved in Cork that connected the plans to 
redevelop the waterfront with the re-imagining of the city’s image 
through the ECOC event. Within the discourses of urban planning and 
development, this strategy enabled new narratives to be formed around 
notions of Cork as a city experiencing an ‘urban renaissance’, with new 
building activity reecting the emergence of new knowledge and cultural 
industries (O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007). Since hosting the 2005 event 
the City Council and various development interests have sought to draw 
art into a dialogue with urban transformation, particularly in relation to 
the space of the docklands. More specically, these buildings themselves 
were (at that time) slated for demolition to make way for ‘...three million 
sqft of ofces and over 1,200 apartments... along with a neighbourhood 
centre with shops and other facilities...’ (Barker, 2008). Thus, the 
spectacle did not merely relate to an abstract vision of what might 
happen to this site sometime in the future, but to very immediate material 
transformations.  
 
These red ‘balloons’ which caught my attention were in fact attached to 
the buildings with wire – supported by, rather than supporting these 
structures – as part of an art installation by Sorcha O’Brien and Eli 
Caamano, commissioned by the National Sculpture Factory to celebrate 
Culture Night (an evening of free arts events) in the city. As a public 
installation it was very effective; working as a clever and visually arresting 
aesthetic juxtaposition of shape and colour. The hard edges of the 
angular grey buildings suspended under the contours of the round red 
balloons. The piece works because of its aesthetic simplicity, perhaps 
even whimsy. However, and crucially, it suggests relationships that give it 
depth. 
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The moment of the red balloons  
This piece of public art was produced within a certain set of relationships 
between culture, the city and property development. Reading these 
relationships within the piece, I composed the shot, framed the landscape 
in the camera’s gaze and captured the image. In this I not only framed 
visually what was already ‘present’ but integrated the photograph into a 
frame of analysis that called various absences to bear upon it. Within the 
moment of the red balloons I articulated an image that caught/posed the 
city in a spasm of relations.  
 
The moment of the red balloons formed in Benjamin’s terms a 
‘dialectical image’ – ‘a moment of interruption and illumination, in which 
past and present recognise each other across the void which separates 
them’ (Gilloch, 1997: 113) – in relation to my research practice. It pro-
vided both a monad (the universal discernible within the particular) that 
expressed Cork’s contemporary urban narrative and a dialectical image 
that intersected past and present and placed different visions of progress 
into a relational tension.  
 
Serres suggests that cities do not succeed one another, but rather 
geography ‘presents us with a sowing’ (Serres, 1991: 30, cited in Crang 
and Travlou, 2001: 162), wherein the traces of past cities are pleated in 
the subsequent cities that emerge. For Serres and Benjamin, modernity 
and anachronism always coexist. As Serres puts it, ‘...we are always 
simultaneously making gestures that are archaic, modern, and futuristic’. 
Rather than time being linear, it ‘percolates’ through a turbulent pleating 
together of these categories.Serres suggests the metaphor of the River 
Seine to illustrate this point, indicating that while the Seine, like the 
classical view of time, ‘ows’ in one direction towards the English 
Channel ‘many little trickles turn back toward Charenton or upstream’, 
thus indicating how the ow of time does not obliterate the past, and is 
more chaotic than its measurement though universal increments of days, 
months, and years would imply (Serres with Latour, 1995: 57–62). Events 
that occurred thousands of years ago can be culturally ‘closer’ to us than 
others separated by a much shorter duration because our perception of 
events is dependent on our folding together different sets of knowledge 
in ways that are partially ‘rational’ but also turbulent and affective. Serres 
(with Latour, 1995: 60) likens this to ironing out and then crumpling up a 
handkerchief, thus bringing distant points on the at plane into 
proximity.  
 
Benjamin’s (1999) reading of the city in The Arcades Project is similar. 
As Buck-Morss (1989) points out, by the time Benjamin chose to study 
them, the Parisian arcades were already anachronisms. In them, Benjamin 
witnessed the shimmering array of commodities ‘[h]ollowed out and 
barren...revealed as nothing other than a ruin’ (Gilloch, 1997: 136). But 
rather than conceiving of them simply as historical ‘artefacts’, Benjamin 
uses the arcades to launch a critique on both the transience of 
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commodity forms and the intransigence of capitalist modes of producing 
the city. As Edensor (2005: 15) suggests, ruins ‘...gesture towards the 
present and the future as temporal frames which can be read as both 
dystopian and utopian, and they help to conjure up critiques of present 
arrangements and potential futures’. The ruin exposes the myth of eternal 
progress and, thus, the contradictions of capitalism. In recognising the 
illuminations of the modern capitalist city in the arcades, Benjamin not 
only critiques this particular instance of how new spaces are transformed 
into ruins through creative destruction, but grasps the broader 
implications of how ruins function as sites shifting between obsolescence 
and opportunity.  
 
The image under discussion here similarly depicts ruins in complex ways. 
The industrial buildings on Cork’s waterfront are articulated as ruins 
through the strategy to redevelop the docklands. They are imagined as 
the artefacts of a dead economic era, which are already consigned to the 
realm of heritage, their materiality a mere formality. Thus, the docklands 
strategy produces a ruin space in order to usher in a new phase of 
capitalist development. When read this way these ruins are utopian, sites 
of potentiality and opportunity. They stand on the precipice of a 
becoming commodity – ‘The major opportunity site within the city 
boundary...’ (Cork City Council, 2002: 8) – as sites in which the past and 
the present are projected into an imagined future. However, in recognis-
ing this shifting position of the ruin, how it is simultaneously urban 
blight and opportunity – as we can do through this photograph – we 
destabilise the legitimacy of the linear view of development. The 
combination of art and urban development, the industrial with the post-
industrial, and its intersection with powerful urban imaginaries 
concerning accounts of what the city ‘has ceased to be’ and ‘will become’ 
placed the moment of the red balloons at an interface of urban pasts and 
potential futures. The pleated histories of space comingle in an image 
that seems to ‘move’ guratively to unveil urban complexity. Within this 
image, visions of the future coalesce and coexist among the ruins of the 
past, pasts rendered ruin by the pathways of progress mapped out in the 
strategies of the present day, while the ungainly tension between these 
trajectories is obliquely animated by the punctuation of the red balloons. 
Thus, in rendering this irreconcilable juxtaposition of past, present and 
future visible the red balloons explode the myth of linear progress by 
calling to attention the space (and the city) as one of mixture and 
multiplicity. The moment of the red balloons articulates the shifting 
mingled relationships between the city as commodity, opportunity, and 
ruin, between past, present and future.  
 
But there is a double-bind here. The subsequent unravelling of the surety 
of the entrepreneurial vision of the city further dissolves the boundaries 
between these coordinates. The commodication of the city’s future 
encapsulated in this vision is itself exposed as ruin. The photograph, 
thus, becomes also a depiction of a ruin of what never was. At the time I 
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took this photograph it not only suggested to me the form of urban 
development practiced in Cork, it also suggested to me the fragility of 
this system. In doing so, it exposed for me the apparatus of 
entrepreneurial urbanism – seemingly so entrenched in the urban political 
economy – as a tenuous alignment of a fragmented set of relations poised 
to fall apart at any moment. With the country sliding into recession and 
the world poised on the precipice of nancial meltdown, it reected the 
city tethering on a thin and anxious line between movement and stasis. 
Given the then impending demolition of these buildings, the warm red of 
the balloons seemed to oat in an eerie silence over the deserted 
buildings, highlighting their temporality, but also their physicality. In this 
way, they seemed to me almost like a question mark. As Cork stood on 
the cusp of a new phase of development, the balloons looked set to take 
off, to lift these buildings – relics of an industrial past – and clear the way 
for change. But, like the city itself, they were still anchored to the ground; 
tenuously tugging at ight, but with roots deep in the landscape.  
 
If I look upon the photograph now, there is less of a sense of struggle. 
The extravagant plans for the docklands are gradually vanishing into the 
fog of recession. In 2009, it was announced that planning permission had 
been granted for three new bridges that were seen as central 
infrastructural provisions for the docklands project. However, as this 
story adorned the front page of the local newspaper, it sat side-by-side 
with the story that a warrant had been issued for the arrest of one of the 
main developers involved in the scheme set to benet most from this 
infrastructure. The Irish property market has crashed spectacularly 
(Kitchinet al., forthcoming). Meanwhile, arts funding has been slashed 
and Cork has lost some important cultural venues. While schemes have 
subsequently been announced for the docklands, they come with so many 
caveats that it seems unlikely redevelopment will happen in the near 
future (O’Callaghan, 2011). The moment of the red balloons now seems 
like a culmination of a set of plans and relationships that ended in this 
snapshot; the wind failed to lift and the buildings coiled their briey 
relaxed roots into the ground once more. The moment of change had 
passed.  
 
As I currently see it, then, the image depicts two sets of ruins; the ruin of 
the industrial city that has ceased to be and the ruin of a particular 
version of the post-industrial city that never was. The former has a 
material basis, the latter a virtual. But, nevertheless, both ruins are impli-
cated in how we perceive the image, and thus how we might experience 
the space that it depicts. As these buildings sit empty on the quay, they 
occupy a representational space between these two ruins, neither urban 
blight nor opportunity but quiet stasis, existing still in the lull between 
economic eras.  
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Lightness and weight  
Milan Kundera (1984) in Theunbearable lightness of being suggests the 
problematic of a dichotomy between the concepts of ‘lightness’ and 
‘weight’. Is lightness positive and weight negative? ‘The only certainty is: 
the lightness/weight opposition is the most mysterious, most ambiguous 
of all’, he suggests (Kundera, 1984: 5). Looking at this image I am 
reminded of this fragile opposition. In this picture which is lightness and 
which is weight? Depending on our acceptance of the piece’s optical 
trick; are the buildings light, and thus the balloons have weight in order 
to lift them? To follow the metaphor through is heavy industry made 
light by art? Is the heaviness of Cork’s industrial heritage made light 
(made removable) by the powerful vision of ‘progress’ encapsulated in 
the Docklands plans? And if so, is the apparatus of the neoliberal 
entrepreneurial city characterised by lightness or weight? Is the apparatus 
of entrepreneurial urbanism akin to the optical trick performed by this 
image, making that which is light appear to exert an oppressive weight of 
inuence under which the lightness of opposing visions of the city 
cannot hope to combat?  
 
This image of Cork encapsulates the way in which various forces and 
processes are combined with associations and assumptions to construct 
an imagining of the urban fabric that carries a weight to such an extent 
that it becomes ‘real’. Urban projects like Cork Docklands demonstrate 
how powerfully images function within society. The bombardment of 
plans and visions of the area’s transformation translate the space 
incrementally from one associated with one thing (industrial) to another 
(postindustrial). These visions ‘order’ the city, but do so ‘cosmetically’ by 
accentuating certain relationships (and thus xing the city through a 
discursive imaginary) and not by organising the multiplicity. Serres (1985: 
32–35) suggests that ordering and adorning are one and the same:  
 
The Greeks in their exquisite wisdom combined order and adornment in 
the same word, the art of adorning and that of ordering. ‘Cosmos’ 
designates arrangement, harmony and law, the rightness of things: here is 
the world, earth and sky, but also decoration, embellishment and orna-
mentation... Cosmos and cosmetics, appearance and essence have the 
same origin. Adornment equals order and embellishment is equivalent to 
law, the world appears ordered, at whatever level we consider 
phenomena. Every veil is a magnicently historiated display (Serres, 
1985: 32).  
 
For Serres ‘[t]he question of the city goes far beyond the urban question. 
It concerns simultaneously the emergence of the collective, foundations 
and relations, forms of multiplicity, representations of the world...’ 
(Hénaff, 1997: 63). Inherent in any ordering of phenomena is the 
containment of the multiple. As Assad (2005: 216) argues ‘...Western 
thought has opted for rational, explanatory clarity and epistemological 
linearity and pushed aside the nonsolvable and nonclariable into the 
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realm of the nonscientic...[whereas Serres opted] to present his scientic 
discourse in a metaphoric, often allegorical form…’ Serres’ critique in 
this regard is that the rational, scientic, and linear discourse itself 
occludes the multiple through a cosmetic ordering.  
 
On this view, the urban visions that order the city do not present a ‘false’ 
depiction, but rather apply a selective cosmetics that uncovers the 
essential elements of (and essentialises) the city. They are veils that 
simultaneously make visible and conceal. But they do so only relation-
ally, in combination with other veils that conceal and reveal different 
histories and potential futures. Urban visions are, thus, both weighty and 
light, powerful and fragile. Ordering and representation are always bound 
up in, and eroded by, multiplicity. The urban narrative is pleated and 
temporally out-of-joint, encompassing thousands of abandoned dreams 
like dead leaves scattered around the body of progress. The aborted plans 
of expansion, the discursive visions never to given material form, are not 
the inconsequential aberrations of a fundamentally linear march of time 
and space. They are the remainder of the creative destruction of 
capitalism in the city that is denied by the illusion of eternal progress. 
These substantial (anti) visions are powerful in their capacity to disrupt 
the linear and logical view of progress seated within the vision of 
entrepreneurial and neoliberal capitalist accumulation.  
 
In my rereading of this image, the weighty relationships it had 
represented for me (relationships that would ‘structure’ the future of the 
city) became light components of histories never to have been (they 
would not even ‘structure’ the past). Yet this reading also succumbs to a 
linear understanding of time and the city and separates the material from 
the discursive. If the vision of the Docklands held such a powerful grip 
on the urban imaginary, then surely it does not vanish in the instant that 
the redevelopment of the site no longer becomes commercially viable. 
The Dockland project ‘exists’, has been made to exist over the last 
decade through a few plans and strategies, hundreds of newspaper 
articles and speeches, countless conversations, negotiations, and schemes, 
and a couple of prominent developments. This vision is altered, perhaps 
loses its potency (its weight) in becoming a history never to have been 
instead of a future to be, but it remains folded in the urban fabric, 
pleated again (and again) into the city’s histories. In doing so, it disrupts 
the linear (progress) vision.  
 
Within the entrepreneurial city vision an unbroken trajectory between the 
past, present and future is articulated that denies urban spatial and 
temporal multiplicity and exerts a weight of inevitability to the city’s 
development. But other cities are located in the interstices of this vision, 
hidden histories and veiled futures that interrupt the linear ow of time 
and space. In this article I have argued that because images are inscribed 
with these relationships and meanings they can also be mobilised to 
disrupt the ordered and static view of what cities can be. Nancy (1991) 
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suggests that every collectivity is produced and transformed by 
continually ‘unworking’ itself through singular interventions that 
interrupt totalising meanings. The city as a collectivity is similarly 
unworked by such small-scale interventions that, rather than signifying a 
violent wakening from Benjamin’s ‘collective dream’, involve a perpetual 
process of ‘crumpling’ the urban fabric to illuminate these other cities. 
Such interventions are not a radical departure for urban studies. But as 
capitalism regenerates after this most recent crisis, a critical agenda that 
seeks to continuously (iteratively) destabilise the weight of ‘logic’ 
presupposed within the neoliberal view of space and society is both 
warranted and necessary to keep the possibility of alternative urbanities 
in play.  
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CHAPTER 37 
 
POLITICS, THE EUROVISION SONG CONTEST AND 
IRELAND 
 
ADRIAN KAVANAGH 
 
First published on Adrian Kavanagh’s Blog, 
http://adriankavanagh.wordpress.com, May 3rd, 2012.  
 
While the Eurovision Song Contest attests to be a non-political event, 
there are always strong political elements running through the different 
stages of this contest each year, whether it be issues to do with national 
song selections, the staging of the contest or the much discussed 
Eurovision voting patterns. This post will consider the politics of the 
contest with respect to Ireland’s participation in it. The political 
dimensions of the Eurovision Song Contest and Ireland’s involvement 
relate not only to voting patterns and this was evidenced in the 
relationship between the Dustin debacle of the 2008 Belgrade contest 
and the failure of the first referendum on the Lisbon Treaty, which 
followed hot on the heels of that high profile Eurovision failure as will 
be discussed later. In light of this, it is perhaps chastening to remember 
that the upcoming European referendum will take place days after this 
year’s Eurovision Song Contest in Baku and consider whether a high 
profile Jedward loss in the semi final or a Jedward win could have a 
bearing on people’s intentions in the referendum! But first this post will 
look at the wider politics of the Eurovision and the different European 
countries that have been shaped by this. 
 
Politics and the Eurovision 
Outside of Ireland, even though the contest professes itself to be 
apolitical and the organisers have intervene to prevent it becoming 
politicised, the political alliances and divisions that mark Europe often 
become too readily evident with the contest. Political and cultural allies 
(for example, Russia and Armenia, Cyprus and Greece) tend to 
consistently award each other high votes at Eurovision, while countries 
that are at war, or have recently been at war, tend not to vote for each 
other even if they are neighbours (Cyprus and Turkey, Russia and 
Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan) although this interestingly does not 
seem to apply in the case of the Former Yugoslav states. There are a 
series of incidents where politics has directly impinged on the contest; 
one of the earliest probably being the “Francogate” controversy 
surrounding the 1968 contest which ‘allegedly’ cost Cliff Richard victory 
and lead Terry Wogan to mutter bitterly in relation to Spain’s entry in the 
2007 contest about how “even Franco’s secret service couldn’t even save 
this”. In 2003 political opposition within Europe to the UK’s 
involvement in the Iraq conflict was argued to be the reason why the UK 
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entry attained the dreaded nils points score in the Eurovision final in 
Riga. 
 
The Orange Revolution in the Ukraine in 2004 was to strongly influence 
hosting of the 2005 Eurovision by that country, as well as the song 
represented to select the Ukraine in that contest – the lyrics of which had 
to be changed after the European Broadcasting Union took issue with 
political references to the Orange Revolution in the song. In the 
following year, tensions in the lead up to a Montenegrin independence 
referendum came to the fore in the Serbia and Montenegro Eurovision 
selection contest, almost leading to a riot at the event (which incidentally 
also featured Brian Kennedy – the show, not the near-riot…) and 
ultimately leading Serbia and Montenegro to withdraw from that year’s 
contest. Following the conflict with Russia in 2008, Georgia initially 
seemed likely to boycott the following year’s contest which was being 
held in Moscow, but eventually seemed to relent and announced they 
would enter the contest and went about the process of selecting a song 
for this. The song chosen by Georgia for the 2009 contest, We Don’t 
Wanna Put In, awoke controversy with alleged references to Russia and 
its then prime minister, Vladimir Putin: 
 
We don’t wanna put in 
 
the negative move 
 
It’s killin’ the groove 
 
I’m a-tryin’ to shoot in some disco tonight 
 
Boogie with you  
 
(Diggiloo Thrush, 2009) 
 
After protests from Russia, the European Broadcasting Union requested 
that Georgia either enter change the song lyrics or else enter a different 
song; when Georgia refused to do they were disqualified from the 2009 
contest. Controversy also emerged surrounding Azerbaijan, when it was 
discovered that the authorities there had called in for questioning the 43 
people who had voted for Armenia in the 2009 final (one of whom 
claimed they had for voted for the Armenian entry because it sounded 
more like a song from Azerbaijan that the song that had represented 
Azerbaijan that year). The 2010 contest did not attract the same degree of 
political controversy as the previous year’s contest did, although there 
was controversy surrounding the initial selection of the Ukrainian entry, 
which was allegedly politically influenced, and a change of government in 
the Ukraine subsequently kick started a new selection process for their 
Eurovision entry.  In 2011 to date there has already been controversy 
concerning the Belarus selection, in which the president of the country 
371
was seen to intervene in the decision to overturn the initial result. The 
most dramatic development has circled around the decision of Armenia 
to withdraw from the contest given that it is being hosted by Azerbaijan, 
a country that it still effectively remains in a state of war with over the 
Nagorno-Karabahk secessionist cause. The hostility between these two 
neighbouring states (heightened by the significant success levels achieved 
by these during their very short histories as Eurovision participants) was 
already evident at Eurovision in relation to the controversy over the 
questioning by authorities of people within Azerbaijan who had voted for 
Armenia in the contest (as noted above) but also in the featuring of an 
image from the contested Nagorno-Karabahk region when Armenia was 
reporting their Eurovision votes at the 2009 final. 
 
Politics and Ireland in the Eurovision 
Voting patterns can say a lot about Ireland’s relationship with the rest of 
Europe– and probably are indicative of a growing peripheralisation of an 
Ireland – that Mary Harney would claim to be closer to Boston than to 
Berlin - in the 2000s from a Europe that was decidedly shifting further 
eastwards in focus. The results of contests in the 2000s lead many 
bemused Irish people and commentators to claim that they had never 
heard of countries such as FYR Macedonia, Moldova or Azerbaijan 
beforehand and that they weren’t aware of such countries actually being 
in Europe. (It is worth noting that it is membership of the European 
Broadcasting Union that determines whether a country is eligible to take 
part in Eurovision or not, not being “European”. This explains Israel’s 
participation in the contest as well as Morocco’s sole entry in 1980 – 
indeed all of the North African states and a number of Middle Eastern 
states are eligible to take part in Eurovision but most choose not to due 
to Israel’s participation in the contest, a fact that was especially evident in 
2005 when Lebanon decided to enter the contest and actually had chosen 
a song, but then withdrew when the EBU told them they would not be 
allowed to block the performance of the Israeli entry.) At the same time, 
it was obvious that Ireland simply wasn’t registering as a voting option 
with voters from countries at the other side of the continent, such as 
those from Belarus, Bulgaria, Georgia and Azerbaijan. The growing 
Easternisation of the contest and Ireland’s diminished fortunes fed into 
the political climate of mid-2000’s Celtic Tiger Ireland, in which 
immigration issues and Ireland’s changed position within an enlarging 
European Union was feeding into a growing antipathy towards the 
European Union (on which Ireland seemed to becoming less dependant 
on) within the state (and indeed other western states) during the mid to 
late Celtic Tiger era. Just as Ireland had been seen to lose out from the 
enlargement of the Eurovision to include new eastern entrants, it was 
feared that Ireland would similarly “lose out” in economic and political 
terms due to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements of the European Union. 
Just as (akin to a “boy who stops winning and takes the ball away” 
mentality) many were questioning whether Ireland should continue to 
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take part in the Eurovision Song  Contest, there was a growing feeling 
that affluent Ireland no longer needed the European Union. 
 
This culminated in the events of 2008 (which in cultural terms could be 
viewed as symbolising the dying embers of the Celtic Tiger era), where 
Ireland controversially entered a novelty entry, Irelande Douze Points by 
Dustin the Turkey, for the Eurovision contest in Belgrade, which was 
specifically seen to be a protest against Ireland’s poor Eurovision results 
in the 2000s: 
 
Oh, I come from a nation 
 
What knows how to write a song 
 
Oh Europe, where oh where did it all go wrong?  
 
(Diggiloo Thrush, 2008) 
 
The entry, part searing poststructuralist critique of the changing dynamics 
within a post-Stalinist Europe and Eurovision, part total rubbish, met a 
cold reception from the Eurovision voters, no doubt not totally unrelated 
to references in the song likening their previous Eurovision efforts as 
being akin to “Drag acts and bad acts and Terry Wogan’s wig, mad acts 
and sad acts” (Diggiloo Thrush, 2008). While Dustin himself has 
managed (so far) to escape the same fate, Ireland got stuffed as a result, 
failing abysmally to qualify for the final despite having been one of the 
pre-contest favourites. While some commentators rightfully roasted the 
decision to send such an entry to Eurovision especially at the expense a 
number of quality entries such as Leona Daly’s that lost out to it in the 
national selection, others blamed the failure of the song on a lack of a 
sense of humour on the part of Europeans who just “didn’t get us”. This 
was to tie in with the growing disenchantment and disengagement that 
sectors within Celtic Tiger Ireland had with all things European and 
European Union in the mid-2000s and would culminate in the loss of the 
first Lisbon Treaty referendum some weeks later. (Unlike the 
“accidental” loss of the earlier Nice Treaty (2001) referendum, which was 
largely explained by the low turnout levels for that contest and was not 
reflective of an especially significant anti-European bloc within the state 
at that time.) 
 
Indeed, the misguided fowl was itself to call for a no vote in the wake of 
the Belgrade humiliation as a response to Ireland’s Eurovision defeat. 
The extent to which the Eurovision result did bear on people’s voting 
decisions is perhaps moot but the Dustin episode did point to a growing 
distancing between Ireland and Europe which was at the roots of the 
referendum defeat. The actual Lisbon vote itself was particularly notable 
given that the “No” victory could not this time be put down to low 
turnout as happed with the earlier vote on the Nice Treaty referendum. 
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The resultant sea-change in attitudes toward Europe in the wake of the 
economic recession, which saw a decided shift in favour of the treaty in 
the second referendum, also was replicated in Eurovision terms with 
credible acts being selected for the 2009 and 2010 contests and growing 
sense that the country was once again thirsting for Eurovision glory as an 
antidote to the economic gloom and doom: 
 
Chastened and bowed by the collapse of the Celtic Tiger 
and by failure to qualify for the Eurosong finals three years 
in a row, how we would love the morale boost that a win 
for Niamh Kavanagh in Oslo tonight would give us. How 
we would love to watch the Irish contingent whooping 
victoriously in the Telenor Arena.  (Irish Independent 
editorial, 2010) 
 
Just as our Eurovision heyday preceded the econ0mic boom of the late 
1990s and 2000s, the Crisis of the past few years has seen a re-awakening 
of Irish interest in the contest. Ireland is now putting in a greater effort 
into its Eurovision selection and indeed staging of the Irish entry even 
within the growing financial limits placed on RTE – for instance contrast 
the staging of Jedward’s “Lipstick” in Dusseldorf in 2011 which was one 
of the most impactful performances in that contest with the staging of 
Irish acts earlier in the decade, which tended to be over-shadowed by 
more high-powered performances from other Eurovision countries, but 
most notably the more eastern states such as The Ukraine. This improved 
effort has fed into improved results in the contest – 2010 and 2011 were 
the first two years that Irish acts consecutively qualified from the 
Eurovision semi finals and, as the previous post shows, 2011 marked an 
especially significant return to form and the first time since 1997 that an 
Irish act won a number of douze points from different countries at the 
Eurovision voting on Final night. Increased success in turn links in to an 
increased interest level amongst the Irish public – the viewership for 
Eurovision shows over the past two years has ranked the contest as being 
one of the most watched shows on RTE in each of those years. 
 
But there is a chastening dimension to these growing interest levels in 
light of the fact that the European Fiscal Stability Treaty referendum vote 
is scheduled to take place within days of this year’s Eurovision contest. If 
the vote is tight one (and this would appear to be highly likely), could 
voters’ attitudes be, albeit subconsciously, shaped by Jedward’s result in 
Baku? Could a Jedward defeat in the semi-finals lead to a growing 
embitterment towards all things European and encourage people to vote 
No? Could a triumphant Jedward victory in the Final lead to a growing 
sense of bonhomie towards Europe amongst Irish voters and help to get 
the treaty over the line? Only time will tell or as they say in Baku – at 
least according to Google translate! – yalnz zaman deyəcəklər. 
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 CHAPTER 38 
 
THE ENERGY BUDGET OF THE URBAN SURFACE: TWO 
LOCATIONS IN DUBLIN 
 
STEPHANIE KEOGH, GERALD MILLS, and ROWAN FEALY 
 
Forthcoming in Irish Geography. 
Introduction 
In the first decade of the 21st Century a significant milestone was reached 
when the urban proportion of the world’s population of 6.6 billion 
passed 50%. This proportion will increase rapidly in the decades to come 
as parts of Asia and Africa become progressively less rural and more 
urban. Although urban areas occupy less than 3% of the planetary 
landmass, they are the foci of humans and economic activity. The 
climates that they generate are distinctive and represent unambiguous 
evidence of the anthropogenic climatic effect. This urban climate effect is 
a consequence of two related properties, land cover (form) and land use 
(function). Urbanisation replaces ‘natural’ surfaces with manufactured 
materials that are usually impervious and have distinctive thermal and 
radiative properties. In addition, the urban surface is both geometrically 
complex and highly diverse. These properties of form result in the 
formation of myriad microclimates caused by a number of climate 
drivers, including access to the sun and shelter from wind. Urban 
function refers to the human activities that generate waste heat, moisture 
and materials as a result of transportation, industrial production, energy 
consumption, and so on. These functions tend to have distinctive spatial 
and temporal emission patterns. Together, urban form and urban 
function generate urban climates at a hierarchy of scales.  
 
At a micro-scale, the outdoor climate is extraordinarily diverse and a 
myriad of microclimates are generated in and around buildings. 
Turbulence mixes these distinct climates so that, with increasing 
elevation, the individual contributions become diluted and the urban 
(rather than building) climatic effect becomes evident. This mixing 
process produces an urban boundary layer (UBL) that develops at the 
upwind edge of the city and grows in depth with distance as it entrains 
non-urban air into the layer at its upper boundary (Figure 1). For a large 
city, the UBL may be 1-2 km deep by late afternoon as surface heating by 
the sun encourages vertical exchanges. At the lee side of the city a new 
boundary layer forms and it too grows in depth with distance from the 
city edge. It will develop as an internal boundary layer separating the 
elevated UBL from the underlying surface. As a result an urban plume, 
                                                 
 Gerald Mills, School of Geography, Planning, and Environmental Science, University 
College Dublin. 
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 which is warm, relatively dry and enriched with a host of gaseous 
(including CO2) and material pollutants, extends downwind of the city. 
An understanding of the growth and development of the UBL is 
necessary for a range of climatic studies, including the formation of the 
urban heat island and local and regional air quality. This paper reports on 
a project that is examining Dublin’s climate by measuring energy 
exchanges at the urban surface. However, identifying this ‘surface’ is not 
easy in an urban setting. A brief discursion into boundary-layer 
climatology will make the urban ‘problem’ clearer and provide a context 
for the research reported on here. 
 
Figure 1. Schematic of the vertical layers at which urban climate effects 
occur. The urban boundary layer is generated as a result of the urban 
form and function and can extend downwind of the city. The arrow 
indicates the direction of the prevailing wind 
 
 
 
Boundary-layer climatology 
The climate near the ground is formed as a result of energy exchanges 
with the underlying surface, which can be formalised as a statement on 
the energy budget that may be applied to a volume (Fig 2), 
 
                                                                               (1) 
 
Net radiation (Q*) is partitioned into the vertical exchange of sensible 
and latent heat (QH+QE) via turbulence, the storage of heat (ΔQS) and 
the horizontal transport of energy or advection (ΔQA). Each term is 
expressed as a flux density, the flow of energy per unit surface area 
(Wm2). If these terms are measured over a homogenous surface then 
there is no horizontal transfer in the system and ΔQA≈0. In these 
circumstances, the only concern is the height at which the remaining 
terms are evaluated. Ideally, the observation platform is located within a 
constant flux layer where each of the energy budget terms is nearly 
invariant with height. This layer represents the level at which the 
atmospheric properties have come into equilibrium with the surface 
below. It is located above the height of the roughness elements, which 
may be blades of grass on a prairie or trees in a forest.  
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 Figure 2. Schematic of a typical urban volume illustrating the required 
height at which to make representative observations. The vertical arrow 
represents vertical exchanges of energy via turbulence, and the horizontal 
arrows represent the transfer of energy via advection 
 
 
 
Net radiation (Q*) is comprised of the incoming (↓) and outgoing (↑) 
short- (K) and longwave (L) radiation, 
 
                                                                                (2) 
 
Shortwave (or solar) radiation is emitted by the sun, it occupies a 
wavelength range between 0.01 and 3 µm and has a peak at about 0.5 µm 
within the spectrum of visible radiation. Incident shortwave radiation 
(K↓) at a surface is a function of day of year and time of day, which 
govern the altitude of the sun in the sky. In Ireland maximum K↓ 
(approx. 800 Wm-2) will occur on a flat surface at noon under a clear sky 
during the summer solstice. At noon on a clear winter day, the magnitude 
of K↓ will be a great deal less (approx. 300 Wm -2). Time of year also 
controls the length of day, whereas during the summer solstice the day-
length in Dublin is 17 hours, at the time of the winter solstice, it is just 
7.5 hours. Outgoing shortwave radiation (K↑) is a function of a surface 
reflectivity (or albedo) which is expressed as a proportion (α), 
 
                                                                                      (3) 
 
Albedo varies with surface cover and common values are listed in Table 
1. 
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Table 1. Thermal properties of grass and materials used in urban 
construction (Modified from Oke, 1987). 
 
Material Emissivity Albedo 
Density 
(kg m-3 x 
103) 
Conduc-
tivity 
(Wm-1 K-1) 
Heat 
capacity 
(Jm-3 K-1 x 
106) 
Concret
e 
0.71-0.90 0.10-
0.35 
2.40 1.51 2.11 
Asphalt 0.95 0.05-
0.20 
2.11 0.75 1.94 
Tile 0.90 0.10-
0.35 
1.92 0.84 1.77 
Slate 0.90 0.10 2.69 2.01 2.06 
Glass 0.87-0.94 0.08 2.48 0.74 1.66 
Brick 0.90-0.92 0.20-
0.40 
1.83 0.83 1.37 
Stone 0.85-0.95 0.20-
0.35 
2.68 2.19 2.25 
Grass 0.95 0.26 - - - 
 
Longwave (or terrestrial radiation) is that emitted by all objects at Earth-
like temperatures. It occupies a range between 3 and 30 µm and has a 
peak at approximately 10 µm. The magnitude of emitted radiation is a 
function of both temperature and emissivity (ε). For a surface, incoming 
longwave radiation (L↓) is derived from the overlying atmosphere, 
 
        
                                                                                         (4) 
 
Where Ta is air temperature (in Kelvin, K), σ is the Stefan-Boltzmann 
constant (5.67x10-8 Wm-2K-4) and εa is atmospheric emissivity, which is 
substantially a function of atmospheric water content. Outgoing 
longwave radiation (L↑) is comprised of that which is emitted and 
reflected L↓, 
 
        
                                                                             (5) 
 
where the subscript (s) refers to the surface. Emissivity varies with the 
nature of surface materials – most natural surfaces have εs values greater 
than 0.9 (see Table 1). 
 
Over the course of a day, each of these radiation terms inscribes a 
distinctive pattern. In the absence of cloud, K↓ increases from sunrise to 
noon and declines until sunset and K↑ displays an opposite pattern. At 
night both are zero. By comparison the longwave terms show little 
diurnal variation and typically L↑ exceeds L↓. Net radiation (Q*) then is 
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 negative at night and positive during the daytime. This energy is used to 
drive heat transfers with the overlying atmosphere and underlying soil.  
 
Vertical heat exchanges with the atmosphere occur as turbulent motions 
transfer sensible and latent heat. These occur as a consequence of vertical 
gradients of air temperature and humidity. The nature of these exchanges 
can be represented simply as, 
 
                                    
 
                                         (6 and 7) 
 
Where Ca is the heat capacity of air and LV is the latent heat of 
vapourisation (LV), which may be treated as constant near the surface. 
The terms in the parenthesis represent the correlation of vertical velocity 
(w) and air temperature (T) and of w and humidity (ρV). The overbar 
represents an average and the primes represent fluctuations (positive and 
negative) from that average. It is the correspondence of the signs of 
deviation that produces a positive or negative flux. For example, if a 
rising (w’>0) brings warmer air (T’>0) then the flux is positive, similarly 
if sinking air (w’<0) brings warmer air (T’>0), the flux is negative.  
 
The final term in the equation is heat storage, which refers to the energy 
stored in the volume under study. A small proportion of this heat is 
stored in the atmosphere and is revealed as changes in the vertical air 
temperature and humidity profiles that result from surface-air exchanges. 
The majority however is stored in the solid substrate, the layer below the 
surface. The lower boundary of the volume under study extends to a 
depth (D) where no diurnal temperature change occurs so that, 
 
       
  
  
                                         (8) 
 
Where Cs is the heat capacity (Jm-3K-1) of the substrate and ΔT/Δt is the 
change in temperature with time (Ks-1).  
 
When these terms (Q*, QH, QE and Δ QS) are plotted over the course of a 
day each flux exhibits characteristic patterns that illustrate the nature  of 
exchanges. The net radiation curve is negative overnight and positive 
during the day, which corresponds to daytime radiative heating 
(associated with the receipt of short-wave radiation) and night-time 
radiative cooling. At night this cooling is supported by heat drawn out of 
storage and by heat transfer from the overlying atmosphere. During the 
daytime, the opposite occurs as the surplus energy at the surface is used 
to heat the atmosphere and the substrate. However, the patterns are not 
symmetrical about noon. When the sun rises and Q* becomes positive, 
most of this energy initially is transferred into the substrate. At this time 
of the day the atmosphere near the surface is very stable and there is little 
turbulent activity. As the surface continues to warm the near-surface air 
temperature gradient increases, vertical motion becomes more vigorous 
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 and QH and QE begin to dominate exchanges. By the afternoon, ΔQS has 
become negative (heat drawn out of storage), even though Q* is still 
positive. QH and QE remain positive even after sunset, when Q* has 
become negative.  
 
This outline describes a typical pattern on a sunny calm day, where 
vegetation is present. On a cloudy day, there is little direct beam short-
wave radiation to drive the diurnal patterns and the atmospheric response 
is muted. Similarly, on a windy day turbulence is driven by mechanical 
forces and the nature of energy partitioning between the atmosphere and 
the substrate changes. In these circumstances, one would expect the 
atmospheric temperature profile to be neutral (isothermal) as heat is 
mixed into a deep layer. Finally, the nature of exchanges will depend 
upon the nature of the surface itself. For example, in the absence of 
vegetation, there will be little potential for evaporation and QE will be 
small. In these circumstances available radiation energy (Q*) is 
partitioned into heating the atmosphere (QH) and the substrate (ΔQS). A 
common means of comparing surface types then is to obtain the ratio of 
energy fluxes to see how available net radiation energy is partitioned in 
storage (ΔQS/Q*) or among the turbulent fluxes (QH/QE). 
 
The urban problem 
Cities pose a real challenge for the application of boundary-layer 
concepts largely owing to the nature of urban functions and of urban 
form. As a result there are very few measurements programmes 
internationally of any duration. Nevertheless, the results from these 
programmes have provided the conceptual basis for observations within 
the urban environment and are used in the project described here. 
 
The effect of urban functions is the emission of an anthropogenic heat 
flux (QF) that can be substantially attributed to energy use associated with 
industrial production, building air conditioning (e.g. heating, cooling and 
lighting) and transportation. It represents an additional term in the energy 
budget (EB) equation, 
 
                                                                        (9) 
 
QF is difficult to isolate in measurement programmes and is most often 
estimated from information on energy use. For mid-latitude cities it is 
estimated at between 25-100 Wm-2 on average depending on the intensity 
of energy use in different parts of the city. It will also have a distinctive 
temporal pattern associated with the working day and week. As an aside, 
as most energy is generated from fossil fuels, QF is directly linked to the 
emission of CO2 in cities. 
 
The effect of urban form is twofold. Firstly, the urban surface is 
aerodynamically very rough and this is reflected in a deep layer of intense 
turbulent activity that creates a deep surface layer. Secondly, the urban 
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 facets that comprise the urban surface (walls, roofs, gardens, etc) are 
highly diverse in terms of their radiative and thermal attributes. The 
result is exceptional micro-scale variation in atmospheric properties 
(wind, temperature, humidity, etc.) in and around buildings so that 
observations close to buildings will have difficulty in ‘closing’ the energy 
budget owing to the diverse sources from which the instruments will 
sample. In these circumstances, observations that are representative of 
the underlying urban surface (with its characteristic diversity) need to be 
made at a height where these microscale variations have become blended. 
The evidence from field observations suggests that energy flux 
instruments should be placed at 1½ to 2 times the average height of 
buildings to avoid the effects of individual buildings and surfaces.   
 
Finally, we must deal with the issue of surface variation, which means 
advection cannot be ignored (ΔQA0). Although the urban surface is 
heterogeneous, much of this variation can be attributed to variation 
between types of urban landscapes that are (relatively speaking) extensive 
and homogenous. Thus, for example, mature residential suburbs in 
Ireland can be characterised by typical residential densities, building 
dimensions, road widths, green areas and so on. Similarly, industrial, 
commercial or city centre have characteristic properties associated with 
form and function. From this perspective the urbanised surface can be 
seen as a patchwork of urban sub-types. As air moves across the city 
surface, it encounters different patches and each of which will modify the 
overlying air. Initially, at the boundary between one sub-type and 
another, these modifications are significant as the air rapidly adjusts to 
changes in the underlying surface. These effects are transferred upwards 
into the atmosphere forming an internal boundary layer that grows in 
height at a rate of about 1:100. In other words, air traversing a distinctive 
urban surface will have an internal boundary layer approximately 10 m 
thick, 1 km from the upwind edge of that patch (termed the ‘fetch’). At 
an urban scale, each of these internal boundary layers become 
progressively mixed with vertical distance from the urban surface until 
the unique imprints of the urban subtypes is lost.  
 
To apply the EB to these urban sub-types requires that the instrument 
platform is both within the fetch of that sub-type and near the top of the 
surface layer. In these circumstances, the observations will sample from 
air that has been uniquely affected by the underlying surface at a height 
where the variations associated with that urban-subtype have been 
thoroughly mixed. Ideally this is accomplished by identifying urban 
patches that are representative of an urban sub-type and extensive in 
area, and locating an observation platform at 1½ to 2 times the average 
height of buildings and sufficiently distant from the boundary of that 
patch.  
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 This research that is reported on here is the first examination of the 
energy budget of Dublin’s urban surface. It will contribute to a growing 
number of urban energy budget programmes globally.  
 
Methodology 
Two locations were identified in Dublin to represent two urban subtypes: 
suburban and urban (Figure 4). The suburban site is located in residential 
Terenure in south-west Dublin and consists of semi-detached, two storey 
houses with large private gardens. The observation site is on the grounds 
of a primary school and the instrument platform is placed on a mast at a 
height of 12 m whereas the average building height is 8 m. Land use here 
is predominantly residential and light commercial activity and natural 
land cover consists of gardens, shrubbery and mature trees. The urban 
site is located on the western side of inner city Dublin where the 
instrument platform is attached to a mast on a three-storey building, 17 
m above ground-level. The surrounding building heights range from 4.5 
m to 18 m, but the mean height is about 10 m. The principal land uses 
are industrial, light-commercial, residential and institutional. Located to 
the south, east and west of the instruments are a combination of storing 
yards, warehouses, car parks, and institutional buildings. To the north of 
the observation site are two- to five-storey residences consisting of both 
apartments and houses and the Guinness brewery.  
 
A combination of site surveys, aerial imagery and a geographic 
information system (GIS) was used to determine the physical properties 
of the observation sites (Table 2). Information regarding instrument 
height, orientation and exposure was determined and recorded at the 
time of deploying the instruments. Dublin City Council (DCC) provided 
a vector-based GIS dataset representing estimated building heights in 
metres for the urban site and a site survey was conducted at the suburban 
site. Digitised datasets illustrating different surface covers such as, 
asphalt, concrete and vegetation, were created for both observation sites 
and were used to derive area-average albedo and emissivity values using 
information from a circular area (radius 200 m) centred on each site.  For 
the suburban site, values for albedo ranged from 0.17 to 0.28 and those 
for emissivity ranged between 0.87- 0.92. By comparison, the urban site 
which had less green area, exhibited values for albedo and emissivity 
values of 0.10-0.25 and 0.76-0.80 respectively. 
 
At each site a suite of high-resolution micro-meteorological instruments 
is deployed (Table 3 and Fig 6a). Net radiation (Q*) and its short- and 
long-wave components are obtained from an instrument that records 
radiation receipt on an up- and down-facing pyranometer (K↓ and K↑) 
and pyrgeometer (L↓ and L↑). The turbulent fluxes of sensible (QH) and 
latent (QE) heat fluxes are obtained using an open-path eddy covariance 
(EC) system, which comprises a sonic anemometer (which measures 
vertical velocity, w) combined with fast response temperature (T) and 
humidity (ρV) sensors (Table 3 and Plate 2). Measurements are made at a 
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 rate of once each 0.1 s and from this 30 minute averages and deviations 
(w’, T’ and ρv’) are obtained, see eqn. 6 & 7. This data forms the basis of 
the calculation of the turbulent energy fluxes. The anthropogenic heat 
flux (QF) is not explicitly measured here and is included within (QH+QE) 
and we do not attempt to obtain this term separately. The remaining flux 
in the energy balance is ΔQS, which is heat held in storage. Again, this is 
not obtained directly here and is estimated as the residual from eqn. 10,  
 
     
                                                 (10) 
 
One should note that in this formulation     includes any measurement 
errors associated with the terms on the RHS. These errors result from 
both instrument and observational inaccuracies. The latter are particularly 
difficult to quantify as they result from the different source areas that the 
instruments sample from. For example, while the radiation instruments 
obtain their fluxes from a circular area directly blow the mast, the 
turbulent fluxes vary in space and time associated with wind velocity and 
atmospheric stability. These errors are greatest when the underlying 
surface is heterogeneous.  
 
In this paper we evaluate the magnitude of errors in     by comparing 
values obtained as a residual from eqn. 11 against those derived using the 
objective hysteresis model (OHM) developed by Grimmond et al (1991). 
While this does not address the errors associated with varying source 
areas, it does provide some confidence in our calculated storage terms 
and indirectly in the turbulent flux terms. In a subsequent paper the 
source areas of the QH and QE will be presented. The OHM estimates 
   as a function of net radiation and the thermal properties of the 
surrounding urban surface,  
 
                  
   
  
      
 
                                                     (11) 
 
Where n refers to each of the i surface types that are found in a 200 m 
radius area surrounding the observation platform where Q* is measured 
and the terms a1, a2 and a3 are coefficients obtained from previous studies 
(Table 4). The average values of these coefficients are used here in 
conjunction with surface cover statistics to calculate site specific model 
coefficients (Table 4 and 5).OHM values are then compared with residual 
values to evaluate the EB.  
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 Figure 3. Planar area illustrating the surface covers of the 200 metre 
radius surrounding (a) suburban and (b) urban observation sites. Building 
footprints were provided by Ordnance Survey Ireland, Government of 
Ireland (EN 0063512). 
 
 
Table 2. A) Shows the fractional surface cover and B) outlines the 
physical properties of the observation sites. 
 
(A) Surface cover  
Site Roof Asphalt Concrete Vegetation 
Urban 0.24 0.22 0.44 0.10 
Suburban 0.22 0.10 0.25 0.43 
(B) Physical properties 
Site Albedo Emissivity Building 
height 
Building aspect 
ratio 
Urban 0.10-0.25 0.76-0.8 10 metres 0.40 
Suburban 0.17-0.28 0.87-0.92 8 metres 0.30 
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 Figure 4. Google earth images representing a 1km radius of the 
observation sites, the black arrows represent the south westerly wind 
direction prevailing during the observation campaign. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Mean daily mean sea level pressure in Pascals for a) 17 April 
2010 and b) 20 June 2010. Source: National centres for environmental 
prediction (NCEP) reanalysis data. 
 
 
 
Figure 6. a) Instruments mounted at the suburban site, b and c illustrate 
the difference in vegetation density between April and June 2010 at the 
suburban site. 
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 Table 3. Variables measured, instrument name and manufacturer and 
instrument height (z) above ground-level  
 
Variable Urban Suburban 
Net all-wave 
radiation 
Net radiation sensor, 
Hukseflux, NR01 
z=15m 
Net radiation sensor,   
Hukseflux, NR01 
z=11m 
Wind velocity 
in x, y and z 
directions 
Sonic anemometer, 
Campbell Scientific, 
CSAT3, z=17m 
Sonic anemometer, 
Campbell Scientific, 
CSAT3, z=12m 
Water vapour 
density 
IRGA, Licor Sciences, 
LI-7500, z=17m 
IRGA, Licor Sciences, 
LI-7500, z=12m 
Air 
temperature 
and relative 
humidity 
Temperature and 
relative humidity 
probe, 
Vaisala Inc., HMP45C, 
z=17m 
Temperature and relative 
humidity probe, 
Vaisala Inc., HMP45C, 
z=12m 
 
Table 4. Empirically derived coefficients used in the OHM and their 
authors 
 
Surface cover Author Regression coefficients a1                  a2 (h)       a3 (Wm-2) 
1. Vegetation     
Grass (Doll et al. 1985) 0.32 0.54 -27.4 
2. Rooftop     
Uppsala (Taesler 1980) 0.44 0.57 -28.9 
Vancouver (Yap 1973) 0.17 0.10 -17 
Kyoto (Yoshida et al. 1990-91) 0.82 0.34 -55.7 
 Average 0.4766 0.3366 -33.8666 
3. 
Paved/Impervious 
    
Concrete (Doll et al. 1985) 0.81 0.48 -79.9 
 (Asaeda et al. 1996) 0.85 0.32 -28.5 
 Average 0.83 0.40 -54.2 
Asphalt (Narita et al. 1984) 0.36 0.23 -19.3 
 (Asaeda et al. 1996) 0.64 0.32 -43.6 
 (Anandakumar 1999) 0.82 0.68 -20.1 
 Average 0.6066 0.4100 -27.6666 
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 Table 5 A) and B) Employ the averages of the regression coefficients and 
the surface cover weighting factors to calculate site specific model 
coefficients  
 
Table 6. Average of radiation fluxes for April 17th and June 20th for the 
observation sites. Average values for K↓ and K↑ pertain to daylight 
hours while average values for L↓ and L↑ pertain to all 24 hours  
 
Month Site K↓ K↑ Albedo 
(α)  
L↓ L↑ 
April Urban 363.43 48.58 0.14 291.30 389.54 
April Suburba
n 
372.07 34.18 0.10 294.29 392.73 
June Urban 511.80 64.03 0.13 318.20 426.25 
June Suburba
n 
510.61 45.01 0.10 319.48 435.06 
 
Table 7. Proportioning of net radiation (Q*) for daytime- and all-hours 
for the two observation sites 
 
Month Site 
 
Hours Q* QH/Q* 
χ 
QE/Q* 
ϒ 
ΔQS/Q* 
Λ 
QH/QE 
β 
QH/ΔQS 
κ 
April Sub- 
urban 
All hours 139.62 0.51 0.12 0.37 4.09 1.38 
  Q*>0 333.56 0.44 0.10 0.46 4.40 0.97 
 Urban All hours 122.81 0.59 0.03 0.37 17.82 1.60 
  Q*>0 327.70 0.43 0.02 0.55 21.32 0.78 
June Sub- 
urban 
All hours 212.94 0.48 0.15 0.37 3.14 1.29 
  Q* > 0 388.62 0.44 0.13 0.43 3.31 1.02 
 Urban All hours 207.51 0.59 0.07 0.34 8.66 1.73 
  Q* > 0 410.30 0.46 0.04 0.49 10.52 0.94 
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 Figure 7. The diurnal profile of the radiation balance of the suburban 
observation site for April 17th 2010. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. The diurnal profile of the surface energy balance of the 
suburban observation site for April 17th 2010. 
 
 
 
Results 
As the purpose of this investigation is to examine the distinctive urban 
climatic effect, two days were selected for an initial investigation that 
reported clear-sky and calm conditions, which were likely to accentuate 
this distinction. The meteorological conditions on April 17th and on June 
20th 2010 were consistent; clear-skies, wind speeds below 5ms-1 from a 
south-westerly direction (200-240°). Meteorological conditions were also 
388
 associated with high pressure systems centred on, or close to, Ireland and 
both days followed dry periods. 
 
The radiation budget  
The radiation budget (RB) for April 17th at suburban location is 
presented in figure 7 and illustrates the diurnal profile of incoming and 
outgoing/reflected solar and longwave radiation. The results are half-
hourly averages and are corrected to local apparent time (LAT). K↓ has a 
distinctive pattern during clear-sky conditions in that it is symmetrical 
around solar noon. For April 17th  K↓ increases following sunrise 
(06.30), peaks at solar noon (794 Wm-2 at 13.30) and declines in 
magnitude, in unison with solar elevation, before becoming zero at sunset 
(20.30) (Fig 7). 
 
K↑ is a function of K↓ and the surface albedo. As K↓ increases with 
solar elevation a greater proportion is reflected by the surface, this gives 
rise toa peak in K↑ at solar noon (72 Wm -2) (Fig 7). In the absence of 
solar inputs both K↓ and K↑ are zero during the night time. During 
cloudy conditions K↓ and consequently K↑ would not exhibit a smooth 
curve like that in figure 7. Instead the flux would vary according to cloud 
passing over the radiation sensor. In this case a greater portion of solar 
radiation would be received via diffuse as oppose to direct beam solar 
radiation. As mentioned earlier fluxes of L↓ are a function of the 
temperature and emissivity of the overlying atmosphere. Fluxes are the 
lowest in magnitude from midnight until sunrise. During this time the 
overlying atmosphere of the suburban location continues to cool in the 
absence of solar inputs, consequently temperature and L↓ decrease. 
Throughout the daytime the atmosphere begins to heat up and values are 
greatest during the late afternoon (317 Wm-2 at 16.30). L↑ on the other 
hand is a function of the temperature and emissivity of the surface 
beneath the radiation sensor and that which is emitted and reflected L↓. 
The suburban surface responds more efficiently to changes in 
temperature than the overlying atmosphere, especially for a location 
whose surface extent is largely made up of greenspace or grass. In this 
case the surface will heat up and cool down in close conjunction with the 
magnitude of K↓ (Fig 7).  
 
In order to investigate the RB over space a brief overview of results will 
be outlined for the urban location for this day. Firstly values representing 
K↓ were similar in magnitude to the suburban location throughout the 
daytime.K↓is largely governed by external factors (i.e. latitude and solar 
inclination) therefore one would expect the two locations, located within 
5km of each other, to receive similar amounts of solar radiation. Peak K↓ 
was 777 Wm-2 whilst peak K↑ was 104 Wm-2. Lower values for K↓ for 
urban locations relative to suburban locations are reported in the 
international literature and are attributed to increased pollution 
concentration which serves to reduce irradiance (Jauregui and Luyando, 
1990, Stanhill and Kalma, 1995). With regard to K↑ dense urban 
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 locations generally possess lower albedos than those of suburban 
locations. This investigation revealed higher values of K↑ for the urban 
location indicating a higher surface albedo. This trend was unusual given 
the nature of the two measurement locations and will be discussed later. 
Similarly longwave radiation fluxes showed deviations from its suburban 
counterpart. Urban materials generally have lower emissivities than grass 
and take longer to heat up. As a consequence L↑ increases later in the day 
than its suburban counterpart. Thus daytime values are lower in 
magnitude whilst night time values are consistently greater in magnitude 
than the suburban location. Values pertaining to the urban location for 
L↓ are almost identical to those observed at the suburban location and 
again reflect the relatively spatial consistency of in-coming radiation 
fluxes. The RB for June 20th revealed much the same patterns for K↓, 
K↑, L↓, and L↑ at the two measurement locations. The magnitude of 
solar radiation increased relative to April 17th as a result of increased 
solar inclination towards the sun, which in turn increased the day length 
and hours where solar radiation was received by the surface.  Peak values 
for K↓ increased by more than 100 Wm -2 at the two locations, with 
corresponding increases in the magnitude of K↑, L↓, and L↑. Average 
radiation values across the two locations for the measurement days are 
outlined in table 6. 
 
The surface energy balance 
The EB corresponding to the suburban location during April 17th is 
illustrated in figure 8. The EB represents the expenditure of net radiant 
energy (Q*) between surface heat fluxes (QE, QH, and ΔQS). The timing, 
partitioning and magnitude of these surface heat fluxes are determined by 
the nature of the underlying surface, for example the availability of water 
for evaporation or the presence of substrate for storage. The smooth 
pattern of Q* illustrates the increase of net radiant energy into the local 
climate system in response to solar inputs (K↓ in figure 6). Peak Q* 
occurs around solar noon and declines thereafter becoming negative in 
magnitude around sunset (approx 20:30 in April) (Fig 8). Storage heat is 
the first of the heat fluxes to increase following sunrise a trend that has 
also been observed in previous international studies (Grimmond and 
Oke, 1999, Christen and Vogt, 2004). Following sunrise energy is directly 
transferred into the substrate at the observation site and ΔQS is the 
dominant heat flux in the morning. ΔQS is the first heat flux to become 
negative, changing sign prior to sunset; this trend illustrates the release of 
heat from the substrate to the atmosphere via QH.  Also evident in the 
diurnal trend of ΔQS is a double peak, occurring around 13:00 and 15:30. 
As solar elevation declines energy is transferred to previously shaded 
facets giving rise to this second peak in ΔQS. Following noon QH 
becomes the dominant heat flux for the afternoon and evening where 
heat energy is preferentially channelled into the atmosphere via 
turbulence as oppose to the substrate via conduction (Fig 8). Surface 
warming occurring in the morning causes vertical temperature gradients 
to develop and encourages turbulent mixing in the surface layer. In the 
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 absence of solar input via K↓ sensible heat decreases at night and the 
atmosphere continues to cool until the morning (Fig 8). QE representing 
fluxes of latent heat are lower in magnitude relative to values pertaining 
to ΔQS and QH.  Fluxes of QE are influenced by water availability, and the 
presence and density of natural surface cover which in turn determines 
the available surface for transpiring and evaporating. Low vegetation 
density in conjunction with dry antecedent conditions in April would 
have affected the availability of surface area and water for evaporation 
and hence fluxes of QE. That said however the diurnal trend largely 
follows that of QH and Q*, increasing following sunrise, peaking in the 
afternoon (73 Wm-2) and decreasing thereafter (Fig 8). 
 
Difference of the EB over space: April 17th 
Within the two study volumes the magnitude and timing of available 
radiant energy (Q*) is very similar. Peak values occur at 13.00 and are 535 
and 541Wm-2 for the suburban and urban location respectively. Greater 
night time losses occur at the urban site (approx. -80 versus -60Wm-2) in 
response to a greater heat release from the substrate (Fig 9a).  Fluxes of 
sensible heat (QH) are driven by surface warming and the consequent 
convective mixing of warmed air higher into the atmosphere. QH is 
therefore slow to increase and values reach a peak around local solar 
noon, 290 and 299Wm-2 at the suburban and urban location respectively. 
Warming of the atmosphere continues into the evening and fluxes can 
remain positive into the night time. This trend is especially evident at the 
urban location and gave rise to what is commonly referred to as the 
nocturnal urban heat island effect (Fig 9b). Fluxes of latent heat are the 
lowest in magnitude and most variable during the day time at both 
locations. Fluxes represent the amount of energy spent in the study 
volume for evaporating water (or adding water to the atmosphere). As 
mentioned above fluxes at the suburban location increase and decrease in 
unison with Q* and the other turbulent flux (QH) (Fig 9c). However the 
urban observations reveal lower values pertaining to QE. This trend is 
expected for a dense urban location that serves to drain water away from 
the surface and which has a small fraction of greenspace space (10%).The 
storage heat flux is the most dominant of the fluxes throughout the 
morning at both locations. Following sunrise heat is quickly and easily 
transferred to tall building structures. The urban location has a higher 
storage heat flux during the day time as a result of its higher associated 
heat capacity (i.e. comprised of more man-made materials) and its greater 
active surface area (i.e. taller buildings). At night time this trend is 
reversed and the urban location displays increasingly negative fluxes 
indicative of greater heat loss from the substrate. 
 
Difference of the EB over time: April 17th versus June 20th 
The general trend of Q* on June 20th does not differ significantly from 
that observed on April 17th. The increased inclination towards the sun 
has however increased the day length (affecting the timing) and the 
maximum possible receipt of radiant energy (affecting the magnitude) at 
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 the surface. Values for Q* increase earlier in the day and decline later in 
the evening (Fig 9a), while the peak magnitude increased by 94 and 
108Wm-2 at the suburban and urban site respectively.  Increased day 
length has also affected fluxes of QH. Surface warming occurs earlier in 
the day hence increasing fluxes of QH at the two locations. Peak values 
increased by 30 and 56Wm-2 at the suburban and urban location, and 
there is more pronounced UHI effect evident at urban location compared 
to April (Fig 9b). Furthermore the previous day,  June 19th, reported 
clear-sky calm conditions conducive to UHI formation, a trend which 
can be seen from the fluxes of QH at the urban location between 
midnight and sunrise where values did not fall below zero (Fig 9b). 
Fluxes of QE are again the smallest and most variable of the surface heat 
fluxes in June. The pattern at the suburban location is more in unison 
with the other turbulent flux (QH) increasing and decreasing with Q*. 
The same cannot be said for observations of QE at the urban location, 
where a sharp increase occurs in the late evening (22.00) (Fig 9c) the 
reason for which is not yet known but may be as a result of an 
anthropogenic release of moisture into the local system. Peak values of 
QE are significantly greater than those observed in April, increasing by 79 
and 59Wm-2 for the suburban and urban location respectively (Fig 9c). 
With regard to average daytime values of at the suburban location QE has 
increased from 33 to 51 Wm-2. Although antecedent conditions in June 
were similarly dry, this increase has been attributed to the vegetation 
becoming denser thereby increasing the available surface for transpiration 
and evaporation (Fig 6c). Estimated values perta ining toΔQS increased 
for June in unison with observed fluxes. Heat is transferred to the 
substrate earlier in the morning, and although day length has increased 
ΔQS still becomes negative in magnitude prior to sunset at both locations. 
At the urban location day time values of ΔQSare particularly greater while 
night time values are lower in June relative to April. More heat is 
channelled into the substrate during the day leading to greater losses at 
the night (Fig 9d). The heat is lost to the atmosphere via sensible heat, 
thus helping fluxes of QH to remain positive into the night .     
 
Discussion 
Given that the heat storage flux, calculated as the residual (ΔQSRES 
hereafter), is not an atmospheric or measured variable it will inherently 
contain errors associated with the measured variables. In order to have 
confidence in the representativeness and plausibility of the EB results 
which containΔQSRES, the OHMwas employed to generate modelled 
values for heat storage (ΔQSOHM) over the measurement campaign. 
These values are generated using Q* but are independent of the 
measured turbulent heat fluxes (QE and QH) and hence are a useful tool 
for evaluating the EB residual, ΔQSRES.  
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 Figure 9. Comparison of urban and suburban surface heat fluxes for 17th 
April and June 20th2010. Note the vertical axis scale difference in a, b, c 
and d. 
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  The OHM requires detailed information regarding the fractional cover 
of surfaces surrounding the measurement location including greenspace, 
rooftop and impervious (i.e. concrete and asphalt). Each of these surface 
types have empirically derived coefficients which describe their 
1. Direct proportionality to Q* (a1) 
2. Timing in relation to Q*(which accounts for hysteresis)  (a2) 
3. Value of ΔQs when Q* equals zero (a3). 
 
The coefficients are as a result of previous studies undertaken for urban 
surfaces and are outlined in table 4.  A variety of coefficients are used for 
each surface type (except greenspace) because their value will be 
influenced by characteristics of the original study site (Camuffo and 
Bernardi, 1982). An average of the empirical coefficients is calculated for 
all but the greenspace or grass surface. In order to calculate site specific 
model coefficients for the Dublin sites the values of fractional surface 
cover presented in Table 2 (a) were used in the OHM as land surface 
weighting factors. The average of each of the surface cover coefficients 
was then multiplied by the associated weighing factor to generate site 
specific model coefficients for a1 a2 and a3 (Table 5 a and b).  ΔQSOHM 
is then calculated according to eqn. 12 for the April 17th and June 20th 
2010 and the results are presented in figure10.Overall the EB residuals 
and modelled values show good agreement regarding the rising and 
declining limb for all cases (Fig 10). Greater disparity exists however 
around midday and late afternoon. The OHM is close to estimating peak 
ΔQSRES but OHM consistently under predicts values, a trend similar to 
that reported in Grimmond et al. (1991). Night time values modelled 
using the OHM are again in good agreement with residuals, particularly at 
the suburban location. For this investigation residual values were 
calculated for 30-minute intervals, however Grimmond and Oke (1999) 
recommend using longer averages (i.e. two hours) especially when dealing 
with intra-daily data. This would likely improve agreement between 
values of ΔQSRES and ΔQSOHM for a diurnal time series, and in 
particular around midday. Residual values, although not measured 
themselves are regarded as the reference values and as the closest to 
potential correct values given that they are the result of high-grade 
scientific measurement campaigns (Roberts et al., 2006). Given the good 
agreement between residual and modelled values it can be assumed that 
the instruments are observing reasonable EB fluxes for the study 
campaign. We can therefore have confidence in the EB results as we 
continue to analyse them in greater detail.  
 
394
 Figure 10. Residual and modelled storage heat fluxes for April 17th and 
June 20th 2010. 
 
 
 
Partitioning of surface energy balance fluxes 
Ratios are considered as useful parameters when attempting to identify 
temporal/diurnal and spatial trends in the partitioning of Q*. The various 
ratios are presented in a summary table below (Table 7). The spatial 
variations in the EB are evident by comparing ratios pertaining to the 
urban and suburban location. While an increasingly temporal depiction of 
EB fluxes is provided when ratios are separated into two categories, all 
hours (i.e. 24hrs) and day time hours (i.e. when Q* > 0). The table 
outlines the partitioning of available radiant energy (Q*) into QH, QE 
and ΔQS and introduces two additional ratios. Firstly, the Bowen ratio 
(β) describes the relationship between the two turbulent fluxes (QH and 
QE), when its value is greater than 1 or unity more energy is spent 
heating the atmosphere than evaporating water. Values of β less than 1 
indicate that more energy is used to evaporate or add water to the 
atmosphere as oppose to adding heat. Secondly, QH/ΔQS (κ) represents 
the ratio of sensible heat to the atmosphere and to the substrate. When 
the atmosphere amasses a greater portion of energy than the substrate κ 
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 will be greater than 1. Conversely when κ is less than 1 the substrate in 
the study volume is the more effective energy store.  
 
Latent heat fluxes represent the smallest proportioning of Q* at the two 
observation sites in April and June.  QE accounts for a greater portion of 
Q* for all hours than to during day time hours. During the day time other 
fluxes are more dominant however at night time when storage heat is 
negative, QE can remain positive into the night thus increasing its ratio. 
QE/Q* increases between April and June for all cases representing the 
relative increase in fluxes of QE in the summer. Maximum QE/Q* 
occurs at the suburban location in June and represents 15% of Q* in all 
hour conditions. QH is the greatest consumer of Q* for all-hours in 
April and June at both locations, ranging from 44 to 59% of Q*. This 
means that over an average 24hr period energy within both systems is 
predominantly used to heat the atmosphere. Furthermore QH/Q* is 
consistently greater at the urban location for all hours which means that 
the urban atmosphere will be relatively drier and warmer than that of its 
suburban counterpart. The substrate (ΔQS/Q*)is generally the 
predominant energy sink for day time hours, however ratios are quite 
similar in magnitude to QH/Q* (Table 7). This trend is reversed for all 
hours when QH/Q* takes precedence. All hour ratios for ΔQS/Q* are 
lower because night time values are negative in magnitude corresponding 
to losses of heat from the storage substrate. 
 
The Bowen ratio (β) is consistently higher at the urban location for all 
cases (Table 7). This trend illustrates the significantly lower fluxes of  QE 
relative to QH. β is greater during day time hours because of the large 
difference in fluxes of QE and QH. However β decreases for all hour 
conditions because of the smaller relative difference in the two turbulent 
fluxes at night time. β is greater than 1 for all cases indicating that more 
turbulent energy is used to add heat to the atmosphere as oppose to 
water.  With regard to κ, ratios in Table 7 indicate that the substrate at 
both locations is the more effective energy sink during the day time (i.e . 
ratios less than 1). On the other hand for all hour conditions, taking night 
time values into account, the atmosphere is the dominant store of radiant 
energy (i.e. ratios greater than 1).  
 
If we return to the RB and recall that the reflected portion of short-wave 
radiation (K↑) at the urban location was unusually greater than that 
observed at the suburban location; this trend indicated a higher surface 
albedo at the urban location in comparison to the suburban location. 
One would expect that the urban environment would have a lower 
albedo when compared to a well-vegetated suburban location. This 
unusual trend has been attributed to the nature of the immediate 
surrounds of the instruments. This area exercises the greatest influence 
on radiation observations .The Dublin City Council roof and surrounding 
storage yards are comprised of light coloured asphalt and concrete while 
the school roof surface and yard are largely made up of darker asphalt. 
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 Darker asphalt would serve to reflect less K↑ and hence reduces the 
surface albedo. The albedo values calculated from the instruments and 
are presented in table  6. The combined albedos for the observation sites 
outlined in table 2b are consistent for the urban location (i.e. 0.10-0.25) 
however the instrument calculated value is outside of the expected range 
(0.17-0.28) for the suburban location (Table 5a).   This indicates that the 
school yard and roof surface have a greater influence on observations 
than the extensive greenspace located further from the instruments.  
 
Conclusion 
Knowing about the urban landscape, its geometry and surface properties 
provides researchers with robust explanatory power when deciphering 
urban meteorological observations. The deployment of high-resolution, 
meteorological instrumentation in the urban environment has 
significantly improved our understanding of the energy exchanges 
operating in the surface layer that give rise to distinctive local climates. 
The current research was a first attempt at investigating the radiation and 
surface energy balance for Dublin. This study revealed a spatially 
conservative radiation budget however the subsequent partitioning of 
radiant energy among surface heat fluxes was increasingly variable and is 
a result of the differing surface properties of the observation sites. 
 
The results are broadly consistent with studies undertaken during the 
summertime in North American cities and suburbs, as well as European 
campaigns (Grimmond and Oke, 1995; 1999, Christen and Vogt, 2004, 
Offerle et al., 2006). The magnitude of Q* was similar at both 
observation sites in unison with findings reported in Basel, Switzerland 
(Christen and Vogt, 2004). The urban fabric was a net energy store 
during the day time, the magnitude of which increased with increasing 
urban density. The proportioning of energy into heat storage was 
consistently greater during the day time at the urban location than its 
suburban counterpart. Fluxes of latent heat were greater at the suburban 
location which is expected for a location whose greenspace surface is 
greater in extent; however values for the summertime were still relatively 
low in comparison to other suburban EB studies where swimming pools 
and sprinkler systems were present (Grimmond and Oke, 1999). The 
relatively low magnitude of latent heat fluxes reported may also be as a 
result of the relative dryness of April and June in 2010. Precipitation 
recorded at Dublin Airport was 44 and 75% of baseline precipitation for 
April and June respectively. Furthermore no rainfall was recorded at least 
7 days before the selected study days which would have affected the 
availability of water for evapotranspiration (Met Éireann).  
 
Results reported here also confirm typical assumptions about the relative 
dryness and warmth of the urban atmosphere when compared to less 
dense suburban locations. Evaporation at the urban location is less than 
at the suburban location, as indicated by fluxes of latent heat. Sensible 
heat fluxes are almost always greater at the urban location, particularly 
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 during all hour conditions.  The release of heat from storage during the 
night time contributes to increases in fluxes of sensible heat. This 
phenomenon helped to give rise to the nocturnal UHI at the urban 
location during the observational campaign. At present unquantified 
advective influences mean that closure of the EB is difficult. The 
magnitude of storage heat flux, given that it is not a measured flux, 
presents the greatest uncertainty in the EB. This research employed the 
OHM to independently validate the EB residuals. Good agreement 
means that we can have confidence in our EB measured fluxes for the 
study campaign. That said however, the results reported here are 
preliminary and represent only two clear-sky, calm, twenty-four hour 
periods. Future research will require flux footprint modelling and analysis 
to ensure the spatial consistency of the EB during different 
meteorological conditions. The study days chosen for this particular 
study are not necessarily typical for Dublin so it will be necessary to 
investigate longer term datasets.  
 
The anthropogenic heat flux, omitted for this study, warrants attention 
and would require data associated with transport use, space heating and 
cooling and population density. Furthermore instrumentation is in place 
for an in-depth evaluation of atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations 
and fluxes, an increasingly popular and relevant area of urban climate 
science. A study of this kind would complement research in the area of 
urban EB studies and would create a more holistic picture of the urban 
effects on the urban and suburban atmosphere. In addition, observations 
being recorded at the two locations will prove important for initialising, 
parameterising and validating a future potential urban climate model for 
Dublin. The two observation locations were chosen for their widespread 
applicability. If we know the physical form of a neighbourhood and the 
associated urban climate response we can then begin to apply this 
knowledge to more widespread urban areas. In this way you can create a 
spatially disaggregated energy and emission flux database for urban areas 
in Dublin and Ireland. 
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Introduction 
The Irish economic model which prevailed between 1993 and 2007 was 
widely heralded as a beacon of what the deep liberalisation of a small 
open economy might deliver. Indeed, the so-called ‘Celtic Tiger’ years 
saw a dramatic transformation in the social and economic life of a 
country that had, until the start of the 1990s, been a relatively poor and 
peripheral state, perched on the edge of Europe with a weak indigenous 
economy and a foreign direct investment sector characterised by low-
skilled, branch plant manufacturing.  In the 1990s, Ireland embraced 
deregulation, entrepreneurial freedoms and free-market principles and 
aggressively courted high valued added export oriented foreign direct 
investment (see O’Riain, 2004). The result was a rapid shift to high-
skilled manufacturing, a phenomenal growth in the service sector, the 
development of a domestic consumer society, a rapid growth in 
population through natural increase and immigration, and a housing and 
property boom (see Allen 2007; O’Hearn 1998; O’Riain 2004; Bartley and 
Kitchin 2007; Jacobson et al. 2006; Moore and Scott 2005). Politicians, 
policy makers, economists, academics, practitioners, think tank gurus and 
journalists from around the world flocked to Ireland to be inducted in 
the art of best practice in fast track growth and former Irish leaders have 
gone on global lecture tours espousing the so-called benefits of the ‘Irish 
model’ of neoliberal economic reform for countries wishing to fast-track 
modernisation. 
 
But since 2008, as a number of worldly dramas have unfolded, so too has 
the Celtic Tiger model unravelled. The domino effect of the global 
financial crisis unearthed the fragility, over-extension, and tenuous 
alignments of the international financial markets. Since then, the world 
has been plunged into recession, banks have collapsed, others have been 
the recipients of generous tax-funded bailouts, and national and supra-
national governments have scrambled to resurrect their economies from 
the detritus of the recession.  The effects of the international financial 
crisis, while practically ubiquitous, have been felt more strongly and 
deeply in Ireland than in many developed countries.  As a small open 
 Karen Keaveney, Lecturer in Spatial Planning in the School of Planning, Architecture and 
Civil Engineering in Queen’s University Belfast. 
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economy, Ireland was always going to be exposed to fluctuations in the 
international markets (O’Hearn, 1998; Jacobson et al, 2006), but the 
extent of this exposure was significantly exacerbated by the home-grown 
inflation of a property bubble (O’Toole 2009).  Indeed,  the Celtic Tiger 
era of economic expansion was split into two periods: the first period 
(1993- 2002) characterised by export-led growth dominated by FDI and 
the second period (2002-2007) involving a property boom largely 
consisting of Irish developers capitalised by Irish banks, who in turn 
were borrowing from European banks.   
 
As the global crisis deepened, the Irish property bubble burst and the 
vast over-exposure of Irish banks to toxic property loans became 
apparent.  The collapse of the property and banking sectors led to a 
contraction in the wider economy, with the drying up of credit, markets 
and tax receipts, leading to a huge hole in the public purse; an extensive 
bank bailout, including the establishment of the National Assets 
Management Agency (NAMA) that has acquired €88b of property debt 
and rolled up interest from Irish banks; bank recapitalisation (Bank of 
Ireland) and nationalisation (Allied Irish Bank, Irish Nationwide Building 
Society, Anglo Irish Bank); massive state borrowing to service the bank 
bailout and the public sector spend; rising unemployment; and 
plummeting house prices.  Given the perilous economic state, this 
ultimately led to the €85bn IMF-EU bailout in November 2010, and the 
collapse of the Fianna Fail led government in February 2011. 
 
The response of the Irish government (like other national governments) 
thus far has amounted to ‘more of the same’; to patch up, rather than 
transform, the political economic system.  As such, there is seemingly 
little appetite for any radical departure from orthodoxies and dogmas 
which have demonstrably failed.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, given the 
international pressure, Ireland’s response to its crises represents little 
more than an anxious toeing-the-line in economic policy, cow-towing to 
the demands of the IMF, and nostalgically dreaming of those halcyon 
days of perpetual growth.    Indeed, Ireland is being touted as an 
exemplar of the benefits of austerity and is being held up as a model for 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain to follow.  
 
In many ways, the story of the rise and rise of neoliberalism in Ireland, 
the rise and fall of the Irish economy, and the Irish property boom and 
bust, provides an insight into the travails of proto-neoliberalism in the 
secular world. And yet to date there has been insufficient and inadequate 
dialogue between scholarship on neoliberal ideology and practice and the 
fate of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger.  The relative paucity of such dialogue can 
be attributed to two sets of confusions: the appropriateness of the 
concept of neoliberalism and the failure to apprehend the Irish state as a 
neoliberal state.  Firstly, the extent to which the term ‘neoliberalism’ may 
be said to map on to any meaningful empirical referent has become the 
subject of considerable debate (Larner 2000). Indeed, within some 
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intellectual communities, we note the palpable mood of hostility which 
has arisen against those who might use and abuse the notion (Hackworth 
2007). Whilst many commentators within Ireland, both populist and 
academic, speak loosely and often carelessly about an Irish neoliberalism, 
there remains within more studied commentary a wariness in  
overstretching the concept and a nagging doubt about its utility.  
Secondly, in some respects Ireland postures as a somewhat ambivalent 
case-study of neoliberalization; ideologies of neoliberalism have come to 
assume a ‘commonsense’ status within the country’s political class to the 
extent that the term has rarely been explicitly articulated in national 
political debates. When it has been deployed by the Irish state itself, the 
label neoliberalism has rather confusingly been bound up with the notion 
that the Irish economic model represents a hybrid formulation – to use 
the analogy popularised by former Tanaiste Mary Harney in 2000, 
somewhere between Boston (American neoliberalism) and Berlin 
(European welfarism).  
 
Undoubtedly, the limited application of scholarship on neoliberalism to 
Irish economic history has hampered, and been to the detriment of, 
academic comprehension of Ireland’s spectacular rise and fall, and in 
particular to scholarly appreciation of the roots of Ireland’s property 
boom and subsequent property crash. Reciprocally, it has also 
impoverished the ongoing agenda of figuring out appropriate ways in 
which to theorise neoliberalism’s various past, present, and emerging 
actually existing forms. In this paper, we propose that Ireland is indeed 
uniquely placed to both instruct and be instructed by theoretical literature 
on neoliberalism and its discontents. We offer the ideas of path 
amplification, neoliberalism’s topologies and topographies and accumulation by 
repossession as central to the structuration of neoliberalism in Ireland and 
potentially useful additions to ongoing efforts to theorise neoliberalism’s 
wider biography. 
 
An Irish Neoliberalization? 
At the heart of the concept of ‘actually existing neoliberalism’ is the 
notion that proto- neoliberalism is an economic experiment which has 
become woven into localities in different ways as a consequence of their 
unique social, cultural, economic, political and institutional histories. 
Brenner and Theodore (2002: page 351) note the ‘path dependent’ nature 
of neoliberal restructuring projects ‘insofar as they have been produced 
within national, regional, and local contexts defined by the legacies of 
inherited institutional frameworks, policy regimes, regulatory practices 
and political struggles’. In these divergent contexts, they have identified 
key moments of what they call “creative destruction”, involving the 
dismantling of particular institutional forms and the construction of new 
(de)regulatory apparatus. Other strands of work have argued for 
understanding neoliberalism in terms of governmentalities (Larner, 2000), 
and as a ‘mobile technology’ (Ong, 2007).  England and Ward (2007, page 
8) suggest that there are important similarities, ‘discursively and 
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materially in the “restructuring” of markets for currency, energy, public 
services, transportation and so on’, which highlight the shared 
characteristics of state neoliberalization, but that the contingency of the 
‘project’ on place-specific market and regulatory structures means that it 
cannot be theorised as a coherent set of global processes. 
 
The propagation of the ideology of neoliberalism of course betrays a long 
and colourful history. For instance, and representing only one example,  
before crashing onto the shores of both the United Kingdom and the 
United States in the 1980s in the guise of Thatcherism and Reaganism, 
neoliberalism was long experimented with and refined and rejigged in the 
context of IMF imposed Structural Adjustment Programmes on bankrupt 
nations in the developing world. There is certainly a tradition of 
scholarship that has preserved an interest in these multiple past and 
present laboratories. But it might also be argued that that recent work 
within Anglo-American Geography has tended to prioritise a limited 
number of case study sites, both spatially and temporally. Firstly, Brenner 
and Theodore’s (2002) assertion that the urban scale now constitutes the 
most appropriate entry point for empirical explorations of the grounding 
of neoliberalism in concrete histories and geographies has  generated a 
disproportionate drift in interest towards the (western) city.  Secondly, to 
date, the principal antecedent context has been the Fordist Keynesian 
welfare state.  Neoliberalism has generated a period of creative 
destruction and has junked, metamorphosed and recalibrated prior 
Fordist Keynesian institutions. And much recent work has sought to 
develop the New Urban Politics literature to map a purported epochal 
transition in urban governance from urban managerialism to urban 
entrepreneurialism (Harvey 1989,  Cox 1993, Cox and Mair 1989, and 
Hall and Hubbard 1996). 
 
Arguably, the development of the concept of actually existing 
neoliberalism has been colorated, but also limited, by the selective field 
sites which Anglo-American Geographers have chosen to work on.  The 
Irish case endorses the need for a consideration of a wider range of scales 
of analyses and spaces and places and an appreciation of prior histories in 
the longue duree and a deeper reach into the past. Our proposition is that 
Ireland’s interlacing with neoliberal ideology has been mediated largely by 
institutions operating at the level of the nation state and within a 
particular political culture and system inflected by the long history of 
Anglo-Irish relations and the country’s emergence as an independent 
postcolonial state. In this sense, the Irish case can be read as an exemplar 
of a much wider and richer historical geography of encounter between 
neoliberal ideology and the postcolonial legacy. We propose that Ireland’s 
neoliberal model has been shaped by at least four important historical 
factors. 
 
First, British colonisation of Ireland, and annexation through plantation, 
has created a long history of conflict in Ireland over ownership and 
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propriatorial control over land and property. Historically, various strands 
of Irish cultural and political nationalism and Irish Republicanism fore-
grounded land and property ownership and land reform as central to 
their mission. Irish cultural and political life is thus marked by a fierce 
and combative defence of the rights of the citizenry to exercise almost 
complete freedom and autonomy over land and property. 
 
Second, living under the yoke of British political control, the Irish 
political model developed in ways which privileged local social relations 
and in particular a clientalistic and patronage species of politics. The craft 
of votes for favour and graft were honed in the rural Irish village and 
through time became sedimented and naturalised. The result is that Irish 
politics is marked by a triumph of local politics over party and national 
politics (see Collins and Cradden, 1997). This was combined with a highly 
centralised bureaucracy inherited from the former British colonial 
administration (Breathnach, 2010, page 1186).  Moreover, local 
politicians wield power in ways which have actively subordinated the 
Irish planning system.  As a result, Irish planning has never achieved the 
same status as it has in much of Europe and has always been weakened 
and compromised by localism, cronyism and corrupt political practices.    
 
Third, although Irish nationalism was infused with strains of Marxist and 
Socialist politics arguably Ireland’s revolution was one of the most 
conservative in modern history. Since Independence, Irish political life 
has been dominated by the oscillating fortunes of two hegemonic, right 
of centre and conservative nationalist parties: Fianna Fail and Fine Gael.  
These parties were formed out of the Irish Civil War and reflect not left 
and right divisions in ideology but pro- and anti-treaty sentiments at the 
time of independence. Irish political cleavages then for the most part do 
not pivot around ideological differences.  
 
Fourth, in the years immediately following Irish independence, Ireland’s 
principal economic policy was one of import substitution. External 
capital was to be heavily regulated, limited, and policed, and domestic 
industries were to be nurtured and protected.  By the late 1950s it was 
becoming evident that this model had and was impoverishing Ireland.  
From the 1960s on Ireland embraced a model of a liberal and open 
economy and aggressively sought to court export oriented manufacturing, 
piloting and adopting policies which would later be labelled neoliberal.  
 
These four factors shaping the Irish political landscape have produced a 
certain species of neoliberalism in Ireland which is perhaps best 
characterised as ideologically concealed, piecemeal, serendipitous, 
pragmatic and commonsensical. Indeed, successive Irish governments 
have never had an explicit neoliberal ideology (apart from a small number 
of influential Ministers) (Kirby 2010).  Ideology thus remains largely 
hidden in the apparatus of Irish politics.  Its presence is barely articulated 
and often invisible.  And yet Ireland was characterised over the Celtic 
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Tiger period by a range of practices that bear important similarities 
discursively and materially with key processes of neoliberalization (Peck 
and Tickell 2002).  As opposed to an ideologically informed project, such 
as those implemented by Thatcher in the UK and Reagan in the USA 
during the 1980s (see Harvey 2007), Irish neoliberalism was produced 
through a set of short-term (intermittently reformed) deals brokered by 
the state with various companies, individuals and representative bodies, 
which cumulatively restructured Ireland in unsustainable and 
geographically “uneven” ways.   
 
Breathnach (2010) argues that the tension between the overwhelming 
concentration of employment and population in the East of the country 
and the political, clientelistic motivation towards “balanced regional 
development” has resulted in an inability on the part of the state to make 
spatially selective decisions in order to strategically plan for economic 
growth.  During the Fordist period, in which Ireland operated as a 
branch-plant manufacturing centre, this resulted in an extreme form of 
industrial decentralisation – manifested during the 1970s by the state’s 
construction of ‘advance’ factories in 156 locations – but was 
significantly exacerbated from the 1980s onwards, once services became 
the main source of employment growth.  Although intended as a way of 
addressing this imbalance, the National Spatial Strategy published in 2002 
was effectively disabled by these same political features.  Moreover, when 
export-led growth slowed down, the entrenched system of local 
clientalism was not superseded by indigenous entrepreneurship that 
capitalised on Ireland’s new industrial composition, but rather new 
wealth was invested in property.  The Irish state’s moves towards 
neoliberalisation, then, could be seen to operate at two scales: the 
international level whereby the state attempted to create a vibrant and 
open economy that would attract FDI due to the ease of conducting 
business and generating profit, and the national/local level whereby the 
state pandered to their political allies by cultivating the conditions for a 
property boom, which was equally characterised by a lack of spatial 
selectivity.  As the property sector began to take precedence over FDI as 
the major generator of state revenue, and due to reliance on indirect taxes 
from this sector, this created an economic model that could only perform 
adequately in a situation of perpetual growth.  This need for perpetual 
growth was ingrained both structurally in the state’s taxation system, and 
discursively in the Celtic Tiger myth itself.    
 
The Irish neoliberal model ostensibly takes elements of American 
neoliberalism (minimal state, privatisation of public services, public-
private partnerships, developer/speculator led planning, low corporate 
and individual taxation, light to no regulation, clientelism) and blends 
them with aspects of European social welfarism (developmental state, 
social partnership, welfare safety net, high indirect tax, EU directives and 
obligations) (Kitchin and Bartley 2007).  Rather than being the result of 
some well conceived economic master plan, however, the Celtic Tiger 
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was the outcome of a complex set of unfolding, interconnected, often 
serendipitous processes, held together by a strategy of seeking to attract 
and service foreign direct investment.  Thus, Ireland exhibits a peculiar 
brand of ‘emergent’ neoliberalization (McGuirk, 2005).  The model is 
perhaps better described as a series of disparate policies, deals, and 
actions that were rationalised after-the-fact, rather than constituting a 
coherent plan per-se.  As such, the claim that the Irish model sits 
politically somewhere between ‘Boston and Berlin’ is not so much an 
indication of a country pioneering a new model of neoliberalism, as it is 
suggestive of the ways in which new policies and programmes were 
folded into the entrenched apparatus of a short-termist political culture 
shadowed by low-level clientelism, cronyism and localism that works to 
the detriment of long-term, state-wide planning (O’Toole 2009).   
 
Much of the policy transformations of the Celtic Tiger era movements 
were then, to an extent, the outcome of a certain political pragmatism – 
doing what was necessary at the time to satisfy the needs of various 
sectors of the voting public – rather than being characterised by clearly 
delineated periods of ‘roll back’ and ‘roll out’ neoliberalism (Peck and 
Tickell, 1994).  The rolling out of neoliberal mechanisms such as 
privatisation and Public Private Partnerships were rarely handled in any 
sort of ideologically informed or systematic manner, and the state often 
failed to achieve the appropriate balance between private sector risk and 
public sector reward in these projects (Hurst and Reeves, 2004; Kirby 
and Jacobson, 2006; Reeves, 2003; Palcic and Reeves, 2005).   Despite the 
relatively small receipts yielded to the taxpayer by privatisation, the state 
has continued to roll out privatisation into diverse service areas such as 
school buses, refuse collection, motor vehicle testing, and urban car 
parking and clamping, and initiate public private partnerships with 
respect to public buildings, social housing, and road infrastructure 
(Barrett, 2004).  However, while the state rolled out neoliberal policy 
mechanisms in fragmented and piecemeal ways into different sectors, this 
was not accompanied by an equivalent rolling back of social welfarism –  
unemployment and child support and other benefits remained relatively 
high – although it should be noted that a) the overall quality of services 
in many areas of the public sector (such as Health, Education, and Public 
Transport) failed to reflect the magnitude of the dramatic 
transformations of the nation’s wealth during this same period (OECD, 
2008)., b) social disadvantage was not adequately addressed during this 
period (NESC, 2005) and c) the response to the current crisis has seen 
savage cuts in these same sectors. Moreover rather than pitting the state 
against the trade unions, the period of Irish neoliberalization was 
characterised by “… the dense networks of institutions of ‘social 
partnership’ extending across all spheres of the political economy and 
integrating local actors, state agencies, and European Union Programmes 
… [that became] an institutional mechanism of public governance 
through almost all spheres of public life” (O’Riain, 2004, pages 9-10).  
These agreements traded work and pay related concessions for union 
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docility, and were used by the state as a means of manufacturing labour 
stability.  Additionally, “[u]nlike most other countries in Europe, Ireland 
has consistently rejected the model of decentralised decision making even 
in policy areas, which many observers might suggest are most sensibly 
located and managed by the local or regional sub-national levels of 
government. Ireland’s system of local governance is traditionally poorly 
organised, in receipt of very limited funding, and responsible for a very 
limited range of policy” (Stafford and Payne, 2004: p. 3).  As a result, 
Kirby and Jacobson (2006, pages 28-40) argue that the neoliberalization 
of Ireland has been flimsy and unsustainable and that the Irish state 
failed to recognise that “market liberalisation requires a more robust and 
socially responsible state” to achieve equality and stability. Similarly the 
Irish sate has failed to adequately embed FDI industries over the boom 
period through investing in and growing indigenous companies. Indeed, 
Ireland’s dependence on foreign investment is starkly identifiable by the 
degree to which GDP exceeds GNP (O’ Hearn, 1998).    
 
What we need to take away from this discussion is that these 
particularities of the Irish state’s flirtations with neoliberalism are not 
anecdotal or addendum to the technologies more ‘representative’ of 
neoliberalisation globally.  Rather, these particularities have been central 
to how actually existing neoliberalism has emerged in the Irish context.  
As such, we find the concept of creative destruction, which sits at the 
heart of ideas such as path dependency and path trajectory problematic 
and offer instead the concept of path amplification. The relentless focus 
on the paradigmatic case of neoliberalism’s assault on and dismantling of 
Fordist Keynesian, and cultural, political, and historical infrastructures at 
the level of the city, has arguably effaced the recognition that in some 
cases neoliberalism actually finds itself in harmony with, rather than in 
opposition to, prior institutional histories. Path amplification points to 
the importance of forms of path trajectory in which history serves to 
amplify rather than slow down neoliberalism’s ambitions. Although often 
seen as a burden, weight, and source of friction, in fact in some cases 
pasts can serve as catalysts, lubricants, and wellsprings for neoliberal 
reforms. In light of these arguments, the following section looks more 
closely at the Irish property boom as indicative of the actually existing 
ways in which these processes converge.   
 
Actually Existing Neoliberalism in Action: The Irish Property 
Boom and Bust 
In the ten years between January 1996 and December 2005 an 
unparalleled 553,267 housing units were built in Ireland, with a total 
stock of 1.733m units in 2005 (DEHLG 2009).  By 2007, Ireland, along 
with Spain, was producing more than twice as many units per head of 
population than elsewhere in Europe (see Figure 1).  This building frenzy 
was accompanied by phenomenal growth in house prices. The average 
new house price rose from €78,715 in Dublin, and €66,914 for the 
country as a whole in 1991, to €416,225 in Dublin (a 429% increase) and 
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€322,634 for the country as a whole (382% increase) in 2007 (DEHLG 
2009).  Not unsurprisingly, second-hand homes follow the same trend, 
costing on average €76,075 in Dublin in 1991, and €64,122 for the 
country as a whole, rising to €495,576 in Dublin (551% increase) and 
€377,850 (489% increase) across the country in 2007.  In the same 
period, house building costs and wages only doubled (Brawn 2009).  In 
Q3 1995 the average secondhand house price was 4.1 times the average 
industrial wage of €18,152, by Q2 2007 secondhand house prices had 
risen to 11.9 times the average industrial wage of €32,616. 
 
Figure 1:  
 
 
Similarly, the cost of land spiralled, dramatically increasing in price in 
2005 and 2006, with land jumping in value from just under €10,000 per 
hectare in 1998 to over €58,400 per hectare in 2006 (Savills HOK 2007).  
This made Irish land the most expensive in Europe, nearly twice the cost 
per hectare of any other European country and three times greater for all 
but four countries (Spain, N. Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands), despite 
having a largely unrestricted planning system.  Land price inflation was 
driven by developers competing for urban brownfield sites, agricultural 
land being sold for housing development, and individuals buying sites for 
one off houses (S. Kelly, 2009).  The result was that land became a 
significant component of housing cost, up to 50 percent as against a 
European average of 10-15% (O’Toole 2009).   
 
Correspondingly, the total value of mortgage debt increased from €47.2 
billion in 2002 to over €139.8 billion at the end of 2007, with the average 
size of a new mortgage €266,000, nearly double the 2002 figure (CSO 
2008).  Moreover, loans to developers for land and developments sky-
rocketed.  As Honohan (2010: 26) notes, “At the end-2003, net 
indebtedness of Irish banks to the rest of the world was just 10 per cent 
of GDP; by early 2008 borrowing, mainly for property, had jumped to 
over 60 per cent of GDP.  Moreover, the share of bank assets in 
property-related lending grew from less than 40 per cent before 2002 to 
over 60 per cent by 2006.”  By 2008 Ireland’s property bubble was 
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already starting to slowly deflate, but the global financial crisis provided a 
redoubtable pin.  
 
The Daft.ie house price report for Q4 2010 (Daft 2011) detailed that 
asking prices, based on stock advertised through its services, were down 
on average c.-14% in 2009, on top of decreases of -19% in 2009 and 
almost -15% in 2008.  The average asking price for a residential property 
was just over €222,000, €145,000 below the mid-2007 peak.  The drop in 
asking price from peak prices varies geographically, with the smallest 
drop in County Limerick (-29%) and largest drop in Dublin city centre, 
where prices were down -49.6% at the end of 2010.  The Permanent 
TSB/ESRI Index reported in January 2011 that the average national 
prices, based on mortgage data, had fallen to Q2 2002 levels, with a 38% 
decrease in prices since they peaked in Quarter 4 2006, falling from 
€311,078 to €204,830 (outside of Dublin from €267,484 to €174,570 (-
34.75%); in Dublin from €427,946 to €237,480 (-4.53%)).  Many 
economic commentators predict that house prices will fall in excess of 
60% from peak values (e.g., M. Kelly 2007; Whelan 2010a).  Similarly, 
rents fell for seven quarters in a row to Q1 2010, with private rents being 
almost 25% below their peak value in Q2 2008 (DKM 2010).  House 
prices have depreciated to the extent that over 250,000 households are in 
negative equity (c. one third of all mortgages) and, as of the end of Q4 
2010, the Central Bank reports that 44,508 mortgages were in arrears for 
90 days or more and another 35,205 had been restructured (together 
totalling 10.13% of residential mortgages) (Finfacts 2011).  Further, there 
has been a steep decline in land values since the height of the boom, 
reduced 75-98 percent depending on location.   
 
DKM (2010) reports that from 2006 to 2010(est.) the total value of 
construction output fell from €38,631m to €11,733 (a drop of 69.6%).  
Further, the number of construction workers fell from their Q2 2007 
peak of 269,600 to 105,700 in Q2 2011 (CSO 2010).  Property related tax 
receipts (stamp duty, capital gains tax, VAT, development levies) have 
also dropped dramatically given the much smaller percentage of sales and 
the reduction in new commencements.   
 
It is now abundantly clear that during the Celtic Tiger period, property 
supply and demand became disconnected so that when the bubble burst 
the state has been left with a staggering level of oversupply. The 
particular ways in which the property sector emerged over the Celtic 
Tiger period offers an insight into both how the geographies of neoliberalism 
were spatialisised within the Irish context and how this in turn has 
produced and deposited new neoliberal geographies.  While the literature has 
predominantly focused on the former category (the spread of 
neoliberalisation between places), we suggest that the landscapes and 
geographies that this subsequently secretes have been equally important 
in conditioning the course of neoliberal trajectories.  These topographies 
and topologies of neoliberalism, therefore, warrant attention not only as effects 
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of neoliberalisation but as also productive elements in the continuing 
evolution of neoliberal geographies.  The way in which neoliberalism was 
contaminated and enfolded within the entrenched conditions of Ireland’s 
political and economic culture was instrumental in the articulation of 
specific relationships between the state, market, and civil society and in 
the deposition of particular geographies.  These relationships, as 
manifested through the property bubble, produced a cannibalising form 
of capitalism (not unlike the practices that took down the international 
financial markets) that evolved through a solipsistic financialised logic: 
house prices rose while (counter intuitively to market logic) houses were 
built to excess.  Ireland was in the middle of a building and land 
speculation frenzy when the crisis initiated, and which although it 
deflated relatively fast led to 244,590 units being built between January 
2006 and December 2009 (that were connected to the ESB electricity 
grid).  This is despite the fact that in April 2006, the Census revealed that 
266,322 housing units were unoccupied (216,533 vacant units and 49,789 
holiday homes; 15% of stock).  The preliminary results of the 2011 
Census report a total housing stock of 2,004,175 of which 294,202 units 
were vacant (including holiday homes), with many areas of the country 
having vacancy levels above 25% (see Figure 2) 
 
One highly visible result of housing supply being out of sync with 
housing demand has been the creation of a new phenomenon, so-called 
‘ghost estates’.  Our research detailed that there were 620 such estates in 
Ireland at the end of 2009, where a ‘ghost estate’ was defined as a 
development of ten or more houses where 50% of the properties are 
either vacant or under-construction (Kitchin et al., 2010), while a 
Department of the Environment and Local Government survey in May 
2010 revealed that there are 2,846 unfinished estates in the country, 777 
of which meet the criteria of a ‘ghost estate’, and only 429 of which were 
active at the time of the survey.  The total number of units in these 
estates is 121,248, with planning permission for an additional 58,025: 
78,195 units are occupied.  Of the 43,080 units that are unoccupied, 
23,226 are complete, 9,976 nearly complete and 9,854 where construction 
has started.  There are multiples of unfinished estates in every county in 
the state (see Figure 3). 
 
In addition to housing and land there is also an oversupply in offices, 
retail and hotels.  In Dublin, 23% of office space (some 782,500 sqm) is 
vacant (Savills HOK 2010).  By the end of 2010 there was estimated to 
be over 2m sqm of shopping centre space and 1.32m sqm of retail park 
space in the state, double that of 2005 (CBRE 2010).  At the end of 2008, 
there were 905 hotels with 58,467 rooms, 15,000 of which are deemed 
excess to supply (26%) (Bacon 2009). 
 
Much of the literature has highlighted that neoliberalisation entails not so 
much a retraction of the state as opposed to the deployment of different 
types of state interventions.  Similarly, the Irish property bubble was not 
411
only the result of deregulated markets, but was facilitated by a range of 
contributory factors.  There is no question that Ireland did need from the 
early 1990s onwards to cater for a significant transformation in its 
demographic profile.  Between 1991 and 2006 the population of Ireland 
grew by 714,129 (20.25%) from 3.525m to 4.239m, with the number of 
households growing by 440,437, up from 1.029m to 1.473m (CSO 2006). 
 
Figure 2. 2011 housing vacancy in Ireland 
 
 
 
 
The growth in population was driven by both immigration and natural 
increase.  Household growth was also driven by household 
fragmentation.  One would have thought that such changes in demand 
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would have been sufficient to drive market response, but they were 
accompanied by a range of other policies and practices. 
 
Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Tax incentive schemes initiated under the 1986 Urban Renewal Act 
allowed developers to claim back tax on income over a ten year period, 
and were integral to kick-starting regeneration. Initially, the Department 
of Finance introduced tax incentives in order to promote growth and 
stability, particularly in inner city areas. Urban renewal schemes were 
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introduced ‘in an effort to alleviate the increasing problem of dereliction 
and dilapidation which had affected large parts on the inner areas of 
towns and cities nation-wide’ (Department of Finance, 1999). A number 
of urban renewal schemes ran from 1986 to 2008 (termination date 
depending on the scheme and a number were extended), including a 
Town Renewal Scheme (100 towns throughout the state covered), Living 
Over the Shop (LOTS) and a Seaside Resort Scheme (15 towns covered) 
which enabled access to Section 23 tax relief on capital expenditure 
incurred in the construction, refurbishment or conversion of rented 
residential accommodation.  Section 23 encouraged development for 
rental purposes (including holiday homes) by allowing developers and 
small investors to offset tax up to 90% of direct costs occurred against 
income for up to ten years.  These schemes also marked the beginning of 
a new entrepreneurial approach to urban development in Ireland, which 
was specifically manifested in an effort to make Dublin fit for purpose 
for the new forms of economy that were becoming spatially fixed in cities 
in the post-industrial era. 
 
Many critics noted the neoliberal character of these urban strategies, and 
despite being widely criticised in terms of their redistributive effects on 
local areas (Corcoran, 2002), they were successful in terms of bringing 
new wealth to the capital and, over time, attempts were made to replicate 
the model in other Irish cities (O’Callaghan and Linehan, 2007).  The 
stimuli for development were supplemented with state funded 
redevelopment projects such as the International Financial Services 
Sector (IFSC) in Dublin docklands, the Digital Hub, and the regeneration 
of Temple Bar as a cultural quarter that were significant in attracting 
inward investment in advanced producer services and digital industries 
(MacLaran and McGuirk, 2001; Montgomery, 1995; Moore, 2008).  These 
tax initiative and redevelopment schemes were essentially deals struck 
between the Department of Finance and the private sector, with little 
role afforded to local authorities.   
 
 The urban tax relief schemes were accompanied from June 1998 by the 
Pilot Rural Renewal Scheme for the Upper Shannon Region (introduced 
under the Finance Act, 1998).  The scheme was designed to encourage 
people to live and construct new dwellings in designated areas and to 
promote new economic activity and consisted of two main elements 
were: (1) business tax incentives: tax relief for the expenditure incurred 
on the construction or refurbishment of industrial buildings (from July 
1st, 1999); and (2) residential property tax incentives: tax relief for both 
owner occupiers and renters (Department of Finance, 1999).  The result 
was the massive incentivisation of building long after such incentives 
were needed.  In the case of the five counties in the Upper Shannon 
Scheme – Longford, Leitrim, Cavan, Sligo and Roscommon – housing 
stock was increased by 45,053 (49.8%) between 2002 and 2009, from 
90,491 to 135,544 dwellings, with 1 in 3 houses built in this period (see 
Figure 4).  Between the 1996 and 2006 censuses 30,695 houses were built 
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in these counties and yet household numbers only grew by 18,896 – in 
other words, house building was progressing at a pace well in excess of 
household growth.     
 
Figure 4.  
 
Somewhat running against notions of balanced and sustainable 
development advocated in national spatial planning policy, the boom in 
construction encouraged local authorities to be pro-growth because it 
enabled the accrual of development levies (in the absence of more 
sustainable local residential property taxes), with local councillors 
pursuing zero-sum games with regards to their constituency where if one 
area got a certain kind of facility or development, then their area needed 
the same (hence several regional shopping centres in each region instead 
of one).  Chambers Ireland (2006) reported that development levies had 
risen from €0.11bn to €0.55bn between 2000 and 2005, representing 
13.6% of local government expenditure.  This is indicative of how new 
neoliberal interventions in the property sector were interwoven with the 
localised nature of Irish politics to produce particular spatial articulations 
of capital.   
 
This was replicated at the national level through the government’s pro-
cyclical fiscal policy and taxation system, which worked to both boost the 
construction industry and to make it critical to sustaining public 
spending, rather than acting as a counterweight to ensure sustainable 
growth.  Stamp duty, capital gains taxes and VAT were significant 
contributors to the public purse, despite capital gains tax being halved to 
20% in 1997, justified by normative neoliberal faith in the market that the 
sale and purchase of assets becoming less costly would free capital to be 
invested within the wider economy. Significantly, development land was 
also included under capital gains tax, in an attempt to ensure that a 
greater amount of land was released for enterprise purposes.  Davy 
Research (2006) reported that the property market accounted for 17% of 
total tax revenue in 2006, up from 5% in 1998.  Revenues from stamp 
duty on property transactions were c. €2.98b in 2006, up from 387m in 
1998, and there were c. €3.2b in VAT receipts (CSO 2008, Davy 
Research 2006).  Stamp duty rates were lowered several times between 
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2001 and 2007, and the ceiling on income tax deductibility of mortgage 
interest for owner occupiers was increased four times between 2000 and 
2008 in order to further stimulate the housing market (Honohan 2010).  
In addition, a significant number of people were employed in the 
construction and related sectors and construction was accounting for a 
significant chunk of growth in GDP (in 2006 construction accounted for 
9% of GDP and 10.4% of GNP; DKM 2008, cited in CSO 2008).   
 
In turn, the planning system became beholden to development, being 
pro-growth in orientation with a presumption for development operating, 
and was consistently undermined with localism, clientelism, cronyism and 
low-level corruption.  At the local scale, individuals and developers 
lobbied and sought to curry favour or do deals with county councillors 
and constituency TDs for zoning and permissions in return for support, 
votes and remuneration of various kinds (favours, kick-backs, fees for 
‘planning consultancy’, etc).  The Irish planning system lends itself to 
such a relationship as a result of its division of legislative and executive 
functions between councillors and planners.  The formulation and 
adoption of development plans and zoning decisions fall under the remit 
of elected local councillors, whilst the planning authority adjudicates over 
planning applications (with the planning authority a part of the local 
authority that local councillors oversee).  The function of local authority 
planners is as advisors on all development planning matters, rather than 
being formal decision makers; elected representatives have the final say 
on all development plan and zoning matters, and are under no obligation 
to take the recommendations of experts into account.  Moreover, 
councillors can use mechanisms such as Section 140 (of the Local 
Government Act 2001 – formerly Section 4 of the City and County 
Management (Amendment) Act, 1955) to override a specific planning 
decision.  And, while local authority staff are legally bound not to engage 
in work that might imply a vested interest, there is no such monitoring 
for councillors. This is exemplified by examples of elected representatives 
‘double jobbing’ as planning agents (or consultants).   
 
The result was too few checks and balances to stop excessive zoning and 
permissions being granted, despite the fact that detailed demographic 
profiling would have indicated limited demand in many locations, and the 
absence in many cases of essential services such as water and sewerage 
treatment plants, energy supply, public transport or roads.  This is 
exemplified with respect to land zoning.  In June 2008, the DEHLG 
recorded that there were 14,191 hectares of serviced land zoned 
nationwide for 462,709 potential new units (and an additional 30,000 
hectares of unserviced zoned land), with many counties having enough 
land zoned to last many years.  For example, Monaghan, which had a 
stock of 21,658 houses in 2006 had enough serviced land zoned for an 
additional 18,147 units, which would cater for a household increase of 
83% and last over 50 years if households continued to grow at the 1996-
2006 rate.  The national average is 16.8 years.   
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At the national level, developers and vested interest organisations lobby 
and pressure Ministers with respect to regional and planning policy 
formation and key legislation (Allen, 2007).  The property sector thus 
maintains close relationships with the major political parties, providing 
funding donations, the use of services and facilities, access to elite 
networks, employment/directorships after politics, and so on, in order to 
influence development plans, zoning and planning decisions, and 
planning policy.  As the revelations of the Mahon Tribunal into planning 
corruption have suggested, this relationship has been characterised as one 
of mutual benefit, along with direct and indirect bribery and coercion of 
elected officials at all levels of government (see O’Toole 2009).   
 
The vicious circle of politicians and developers was completed by the 
domestic banking sector, which got involved in a lending war driven by 
personal bonus schemes and inter-bank rivalry to generate record annual 
profits, flooding the market with development and mortgage capital that 
catered to speculator and buyer demand, but also actively encouraged it.  
Rather than using their own deposits to underpin loans, given favourable 
lending rates, banks borrowed money from other international banks and 
private equity funds to offer evermore easier forms of credit to home 
buyers and investors.  Utilising the international financial markets for 
credit “greatly increased banks’ vulnerability to changing market 
sentiment” (Honohan 2010: 6).  This reckless lending, often conducted 
without proper due process and exceeding stress test criteria, was 
exacerbated by financial deregulation and a regulatory system that failed 
to adequately police the banking sector (Ross 2009; Murphy and Devlin 
2009).  The involvement of international banks in the Irish property 
crash forms another critical component to understanding the relational 
geographies of the financial crisis.  The flow of international capital into 
Irish institutions effectively provided the means by which the property 
boom could occur.  While we are acutely aware of the importance of 
these financial flows to the predicament that Ireland currently faces, and 
indeed the fate of the entire Eurozone, it is nevertheless both empirically 
and conceptually beyond the scope of the current paper to account for 
this in detail.  Rather, we limit our analysis to the manifestations of these 
processes within Ireland.  
 
The Honohan Report (2010) makes it clear that there were catastrophic 
regulatory and governance failures both in the financial sector itself (with 
respect to senior management decisions, bank auditors and accountants, 
and financial intermediaries such as mortgage brokers) and the Central 
Bank and Financial Services Authority of Ireland which overemphasised 
process rather than outcomes, downplayed quantification of risks, 
applied ‘light-touch’ and deferential regulation, and failed to implement 
any penalties for breaches of rules and regulations.  Moreover, they 
created a false sense of security by producing reports that were overly 
optimistic and reassuring, regardless of the evidence base.  This was 
compounded by similar reports from the IMF, OECD and other bodies 
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such as rating agencies and vested interest groups.  As the Honohan 
Report (2010) notes, Ireland’s banking performance was the second 
poorest after Iceland during the present global downturn, and was 
entirely homemade on the basis of the Irish construction boom, rather 
than exposure to sub-prime mortgages or aggressive overseas 
acquisitions. 
 
The frenzy of house building were exacerbated by the dispersed 
deployment of strong discourses around home-ownership and buy-to-let 
or flip speculation, combined with a simultaneous retreat from social 
housing provision.  Ireland has a relatively high rate of home ownership, 
with almost three quarters of private dwellings in the State being owner-
occupied in 2006 and  the housing boom was almost exclusively targeted 
at the home owners and investors, with: first time buyers feeling harried 
to get onto the property ladder at all costs (driven by arguments such as 
‘being left behind’ and ‘rent is dead money’); existing home owners 
encouraged to take advantage of the equity in their homes to scale-up or 
purchase second or holiday homes or release equity to enable their 
children to get onto the housing ladder; and small investors encouraged 
to invest in buy-to-let purchases as a long term, secure investments that 
lacked the volatility of stocks and shares.  The latter group were 
particularly important in keeping demand high and pushing up prices.  By 
2007, the Bank of Ireland Group were lending as much money to buy-to-
let and flip speculators (28%) as to first time buyers, with the Irish 
Banking Federation noting that they typically paid c.€100,000 more on a 
property purchase (Brawn 2009).     
 
Thus, Irish neoliberalism exhibits a particular form of path dependency, 
which is indicative of both a commonsense approach to neoliberalization 
and the avoidance of its contradictions.  While the Irish state essentially 
bought into a free market ideology, the implementation of neoliberal 
policies and reforms in the property market were at the same time 
undermined by folding them into a system of entrenched localism, 
cronyism, and low-level corruption, both perpetuated and exacerbated by 
the interwoven short-term policy goals of the political system, and the 
unsustainable circulation of capital between banks, developers, and 
investors.  Thus, a range of state interventions in the property market 
perpetuated the privileging of the property market in geographic areas 
where essentially there was no market, and supported the capitalist 
accumulation of a small range of interests (who had close political ties) to 
the ultimate detriment of more sustainable redistribution of Celtic Tiger 
wealth.  As O’Hearn (1998: page xi) observed, “[t]he main benefactors of 
growth – foreign computer firms and Irish professionals – disposed of 
most of their fortunes in ways that were either fruitless (in the case of 
profits removed from Ireland) or downright harmful (property 
speculation that drove the costs of housing through the roof)”.   
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The result of these various factors, underpinned by a neoliberal 
philosophy of free market development and market-led regulation, was a 
housing bubble. Whilst many of the factors we have discussed do not 
differ greatly from the role that property development and speculation 
plays in many nations undergoing neoliberalisation, the ways in which 
these factors were articulated in Ireland was also contingent upon its 
particularities.  The sheer frenzy around home-ownership was clearly a 
latent outcome of a postcolonial anxiety around land.  Rather than being 
a mere footnote illustrating the more recent (and thus important) 
histories explaining the property boom, the postcolonial context was in 
fact integral to how it was produced and sustained over time; without the 
widespread desire for home-ownership at any cost, the ever escalating 
market could not have been sustained for as long as it was.  Similarly, the 
inherent localism and cronyism of Irish politics produced a series of 
affects that structured the property sector, its geographical manifestation, 
and the architecture of its downfall.  Ireland provided a lubricated 
laboratory for neoliberal expansion, wherein resistance to these reforms 
were minimal, and their articulation exhibits a type of path amplification 
that mutates both Ireland and the ‘neoliberal’.  The variants of 
neoliberalism produced  must be seen in light of these historic 
specificities, but cannot be reduced to that which is predictable or 
foreseeable.  Ireland’s geography and the ‘neoliberal’ mutate together and 
amplify each other. 
 
The Government’s Solution to the Banking and Property Crisis: 
NAMA 
The government’s response to the banking and property crisis in Ireland 
has been characteristic of the short-termist and reactionary modus operandi 
of Irish politics that then unfolds into a de facto longer term response 
(O’Toole 2009; Ross 2009).  Rather than rethink the Irish economic 
model, the solution to the crisis has employed a deepening of 
neoliberalised policy designed on the one hand to protect as much as 
possible the interests of the developer and financial class, and on the 
other to implement widescale austerity measures and severe cutbacks in 
public services and to consider the privatization of state assets, all framed 
within a post-political discourse of ‘there is no alternative’.  While this is 
perhaps unsurprising given the prevalence of similarly hermetic responses 
elsewhere, and neoliberalism’s ability to mutate to reinforce certain types 
of class power at the expense of others (Harvey 2007; see also Fox-
Rogers et al 2011 for a review of how changes in Irish planning law 
reinforces class bias), in particularly utilising and mobilising crisis as a 
way of solidifying these arrangements (Klein, 2008; Zizek, 2010), it is 
worthwhile to elaborate empirically on how such processes were 
operationalised and rationalised in the Irish context with respect to 
property. 
 
The government’s initial reaction to the faltering economy was to insist 
that the banks were well capitalised and that the housing market would 
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slow to ‘soft landing’.  However, as the crisis deepened and liquidity 
started to dry up on the international money markets, it became clear that 
there were significant problems of capitalisation in the Irish banking 
sector.  Banks neither had the funds to lend to investors and businesses, 
nor to pay back loans to international banks.  Irish bank share prices 
collapsed (between May 2007 and November 2008 Irish shares fell in 
value from €55b to €4b) resulting in the introduction of a state backed 
bank guarantee scheme to prevent a run on the banks, wherein the state 
underwrote €440b of deposits and other assets (Murphy and Devlin 
2009).  Property buyers and investors, already cautious because of the 
slow down in the housing market, found it increasingly difficult to source 
credit, thus developers found themselves left with liquidity problems that 
prevented them from finishing out developments.  If evidence was 
needed of the failure of the neoliberal model not only to provide 
equitable redistribution, but also to support those interests most central 
to its functioning, this case offered a clear example.  In order to 
introduce liquidity into the Irish banking system the state took a two-
pronged approach: (1) direct recapitalisation or nationalisation, wherein 
the state took a stake in the banks for preferential shares or took direct 
ownership, using the national pension reserve and finance procured on 
the international markets; (2) relieving the banks of their toxic assets by 
purchasing all property loans of €5m or more issued before December 1st 
2008 and placing them in a new state agency to manage on behalf of the 
taxpayer.  Somewhat controversially, all Irish banks were to participate in 
the strategy adopted, meaning that the two institutions with the smallest 
depositor base and largest portfolio of toxic debt (Anglo Irish Bank and 
Irish Nationwide) were protected from being wound down. 
 
The new property agency to manage the second scheme is the National 
Assets Management Agency (NAMA), part of the National Treasury 
Management Agency (NTMA).  Plans for NAMA were announced in the 
Minister for Finance’s Supplementary Budget on 7th April 2009, with the 
National Asset Management Agency Bill (2009) published September 10th 
of that year.  The Bill enables NAMA to acquire bank assets relating to 
land and development loans and associated loans, and to manage those 
assets for the benefit of the taxpayer.  The first loans were transferred 
from the banks to NAMA in March 29th 2010 (NAMA 2010a).   
 
The NAMA Draft Business Plan (2009) details that in total, €88bn worth 
of assets with a loan book of  €77bn and €9bn in rolled up interest, are 
being transferred to NAMA from five Irish banks (AIB - €24.1bn, Bank 
of Ireland - €15.5bn, EBS - €0.8bn, Irish Nationwide - €8.3bn, and Anglo 
Irish Bank - €28.4bn): €27.8bn (36%) relates to ‘land’, €21.8bn (28%) 
relates to ‘development loans’, €27.7bn (36%) relates to ‘associated 
loans’.  In return for the impaired assets, the agency issues the five banks 
with government-backed bonds, which the banks could use to borrow 
from the European Central Bank, and thus, in theory at least, inject 
liquidity into the Irish banking system.  Rather than paying present 
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market value of the underlying assets, NAMA paid 15% more to 
represent long term economic value.  Based on the first payments to 
banks, the state is paying on average 50% of the loan value for the asset 
(NAMA 2010b), though the developer will continue to repay the full 
value of the loan.  NAMA estimates that 40% of the loans will be 
cashflow generating and that 80% of loans will be repaid by borrowers, 
with 20% defaulting.  NAMA has up to €5bn to selectively spend on 
completing projects.   
 
At present, there is very little detail available with respect to the 22,000 
loans that have been transferred into NAMA and the properties they 
relate to, nor the specific geography beyond national territories (see Table 
1).  As a consequence, it is difficult to determine the present status of 
assets and their future potential worth.   
 
Table 1: Geographical breakdown of NAMA portfolio 
 
 L&D 
loans 
Associated loans Total % of total 
Ireland 33.13 18.35 51.48 66.80% 
Northern Ireland 3.29 1.51 4.8 6.20% 
Great Britain 10.34 5.59 15.93 20.70% 
USA 1.39 0.66 2.05 2.70% 
Germany 0.05 1.01 1.06 1.40% 
Portugal 0.46 0.14 0.6 0.70% 
France 0.39 0.13 0.52 0.70% 
Czech Republic 0.11 0.07 0.18 0.20% 
Italy 0.04 0.09 0.13 0.20% 
Spain 0.05 0.07 0.12 0.20% 
Other 0.13 0.11 0.24 0.30% 
TOTAL (€ billions) 49.38 27.73 77.11 100.00% 
 
Source: NAMA (2009) 
 
Since its announcement, the NAMA project has been roundly criticized 
by politicians and economists (see for example, Gurdgiev 2010, Lyons 
2010, Lucey 2010, McWilliams 2010, Whelan 2010b).  There is a broad 
concern as to whether NAMA has been the right vehicle to deal with the 
property crisis and whether it can succeed given the make-up of the 
portfolio (particularly given the geography of assets and the amount of 
land and redundant property such as ‘zombie hotels’), the extent of the 
property crash, the sums being paid by the state to the banks for their 
‘assets’, the validity of ascribed long-term economic values and rent 
yields, and the veracity of valuations and underlying economic models 
and calculations.  Others question the fact that NAMA has paid a 
notional long term economic value rate rather than present market prices, 
thus second guessing the market and inflating the transfer to the banks at 
the state’s risk; and that to recover the state investment the property 
market will need to be re-inflated, which will mean the re-inflation of the 
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surrounding apparatus of interests in banking, property, planning, and 
government.    Moreover, if land is purchased by the state on the basis of 
existing zoning then any future dezoning by local authorities will deflate 
its value and lead to a loss on the investment.   
 
For those on the Right, NAMA represents state interference in the logic 
of the free market, disrupting its ‘natural’ recovery by artificially 
controlling large elements of the property market and protecting failed 
developers and speculators in the short term who otherwise would have 
gone bust, thus blocking the growth of more resilient players or new 
start-ups.  For those on the Left it protects those who created the crisis 
but it does nothing to protect home owners and tenants struggling to pay 
mortgages and rent and who are also underwriting NAMA’s costs.  
Moreover, it is employing as experts (bankers, estate agents, property 
consultants, planners, lawyers) the very same people who acted 
irresponsibly to create the bubble, some of whom are overseeing 
transfers from their former employers.  These experts are being 
handsomely rewarded for their services, with fees expecting to run to 
€2.46bn over the projected ten year life course of the agency (NAMA 
2009).  Further, NAMA is exempt from freedom of information requests 
and despite managing a vast amount of state managed assets it is 
particularly opaque in its operation.   
 
Interestingly, very few of the critiques of NAMA question the underlying 
neoliberal ideology that underpins the creation and operation of the 
agency and the whole Irish economic model.  Indeed, there seems to be 
widespread acceptance that the core logics and principles underpinning 
Ireland’s economy during the Celtic Tiger period were fundamentally 
sound, and that the crisis and crash were simply the result of misfortune 
with respect to the timing of the global financial crisis, poor management 
and regulation, and cronyism and greed (in other words, how it was 
(mis)applied).  In general then, criticisms do not extend to the Irish 
economic model, with its narrow tax base of low corporate and income 
tax, high indirect taxes, and lack of property taxes, and its laissez fair 
approach to planning and regulation.  As Marcuse (2009) has noted, 
“todays-more-than-financial-crisis” is being rationalised away as an 
anomaly within the system of neoliberal capitalism, a cog to be corrected 
rather than indicative of more systemic failures. 
 
 In Ireland, as with other countries, the solutions to the crisis are a 
selection of alternative tactics wherein the overall strategy is a new round 
of neoliberalisation.  In other words, rather than seeking radical (or even 
moderate) change with respect to the economic, political and planning 
systems, a fresh dose of neoliberalisation is seen as the solution to the 
failings of previous rounds of neoliberalism.  The apparatus that created 
the conditions for crisis are not only left in place, their positions are 
strengthened through affirmation.  Harvey (2007) argues that the 
neoliberal project was designed as a means to restore class power to an 
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elite by strategically aligning state resources and supports to this strata of 
society.  The Irish state’s response to the crisis supports this argument.  
It is indicative of free market fundamentalism “losing both its claim to 
legitimacy and its claims on democracy” (Giroux and Searls Giroux, 
2009, page 1), having to abandon the assumption that markets can 
operate in the absence of state interventions.  In Ireland, we are now 
witnessing the rolling out of public money and resources to rescue poorly 
performing private institutions and restore a faulty system from ruin, an 
example of what we term “accumulation by repossession”.  In a period of 
‘roll with it’ neoliberalism (Keil, 2009), the investment in these types of 
responses has reached a point where it is less politically contentious to 
continue to invest in these ideologically contradictory responses of state 
regulated free-markets than to either follow through on the promise of 
the free-market or to implement more socially responsible models.   
 
Conclusion  
This paper has sought to bring the Irish economic ‘miracle’ which 
prevailed between 1993 and 2007 and its spectacular collapse since 2008, 
into dialogue with recent literature on neoliberalism, its actually existing 
forms, and its path trajectories in specific and concrete milieu. Given its 
pivotal status in global debate on fast track growth in small open 
economies and on the causes and consequences of collapse and crises, we 
note a surprising absence in academic literature of sustained conversation 
between the Irish case and theoretical ruminations over neoliberalism and 
its political pretensions today. This paper stands as a contribution 
towards the filling of this lacuna. Our discussion has focussed upon the 
causes of the massive property orgy that Ireland indulged in at the height 
of its prowess as a Celtic Tiger, the disastrous social and spatial costs and 
consequences that this glut has left in its wake, and the (re)commitment 
to neoliberal policies which proposed solutions to Ireland’s property 
crises betray.  
 
At one level, the follies, excess, gluttony, greed, defaults, bankruptcies, 
repossessions, and bail outs, which have marked Irish life in the past two 
decades reflect simply the cultural flotsam and jetsam of a classic crises 
of over-accumulation. Inherent in the capitalist system is a tendency 
towards over-accumulation, signposted by a series of desperate 
displacement strategies which include the switching of capital from 
primary circuits to secondary circuits and in particular into land and 
property. Overheated housing markets are emblematic of the endemic 
and innate drift of capitalism into spatially and temporally specific crises 
which are then exacerbated by capitalism’s will to find what turn out to 
be fallacious solutions. Ireland’s particular and dramatic encounter with 
the creative and destructive powers of unregulated and insufficiently 
regulated market processes is but the latest chapter in the now well 
populated and inglorious history of capitalism and property bubbles more 
widely.  Ireland’s crises are simply capitalism’s crises rendered visible and 
naked. 
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But Ireland’s story was home grown too. Both fiscal and planning policy 
formation, implementation and regulation were overtly shaped by the 
neoliberal policies adopted by the state, particularly in the period from 
1997 onwards.  During this time, the government pursued a neoliberal 
agenda of promoting the free market, minimising regulation, privatising 
public goods, and keeping direct taxes low and indirect taxes high.  The 
state thus loosened regulation of the financial sector, introduced tax 
incentive schemes, changed the parameters of stamp duty, lowered 
capital gains tax, allowed developers to forego their affordable and social 
housing obligations, promoted a laissez faire planning system, failed to 
address the vestiges of clientelism and allowed elected representatives to 
abandon basic planning principles, and encouraged local authorities to 
produce ambitious, localised growth plans framed within a zero-sum 
game of potentially being left behind with respect to development.  In 
short, it allowed the property sector to be driven by developers, 
speculators and banks, rewarding them with tax incentives, less tax 
obligations, and market-led regulation; it enabled buyers to over-extend 
their indebtedness; and it provided too few barriers to development by 
failing to adequately oversee, regulate and direct local planning. Whilst 
the global financial crisis might have been a contributing factor, the Irish 
housing market was already running out of control, with supply 
outstripping potential demand in all parts of the country, and house and 
land prices skyrocketing to amongst the most expensive in the world.  
And banks had massively over-extended themselves lending to 
developers.  The crash was inevitable.  The severity of the crash was 
significantly exacerbated by the state’s neoliberal agenda and lack of 
oversight, foresight and poor policy formation with respect to both the 
planning system and banking sectors. 
 
In mobilising the idea of actually existing neoliberalism we have made a 
case for widening the laboratories within which the grounding of 
neoliberalism is scrutinised. We have argued that the vital context which 
has mediated Ireland’s specific encounter with neoliberal doctrines has 
been Irish attachments to land and property, Ireland’s coloration by 
clientalistic and patronage politics, the dominance of right of centre 
political parties that prioritize localism, and the desire for a FDI 
dominated, open economy that collectively helped broker the rise and fall 
of Ireland’s Celtic Tiger economy, and have given the property bubble 
and its implosion a unique Irish fingerprint.  We have characterised Irish 
neoliberalism then as a common sense, partial, happenstance and 
emergent piling up of market oriented policy orientations, strategies, and 
instruments, framed within its localist, clientelist political culture and 
system that operates across modes and scales of governance. 
 
In framing Ireland’s encounter with neoliberalism in terms of the 
country’s emergence from a troublesome colonial past we are not of 
course suggesting that Ireland is particularly exceptional. It may be that 
Ireland’s puzzling conservative revolution, its brand of clientalistic and 
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patronage politics, its culture of reverence towards and deferral to 
property rights, and its rejection of import substitution and embrace of 
open markets, resonates with other states emerging from a colonial 
experience. To the extent that the social, cultural, economic, and political 
milieu in which neoliberalism took root in Ireland might be more typical 
than unique, arguably the theoretical innovations piloted in this paper 
assume wider significance. Whilst to date much work on actually existing 
neoliberalism has focussed upon the creative destruction of institutions 
of urban governance in the western city, the Irish case may well serve to 
invigorate a fresh focus upon neoliberalism’s journeys in states who still 
carry the imprint of their colonial past and where colonial and 
postcolonial histories provides the essential context in which the 
structuration of the neoliberal experiment takes place. The Irish case can 
be located against the backdrop of neoliberalism’s early experimentation 
in Structural Adjustment Programmes, but it clearly surpasses, extends, 
and suggests new directions, for scholarship with this parentage. 
 
In concluding we ruminate on the wider significance of the Irish case for 
critical human geographies of actually existing neoliberalism in the 
context of the global economic crises. To this end we offer three 
concepts which emerge from the Irish story but which may have wider 
resonance and might constitute a useful fleshing out of theoretical 
framings of concrete and particular neoliberalisms; path amplification, 
neoliberalism’s topologies and topographies and accumulation by repossession. 
 
Firstly, the concept of path trajectories and path dependencies have 
become important denotations of the place specific character of local and 
particular neoliberalisms and their development. Because emphases to 
date has tended to be focussed upon neoliberalism’s  working on 
antecedent city-based Fordist Kenyesian institutions and infrastructures 
the concept of creative destruction has tended to be foregrounded, both 
cerebrally and viscerally. The idea of creative destruction itself implies 
that to move forward neoliberalism has to destroy prior spatial and 
ideological fixes. The idea of neoliberalism’s path trajectories and path 
dependencies has become preoccupied with ideas of friction and inertia; 
obstacles have to be overcome. Given Ireland’s unique social, cultural, 
economic, and political history arguably neoliberalism encountered a 
more conducive incubator. Perhaps for this reason it did not have to 
become an overtly political and ideological project as such and was 
paraded as little more than commonsense. To counter assumptions of 
friction, inertia, and stases which can unwittingly pervade concepts such 
as path dependency and path trajectory we offer the idea of path 
amplification. In some spaces and places neoliberalism finds itself in 
harmony with, rather than in opposition to, prior institutional histories 
and can germinate exponentially and benefit from local amplification.     
 
Secondly, whilst much work to date has focused upon geographies of 
neoliberalism it is equally the case that neoliberalism produces its own 
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geographies. We refer to this as neoliberalisms topographies and topologies. All 
too often the full significance of these geographies and their importance 
in conditioning the subsequent path trajectories of neoliberalism are 
insufficiently understood; where they are ill defined and under specified 
notions of uneven development are mobilised. The importance of 
debates over ghost estates and zombie hotels to the future trajectory of 
neoliberalism in Ireland merits attention. Alongside Dubai and Japan, 
Ireland might become the most appropriate laboratory within which to 
study the impact of such haunted landscapes of despair on the future of 
neoliberal thinking and its possible mutations.   The growth in the Irish 
housing market, both in terms of revenue and land-use, and subsequent 
crash and legacy of oversupply, has had an era-defining impact on Irish 
society and space.  It has affected all aspects of social and economic life 
in urban and rural communities leaving in its wake a topology of vacancy, 
unfinished estates, and empty offices and retail parks and a topography 
of broken lives, shattered dreams, terminal indebtedness, and for some 
chronic stress, anxiety, depression, and even suicide. Neoliberalism’s 
spatial imprint needs to be considered as central to its structuration, both 
before and during the present crises.  
 
Finally, worryingly, the present government’s solution to the crisis has 
been another round of short-termist neoliberalism in the form of the 
public collectivization of private debt through detoxification, 
recapitalisation, and nationalisation of the banks and the protection of 
the interests of developers and speculators at the potential expense of the 
taxpayer.  We are entering it seems a period in which capitalism is folding 
in on itself, where perhaps one would expect it to implode, instead it 
regenerates and thrives on its own contradictions; ‘the more it breaks 
down, the more it schizophrenizes, the better it works’ (Deleuze and 
Guattarri, 1977, 166).  We are seemingly entering a period of paranoid, 
schizoid, and cynical neoliberal capitalism, wherein any utopian dream of 
efficiency through markets, democracy through accumulation, has been 
lost within the scrapheap of the international crisis. Ireland has been 
buried under this detritus more than most.  According to Harvey (2007), 
the recent history of neoliberalism can be read as a decisive development 
in class war over the division of the national product. Through what 
Harvey (2003) calls accumulation by dispossession, capital has reversed 
the gains to labour which were ushered in with the Fordist Keynesian 
state and restored inequalities in wealth to Victorian levels. In Ireland’s 
case capital is being saved from its later folly not only by the privatisation 
of social assets but also by the socialisation of private loss. Productive 
state assets are to be deployed to save and in some cases further (perhaps 
more than we currently know about) enrich capital, whilst capital’s losses 
are to become the public’s losses. We suggest the concept of accumulation 
by repossession to capture this latest development and offer it as an 
accompaniment to Harvey’s concept of accumulation by dispossession.  
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In the present-post political climate of manufactured amnesia it is useful 
to remind ourselves that a different future remains possible, despite the 
fact that Ireland’s neoliberal state seems presently incapable of 
envisioning and embracing another future.  Indeed, it is somewhat ironic 
that in many ways the Irish state has never been better placed to choose a 
different future given the state ownership of huge tracts of land and 
property, along with the country’s primary banking institutions.  The era 
of neoliberalism, however, has also seismically    shifted the context of 
the state into which such reforms/reclamations would need to be 
implemented.  Gleeson (2010), in his book Lifeboat Cities, likens the past 
thirty years of welfare retrenchment and the rise to prominence of 
neoliberal rule as akin to being ‘handcuffed to a madman’. During this 
period Gleeson suggests, we have witnessed a period of reconstitution in 
which socio-spatial relations have degenerated such that they are no 
longer fit for purpose for human flourishing. For Gleeson, the global 
economic downturn has raised the stakes and created new opportunities. 
No longer must the call to resist or contest neoliberalism rest on an 
agenda of moderate reform. The scale of the task is now so great, and the 
sense of urgency so crushing that much more ambition thinking is 
required. Perhaps the core of the problems lies in what Žižek (2002, page 
152) considers as the difference between the capacity of states and 
individuals to React and to Act: “An act always involves a radical risk ... it 
is a step into the open, with no guarantee of the final outcome ... 
[b]ecause an Act retroactively changes the very co-ordinates into which it 
intervenes”.  Thus far, the Irish response to the crisis – like that of many 
other nations – has been to React rather than to Act, thus exhibiting a 
fundamental conservatism that seeks to recover rather than reform.  To 
certain extent this is now inevitable given the complex interweaving of 
political and economic geographies, the new post-crisis relational geo-
political configurations both within and external to the Eurozone, and 
the embrace of the IMF/ECB bailout, that enable and constrain the 
ground on which national institutions can react to and act upon the crisis.  
But perhaps, only in taking that step into the unknown can Ireland begin 
the search for the opportunity inherent within crisis.   
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CHAPTER 40 
 
SPACED AND TIMED IN THE NEW YORK MARATHON 
 
STEVE MCCARRON 
 
Original essay for this collection. 
 
Introduction 
We inhabit a world of near ubiquitous information and communications 
technology (ICT) presence.  Mobile communication networks now have a 
carrying capacity (bandwidth) to allow user-friendly communication tools 
(software) to transmit information rich (e.g. text and imagery) messages 
in real-time, across the globe.  As consumers of the bandwidth capacity 
on offer, we are being presented with many additional means of using 
this possibility to contact each other.  Combined advances in ICT and 
software functionality produce new types of information (e.g. spatial 
location) that might be ‘valuable’ to receive, and thus worthwhile to pay 
to transmit.  Our telephones are no longer just phones, but advanced 
microcomputers with all the modifiable functionality which that implies 
(via hosted software applications or ‘Apps.’).  Mobile devices offer new 
opportunities to communicate new types of information from new 
situations to new ‘audiences’ or ‘constituencies’.  ICT infrastructures (e.g. 
cellular networks) allow trans-global communication instantly and 
relatively cheaply.  It is argued that when accompanied by mobile devices 
running such software, they are creating personal ‘coded spaces’ (Kitchin 
and Dodge, 2011) that are significantly modifying how interpersonal 
contact, or lack of it, may be interpreted.  In this essay I detail my 
experience of one such coded space, the New York City (NYC) 
Marathon, and discuss some of the implications of communications 
software infiltration into this and similar situations.  
 
Running the NYC Marathon, 2011 
On the 6th of November 2011 I competed in the New York City (NYC) 
Marathon.  Competed might be a bit of an exaggeration.  I took part in 
the event, running as best I could along the 26.2 mile course through five 
New York boroughs (Staten Island, Brooklyn, Queens, The Bronx and 
Manhattan).  I was accompanied by 47,000-odd other runners and 
walkers.  As with the vast majority of ‘competitors’ involved, the only 
competition I had was with the distance and ‘the clock’.  Completion of 
the NYC Marathon was a long held desire, on my ‘bucket list’.  The 
arbitrary marathon distance of 26.2 miles is talismanic, and for many is 
the ultimate challenge of their endurance.  It truly is an endurance event, 
and few technological advances have or will diminish the extreme 
physical effort required to complete the distance.  It is therefore likely to 
remain and even increase in popularity as a motivational tool.  When I 
decided to undertake the challenge in April 2011, it was also intended as 
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a way to encourage my perseverance with an extended training 
programme, which it proved to be.   
 
As a physically extreme task however, attempting but failing to complete 
the marathon is always a distinct possibility, no matter how much training 
is undertaken.  This may happen for many reasons on the day, including 
injury, illness or just exhaustion.  As an amateur athlete, bringing oneself 
to the starting line in optimal condition is not easy.  The incorporation of 
trans-Atlantic travel and a couple of day’s hotel living in the immediate 
pre-race period is also not an ideal way to prepare! As the strain imposed 
upon the body is so extreme during the event, the physical well-being of 
participants is everyone’s primary concern.  This includes the event 
organisers and the constituency of spectators concerned about any 
participant in the event.  
 
This was to be my first marathon attempt in six years, which should really 
have caused me more concern than it did.  My previous attempt in 2005 
had made me and my family (in attendance that day) very aware of the 
difficulties associated with completing the 26.2 mile marathon distance.  
This time around, I travelled to the event without those spectators.  
However many people were aware of my participation including family, 
friends and colleagues who had all kindly donated money to a fundraising 
effort.  
 
Coded spaces in the Marathon 
Coded spaces (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011) are inventions or transductions 
(Mackenzie, 2003) of our inhabited spaces due to the use of, but not 
wholly functionally determined by, software information processing.  
Mass public participation running events, of which the NYC marathon is 
a long standing and one of the most popular  examples, function in their 
current form with the use of automated ‘chip’ timing of each participant’s 
progress along the course.  Each participant’s numbered bib carries an 
ultra-lightweight machine-readable device which is automatically scanned 
and logged at designated locations along the route.  These ‘waypoints’ 
will critically include the start/finish lines, but also in such major events 
each mile marker and other significant distances e.g. 40k (see Fig 1).  
These recorded times at each distance are known as ‘split times’.   
 
Due to this extensive use of ICT and computer processed code I’d argue 
that the events themselves are recognisably ‘coded spaces’.  Without such 
extensive use of automated surveillance to allow in excess of 45,000 
participants to run the NYC marathon in such a streamlined, informed 
and efficient manner, a ‘marathon’ could possibly still happen.  However 
it would be a radically transformed and practically unrecognisable version 
of the same event.  Thus it is debatable if the modern ‘major’ marathon is 
in fact an example of code/space (Kitchin and Dodge, 2011), invented 
and defined by the essential formative role of said software.   
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My personal ‘coded space’ 
Before departing for New York, I had used an internet-based charity 
fundraising facility to let supporters of my marathon attempt know about 
the possibility of tracking my progress through the race, if so desired.  To 
this end, just before the beginning of the race, I registered as a ‘runner’ 
on a mobile phone App.  The App. requested my permission to use the 
phone’s built-in GPS receiver to log my position.  The positional signal 
was then to be relayed via the App.’s communication channel with a data 
server to anyone with the App. (for a small charge) and knowledge of my 
bib number, or with access to a web browser (a free service).    
 
Thus, although unconfirmed at the time, I was conscious that an 
‘audience’ might be aware of my location from that time on.  I was also 
unaware if any or in what form (constant or intermittent updates) 
information was being transmitted or received.  I interpreted the App. 
initiation instructions as indicating that only my split-times (arrival times 
at each mile marker along the course) were being transmitted to any 
‘audience’  This was indeed true, but not only that.  My spatial location 
was actually being semi-continuously updated on the spectator’s version 
of the App. and the race website.  The App. interface was map-based, 
with my position indicated by an icon which moved gradually along the 
marathon route.  The location update occurred after a short lag, 
estimated at about <10mins, based on the arrival time of messages 
following my eventual completion of the event.   
 
Connectivity as a motivational tool 
The App. was presumably designed as a means by which course-side 
spectators could increase their participation in, and enjoyment of, the 
race.  A large proportion of spectators are present to offer support to 
individuals or groups taking part, as well as supporting all participants 
and witnessing the spectacle.  However in a field of circa 47,000 athletes 
it is very easy for spectators to miss an individual or group as they pass.  
With both participant and spectator using the App. however, arrival 
times at any location can be better estimated and anyone’s imminent 
arrival anticipated.   
 
However, as a runner, the technology also worked unexpectedly as a 
motivational tool during the event. I became increasingly aware that 
those monitoring my progress online, whilst not based physically in New 
York, would also be deriving information from the signal.  What I 
inferred was that they might be interpreting what my position, or 
progress speed, might imply in terms of my physical well-being. An 
increase in ‘split times’ could be read as a signal of problems I was 
having, such as injury or exhaustion.  Thus, achieving each mile marker 
to alleviate such concern became a new and additional motivation to 
maintain a constant pace; despite the difficulties I increasingly had to do 
so!   
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This was over and beyond, and to some degree replaced, the usual 
motivation of achieving a desired race time; especially when that time 
became obviously unachievable.  Once any ability to run at a desired pace 
was no longer possible, the motivation to reach the next mile marker in a 
reasonably good time i.e. consistently  became about sending a message 
via this medium of ‘all is well, still moving, thus still OK, healthy and not 
suffering too much’.  It became as much about this as it was to reduce 
the distance to the finish.   
 
Fortunately, I had done enough training to be able to maintain a 
reasonable (if not expected) pace, and a post-event analysis of split times 
(recorded on a pedometer which I also carried) showed a fairly consistent 
pattern.  However at several times I was forced to slow to walking pace, 
something that I was very conscious might raise alarm in those observing 
the split times, and so something I worked especially hard to avoid for 
this reason also.   In my pervious marathon attempt in 2005, a lack of 
sufficient training had led to much greater difficulties.  Many of those I 
was concerned might be monitoring my progress had witnessed these at 
first hand, and it was a reluctance to evoke those memories that helped 
motivate me to begin running again, and make the next waypoint. 
 
Despite advising my family and friends of an intention to use the tracking 
system, during the event I was still unsure who, if anyone was actually 
monitoring my progress.  However the possibility of being ‘watched’ was 
enough to provide the motivation to try to perform in the way described 
(and for those reasons) for an ‘audience’.   Thus the positional broadcast 
was a self inflicted ‘Big Brother’ (which in reality was my little brother!).  
The technology did work, and an audience was in fact ‘watching’.  As text 
messages of congratulations indicated, I found at the finish line that I had 
been far from the (physically) solo runner, inhabiting the isolated space I 
was used to running within on the streets of Dublin or along the banks 
of the Royal Canal.   
 
I had been accompanied by many concerned family and friends, with the 
technological aid of an ‘eye in the sky’.  I was later told in a rather 
poignant statement by my mother that ‘your father took every breath 
with you’.   I would argue that the connection between myself and my 
constituency was transformed, deepened and strengthened by 
transduction of my (and their spaces) into ‘coded spaces’ that respectively 
transmitted and received real-time spatial information.   
 
Human connectivity and telecommunications 
New possibilities in human connectivity across space are offered by 
modern telecommunications.  A revolution in technological availability 
has standardised the inclusion of GPS within handheld personal phones.  
This allows the streaming of positional data to other devices connected 
and programmed to listen.  As before, all runners in a marathon or 
travellers around the globe are connected by multiple invisible strands to 
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all corners of the world.  Indeed this international aspect to the entry 
field to the NYC Marathon is something which characterises the event. 
 
However by carrying a GPS enabled phone I was voluntarily implanted 
with a personal tracking device.  I was mapped in an Orwellian ‘Big 
Brother’ way, linked by new, stronger, digital, strands to my ‘audience’.  I 
had agreed to temporarily become a cyborg, effectively coupled to a 
device that was augmenting my functionality.  My personal connectivity 
to family and friends took on a new digital reality, invisible bonds turned 
into a communication stream.  Mapping my spatial location effectively 
fed a virtual CCTV camera.  An audience ran with me along the streets 
and avenues of New York’s boroughs, vicariously seeing the city, 
imagining the streets as I would be seeing them.  As I also suspected it 
might, it also worked effectively as a health status report to those 
concerned for me.  My physical condition was being interpreted from my 
speed and particularly the difference in times I was taking to complete 
each mile ‘split’.     
 
Postcards from the Edge: Spatial location as a virtual surrogate of 
well being 
Through the marathon App. described here, spectators are now involved 
in new ways through a detailed awareness of runner location.  The 
software-enabled runners are ‘prosumers’ (Ritzer and Jurgenson, 2010), 
using the service provided but also producing content that can be ‘sold’ 
on in the form of App. content or as a vehicle for associated advertising. 
They are motivated by the knowledge that a concerned ‘audience’ of 
supporters may be in continuous awareness of progress being made.  The 
signal of spatial location, as transmitted over social networks or event-
specific applications is thus effectively an accelerated, high frequency 
version of the postcard.  
 
The near real-time postcard is, by its real-time nature, now also enabled 
or loaded with new interpretative levels.  In the marathon, those in the 
‘audience’ concerned with the well-being of a participant now have a way 
of obtaining pseudo-real-time location updates which may be interpreted 
as a measure of health status or ‘well being’.  As the objective in such an 
event is to maintain a constant pace throughout, deviation away from an 
established progress rate may signal trouble.  For instance, imagine what 
might be suspected if the information feed ceased entirely? The effective 
distance of ‘concern’ (c.f. Gregory and the ‘distance of death’, pers 
comm. 2011) between observer and the observed has decreased to the 
distance from the observer to the screen.  The new levels of contact 
created by the marathon App. are analogous to the intimacy generated by 
immersive video games, involving the audience vicariously in the efforts 
of those completing the endurance event. 
 
Similarly, but not generating similar levels of immediate concern perhaps, 
the intermittent detailing of journeys via updates to social networking 
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platforms (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) provides similar mechanisms as the 
marathon App. onto which physical location and by inference, physical 
status, can be broadcast.  It is the act of emitting a spatial signal, if part 
of an expected series of location updates particularly, that may be 
transformed into a signal of health, safety and achievement.  For some 
audiences (e.g. family and friends) this the most important information 
sought, not whether the location of information transmission is actually 
worth visiting.  Problems could be signalled by an unexpected change in 
location, or a failure to update information after an expected period or 
journey. 
 
During the marathon, my spatial location was translated by the recipients 
of this information into a signal which acted as a stimulus for a set of 
human emotions e.g. concern.  However I would also argue more widely 
that the potential for quasi-continuous information updates may in itself 
be a cause of concern.  In this case, having a desire to know of current 
‘status’ is present solely because it is possible to obtain, not because there 
is inherent danger or problems expected.  For those waiting on news of 
travelling family or friends, before the widespread penetration of App.-
enabled status updates, waiting for a postcard or a phone call once a 
week often at a scheduled time were possibly the only opportunities for 
such concerns to arise. Thus  before the ‘personal coded space’ era, 
anxiety over the status of others was not something that could be 
expressed or assuaged by action, as it can via the network of connectivity 
provided by modern ICT. 
 
Discussion: The marathon as a performance space 
During the marathon, my space comprised my route and the totality of all 
other environmental variables that assailed me.  In addition, I essentially 
created another coded space, the one I inhabited whilst being tracked by 
my phone’s GPS signal.  My space was an event, something I was 
creating as I moved along; just as the marathon event itself created the 
(strangely) unique space New York was for that day (cf Doel, 1999).  My 
audience’s spaces were also transmuted into coded spaces, for it was 
web-hosted software that allowed them to ‘observe’ me during the race.  
This audience space also became part of my space during the event, as I 
felt they were ‘there’.  The space that was my NYC was occupied in some 
part by them also.  My audience were experiencing NYC vicariously, 
invited onto the streets by my ‘performance’ (Rose, 1999). 
 
As in combat simulation video games the increasingly accurate rendering 
of digital landscapes promotes a reduction in the distance between player 
and game, creating intimacy and an immersion in the virtual reality.  The 
military personnel controlling remotely operated armed drones on today’s 
battlefields achieve an intimacy with the physically very distant that is 
traumatically real (Gregory, pers comm. 2011).  The visibility of targeting 
in military operations has changed and moved from the blind to the 
visible across a modified space, due to sensor and communication 
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networks. Similarly, spatial information signals allowed my ‘audience’ to 
vicariously share in my experiences, to position themselves closer to me. 
In their case, separation became shortened somewhat to the distance of 
the screen onto which my location was appearing.  For the subject of 
voluntary tracking (i.e. the marathon participant) the audience is also an 
intimate mental companion.  Separation from the audience is not 
metaphysically measurable but comprises an almost haunting ethereal 
immediacy. 
 
Coded spaces and their modification of space 
As exemplified by this example, the world is increasingly populated, and I 
would ague our experience of it modified, by ‘coded spaces’ (Kitchin and 
Dodge, 2011). Cellular telecommunication networks facilitate increasingly 
diverse formats of digital communication between connected devices.  
High penetration rates of mass produced ‘smartphones’ also offer rich 
data-transfer services to all sections of society relatively cheaply.  The 
variety of communication tools (e.g. SMS and Multimedia messaging, 
social networking) increase our usage and expectations of the ubiquity 
and quality of on-demand, rapid communication with other mobile and 
non-mobile devices e.g. PCs.    
 
Practically all places seem within the reach of a cellular/mobile phone 
network.  The high levels of market penetration by such phones and the 
almost complete coverage of space by the information transmission 
network permit the expectation of never falling ‘out of contact’.  This can 
now redefine ‘wilderness’ as a place beyond network reach.  According to 
an off-road vehicle manufacturer’s marketing campaign in 2011, finding 
such a location is the justification for exploring ‘off-road’.  These spaces 
are now only found in the most hard to reach, secluded locations.  The 
goal of the ‘off-road’ exploration is to thus to locate a refuge away from 
invasive modern communication streams.  This, according to the 
advertisement brings the desired opportunity to peacefully spend time 
with ones’ immediate group (also in the spacious vehicle alongside 
voluminous camping gear of course!).  Only when outside network 
coverage can peace and tranquillity be assured i.e. without any 
interruption.   
 
What does this mean in terms human independence and quality of life?  
Is it of benefit to our ‘well-being’ to reduce the number of locations 
outside the possibility of unwanted contact, because of a cellular 
network?  For example, such a world of potentially ‘perpetual contact’ 
(Katz and Aakhus, 2002) removes the possibility of ‘quiet’ time from 
those of whom constant connectivity is being demanded e.g. travelling 
employees.  The hermit’s goal of being deliberately and unalterably 
‘unreachable’ due to geographic isolation is rapidly becoming one that is 
harder to achieve.  It is a concept relegated to a pre-networked world.  
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However, providing a network does not automatically require contact to 
be availed of; after all, any telephone, ‘smart’ or not, can be switched off.  
However for the current generation, connectivity may now exist as an 
expectation in a world experience that has known nothing else.  Constant 
connectivity does not need to be availed of; but habit will probably 
dictate that it is.  To current and future generations in particular it denies 
an opportunity to experience places and events independently of others.  
It possibly precludes opportunities to experience isolation and decision 
making without recourse to the viewpoint of others, thus forgoing a 
significant maturation process and part of the long-term reward of travel.   
 
Coding concern 
However, over an above these dystopian opinions, I argue that the mere 
expectation of connectivity and ‘contactability’ has a meaning that is 
independent of any actual contact.  Critically, the ubiquity of possible 
contact mechanisms and media also now mean that contact is ‘expected’.  
This then raises the issue of how to interpret periods of non-contact.  Is 
lack of contact a signal in itself, or in some situations interpretable as an 
indication of distress?  This inference will be especially relevant when 
undertaking a relatively dangerous pursuit e.g. a marathon or when 
located in an apparently hazardous location. 
 
Major changes in global interpersonal connectivity and its meaning are 
being facilitated by information and communications technology (ICT) 
and the software applications being written to make use of the 
infrastructure and our access to it.   My experiences of using GPS during 
participation in the 2011 New York City (NYC) marathon exemplifies 
how ICT and its attendant software applications are shrinking the 
experiential distance between two personally connected groups of event 
participants (runners and supporters).  As a technology the GPS enabled 
personal device is shortening the distance between an audience and the 
spectacle (the runner).  The distance between ‘connected’ parties is now 
no more than the distance to the screen onto which the spatial location 
information is cast. The distance between runner and spectator is 
metaphysically reduced, as has been the distance between soldier and 
target through the use of remotely operated, visually guided armaments 
(Gregory, 2011).  The sense of contact and participation in the journey 
being undertaken is heightened in the observer.  The technology enables 
a new level of concern to be created.  The possibility of receiving more 
information creates new desires to obtain this information. 
 
It is proposed that contact between the observer and the observed in the 
form of spatial position updates may be translated into information about 
physical ‘well being’.  In a wider context, it is considered that ICT is 
revolutionising both the means and meaning of contact between 
migratory individuals and a connected ‘audience’ or concerned 
constituency.  In any situations where physical well-being might be a 
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cause for concern, use of the traveller’s coded space is increasingly a 
means of assessing their well being.  
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